jugoslavija - od nemila do nedraga

uskok (Novogodišnji gost) wrote:Пре неки дан био документарац о паду Чаушескуа, испада да су југословенски новинари одиграли нечасну улогу у пумпању броја страдалих у злочинима режима, некритички су одашиљали у свет најфантастичније бројке, па и монтиране слике масовних гробница. Непрофесионализам или налог одозго?

Karpatski genije imao je rdjavu osobinu da i Gorbiju objasnjava Staljinove vrline. Zato je rumunska sluzba bezbednosti dve nedelje pred  cuveni miting kojim je zapocela revolucija zabelezila neuobicajen broj sovjetskih "turista"u prepunim ladama. Drugarice turistkinje ostale kod kuce, da brinu o deci.

To nije bila samo njihova akcija.
Bio je to dogovor sa Amerima jer su prsli a ovog nisu ni voleli jer je pokusavao da se kurci kao Broz.

nisu ga voleli zbog dugova rumunije

koje je bese vratio?

Vratio
Nije zbog toga.
Kurcio se kod Afganistana, OI 1984, kao i SFRj...

STOCKHOLM -- Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu Saturday called on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan as part of an overall political solution to the Afghan crisis.
Ceausescu, on a state visit to Sweden, also said Afghanistan and Pakistan should hold direct talks on halting aid to Afghan rebels.
'This is one of many questions to which we must find a political solution,' Ceausescu, a maverick within the Soviet camp, told a news conference.
'Soviet troops should withdraw from Afghanistan, and Afghanistan and Pakistan should hold direct talks on halting any help being given to anti-government forces,' he said.
Ceausescu also said the present unrest in Poland was strictly a Polish problem and must be solved by the Polish people alone.

čaušesku nije slao trupe ni u čssr 1968, kad je pravio turu po istočnoj evropi nikson je prvo otišao u bukurešt pa tek onda u beograd, dobijao je zapadne licence tokom 70ih itd itd.

Zuper wrote:To nije bila samo njihova akcija.
Bio je to dogovor sa Amerima jer su prsli a ovog nisu ni voleli jer je pokusavao da se kurci kao Broz.

Nije, naravno.

Albanski ambasador iz Italije krajem decembra 1989. javio je Ramizu Aliji da je rezim u Albaniji bio tema sastanka Busa i Gorbacova. Pocetkom januara 1990 usledio je napad studentarije na Staljinov spomenik u Skadru.

Gargantua wrote:čaušesku nije slao trupe ni u čssr 1968, kad je pravio turu po istočnoj evropi nikson je prvo otišao u bukurešt pa tek onda u beograd, dobijao je zapadne licence tokom 70ih itd itd.

Čaušeskua su Sovjeti trpeli jer su znali da bi svaki drugi rumunski komunista bio mnogo manje na liniji 1 "lagera". Kad je Gorbi napravio spisak za odstrel starih aparatcika, spasa nije bilo.

Po izbijanju loma u Temisvaru, Kondukator se sjurio kuci iz - Teherana...Svetski politicar.

Šahu Rezi je na proslavu 2 500 godina Perzijskog carstva poslao Elenu i zamjenika premijera.

По свему судећи, није га млатнуо ни КГБ, ни ЦИА, него врх румунске војске. Онда су изгледа пар дана фингирали пуцњаву на улицама да би добили изговор да га стрељају и да заташкају своју улогу. Тиме се објашњава зашто ни до данас није познато ко је убио 1000 Румуна током тих чудних пуцњава.

SOVIET HAND IN BUCHAREST





By Jack Anderson and
Dale Van Atta
September 22, 1991

Romania's "democratic" revolution two years ago looked to the world like the bloody overthrow of an oppressive government by people who could no longer tolerate communist tyranny. In reality, it may have been a carefully planned coup aided by the Soviet Union -- Mikhail Gorbachev's way of eliminating the troublesome despot Nicolae Ceausescu.

If there is any documentation of the plot, it most likely lies in the secret files of a little-known former Romanian intelligence unit code-named U.M. 0920. Those files are now in the control of Romania's pro-Soviet president, Ion Iliescu.

Through our sources cultivated in Bucharest and access to highly classified Central Intelligence Agency reports, we have learned that Moscow had a much more direct hand than previously revealed in the creation of the ruling Romanian party to replace the Ceausescu government, the National Salvation Front.

Iliescu and the ex-Communists who run the Front have a vested interest in destroying all the documents and evidence of Soviet tinkering. They are facing tough elections next spring, and their popular support, according to the polls, is shrinking.

