jugoslavija - od nemila do nedraga

Zuper wrote:Sluzba se po nemackoj nije samo obracunavala sa ustasama.
Minhen je bio centar ljoticevske emigracije, mislim da je tamo stampana 'Iskra'.
Na njih je sluzba imala poseban pik jer su imali dobre kontakte u nemackoj drzavi, bili su uglavnom dobro obrazovani i cak jako bogati(kao onaj Lunjevica, ako se dobro secam prezimena, na NZ sto je bio vodja omladine ZBOR pre 1941, koji je opako progonio SKOJ-evce po BG tridesetih, o cemu svedoci Vlado Dapcevic) za razliku od cetnicke emigracije koja je svuda bila debilna.

bruno sulak wrote:zar nisu bas kod nemaca bili ustaski regrutni centri?

шумидер-модер wrote:

Zuper wrote:Sluzba se po nemackoj nije samo obracunavala sa ustasama.
Minhen je bio centar ljoticevske emigracije, mislim da je tamo stampana 'Iskra'.
Na njih je sluzba imala poseban pik jer su imali dobre kontakte u nemackoj drzavi, bili su uglavnom dobro obrazovani i cak jako bogati(kao onaj Lunjevica, ako se dobro secam prezimena, na NZ sto je bio vodja omladine ZBOR pre 1941, koji je opako progonio SKOJ-evce po BG tridesetih, o cemu svedoci Vlado Dapcevic) za razliku od cetnicke emigracije koja je svuda bila debilna.

Див јунака Марисава су се ипак докопали, мало касно додуше, али боље икад него никад...


Иначе, чудно је да нико од данашњих младих истраживача не узме да обради ликвидације и покушаје ликвидација са све пратећим скандалима по разним иностранствима које је обављала полиција Краљевине Југославије.
И то искључиво припадника усташке емиграције, будући да на комунисте није важио ловостај, њих су скењавали и у земљи...

Иначе, мислим да грешиш за Ђурековића: обична, додуше повећа лопурда коју су Немци изабрали за показну вежбу гледе демонстрације истеривања правде чак и после дуго времена.
Да су, наиме, потегли случај неког другог, правог политичлог емигранта, испливале би њихове везе са потпомагањем усташких група и пратећег тероризма, а то данас није мода.
Овако, са Ђурековићем, демонстрација им изашла јефтина, а они само поштоваоци закона и стандарда правне државе.

паће wrote:

bruno sulak wrote:zar nisu bas kod nemaca bili ustaski regrutni centri?

Па не баш, један део је био и у Аустрији и нешто у Аустралији.

шумидер-модер wrote:А иначе, што се помињаног BND-а тиче:






Чудно је да се правде и права толико жељни Немци не досете еволуције горе приказаног нацисте по имену Rienhard Gehlen, Адолфовог генерал-мајора, па главе CIA немачког ООУР-а познате као Gehlen Organization, да би 1956. постао глава BND и то остао до 1956.
Додуше, као важан и незаменљив експерт за Исток, био Хладни рат, тешка времена јебига...
Са све у BND-у окупљених камарада које из Wehrmacht-а, а још више из SS-а...

И као допринос једном од крунских доказа оправданости постојања Југославије: довољно је само видети каква су се говна, од лошег оца и још горе мајке, трудила да је сјебу...

Zuper wrote:KPJ je obilato koristila ljoticevce u zarobljenistvo kod krize IB.
Malo se to zna u istoriji Srbije i Jugoslavije ali puno pamfleta protiv Staljina kod IB krize su pisali ljoticevci po KPD.

Koliko ja znam, Djurekovic je bio bnd i zbog toga su se nemci izvljavali nad svojom kolonijom hrvatskom da se isporuce obavestajne glavesine.
Moze im se ali jasno da nisu zaboravili sta su udb-a kadrovi radili po Nemackoj cak i kada su postali njihovi saveznici od devedesetih.

