Rat u Ukrajini

A Delicate Pact Was Forged to Get Ukraine More Tanks
Germany has the tanks that Ukraine needs, but it wouldn’t send them without a certain agreement from the U.S.
By Fred Kaplan
Jan 25, 20232:37 PM


President Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz cut a deal on Tuesday: Biden agreed to send Ukraine some Abrams M1 tanks; in response, Scholz agreed to send Ukraine some of its Leopard 2 tanks—and to let several European allies send Ukraine some of their Leopards, bought from Germany, as well.

Scholz had resisted sending Leopards, fearful of alienating constituents or provoking Russia into escalating the war further. He had demanded that the United States send some of its main battle tanks as a precondition.

Now the terms have been agreed upon: The U.S. will send 31 tanks, enough to fill a single Ukrainian tank battalion—a substantial but not enormous number—and those will arrive not in weeks, but in several months, and possibly not for another year.

This is because the tanks will be ordered from the General Dynamics factory, which will have to build them from scratch, and will not be drawn from America’s existing stockpile, though the U.S. Army has about 4,400 Abrams tanks, many of them already in Europe.

I could not get a straight answer when I asked officials why they decided not to take 31 tanks from American stocks and later replace them with newly produced tanks. If they were to do so, the tanks would have to be modified—export versions of the Abrams don’t have all the high-tech features of those built for the U.S. Army—but that would take less time than building completely new vehicles.

Until today, officials in the Pentagon and the White House had opposed sending any M1s, saying the tanks were too complex—too prone to breaking down and too dependent on staggering supply lines, especially when it comes to refueling—for the Ukrainians to operate, maintain, and sustain. As recently as Friday, a White House official told me the administration wasn’t sending M1s because it was pointless to send weapons that the Ukrainians couldn’t use.

These officials haven’t changed their minds on this question. Many in the Pentagon still insist that the Abrams is not suitable for the war in Ukraine. However, Biden decided, and many top advisers agreed, that he had to send some M1s in order to prod Scholz into sending Leopards. A few outside advisers had suggested sending a handful of M1s, just for show. However, officials, including those opposed to sending any tanks, thought that this would be worse than nothing: a too-transparent sign that the shipment was merely symbolic. So the compromise was for the U.S. to send just enough to make a tangible difference to the fight—hence, enough for a Ukrainian tank battalion.

It is unclear how tangible a difference they will make. At a background briefing Wednesday morning, a senior administration official said that the Abrams tanks’ main purpose will be “to boost Ukraine’s long-term defenses,” emphasizing the phrase “long-term,” and adding that they would enhance Ukraine’s security for the “months and years to come.” By contrast, the official said, the Leopards, provided by Germany and other European countries, would cover Ukraine’s “short-term” defense needs. Some of these tanks will arrive in Ukraine in as soon as a few weeks.

Scholz announced that Germany would send 14 Leopard tanks right away, as a first step. In all, Germany and other European countries—including Poland, Spain, Norway, Finland, and possibly others—will send about 80 tanks, enough for two battalions plus some. Britain has also agreed to send 14 of its Challenger tanks, which are similar to the Abrams and the Leopard. The U.S. and the Netherlands are together sending 90 refurbished Soviet-built T-72 tanks, similar to those that Ukraine—a former Soviet republic—has been using.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who expressed gratitude to the Western leaders for their decision, has said he needs 300 Western tanks to mount an effective counteroffensive against Russian troops and thus regain Ukrainian territory that Russians have captured. It is unclear how he came to the number 300—or how the Western nations calculated the number of tanks they would send. There are disagreements, even among officials tracking the battle, about precisely what, and how much, Ukraine needs. One defense analyst also told me, “There is a gap between what Ukrainian officials say they want publicly, what their military says they need privately, and what the U.S. assesses is a priority for them.”

Retired Army Gen. David Petraeus told me in an email that one or two battalions’ worth of modern Western tanks may not seem to be a lot, but, he added, “Having seen what a small number of great tanks with skilled soldiers can do in combat, it is significant,” especially if combined with infantry, engineers, air defense, electronic warfare, artillery, and drones. M1s and Leopard 2s are “really hard to take out without a sophisticated ATGM [anti-tank guided missile] or skilled tank crew,” he said.

In a televised noontime announcement on Wednesday, Biden said Ukrainians would begin training on Abrams tanks “as soon as possible,” so they would be ready to use them upon delivery. This suggests that some of their troops will train on M1s that are already deployed, perhaps in Germany, though this wasn’t spelled out.

Biden began his announcement on Wednesday by noting that “Germany has really stepped up” in meeting its defense commitments. (It ranks second only to the U.S. in economic and military aid to Ukraine.) He also praised Scholz personally as a “strong, strong force for unity” within the Western alliance. This is what the agreement to send Abrams tanks is really about—touting Scholz publicly as a reward for doing something he was very reluctant to do. It is also meant to preserve the political unity of NATO and the 50-member Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which has held together much longer, and much more firmly, than many had predicted at the start of the war 11 months ago—but which Germany’s refusal to send Leopards was threatening to disrupt.

