Syriza ftw

MancMellow, on 11 Mar 2015 - 18:43, said: wrote:Da se odmaknemo malo od Grka, koji se ionako nalaze u nemogucoj poziciji (mada je cinjenica da su neki od njih poceli da lupaju najstrasnije)

Der Spiegel i Toma P.


SPIEGEL: You publicly rejoiced over Alexis Tsipras' election victory in Greece. What do you think the chances are that the European Union and Athens will agree on a path to resolve the crisis?
Piketty: The way Europe behaved in the crisis was nothing short of disastrous. Five years ago, the United States and Europe had approximately the same unemployment rate and level of public debt. But now, five years later, it's a different story: Unemployment has exploded here in Europe, while it has declined in the United States. Our economic output remains below the 2007 level. It has declined by up to 10 percent in Spain and Italy, and by 25 percent in Greece.
SPIEGEL: The new leftist government in Athens hasn't exactly gotten off to an impressive start. Do you seriously believe that Prime Minister Tsipras can revive the Greek economy?
Piketty: Greece alone won't be able to do anything. It has to come from France, Germany and Brussels. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) already admitted three years ago thatthe austerity policies had been taken too far. The fact that the affected countries were forced to reduce their deficit in much too short a time had a terrible impact on growth. We Europeans, poorly organized as we are, have used our impenetrable political instruments to turn the financial crisis, which began in the United States, into a debt crisis. This has tragically turned into a crisis of confidence across Europe.

SPIEGEL: European governments have tried to avert the crisis by implementing numerous reforms. What do mean when you refer to impenetrable political instruments?
Piketty: We may have a common currency for 19 countries, but each of these countries has a different tax system, and fiscal policy was never harmonized in Europe. It can't work. In creating the euro zone, we have created a monster. Before there was a common currency, the countries could simply devalue their currencies to become more competitive. As a member of the euro zone, Greece was barred from using this established and effective concept.

SPIEGEL: You're sounding a little like Alexis Tsipras, who argues that because others are at fault, Greece doesn't have to pay back its own debts.
Piketty: I am neither a member of Syriza nor do I support the party. I am merely trying to analyze the situation in which we find ourselves. And it has become clear that countries cannot reduce their deficits unless the economy grows. It simply doesn't work. We mustn't forget that neither Germany nor France, which were both deeply in debt in 1945, ever fully repaid those debts. Yet precisely these two countries are now telling the Southern Europeans that they have to repay their debts down to the euro. It's historic amnesia! But with dire consequences.

SPIEGEL: So others should now pay for the decades of mismanagement by governments in Athens?
Piketty: It's time for us to think about the young generation of Europeans. For many of them, it is extremely difficult to find work at all. Should we tell them: "Sorry, but your parents and grandparents are the reason you can't find a job?" Do we really want a European model of cross-generational collective punishment? It is this egotism motivated by nationalism that disconcerts me more than anything else today.

SPIEGEL: It doesn't sound as if you are a fan of the Stability Pact, the agreement implemented to force euro-zone countries to improve fiscal discipline.
Piketty: The pact is a true catastrophe. Setting fixed deficit rules for the future cannot work. You can't solve debt problems with automatic rules that are always applied in the same way, regardless of differences in economic conditions.

SPIEGEL: People in Germany tend to be critical of the fact that countries are not abiding by the pact. France, for example, has rarely stuck to the agreed rules.
Piketty: Everyone is dissatisfied, because this entire system of negotiations between the governments and the Brussels bureaucracy doesn't work. Countries like Germany complain because we are not abiding by the deficit rules. But the French aren't amused by the requirements being imposed by Brussels. We Europeans are in a bad situation, and minor structural reforms, which we hope will provide us with a little growth, won't do anything to change that.

SPIEGEL: What do you propose?
Piketty: We need to invest more money in training our young people, and in innovation and research. That should be the most important goal of an initiative to promote European growth. It isn't normal that 90 percent of the world's top universities are in the United States and our best minds go overseas. The Americans invest 3 percent of their GDP in their universities, while it's more like 1 percent here. That's the main reason why America is growing so much faster than Europe.