Lazar Prokić, Šef operativne službe Državne propagande u vladi generala Nedića
Lazar Prokić rodjen je 6. juna 1911, u selu Žabare u okrugu Požarevačkom. Osnovnu školu završio je u Velikom Orašju i Markovcu, a gimnaziju u Svilajncu. Maturirao je u Prvoj muškoj gimnaziji u Beogradu, gde je upisao prava, ali posle godinu dana odlazi u Pariz.
Skoluje se i radi kao fizički radnik u Parizu, ali, bez obzira na velike napore, uspeva da diplomira 1936. na Pravnom fakultetu u Parizu. Po izbijanju Spanskog gradjanskog rata, budući da je bio simpatizer španskih nacionalista, Riverinih falangista i snaga generala Franka, javno vodi diskusije, zbog čega mu Francuska otkazuje gostoprimstvo.
Dolazi u Beograd i 1938. radi u redakciji lista Milana Stojadinovića Samouprava. S obzirom na njegovu ideološku opredeljenost, ne dobija mogućnost da se zaposli na Univerzitetu, a zbog skromnog socijalnog statusa ne uspeva da se ukkjuči u politicki život. Bavljenje diplomattjom mu se takodde uskraćuje i zbog toga se posvećuje publicistici. Bezuspešno osniva svoje listove Slgnal i Nova zora koje je izdavao tokom 1940. godine. Kada je Nemačka odlučila da se suprostavi obaveštajnom radu Engleske u kraljevini Jugoslaviji, formiran je centar RSHA za Jugoslaviju. SS major Karl Kaus je uz pomoć Lazara Prokića, Dušana Pantića i pukovnika Tase Dinića parirao radu Inteligence servisa.
Krajem 1940. vlast ga hapsi i upućuje u zatvor Glavnjača u vreme velikog progona nacionalista koji su se suprostavljali komunističkoj inflitraciji na Univerzitetu. Pošto je tada bilo mnogo žestokih okrššaa, mahom izmeddu pristalica ZBOR-a i komunista, Lazar Prokić svojim pisanjem protiv vlade uspeva da navuče gnev kako komunista tako i Vlade C vetković-Maček.
Po izlasku iz zatvora postaje glavni urednik Samouprave gde je dočekao 27. mart 1941. Iako veliki neprijatelj levice i Simovićeve vlade, Lazar Prokić je bez većih posledica prošao kroz te dane i dočekao Aprilski rat i nemačku okupaciju. Za vreme vlade generala Milana Nedića, Lazar Prokić postaje šef operativne službe Državne propagande protiv aktivnosti Komunističke partite. U toku 1943. odlazi u Berlin u funkciji specijalne državne misije. U toku svojih mnogobrojnih kontakata naaviše uspeha je imao u stvaranju čvrstog prijateljsta nemačkog Trećeg rajha i Srbije generala Nedića. Poznato je da je Lazar Prokić bio jedan od onih koji je izdejstvovao da višijevska Francuska ne prizna NDH. U svojim mnogobrojnim misijama Lazar Prokić je neumorno pisao. Iz ratnog perioda poznate su njegovi eseji o masoneriji i Jevrejima u Srbiji. Isttću se njegovi članci u novinama Novo vreme, Obnova, Srpski rad, a u Berlinu je pisao za Zarobljeničke novine koje su bile namenjene Srbima, zarobljenicima Aprilskog rata.
Početkom oktobra 1944, pred nadiranjem sovjetskih trupa u Srbiju, Lazar Prokić odlazi ilegalno u Švajcarsku, gde menja identitet i prelazi 1945. u Italiju. Anglo-američke snage hapse ga u Italiji 1945. i izručuju Jugoslaviji.
Na sudu, Prokić je osudjen na dvadeset godina robije i upućen u Sremsku Mitrovicu. Posle 15 godina kazna mu je smanjena i on početkom 1962. ilegalno napušta Jugoslaviju. Uspeva da izdejstvuje status političkog emigranta, s obzirom da je izjavio da je promenio predratne i ratne stavove.
Nastanjuje se u Saveznoj republici Nemačkoj. U pedesetoj godini života, Lazar Prokić počinje iz početka. Radio je kao saradnik jedne nemačke radio stanice u Majncu, a porodica mu se ubrzo pridružuje. Nastavio je da piše u emigrantskim listovima kao što je ljotićevska Iskra, ali i u Amerikanskom Srbobranu i Glasu kanadskih Srba, gde je zastupao desničarski stav. Zanimljivo je da je dosta članaka objavio u listovima hrvatske emigracije. U svim ttm tekstovima pseudonim Lazara Prokića je R.Oraski.

