Rat u Ukrajini

Filipenko wrote:Koliko ja vidim, jedini ostrasceni ovde ste vi slavoukrajinasi. 

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:

 Ne tera te svakednevnica na to da se opredelis i ostrastis, ali stvar je lepog domaceg vaspitanja biti na strani Ukrajine i takozvanog kolektivnog zapada a protiv Rusije.

Летећи Полип wrote:

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:

 Ne tera te svakednevnica na to da se opredelis i ostrastis, ali stvar je lepog domaceg vaspitanja biti na strani Ukrajine i takozvanog kolektivnog zapada a protiv Rusije.

Fino vaspitanje, ili to što želimo Rusiju što dalje od svoje avlije?

Russian media publish a video of "restored traffic" on the Kerch Bridge: only one lane, only several cars are allowed at one time at minimal speed. pic.twitter.com/Jb6SCb8wPL

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) July 18, 2023

Despite the support issues on the displaced section on the Kerch Bridge, Russian authorities have allowed partial traffic to resume.

Some sort of ramp or elevated covering was placed down to allow traffic to resume. This is totally not safe. pic.twitter.com/vdDQRcEfxj

— Global: Military-Info (@Global_Mil_Info) July 18, 2023

https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1681240456754077697
Franz-Stefan Gady
@HoansSolo

New🧵: @konrad_muzyka, @RALee85, @KofmanMichael,& I spent some time this month visiting the frontlines in Ukraine to gain new insights into the ongoing counteroffensive & the war overall. Here are some general observations.
11:52 AM · Jul 18, 2023

(Note: More detailed analysis will be coming out by all of us in the coming weeks.)

First off, we spoke to NCOs, officers, a number of brigade commanders (national guard & regular army) in the field plus senior intel & defense officials in Kyiv (alongside @DAlperovitch).

Counteroffensive:
1.) By and large this is an infantryman’s fight (squad, platoon & company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications: 1st: Progress is measured by yards/meters and not km/miles given reduced mobility.

2nd: Mechanized formations are rarely deployed due to lack of enablers for maneuver. This includes insufficient quantities of de-mining equipment, air defenses, ATGMs etc.

2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense & IMO is the main cause for slow progress.

3.) forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver.

4.) Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space & slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is s inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale.

Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe.

5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses.

Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks & months.

6.) There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR coverage.

Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks.There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures. (This is important to keep in mind re. any potential tac. impact of delivery of ATACMs.)

Russian forces, even if severely degraded & lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon- or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated & synchronized along the broader frontline.

7.) Quality of Russian forces varies. Attrition is hitting them hard but they are defending their positions well, according to Ukrainians we spoke to. They have been quite adaptable at the tactical level and are broadly defending according to Soviet/Russian doctrine.

8.) Russian artillery rationing is real & happening. Ukraine has established fire superiority in tube artillery while Russia retains superiority in MRLSs in the South. Localized fire superiority in some calibers alone does not suffice, however, to break through Russian defenses.

9.) An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration.

Ukraine will have to better synchronize & adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tac. decisive in the long run. This is happening  but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the s IMO).

10.) The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed & will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire & maneuver at scale.

(Again, I cannot emphasize enough how difficult this is to pull off in wartime.)

Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality. E.g., some Ukrainian assaults were stopped by Russian ATGMs even before reaching the 1st minefield.

11.) There is a dearth of artillery barrels that is difficult to address given production rates and delivery timelines.

12.) So far Ukraine’s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these  direct assaults are not mere probing attacks.

13.) There is evidence of tactical cyber operations supporting closing of kinetic kill-chains. That is cyber ISR contributing to identifying & tracking targets on the battlefield. Starlink remains absolutely key for Ukrainian C2.

14.) Quality of Ukrainian officers and NCOs we met appears excellent & morale remains high. However, there are some force quality issues emerging with less able bodied & older men called up for service now.

15.) The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal & is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting & exercising command on the frontline.

16.) It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition & hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. (Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains.)

But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination btw. units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. & ...Russians putting up stiff resistance.

rumbeando wrote:Pušten drumski saobraćaj preko mosta, ide jednom trakom naizmenično. Deluje kao dosta veliko kockanje s bezbednošću.

New #satelliteimagery collected this morning, July 17, 2023, of the #KerchStrait showing new damage to the #Crimea Bridge which connects Crimea to Russia’s mainland. The damaged section of the bridge is located at 45.246, 36.587. pic.twitter.com/5kVT0a0FRO

— Maxar Technologies (@Maxar) July 17, 2023

Breakthrough at EU-Latin America summit: The 27 EU states and 32 out of 33 CELAC countries (without Nicaragua) agree on a summit statement.

They condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the global consequences such as for food security. Important diplomatic success for the EU. pic.twitter.com/t6WTgQWjnd

— Hans von der Burchard (@vonderburchard) July 18, 2023

"Today it is Ukraine, but tomorrow it could be any of us." Chilean President Gabriel Boric with an impassioned speech at the #EUCELAC Summit in Brussels today. With English subtitles: pic.twitter.com/E0rOE9VOyB

— Benjamin Alvarez (@BenjAlvarez1) July 18, 2023

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:

Ne tera te svakednevnica na to da se opredelis i ostrastis, ali stvar je lepog domaceg vaspitanja biti na strani Ukrajine i takozvanog kolektivnog zapada a protiv Rusije.

Sotir wrote:

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:

Врхстра, нови нивои лудила.

- Зашто сте ви за неку страну у сукобу?
- Верски
- Национални
- -филства свих врста
- и на крају, због лепог васпитања   

Свима им је заједничко да у одговору нема ни а од аргумената. Иста срања, друга паковања.

Mór Thököly wrote:Prvi full scale osvajacki rat u Evropi posle WW2.

Mór Thököly wrote:Prvi full scale osvajacki rat u Evropi posle WW2.

Летећи Полип wrote:

Mór Thököly wrote:Prvi full scale osvajacki rat u Evropi posle WW2.

Kad ne bi bilo Kipra.