SPIEGEL: The United States has a uniform fiscal policy. What conclusions can be drawn from that?
Piketty: We need a fiscal union and a harmonization of budgets. We need a common debt repayment fund for the euro zone, like the one proposed by the German Council of Economic Experts, for example. Each country would remain responsible for repaying its portion of the total debt. In other words, the Germans would not have to pay off the Italians' old debts, and vice-versa. But there would be a common interest rate for euro bonds, which would be used to refinance the debt.
SPIEGEL: But that would create the risk of a big debt coalition. Who determines how much debt is allowed?
Piketty: We need a communitization of debts, but it has to be democratically legitimized. I propose a European parliament for the euro zone that would consist of members of the national parliaments. Each country would be represented in this parliament in proportion to its population size. In other words, Germany, with its 80 million inhabitants, would have the largest number of members. These politicians would then vote democratically on how high the deficit could be in the euro zone.

SPIEGEL: And the Germany lawmakers, with their aversion for large deficits, would be routinely outvoted by their more free-spending colleagues.
Piketty: I do, in fact, assume that this type of parliament would have saved less in recent years, and would have instead spent more on growth and fighting unemployment. It would have been good for us all. Germans shouldn't be afraid of democracy. If we have a common currency, at some point we have to accept that we also spend money together.

SPIEGEL: How do you intend to ensure that a country like Greece doesn't just return to living beyond its means?
Piketty: Greece would be subject to greater fiscal discipline. The amount of debt would be fixed by a European parliament in which Greek members would only play a subordinate role. In the long run, we need a fiscal union in Europe that is democratically legitimized.

SPIEGEL: Do you expect France to take the initiative? The country seems to be focused more on itself these days.
Piketty: That's true enough! I believe that many of the ideas that could push us forward come from Germany. I deeply distrust the French way of thinking in national categories. Our elites, regardless of their political leanings, are incapable of thinking in truly European terms. Germany is different in that respect.

SPIEGEL: Now that sounds like praise for German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Piketty: The truth is that France hasn't really played a role since the crisis began. We are afraid -- of the markets and of democracy. But fear doesn't get us anywhere. France has internalized Germany's dominant role to such an extent that it no longer feels capable of doing anything.

SPIEGEL: Why does President François Hollande seem so weak?
Piketty: We always have the same types of people at the top here, and it doesn't do our country any good. There is no renewal anywhere. Hollande still feels traumatized by the referendum over the European constitutional treaty in 2005. He fought hard for the treaty, but the French rejected it. It would be good for us and for Europe if he would slowly get over it.

SPIEGEL: The draft treaty would have shifted some responsibilities from European member states to Brussels, but it was scuttled by voters in France and the Netherlands. What should Hollande tackle now?
Piketty: I believe that we need to reform our country to a far greater extent than the government currently intends to. It's critical that we simplify our complicated social security system. But what happens instead? With each new law, the government tries to make it even more complicated.

SPIEGEL: What exactly are you referring to?
Piketty: Immediately after taking office, the new government overturned a measure adopted by the previous government to reduce non-wage labor costs, only to reintroduce it under a different name a year and a half later. That's crazy. Costs to employers are twice as high in France as they are in Germany. But instead of addressing truly important issues, Hollande introduces a 75-percent tax on wealth that's completely ineffective -- which is why it too has been scrapped. Everything boils down to symbolic policies -- but the wrong ones.

SPIEGEL: How could Hollande and Merkel inspire voters to support more Europe?
Piketty: They need to explain to voters, for example, that even Germany and France can no longer manage to efficiently tax multinational companies, because the companies are playing countries off against each other. To this day, many major corporations from the United States and Europe pay less in taxes than small European companies. A common corporate tax for the euro zone, which would be determined by the new euro-zone parliament, would be helpful and would certainly be popular among voters.

SPIEGEL: At this point, voters don't seem overly keen to shift more power to Brussels. On the contrary, EU-skeptic parties are becoming popular everywhere.
Piketty: No matter what you think of Syriza's election victory, it could serve as a shock therapy of sorts for those in power. Suddenly they'll realize that what they've been doing isn't working, and that they have to take a different approach. But a leftist party like Syriza or Spain's Podemos isn't nearly as dangerous as the extreme right. The National Front here in France is more popular than ever at the moment. That's why it's so dangerous for the established parties to continue fueling these nationalists. Constantly berating the lazy Greeks or Portuguese is irresponsible.