Mór Thököly wrote:

MNE wrote:
ni ta proruska vlast nije bila baš proruska, koliko se sjećam bilo je dosta trvenja sa Kremljom oko svačega i tokom devedesetih i tokom dvijehiljaditih

Ih, pa nije ni sa 1 Lukasenkom bilo skroz bez problema. 

Ali...

Blinken ponders the post-Ukraine-war order
By David Ignatius

January 24, 2023 at 5:48 p.m. EST


The Biden administration, convinced that Vladimir Putin has failed in his attempt to erase Ukraine, has begun planning for an eventual postwar military balance that will help Kyiv deter any repetition of Russia’s brutal invasion.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined his strategy for the Ukrainian endgame and postwar deterrence during an interview on Monday at the State Department. The conversation offered an unusual exploration of some of the trickiest issues surrounding resolution of a Ukraine conflict that has threatened the global order.

Blinken explicitly commended Germany’s military backing for Ukraine at a time when Berlin is getting hammered by some other NATO allies for not providing Leopard tanks quickly to Kyiv. “Nobody would have predicted the extent of Germany’s military support” when the war began, Blinken said. “This is a sea change we should recognize.”

He also underlined President Biden’s determination to avoid direct military conflict with Russia, even as U.S. weapons help pulverize Putin’s invasion force. “Biden has always been emphatic that one of his requirements in Ukraine is that there be no World War III,” Blinken said.

Russia’s colossal failure to achieve its military goals, Blinken believes, should now spur the United States and its allies to begin thinking about the shape of postwar Ukraine — and how to create a just and durable peace that upholds Ukraine’s territorial integrity and allows it to deter and, if necessary, defend against any future aggression. In other words, Russia should not be able to rest, regroup and reattack.

Blinken’s deterrence framework is somewhat different from last year’s discussions with Kyiv about security guarantees similar to NATO’s Article 5. Rather than such a formal treaty pledge, some U.S. officials increasingly believe the key is to give Ukraine the tools it needs to defend itself. Security will be ensured by potent weapons systems — especially armor and air defense — along with a strong, noncorrupt economy and membership in the European Union.

The Pentagon’s current stress on providing Kyiv with weapons and training for maneuver warfare reflects this long-term goal of deterrence. “The importance of maneuver weapons isn’t just to give Ukraine strength now to regain territory but as a deterrent against future Russian attacks,” explained a State Department official familiar with Blinken’s thinking. “Maneuver is the future.”

The conversation with Blinken offered some hints about the intense discussions that have gone on for months within the administration about how the war in Ukraine can be ended and future peace maintained. The administration’s standard formula is that all decisions must ultimately be made by Ukraine, and Blinken reiterated that line. He also backs Ukraine’s desire for significant battlefield gains this year. But the State Department, Pentagon and National Security Council are also thinking ahead.

Crimea is a particular point of discussion. There is a widespread view in Washington and Kyiv that regaining Crimea by military force may be impossible. Any Ukrainian military advances this year in Zaporizhzhia oblast, the land bridge that connects Crimea and Russia, could threaten Russian control. But an all-out Ukrainian campaign to seize the Crimean Peninsula is unrealistic, many U.S. and Ukrainian officials believe. That’s partly because Putin has indicated that an assault on Crimea would be a tripwire for nuclear escalation.

The administration shares Ukraine’s insistence that Crimea, which was seized by Russia in 2014, must eventually be returned. But in the short run, what’s crucial for Kyiv is that Crimea no longer serve as a base for attacks against Ukraine. One formula that interests me would be a demilitarized status, with questions of final political control deferred. Ukrainian officials told me last year that they had discussed such possibilities with the administration.

As Blinken weighs options in Ukraine, he has been less worried about escalation risks than some observers. That’s partly because he believes Russia is checked by NATO’s overwhelming power. “Putin continues to hold some things in reserve because of his misplaced fear that NATO might attack Russia,” explained the official familiar with Blinken’s thinking. This Russian reserve force includes strategic bombers, certain precision-guided weapons and, of course, tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

Blinken’s refusal to criticize Germany on the issue of releasing Leopard tanks illustrates what has been more than a year of alliance management to keep the pro-Ukraine coalition from fracturing. Blinken has logged hundreds of hours — on the phone, in video meetings and in trips abroad — to keep this coalition intact.

This cohesiveness will become even more important as the Ukraine war moves toward an endgame. This year, Ukraine and its allies will keep fighting to expel Russian invaders. But as in the final years of World War II, planning has already begun for the postwar order — and construction of a system of military and political alliances that can restore and maintain the peace that Russia shattered.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/24/blinken-ponders-post-ukraine-war-order/