A spokesman for the Romanian Embassy told us that there had been "reports" that Iliescu and other members of the front had consulted with or been directed by the Soviet KGB, but he wrote those reports off to Romanian journalists with an overactive imagination.

The Romanian "revolution" began with riots in the city of Timisoara in December 1989, which then spread to Bucharest. The front, headed by Iliescu, announced formation of a provisional government, held a mock trial for Ceausescu and executed him and his wife on Christmas Day.

Iliescu's new defense minister, Nicolae Militaru, and Foreign Minister Silviu Brucan, both have since confided that the coup was more than a decade in the planning. Dissident elements of the army, the Securitate and the Communist Party had formed rebel cells preparing for the day they would oust Ceausescu. They simply took advantage of the spontaneous demonstrations in Timisoara to carry out their plan.

Brucan had been in Moscow one month before the demonstrations. Several intelligence sources say that he got his marching orders then. Gorbachev, a longtime associate of Iliescu's, was fed up with Ceausescu, who frequently refused to fall in line with the rest of the Eastern Bloc. These same sources tell us that Militaru was indirectly taking intelligence and "suggestions" from the Soviet Red Army and the KGB.

Ceausescu wasn't oblivious to the planning. He became convinced nearly 20 years ago that Moscow would one day try to get rid of him. In February 1972, Ceausescu formed U.M. 0920 to spy on pro-Soviet Romanians including Iliescu, Brucan and Militaru, according to top-secret CIA reports.

The new unit was housed in a building called the "Institute for Marketing" and was guarded around the clock. Half of the 1,000 employees were assigned to monitor Soviet intelligence activities in Romania. They wiretapped Romanian Communist Party officials and others suspected of collusion with the Soviets. They kept track of anything that they might use against these people, including tape recordings of extramarital sexual activity. The outside world knew this secret unit as "Presidential Archivists."

A top defector from the unit told us that "the main direction of identified Soviet Bloc operations against communist Romania was not classical espionage but preparations for a military invasion or a military coup d'etat to overthrow Ceausescu." He said that anyone in the Romanian army or Securitate who got too close to the KGB was supposed to be "neutralized" through demotion or arrest.

Gen. Ion Serb was an example. He graduated from the Soviet Frunze Military Academy and became chief of the Bucharest military garrison. When U.M. 0920 found out that the Soviet military intelligence agency was actively recruiting Serb, he was framed. Classified documents were planted in his home, and he was sentenced to prison for violating the state secrecy law. He was only released after he confessed his "guilt."

"I do not have the slightest doubt that the National Salvation Front mounted what was a Soviet-engineered coup," the U.M. 0920 defector told us. Other evidence we acquired proves that, at the very least, the Soviets were consulted for "advice" as the front took over Romania.

Gorbachev's loss of power and the breakup of the Soviet Union does not bode well for Iliescu and his cohorts. If Soviet reformers discover and expose the role Moscow played in the overthrow of Ceausescu, the resulting disgrace could be fatal for the new government.


 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/09/22/soviet-hand-in-bucharest/b306c11f-df27-4c05-a63d-b6b37b00ea72/

Medijski je pobunu odradio zapad preko SFRj, tacnije TV NS i TV BG, kada su se kalili neki buduci zapadni saradnici...a nisu ni znali da su sovjeti ti koji vuku poluge.
Bilo je to drugo vreme...

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-10-march-1998

...
The key document for this discussion is the final one
in the series published by the Foreign Ministry, a 25
December memorandum of conversation written by
Deputy Foreign Minister Aboimov of his meeting the day
before with Matlock. Since 24 December was a Sunday,
presumably Foreign Minister Shevardnadze as well as
Secretary General Gorbachev were not to be found at the
office, but in their dachas.
Interestingly, Ambassador Matlock’s 1995 book on
the fall of the Soviet Union does not mention the discussion detailed here in the Soviet notes of the conversation.

Only a very indirect hint emerges from the Matlock
passage that reads as follows: “After Germany, the most
traumatic event in the onetime Soviet bloc for the Communist Party and the KGB was the bloody revolution that
took place in Romania at the end of the year. The violence
directed at Ceausescu and his family, and members of the
hated Securitate secret police, was covered in great detail
by the Soviet press, and television did not spare its viewers
the scenes of violence. But when the anti-Ceausescu
forces invited Soviet intervention to support them,
Moscow refused, signaling that the days of military
intervention in Eastern Europe—even under conditions the
West might have found tolerable—were over.”

