jugoslavija - od nemila do nedraga

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:Pročačkaj malo internet u vezi Vanje Špiljka. Djureković je ubijen po nalogu Mike Špiljka, jer je pisao o malverzacijama u INI, i spominjao je baš Vanju koji je tada bio jedan od rukovodilaca. Djureković je ubijen 1983, a Vanja je nastavio sa malverzacijama pa je 1987 pokrenuta istraga i Vanja je morao da ode iz INE u Švajcarsku. Interesantna koincidencija je da je te godine pod misterioznim okolnostima stradao Djurekovićev sin u Kanadi. Btw, osamdesetih je i Miša Broz bio rukovodilac u INI, ali o njemu nema indicija da je krao.

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:Pročačkaj malo internet u vezi Vanje Špiljka. Djureković je ubijen po nalogu Mike Špiljka, jer je pisao o malverzacijama u INI, i spominjao je baš Vanju koji je tada bio jedan od rukovodilaca. Djureković je ubijen 1983, a Vanja je nastavio sa malverzacijama pa je 1987 pokrenuta istraga i Vanja je morao da ode iz INE u Švajcarsku. Interesantna koincidencija je da je te godine pod misterioznim okolnostima stradao Djurekovićev sin u Kanadi. Btw, osamdesetih je i Miša Broz bio rukovodilac u INI, ali o njemu nema indicija da je krao.

fikret hadžiabdić wrote:
Ima toga još ali ove dvije epizode izdvajam jer me podsjećaju na jugoslovenska vremena nestašica. Kako bi bilo dobro da poput ovih ruskih neko napravi ozbiljnu dokumentarnu seriju koja bi se bavila sličnim pojavama u SFRJ vremena. Npr. kako šefovi prodavnica štekuju robu i čekaju da inflacija pojede vrijednost cijene pod kojom je uknjižena. Kako su se pojavili lovci na stare cijene, šverc ture iz Trsta, direktorima raznih Agrokomerca, šverc bonovima za gorivo i sl.

Јанош Винету wrote:То се и дан данас ради али капитализам је томе стао на реп. Типа продаја бакарних жица, крађа расходованих бандера или повезани отпади који имају тапију на метални градски мобилијар, рестлови државних фирми који и даље могу да краду нешто итд.

Раније је то било јако заступљено, поготово 80их и почетком 90их, до краја 90их је већ све то приватизовано и даљег поткрадања нема.
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disident wrote:
Imam osecaj da ce ti se svideti

fikret hadžiabdić wrote:To otprilike u isto vrijeme kreće i kod nas i u CCCP, kod njih je otišlo predaleko već u drugoj polovini vladavine Brežnjeva. Ono što je meni interesantno je to da su tamo ozbiljne pare uspijevali da uzmu obični radnici, ne samo mesari i radnici alko zavoda. Sjećam se kako je u nekoj emisiji Bogolljub Lacmanović ispričao kako i koliko je zarađivao čuvar parkinga za strane novinare i diplomate u Moskvi. Kontakti sa strancima početkom osamdesetih su mu omogućili da na razne načine, nepojmljive u drugoj zemlji i vremenu, zarađuje. toliko da čak i kad udijeli procenat svima koje sleduje, a svi su viši od njega u hijerarhiji, njemu ostaje gomila novca.

U Jugoslaviju su ozbiljne novce na muljanju ipak uzimali direktori, šefovi i partijci. Radnici malo teže. Radnik je mogao da ukrade nešto iz preduzeća, alatku, manju mašinu, rezervne dijelove, elektro ili građevinski materijal, da se upusti u šverc ture... za ozbiljne kombincije moraš da budeš bar šef u nekom jačem preduzeću.

Ima FTV dokumentarac o Agrokomercu ali nema puno o načinu Fikretovog rada, uglavnom se priča o političkim uzrocima i posledicama afere. A mene zanima način i metode direktoskih šema, konkretni primjeri. I ne samo direktorskih, treba da se obradi i ono na nižim nivoima, nešto poput filma Tigar u kom vozači hladnjače Slavko Štimac i Ljubiša Samardžić kradu meso muljajući sa vaganjem kamiona na utovaru i istovaru, krađa bakarne žice u Čovek nije tica i sl. Čitavo blago se krije tu ali znam da to nikad niko neće da napravi, uostalom, sad je već i nebitno. Hoću samo da napišem šta mi se gleda a znam da neću biti u prilici. Utješna varijanta su mi ove ruske serije, slične a ni nalik, dobre i zanimljive.

boomer crook wrote:hm ne mogu da pronadjem ono o miri, kundaku i indiji.