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Iz Politike


Jedno bar 80% ovoga je do sada pomenuto ovde, no nije lose za nekakvo sumiranje pozicije

ostap bender wrote:manc je prilicno dobar na toj temi.

The project of unifying Europe through capitalist institutions and along neoliberal lines has reheated the nationalist divides and north-south, east-west schisms which we were assured had been banished with the stroke of a pen on the Maastricht, Lisbon and other treaties. It has also deepened the class and social antagonisms within European states, all European states.

It is folly in those circumstances to play by the rules of their game, even if it is by way of sympathising with the national underdogs. To do so reduces the Left to being a pawn. We should seek to play a different game, by different rules.

As a thunderstorm strikes...
For some unfathomable reason violent thunderstorms seem to appear whenever I visit Athens. It was true at the end of a long drought a couple of years ago. Friends nicknamed me the rainmaker… among other things.
One has just hit now, turning the junction of Tralleon and Foka into something resembling the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates.
Whimsey about the weather aside, the pace of political events in Greece is quickening, with flashes of imminent confrontation, and nothing to do with my presence here. So much for the journalist know-nothings who populate the European newsrooms and who said the Brussels agreement meant the end of the Athens insurgency against austerity. Step forward, please, Mr Robert Peston of the BBC.
In opening up the issue of German reparations for the Nazi occupation of Greece in parliament yesterday, Alexis Tsipras has placed a crowbar in the fault line that runs through the European capitalist political foundations. Whether he'll jemmy it wide open, and if so along what cleavage, remains to be seen. But one thing is lain to rest by the parliamentary vote to take a step in that direction: it is simply untrue that there is nothing in the arsenal of Athens. It's a question of whether there is political will and agency prepared to deploy the weapons and to pass the ammunition around true friends in Europe.
The major trial of the fascist, criminal conspiracy which is Golden Dawn is also proceeding apace and with it demands that all weapons necessary are utilised by the left in crushing the fascist presence in Greek society. It will begin on 20 April.
The civil action by the victims of the fascists has no public funds. But it is a critical initiative. It means that the anti-fascist movement's lawyers will be able to cross examine and lead evidence in the trial, which the state prosecutors cannot be relied upon to do effectively.
Already under the rules of disclosure the lawyers have uncovered mountains of evidence against leading fascists.
There is an appeal (see website jailgoldendawn.com) for financial and other support for the action. The fight is joined by the families of Shehzad Luqman and Pavlos Fyssas, among others.
A few days ago - thanks to the incompetence of the state prosecutors - the GD equivalent of Martin Bormann, Ilias Kasidiaris was acquitted of the televised assault on Liana Kannelli (of the Communist Party) and Rena Dourou (of Syriza), which shocked all left and liberal opinion in Europe when it occurred three years ago between the May and June general elections of 2012.
The Jail Golden Dawn appeal is particularly aimed at law firms and barristers chambers in centres of international jurisprudence, such as London, but anyone can donate.
For reasons which are too obvious to state I can't go into great detail. But suffice to say that concretely, the judicial and state prosecuting arms of the Greek state are split within and between themselves over the whole prosecution. It arose from the pressure of the movement following the murder of Pavlos Fyssas in September 2013 and the outrage at the secret discussions between then prime minster Samaras's chef de cabinet and Kassidiaris, which were leaked.
So there is a battle within the state over this prosecution. The fascists not only have high ranking and capable lawyers. They have friends in the state and among the oligarchs. The lineages of the Greek far right and capitalist oligarchs go back to the Metaxas dictatorship of the 1930s, the Nazi occupation, the civil war, the Colonels Junta of 1967 to 1974 and the far from complete cleansing of the Augean stable - which would take more than the diversion of two rivers - following the restoration of democracy and reconciliation of the civil war schism under Pasok in the 1980s.
The fascists have run hard since the beginning of the prosecution process with the argument that it is a political trial, without due process, and that GD is simply a political party protected by the Greek constitution.
The heart of the actual prosecution case to be proved is that the political party is a carapace for a criminal enterprise. The statute in the criminal code under which the prosecution takes place is in fact to do with mafia extortion and organised crime.
The alternative was to prosecute under the law dealing with terrorism. For all sorts of reasons the first is preferable for the left. It certainly pertains more to the protection rackets which GD ran in Agios Panteleimonas Square and elsewhere, of which the anti-fascist movement has amassed copious evidence thanks to the migrant victims of those rackets.
First the removal of parliamentary immunity from prosecution and then the preparedness of the parliament to proceed while the fascist MPs were held behind bars - even when they could not be bailed in time for votes - were milestones in the political battle, public and within the sanctum of the legal state.
They were positions hard won by the movement and enforced the delegitimisation of GD.
That is why there is such a reaction here among the anti-fascist and anti-racist forces to the intervention by recently by the president of the parliament (equivalent to Westminster's Leader of the Hosue) Zoe Constantopoulou when she argued that a vote could not take place because bail arrangements could not be made in time for the fascist deputies to be present for it.
Whatever her intentions, and she is an independent-minded stickler for parliamentary procedure who went out of her way on election night to be interviewed in support of sacked workers at the national broadcaster ERT, her rule-mongering argument has strengthened those who seek to relegitimise GD. They are not an insubstantial force. GD's vote was barely dented in the general election, despite the imprisonment of its leadership, and it took third place.
Moreover, the prosecution is not a secondary affair. It will go on for most of this year and has the potential to arraign powerful establishment figures in the business, political and state spheres. It may be televised, with nightly news commentary - like the big anti-corruption trials of the early 1990s.
We are talking about a prosecution which, if the anti-fascist movement's lawyers have anything to do with it, will open up the litany of state-fascist-ND-oligarch collaboration over the last 20 years. It potentially could serve as a belated saneamento (cleansing) of the kind which did not follow Pasok's victory in 1981 with respect to the civil war and which reached only the very top - the troika - of the Colonels junta following the metapolitefsi in 1974 onwards.
One misplaced argument from the left against this tactic was to say that we should not prosecute GD because it is the state rather than the fascists which is the main threat. True as premiss, but false in conclusion - not least because the growth of the fascists marked an *extension* of the state, para-state and deep state rather than some anti-systemic opposition to it. The argument that the state was prosecuting the fascists only as a trial run to prosecute the left ignored how the movement had forced the prosecution and also implicitly conceded the GD defence that this was a political trial.