Compare the language Matlock uses here—”even
under conditions the West might have found tolerable”—
with the language his Soviet counterpart uses to describe
the U.S. approach: “Then Matlock touched on the issue
that, apparently, he wanted to raise from the very beginning of the conversation. The Administration, he said, is
very interested in knowing if the possibility of military
assistance by the Soviet Union to the Romanian National
Salvation Front is totally out of question. Matlock
suggested (probrosil) the following option: what would the
Soviet Union do if an appropriate appeal came from the
Front? Simultaneously, the Ambassador hinted at the idea,
apparently on instructions from Washington. He let us
know that under the present circumstances the military
involvement of the Soviet Union in Romanian affairs
might not be regarded in the context (podpadat’ pod) of
‘the Brezhnev doctrine.’”

The Soviet diplomat Aboimov quickly refused
Matlock’s implied invitation: “To this sounding out
(zondazh) by the American [Ambassador] I answered
completely clearly and unequivocally, presenting our
principled position. I declared that we did not visualize,
even theoretically, such a scenario. We stand against any
interference in the domestic affairs of other states and we
intend to pursue this line firmly and without deviations.
Thus, the American side may consider that ‘the Brezhnev
doctrine’ is now theirs as our gift.”

This last phrase clearly refers to the American
invasion of Panama which had just occurred on 20
December 1989. Some 13,000 U.S. troops had moved
overnight into that Central American country to remove its
dictator, Manuel Noriega, a long-time U.S. intelligence
asset. The Soviet language here indicates that they
believed the U.S. invitation to be at best “stupid,” as
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze later told American writers
Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, and at worst a
provocation intended to put the Soviet Union in a position
parallel to that of the U.S. in Panama.2

...

Did the Soviets plot the fall of the dictator Ceausescu?
The second document here, of a conversation of Aboimov
with the Romanian ambassador I. Bukur (on 21 December)
describes specific allegations from Ceausescu, directed to
the Soviet charge d’affaires in Bucharest, that the
Timisoara protests arose because “the Soviet Union and
other states, members of the Warsaw Treaty” were
involved in “coordinated activities allegedly aimed at the
SRR.”

However, the first Russian document published here
suggests, but does not prove, that the answer is no, at least
for the highest levels of the Soviet Union. Here we have
the Foreign Minister saying to Secretary General
Gorbachev, both of them leaders of the Politburo, that the
Soviets were having to rely on Western telegraph services
for their news of Romania as of 20 December—the day the
army ceased its attack on the Timisoara demonstrations
and the protesters proclaimed Timisoara a liberated city,
five days after the first protests sought to protect pastor
Lazslo Tokes, and three days after the army-Securitate
crackdown.26 This Shevardnadze-to-Gorbachev message
does not mean that the lower levels of the Soviet apparat,
for example the KGB resident in Bucharest, were not
plotting; indeed, based on a Ceausescu-mocking editorial
in Izvestiia on 17 November 1989, R. Craig Nation
concludes that “the involvement of Soviet security forces
in the plot to topple the dictator is a distinct possibility.”27
But this evidence does suggest strongly that the KGB was
not providing much good information to the top. If the
Soviet experience in East Germany one month earlier is
any parallel, the KGB could well have become hostage in
an informational sense to the very secret police forces it
had nurtured and the outside world assumed to be so
powerful. In that case, the Stasi completely underestimated the power of the public protests and the likelihood
of the fall of the Wall.

Why should we believe this document? I think there
is a relatively simple answer: If evidence existed in the
Soviet files of Gorbachev plotting with the KGB to
overthrow Ceausescu, against all of Gorbachev’s public
speeches about non-intervention, President Yeltsin would
probably have released such documents, as he did so many
others derogatory of Gorbachev, during the consolidation
of power after 1991 and certainly in time for the Presidential campaign in 1996, in which Gorbachev won about 1%
of the vote.