Mór Thököly wrote:Bolje ovde

Janko Suvar wrote:View se racuna ako je neko gledao trideset sekundi, tako da to nije neobicno, verovatno je vecina samo otvorila video, a logicno je da je otvorila prvo prvi, odnosno samo prvi.

http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0350-7653/2020/0350-76532051235V.pdf

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At a meeting of the Presidency of the LCY held on 31 October 1968 to discuss constitutional changes, the most influential Slovenian communist Edvard Kardelj stated that “the position of the Kosovo Albanians, given their large number and compactness, cannot be compared with that of the other national minorities in the world.” He added that small national minorities, such as the Italian minority in Istria, could not have the right to self-determination, but that the “Kosovo situation is different” and as such warranted the question of “whether Kosovo should be a part of Yugoslavia or of Albania”. Kardelj went on to propose a thawing of relations with Albania and removing the existing border between Kosovo and Metohija and Albania: “We must strive for changing inter- national relations in the Balkans, establishing friendly relations with Albania, removing borders in their current form, and creating a different climate to make this border an administrative demarcation line rather than a border splitting a single nation.”5

At the meeting, the leader of the League of Communists of Croatia, Vladimir Bakarić, said that the idea of Kosovo’s autonomy had emerged in 1944 as a sort of recompense for the fact that, due to the international situation, this territory could not be incorporated into Albania. Bakarić concluded that the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija needed to be strengthened to make the unification of Albanians a feasible long-term goal: “I believe that the autonomy needs to be developed to make the local Albanian population an active centre for the evolution of the Albanian nation with a prospect of further integration with the Albanians of Albania. To that end, we need to promote brotherhood and unity and regulate the settlement dynamic of Kosmet.”6 Serbian party officials did not oppose Kardelj’s and Bakarić’s proposals aimed at the Albanization of Kosovo. Having ousted Ranković, Broz put the leadership of Serbia in an inferior position to the other republic-level leaderships, and the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS) even lost authority over the party organizations of Kosovo and Metohija and Vojvodina despite their formally being part of LCS.

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According to the testimony of Enver Hoxha’s wife Nexhmije Hoxha, in the second half of the 1960s, the leadership of Kosovo and Metohija intimated to Tirana that the closest possible relations between Albania and the province should be established “while Tito was still alive” and that the status of the Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia after his death was uncertain. Nexhmije Hoxha also said that, regardless of his unwavering fight against Titoism, Enver Hoxha had been aware of the political benefit which Tito’s regime had brought to the Kosovo Albanians: “Enver judged that, as a Croatian nationalist, Tito was very interested in using the Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia as a counterbalance to the Serbs.”45 According to this statement, in the late 1960s, Tirana became aware to a certain extent that the Yugoslav political leadership was using the autonomy of Kosovo as a leverage to weaken Serbia. 
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The establishment of direct political relations between Priština and Tirana led to the temporary suspension of Albania’s anti-Yugoslav campaign in the autumn of 1968, at the time when the constitutional changes that would bolster the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija were being prepared. According to the findings of the historian Ana Lalaj, Enver Hoxha’s easing of anti-Yugoslav propaganda in the second half of 1968 was the result of Fadil Hoxha’s direct intervention. He had informed Enver Hoxha that constitutional amendments that would bolster the autonomy of Kosovo were being planned and that Tirana’s anti-Yugoslav statements could hamper this process. As a result, Albania temporarily stopped its attacks on Tito and Yugoslavia.

A useful source for understanding the relations between Albania and the Kosovo leadership in the late 1960s is the minutes of the conversation of Enver Hoxha with Rexhep Duraku, who headed a delegation of family members of Albanian WWII People’s Heroes from Kosovo in early March 1969. At the beginning of the meeting, Enver Hoxha warned his interlocutor that Tito did not genuinely want to make concessions to Kosovo Albanians but that he had been “forced” to do so.65 Speaking of Broz with disdain, the Albanian leader showed strong personal sympathy towards Fadil Hoxha, the most influential Albanian official in Yugoslavia. Enver said that he had worked with many incumbent Kosovo officials before the Second World War in Albania and that, out of all of them, he “only trusted Fadil”. This was explained by the view that “Fadil Hoxha loved the people of Kosovo” and that “the people of Kosovo loved him”. He added that Fadil Hoxha and he had a common goal: that “the people of Kosovo should win.”

Enver Hoxha said that he was aware of the peculiar position of the Kosovo leadership, which could not publicly criticize Tito like the regime in Tirana was doing. He even said that he “had not been angry” even when Fadil Hoxha criticized him at some conference because he “understood his position”.67 

Rexhep Duraku promised to pass on all of this to Fadil and then asked the Albanian leader for help in procuring armaments: “Things are looking up but one thing is missing. It’s the armament problem. We have no idea how things will unfold in the future and we have no weapons.” Enver replied that this would be “rectified” and that the German and Italian fascists had also seemed “indestructible” but had been ultimately defeated.68 It is unclear if Rexhep Duraku mentioned “the armament problem” to Enver Hoxha of his own accord or if he was conveying a message of the provincial leadership in Priština.
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Mór Thököly wrote:recompense for the fact that, due to the international situation, this territory could not be incorporated into Albania