That was congruent with the right wing liberal line that all are entitled to free speech and that we should stand behind the supposedly politically neutral rule of law, which constitutionally protects political parties from state interference.
There was also an electoral cretinist element of the left - straddling Syriza, the Communist Party, Pasok and the anti-capitalist left - which maintained that a strong GD vote would split the right and allow the left to form a government. We should remember, the old fox French President Francois Mitterrand introduced proportional representation for the National Assembly in 1986 to allow the Jean-Marie Le Pen and the fascist Front National to divide the right. It did. We now have Marine Le Pen, the daughter, gunning for the presidency.
Constantopoulou's intervention was seized upon immediately by Michaloliakos, who legally must be released before the trial as his 18 months are up.
For entirely understandable reasons, many friends on the international left have sought to downplay her intervention, which as been repeated, and to brush off criticisms of it emanating from Athens.
To be sure, it is not part of some nefarious plot by the leadership of Syriza to rehabilitate GD or some other such nonsense. The Greek finance minster while living in Boston was subject to threats by GD, even though he is not even a member of Syriza.
But solidarity with Athens against Berlin and Brussels does not require the suspension of critical faculties, still less a dismissive attitude to fellow activists and socialists in Greece who voice legitimate concerns and criticisms of their government.
Doing that does no one any favours. There are many on the left, including in Syriza, who recognise Constantopoulou's approach as a mistake, however well intentioned. The mistake is compounded if the radical left adopts some supposedly Olympian position that we, not the right, are the true upholders of parliamentary protocol, and the "rule of law" without scrutinising which protocols, whose law and in whose interests.
The police intervening to break up mass pickets is the imposition of the rule of law in Britain, Greece and many other countries. Should we champion that?
Upholding conventions and procedures of capitalist state institutions has, in any case, never won the left any plaudits from the power holders of the right and big business. So when in opposition Alexis Tsipras invoked European Union custom to support Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission against German objection the victorious Juncker showed his gratitude by immediately aligning with Berlin against Athens. He has pressed his side of the threefold vice of the troika on Greece throughout the six weeks of the Syriza government.
No one at meetings of the troika or of Eurozone finance ministers gives Tsipras any credit for "being a good European" over the Commission Presidency spat. Few, in fact, remember it.
The late Tony Benn was told that his plan to create a thousand life peers so that a radical Labour House of Commons would not be frustrated by an unelected House of Lords broke the conventions of the unwritten British constitution. He replied that he not only would rest on popular will and sovereignty against the conventions but that the government would introduce a superior and written constitution too.
That is surely the right approach. We don't propose some arbitrary and dangerously ruleless alternative to the rule of law. But the rule of better law, with a content which is explicit in siding with the exploited against the exploiter, the oppressed against the oppressor. At least as a starting point.
The issue goes to a deeper question: whether the role of the left is to complete the supposedly incomplete modernisation along capitalist lines of the Greek society and state, or whether it is to reconstruct them along different lines.
So on tax, for example, while it is true that the oligarchs engage in massive tax evasion it is not some culture of not paying taxes that is the problem. That is something which the IMF likes to maintain as it blurs the distinction between the teacher in a cramming school who can't afford her taxes and the shipowner who has salted his wealth away in the London property market.
It is the tax structure, and beneath it the structure of ownership and control of the means of making wealth, which are the fundamental issues, not the bribability of tax inspectors.
Rhetoric about playing by the rules and challenging vested interests could be used almost word for word by Pasok leader Andreas Papandreou in his radical period of the early 1980s and by New Democracy's Constantine Mitsotakis in his radical Thatcherite period of the early 1990s.
For the radical left it is rather a question of popular, class rule, not supposed rules transcending the social reality.
That is the thinking behind the civil action to prosecute the fascists. And it challenges the liberal illusion in the state as arbiter of social conflict and the social democratic illusion that we can save capitalism from itself and win the support of those whose interests are threatened by the left's advance by demonstrating to them that we will play by the rules of a game which we are fundamentally opposed to.
Lawyers have a vested interest in Byzantine rules and procedures which they are professionally equipped to interpret, at a price.
The trial of the Golden Dawn criminals has to proceed according to legal process. But it is not about legitimising an inadequate and class-based law and legal system. It is an intervention through that system, within that system in order to lay bare the whole rotten structure while striking a blow at a force which is dangerously poised to return centre stage should the left falter.
It is also pointed, for the movement, against the attempts by ND leading figures to rehabilitate the party. Nikos Dendias was the public order minister under Samaras who authorised the police raids on Michaloliakos and the other GD leaders and the party's headquarters. He was also in charge of the Operation Xenios Zeus roundup of immigrants and other racist measures. He has launched a thinly veiled leadership bid to oust Samaras, accusing him of turning the party into a far right rump. Dendias was a "hammer of the left" on the streets with a tough law and order reputation. He would be perfectly willing to deal with a "reformed" GD. Cleverly, as minister he refused to answer parliamentary questions tabled by GD, saying that they were not legitimate while the legal process was underway. It would be a travesty if he was allowed to pose as a better anti-fascist in parliament than the ministers of the Syriza-led government, who have started to answer questions tabled in absentia by GD MPs. (Though seven weeks in there has yet to be a single law passed by the parliament, which is one reason why the procedural questions, such as the presence or absence of GD MPs and non-lawmking debates, such as the reparations issue, take on such prominence.)
There is no hard and fast line in abstract on this, sure. But politically, to allow the travesty of Dendias - a Norman Tebbit character, for older British readers, posing as a more principled anti-fascist than current government ministers shows a lack of nous, which is the proximate issue rather than "principle".
In the face of the troika imposing conditions of national humiliation, of the fascist gangs exploiting any legal status to overturn democracy and of the oligarchs whose one rule is to hold power come rain or shine, the left is perfectly right to legitimise itself on the maxim of achieving popular power and sovereignty of the labouring masses and their allies - by any means necessary.
http://jailgoldendawn.com/…/financial-appeal-from-the-init…/