Postoji nesto novo i moderno napisano, preporuka za svakog ko hoce da se detaljnije pozabavi revolucijom u Rumuniji

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332408425_Explaining_the_Romanian_Revolution_of_1989_Culture_Structure_and_Contingency

Nema dileme da je uticaj najjacih bezbednosnih sluzbi bio prisutan, ali to je samo  jedan od rukavaca za rusenje vlasti. U rumunskom slucaju, Sovjeti su promene gurali preko srednjih esalona nomenlature povezanih sa vojskom i delovima vrha Sekuritatee, dok je u slucaju obaranja Zivkova puc izveden u samom Politbirou kroz pritisak posebnog Gorbijevog emisara. Gorbacov je bio nepomirljiv prema svim komunistickim dinosaurusima koji su umeli da mu drze slovo u neposrednoj komunikaciji, sto ga je posebno iritiralo. U slucaju Poljske i Madjarske, stvari su isle same po sebi i zbog starih istorijskih razmirica, Cehoslavacka je pamtila 1968, dok je u Istocnoj Nemackoj egzodus izazvao nekontrolisanu masovnu pobunu. Na Balkanu je zbog snage autokratizma sistem morao da bude rusen pojacanim bezbednosnim delovanjem.

Bravo za Ruse, odlicno su odigrali sa Rumunijom, zato im je danas saveznik...

Stefan Gužvica: Tito je na rat gledao levije od Kominterne

Bluberi wrote:Stefan Gužvica: Tito je na rat gledao levije od Kominterne

Tito omasovljuje članstvo i broj profesionalnih revolucionara pred rat…
Broj profesionalnih revolucionara je 350. To su ljudi kojima je posao s punim radnim vremenom da idu po Jugoslaviji i organizuju radnički pokret. A samo članstvo partije raste sa 1.500 ljudi 1937. na oko 8.000 njih 1941.

Скорсезеов "Ајришмен" каже да су амерички синдикалци имали далеко импресивније резултате. 

Ожда кажеш да су остварили ССАД још раније ама нама нико није јавио?

Све аутохтоне револуције (Русија, Србија, Кина) су биле сељачке револуције.
Радници нису у пракси толико склони револуцији колико теорија каже.

drugari iz cia snajka okačili kolekciju dokumenata u vezi sa 30godišnjicom 1989, njihove analize IE iz tog perioda (kraj 1989). tu su i dva kraća dok za Yu. jedan sam siguran da sam ranije čitao (onaj drugi dole), ovaj prvi je možda svež.


https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/collapse-communism-eastern-europe-30-year-legacy?fbclid=IwAR0zGF-3_qlirS4JexMXkM9DGp8bnI4dlSRzK5NTsMC2nedVrZKpVBvLWck

Special Analysis YUGOSLAVIA

Sinking Deeper Into Political Quagmire

The postwar political consensus among Yugoslavia's ethnic groups is
breaking down after a decade of economic deterioration and government
mismanagement. Political tensions probably will increase next year,
undermining the implementation of sorely needed economic and
political reforms and further weakening the country's stability

Tensions in Yugoslavia, already at a postwar high, rose again last
week after bitter exchanges between Serbian and Slovene officials
over a planned demonstration in Slovenia by as many as 40,000
ethnic Serbs. The demonstration was cancelled after Slovene leaders
termed it a Serbian provocation and threatened to use police to
prevent it. Serbian oficials are calling for a retaliatory economic
boycott of Slovenia.

The national leadership has been seriously weakened by the
increasing polarization of regional disputes and has been unable to
mediate effectively. The eight-member State Presidency, which
reportedly often splits evenly on key domestic issues, gave the
Slovene leadership only weak support during the latest dispute with
Serbia. The party's Central Committee is also deadlocked; the latest
furor prompted party leaders to cancel a plenum that was to have
prepared for next month’s national party congress

Yugoslav leaders are unlikely to forge a new agreement on ethnic
powersharing in the coming year. Preparations for the national party
congress are exposing sharp regional differences over reforms and
regional autonomy that republic party congresses to be held this
month will reinforce. Slovenia, and to a lesser extent Croatia,
probably will advocate a multiparty parliamentary system and greater
regional autonomy. Serbia. the largest republic, and its allies in
Vojvodina and Montenegro will support a stronger central
government and the retention of the Communist Party‘s political
monopoly. ln the near term Slovenia probably will proceed with its
plan for its own de facto multiparty system and with plans for open
elections next spring. Few changes are likely in Serbia and its
Despite the deepening political divisions, Yugoslav leaders probably
can muddle through for at least another year but the outlook
after that seems increasingly bleak.