Др Лазар Прокић је током свог тамновања, осетио сву горчину робијашког живота, прошао је кроз све могуће самице и изолације, радио је најтеже физичке послове, комунистичка власт користила је његово знање врсног пропагандисте у пропагандном рату против Стаљина, као добар познавалац страних језика радио је и у преводилачкој групи др Данила Грегорића.

Увидевши квалитете и способност др Лазара Прокића, комунисти су желели да га придобију за себе, као човека од „пера“ али и неког ко се добро сналазио и у обавештајним водама. Тим поводом, негде почетком 1949, године Прокића је у затвору посетио Брана Јевремовић заменк министара унутрашњих послова. На његово упорно инсистирање да прихвати сарадњу, а да ће за узврат бити ослобођен, тако што ће му на поновљеном суђењу бити изречена казна која се поклапа са досадашњим временом проведеним у затвору, Прокић је категорички одбио такву понуду следећим речима:
– Целог свог мисаоног живота борио сам се против комунизма (чак и једну добру деценију са социјалистичких позиција!), па бих се стидео живота који би ми комунизам поклонио (ви се сећате, или сте из судских материјала видели: ја сам то изјавио и на вашем суду, и нисам се жалио на првобитну смртну пресуду). И најзад, жалосну част евентуалног вишег функционера савезничке обавештајне службе, ја не бих продао ни за један од више живота да их имам. Савезнике сам мрзео политички: увукли су моју земљу без њене потребе у рат са Немачком, а ослободивши је од ње изручили је вама – као и мене што су. Али вас, вас мрзим идеолошки: независно од ратова и њихових исхода! Разлика је „квалитативна“ (што би се рекло вашим жаргоном). Да се разумемо једном за свагда: ничији обавештајац нисам био (јер сам имао своје обавештајце) па ни савезнички; а и да јесам, не бих то издао – најмање вама.

Zuper wrote:Ne bih rekao da se zajebavam.
Rekao bih da je npr. solidan broj tekstova u "borbi" nakon izbijanje krize IB napisan u KPD Sremska Mitrovica od strane ljioticevaca.

...
‘Dark clouds are gathering above the multinational state of Yugoslavia… The continued existence of the (con)federation as a viable state seems to be hanging from a silk thread.’ This warning was sent to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague by the Dutch Ambassador in Belgrade, Albert Nooij, on July 23, 1990. Nooij had been given a new assignment and had just paid farewell visits to Croatian leaders in Zagreb and Serbian leaders in Belgrade. Two days earlier, Nooij had reported his conversation with Serbian Foreign Minister Dr Prlja. Quoting Prlja, Nooij had written: ‘Serbia will not let itself be forced by Slovenia and Croatia into a confederate governmental structure. Those republics will not succeed in pushing the always underprivileged Serbia down to its knees through economic means of coercion. Serbia has shown before that it can survive on its own and will do so, albeit with difficulty, in future. The Serbs are… pessimistic about the continued existence of a viable Yugoslavia.’

The difficult conversations with Serbian and Croatian politicians led Nooij to conclude that the differences between Serbia and Croatia ‘had deteriorated to the extent that there was in fact no longer a basis for a continued common existence’. He assessed that a possible scenario was the break-up of Yugoslavia into a confederacy encompassing Slovenia, Croatia and possibly (a part of) Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a greater Serbia encompassing the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Montenegro and possibly the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (It was unclear how Macedonia fitted into this.) Nooij explained that it was uncertain how this would come about. Serbian president Milosevic had  emphasised, Nooij continued, that in that case the borders between the republics would have to be revised – by force if need be – so that every Serb again lived in Serbia without, Nooij stressed, having to leave his present home in Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian President Tudjman would in that case probably want the same for ‘his’ Croats.

On August 18 the Embassy in Belgrade sent another warning to The Hague. Following the departure of Ambassador Nooij, the Chargé d’Affaires, Dirk Hasselman, was running the Embassy. Hasselman had been posted in Yugoslavia for nearly three years and was very pessimistic about its future. In his message he warned that the silk thread on which the survival of the Yugoslav federation was still hanging, was about to break. The three most important indications for this, according to Hasselman, constituted a strike by the Albanian community in Kosovo, a decision by Slovenia that its conscripts could no longer serve outside Slovenia and Croatia, and a referendum on independence among the Serbs in Croatia, which was to be held the next day. 