From the London Guardian rolling coverage:
'Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s frank and outspoken finance minister, says the lack of progress is increasing the chances of an accidental Greek exit from the euro - a “Grexident”.
'He also said the onus was on Greece to help itself.
'Asked by the Austrian broadcaster ORF about the prospect of a Grexident, Schäuble said:
'As the responsibility, the possibility to decide what happens only lies with Greece, and because we don’t exactly know what those in charge in Greece are doing, we can’t rule out.'
Bear in mind that Schaeuble is on record saying that an assisted, negotiated Greek exit is a possible scenario.
It is difficult to tell whether he is articulating a slimmed down eurozone-lite position - favoured by some of German big business - an ever more intransigent negotiating strategy, or something of both.
Either way - the German finance ministry is certainly entertaining the prospect of Grexit or Gexident as a means to increase leverage on Athens. It seems more and more plausible that the ministry is at the very least briefing a different line from Merkel's Chancellery, as suggested at the new year in Der Spiegel.
From the point of view of simple negotiating strategy alone, Athens can and should do they same. It does have counter-threats - and they are better ones, with generalizable application by the European left, than the foreign minister threatening, a la Muammar Gaddaffi, that Greek financial collapse will unleash "millions of migrants and thousands of Jihadis on Europe".
Ahead of the day of action against racism and fascism on 21 March, that lurid threat is not one we on the left in solidarity with Greece, its people and government can echo - in any shape or form.
Better to say that Cold War/Civil War suffocation of the left government in Greece will enhance the position of Marine Le Pen, Golden Dawn and the filth which truly threaten the well being of the masses in Europe, which include migrants and Muslims.
We must target the right, never the victims of the right.