Weak Economy Aggravating Regional Disputes in Yugoslavia

Serious economic deterioration over the past decade has compounded Yugoslavia‘s ethnic
and political problems.
-—- The annualized inflation rate exceeded 16,000 percent in October 1989 and has been -
greater than 100 percent since I986.
— The gross social product, which has declined since 1986, probably will fall by more
than 2.5 percent this year.
— Real net income per worker has fallen almost every year since 1978, according to the
IMF. The decline last year was about 8 percent and probably will be about the same
this year. '

The decline has soured the atmosphere for economic reforms. The recent Serbian-Slovene
conflict has endangered Premier Markovic‘s economic reform package by prompting
renewed Serbian calls for his ouster. interrepublic bickering last month stymied Markovic‘s
attempt to push major reform legislation through the National Assembly.

— Slovenia, the wealthiest republic, opposed a draft tax law because Slovene
authorities feared that the imposition of corporate profit and income taxes would
disproportionally fall on local industries and increase subsidies Slovenia provides to other republics. “
-- Serbia blocked a draft foreign exchange law calling for a fully convertible dinar /
because it would reduce the advantages Serbian firms gain from unique financing
arrangements for trade with the USSR.
— Croatia rejected a draft law that would have made
petroleum prices subject to market forces because the law would have hurt Croatia's large oil industry.

Prospects for Stability

The Communist parry congress that ended Monday did little to clarify uncertainties about Yugoslavia ’s future. Sharp conflict: and a walkout by the Slovene delegation will erode the party 's prestige and authority and will speed movement toward a multiparty system, but they may also aggravate ethnic tensions at the root of the country‘s instability. yy.


The congress voted for a multiparty system, abolishing the Communist party‘s constitutionally-mandated leading role, and endorsed greater protection for human rights. These steps amount to an endorsement of the liberal platform championed by the Slovenes, who nonetheless walked out after losing a vote that would have enhanced the autonomy ofthe republic parties. The refusal by the other republics to endorse Serbia's effort to continue the congress without Slovenes \vas a defeat for Serbian strongman Milosevic.

Movement to a Multiparty System

The practical effects of the party‘s breakup are likely to be minimal; the national party has been paralyzed for the past two years by internal differences and has made few meaningful decisions. Endorsement ofa multiparty system represents a belated recognition of a political trend that has already gained significant momentum. There are alread\ some 40 opposition political parties in the country, some with as many as 70,000 members

Of Yugoslavia‘s eight republics, Slovenia and Croatia are already planning to hold multiparty elections this spring; Montenegro, Macedonia. and Bosnia are moving more cautiously in the same direction. Even orthodox Serbian leaders now publicly support a multiparty system. a largely meaningless concession bee elections are scheduled in Serbia until 1994.

The evolution toward a multiparty system will do little to ease ethnic tensions and may make them worse this year. The new parties may pander to nationalist and even secessionist sentiments. Parties with nationalist agendas have already been formed in Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia.

lmplicatlons for the Markovic Government

The tensions within the national party probably will enhance the clout of Premier Markovic's government. Nonetheless. Markovic must surmount imposing obstacles to put Yugoslavia on the road to political and economic health. He will have to persuade powerful  regional leaders to agree on badly needed economic reforms; failure to do so would mean the continued decline of an economy already suffering ' '

The government will also have to coax the army‘s senior officer corps to accept tighter budgets, a gradual loss of the army‘s political role, and a diminution of the military-"s prestige. Finally. Markovic must obtain help from political leaders in Slovenia and Croatia to brake the secessionist forces that could fragment the country and risk civil war.

Grounds for Guarded Optimism

Markovic and other reformists nonetheless have some things working in their favor. Although the secessionist fever might grow apace with nationalist sentiments, the shrill ethnic squabbles that dominate the Yugoslav headlines probably exaggerate the depth of secessionist sentiment Published polls indicate that e\en most Slo\ enes \\a t greater autonomy within Yugoslavia. not secession.

The military and security forces have resisted the ethnic divisions that have weakened other Yugoslav institutions. and they continue to support a united Yugoslavia. Memories of a bloody civil war during World War H remain vivid. persuading many Yugoslav-s that ethnic tensions must not be permitted to get out of hand. Finally. Yugoslavs—-including many in the leadership— have not given up hope that the country can be politically reformed.

https://www.portalnovosti.com/stefan-guzvica-tito-je-na-rat-gledao-levije-od-kominterne

sad vidim da je bluberi vec postavio

http://www.h-alter.org/vijesti/dvostruki-kriteriji-za-terorizam

Управо сам такве ствари покушавао да споменем на форуму кад нам се спремало бомбардовање, па онда око 11. IX, а и у другим приликама. Да оглувиш од тишине.