During the winter months of 1990, the Embassy temporarily moderated its alarmist stance. On October 3, the day of German reunification, it began to operate under a new Ambassador, Jan Fietelaars. Fietelaars had been prepared and briefed in The Hague. There, the atmosphere had been optimistic: a new European order was said to be coming about as a result of the end of the Cold War. Many Central and Eastern European countries would join up with the European Community, which was soon to become a full-blown economic and political union. Yugoslavia, Fietelaars had been told, would become a member state following a large financial injection to help it service its international debt. Moreover, Fietelaars had been prepared for his job in the classical way, obtaining much of his information from standard textbooks and the Yugoslav Embassy in The Hague, whose information was, however, unreliable, given that it was run by ‘a frightened Slovene who stuck precisely to the Communist party-line'.6 As a result, Ambassador Fietelaars initially underestimated the depth of the Yugoslav crisis and its potential for largescale violence.

While Hasselman disagreed with Fietelaars, the reporting from Belgrade temporarily sounded less gloomy than before. Thus, on October 19, following a meeting of all EC Ambassadors in Belgrade, Fietelaars sent an evaluation of recent developments. In its conclusion, which Fietelaars argued was shared by all the Ambassadors, he stated that the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration was reaching its final stage and that a long period of negotiations for a new form of cooperation between the Yugoslav republics was about to begin. He concluded: ‘Particularly at the start of these, the regression, the theatre and the violent incidents may continue to take place. But one can say that civil war and extreme violence remain unlikely.

Fietelaars’ more optimistic view may have influenced attitudes in The Hague, although it is impossible to know to what degree. If it did influence attitudes, its main effect would have been to confirm an already existing complacency and disinterest. In any case, Fietelaars soon realised that Hasselman’s pessimism was justified. ‘Within the space of three months he had completely converted me. His analyses and predictions were correct. So I began to think differently. By the end of December 1990/ early January 1991 I had come round and said: "something very nasty is going to happen here." And it was in that sense that we began to report.'7 One of the clearest hints of what was yet to come was given by President Milosevic himself in a lunch meeting with Ambassadors from the EC on January 16, 1991. According to the report from Belgrade, Milosevic had made it clear that if Yugoslavia were allowed to break up, Serbia would seek to carve out a new state for itself. This new state would not be restricted to the territory of the constituent republic of Serbia. Milosevic said that he was ready to let Slovenia go and that Macedonia was still under discussion. However, he wanted to be absolutely clear about the Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia: they would be part of the new state. He explicitly warned the Ambassadors: ‘If this is not attainable peacefully, one forces Serbia to use the tools of power which we possess, but they [the other republics] do not.’ As the crisis developed into a war, Fietelaars understandably became an outspoken advocate of a forceful international intervention, including a military component, against Serbia and the Yugoslav army.

Between July 1990 and June 1991 the Eastern European Division, like the Embassy, tried hard to capture the attention of the bureaucratic and political leadership for developments in Yugoslavia. Thus, in a clear sign of support of Ambassador Nooij’s early warning, Ellen Berends, the Division’s deputy-head, wrote a telegram to the Dutch permanent representation at NATO, warning: ‘On this side too it is judged that the situation in Yugoslavia is very explosive and that there is a real danger of a break-up of the federation.’ Berends posed ‘the question of whether the West possessed the means to stop such a development’ and argued:
‘Although with the break-up of the federation the danger of (armed) conflicts between the former constituent parts of the federation is real, increasingly the question seems justified of whether preserving the unity of the federation at all costs results in a much more stable situation. One is increasingly under the impression that federal cooperation in the federation has simply ceased to exist, and it is doubtful whether the central government will then possess the means to keep alive this federation, other than through the use of force.’

The message was timely and correct and was followed by numerous other warnings. Despite Fietelaars’ initial optimism between October-December 1990, the Eastern European Division did not divert from its pessimistic line. On October 23, the Division warned: ‘A break-up of Yugoslavia, however little desirable from the Western point of view, remains one of the possibilities. Already, the country is largely being kept together by negative considerations.’

An important reason for why the Eastern European Division adopted a line in favour of a ‘managed disintegration’ was that Hazewinkel and Berends believed that in the Yugoslav context, the principle of territorial integrity came with continued authoritarianism.8 It would turn out later that theirs was a minority position. But for now, what was  important was that the Division sketched the dilemma and presented it to the DirectorGeneral for Political Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The dilemma was sketched in a note, signed by the Director for European Affairs but drafted by the Eastern Europe Division, for the attention of the Director-General for Political Affairs for a meeting of the Political Committee on November 14 and 15, 1990. The note reflected a German intervention to the same effect made several days earlier in NATO and read:
…one will, by the way, not be able in the future to ignore the question of which choice must be made, if it were to turn out that democracy and human rights would be better served by a partitioning of the country than by holding on to the unitary state. The way things are now, the greatest advocates of unity in Yugoslavia do not seem to be the greatest advocates of democracy. 

Several months later, in April 1991, the Eastern Europe Division launched another small-scale campaign to impress their Minister of the urgency of the situation in Yugoslavia. In minutes for a General Affairs Council on April 8, Hazewinkel and Berends warned Van den Broek that the situation in Yugoslavia was worsening and that civil war was far from inconceivable. The officials also questioned the utility of the Western reliance on Yugoslavia’s Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic, whose power base, Hazewinkel and Berends argued, had to a large measure been eroded. A week later, in preparation for a General Affairs Council on April 15, the Eastern Europe Division began to sound somewhat  desperate as they asked Van den Broek: ‘How realistic is the hope for an undivided Yugoslavia in the light of the Slovene determination to realise, through secession, its endeavour to achieve independence no later than coming July, as well as the increasingly far-reaching tendency that is now notable in all individual republics? In the file for yet another (informal) ministerial meeting, which took place in Mondorf-les-Bains, Luxembourg, on April 27 and 28, the Eastern Europe Division again questioned the realism of the European approach:
The chance of a solution, whereby Yugoslavia continues to exist with a central authority that deserves such a name at all, is getting smaller and smaller… The Twelve have consistently… held the position that the territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia must be preserved. The question nevertheless has to be asked whether a point will be reached, or perhaps is already near, where the only possibility is to manage the disintegration of Yugoslavia in such a way that bloodshed is prevented and a part of the federal structure possibly preserved.

The Eastern Europe Division had not sounded so desperate before, and understandably so. For within the space of two weeks Yugoslavia suddenly and belatedly did become an acute foreign policy issue for the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs. However, this was not the result of a shift in the body of opinion among the Ministers regarding the wisdom of continued support for Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, but because a constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia made clear that the possibility of disintegration was more than just an academic speculation.

On the eve of ‘the Yugoslav war of dissolution’, despite the need for a new perspective on Central and Eastern Europe, the Dutch Foreign Ministry still very much reflected Cold War traditions, both in terms of bureaucratic structure and  general mentality. Inside the Ministry, three foreign policy themes had long outweighed all others in importance to the extent that they had become veritable ideologies. These were loyalty to NATO and the USA, the building of a supranational European economic and political union, and, third, the promotion of international order and society. In none of these three foreign policy themes had a place been reserved for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, all of whom had been tossed into a single basket labelled ‘Warsaw Pact’. The primacy of these three policy themes and the corresponding lack of real interest in Central and Eastern Europe were reflected in the structure of the Ministry. The functional departments focusing on NATO, EC/EU and UN affairs, not to mention the various departments in the Directorate-General for International Cooperation [development aid] had become much more important than the regional desks responsible for bilateral political relations. This made it possible that on the eve of the Yugoslav war, only three officials were responsible for relations with Central and Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union.
...


https://books.google.rs/books?id=evUpTn_g_cgC&pg=PA72&lpg=PA72&dq=Albert+Nooij&source=bl&ots=BQKSAnvO8a&sig=ACfU3U3QGxtOL8Y3you9bU_VNv7bK1gEUQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj515PymonnAhWlAxAIHeQ_BKUQ6AEwD3oECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=Albert%20Nooij&f=false

PS U međuvremenu sam saznao da je Tito i 1966. godine posetio Drvar. Dakle, u ratu dva puta a posle rata tri puta. SVEGA: 5 puta.