паће wrote:Управо сам такве ствари покушавао да споменем на форуму кад нам се спремало бомбардовање, па онда око 11. IX, а и у другим приликама. Да оглувиш од тишине.

Па сад...
Ено, нико да подсети Швеђане како су лаганица пуштали Роловићеве убице, све им обезбедивши авион...
На страну тврдње новокомпонованих српских повијесничара да су убиство изванредног и опуномоћеног амбасадора једне суверене државе третирали као интерни југословенски фајт па, ето, нису хтели да се мешају...

Ал' дође ђаво по своје, ако не на врата, оно упадне кроз прозор...

Jugoslavija in mednarodni terorizem v sedemdesetih letih : dva primera neizročitve teroristov Zvezni republiki Nemčiji

https://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-3IFQS2BB


Yugoslavia and International Terrorism in the 1970s. Two Cases of Non-extradition of Terrorists to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

Summary

On many occasions the former chancellor of the West Germany (1974-1982) Helmut Schmidt
indicated that the month of October 1977 was the most difficult period of his political career. In this
month the terrorist activities, carried out by the West German urban guerrilla since the end of the
1960s, reached their peak. The key representatives of this urban guerrilla were the terrorists operating
under the name of Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) since May 1970. The RAF represented the radicalisation
and continuation of the extra-parliamentary opposition’s efforts in the second half of the 1960s. More
specifically, it fought against something that was seen by the urban guerrilla as the neoimperialist West
German political and economic elite, still infused by the remains of Nazism as well. The core of the
RAF’s first generation (its most famous representatives were Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader, Gudrun
Ensslin and Horst Mahler) had been imprisoned already before 1974. The cruellest terrorist attacks
were committed by the second generation of the RAF, which was active until the end of the 1970s. Its
representatives were incarcerated by the end of 1982. The second generation’s actions culminated in
the aforementioned October of 1977 with the murder of the kidnapped industrialist Hanns Martin
Schleyer, hijacking of Lufthansa Landshut airplane and its rescue in Mogadishu in Ethiopia, as well as
the suicide of the RAF’s first generation terrorists in the Stammheim prison in Stuttgart. The epilogue
of all three events occurred on 18 October 1977.

Since the end of the 1960s the West German urban guerrilla was closely connected with the Palestinian
liberation organisations and depended on their financial and material support. These organisations
also implemented terrorist methods in their struggle for independent Palestine. In exchange
for their help Palestinians demanded from the West German terrorists to take part in some of their
operations. At the same time Palestinians, together with other Arab countries that supported the Palestinian
efforts, provided a safe haven for the German terrorists who were on the run from the judicial
authorities. Due to its economic dependency on the third world countries and its efforts to keep the
prestigious position in the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia was not able to deny at least a passive
support of the Palestinians and the Western European terrorists connected with them. This also explains
Yugoslavia’s actions when the RAF terrorists arrived to its territory on the two occasions analysed in
this discussion.

The first case occurred in September 1976 when Carlos the Jackal, the most wanted international
terrorist at that time, flew from Algiers and landed at the Belgrade airport accompanied by Hans-
Joachim Klein. They were both wanted for the terrorist attack on the OPEC conference in Vienna in
December 1975. The FRG demanded their extradition, but the Yugoslav leadership refused it with the
explanation that the persons under consideration were not terrorists at all. They both flew to Baghdad.

The second case took place in May 1978 when four RAF terrorists arrived to Yugoslavia from Bulgaria.
Rolf Clemens Wagner, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, Peter-Jürgen Boock and Sieglinde Hofmann were also connected
with the aforementioned events of October 1977. Yugoslavia refused their extradition as well.
During several months of negotiations Yugoslavia repeatedly demanded the extradition of the terrorists
connected with the Croatian political emigration by the FRG as a precondition.

The two cases of the non-extradition of terrorists temporarily aggravated the bilateral relations between
the FRG and Yugoslavia. However, the crisis was soon over because both sides were interested in
maintaining close cooperation. The discussion is based on the documents kept in the political archives
of the German foreign ministry and exposes the following reasons for the Yugoslav actions: Yugoslavia’s
efforts to foster good relations with the Arab countries, especially important for Yugoslavia in the
period following the oil crisis and the increase of oil prices, as well as Yugoslavia’s efforts to preserve its
prestigious position in the Non-Aligned Movement or in the community of the third world countries.
The decision of the Yugoslav leadership can also be explained by the fear that Tito and his associates felt
in regard to the political emigration, hostile towards Yugoslavia.