“There will be millions of migrants and thousands of jihadists flocking in Europe if the Greek economy crumbles,” he said. “There is no stability in the western Balkans and then we have problems in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq and North Africa.”

Awkwardly avoiding the word “crescent” and its Islamic connotations - as in the alleged Shia crescent arcing from Beirut to Tehran - he concluded: “There is a scythe formed.”
In a post-Charlie Hebdo Europe, the intervention that was carefully planned according to Kotzias’s team, was guaranteed to press the buttons of both the continent’s securocrats and tabloid media.
- See more at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/syriza-led-greece-marks-out-new-tilt-east-1520847152#sthash.1u9Dd0nu.dpuf

[size=32]Varufakisov dom razbesneo Grke[/size]
IZVOR: B92, TANJUG
Atina -- Fotografije grčkog ministra finansija Janisa Varufakisa, u porodičnom domu u Atini, objavljene u francuskom magazinu Pariz mač izazvale su pravu buru reagovanja


 

Foto: Tanjug/AP

Na jednoj fotografiji Varufakis sedi za klavirom u dnevnoj sobi, na drugoj večera sa suprugom na krovnoj terasi svog, kako magazin opisuje, "ljubavnog gnezda u podnožju Akropolja", na trećoj čita knjigu u biblioteci...
Poznati magazin o slavnima takođe otkriva da Varufakis i njegova supruga, poznata umetnica Danae Stratou, žele da se presele iz svog sadašnjeg doma u veći stan u "trendi" naselju Plaka, koji je u vlasništvu njene bogate porodice. 

U članku se takođe kaže da bračni par, međutim, nema mnogo vremena da uživa jedno u drugom, jer "on mora da otputuje na pregovore o ekonomskom spašavanju Grčke i tako spreči bankrot svoje zemlje". Odmah po izlasku magazina usledile su brze i nemilosrdne reakcije na priču o životnom stilu prvog čoveka grčkih finansija u levičarskoj vladi koja se suočava sa velikim finansijskim problemima, navodi AFP. 

Tako se, recimo, Varufakisov kolega, ekonomista Ben Stajl iz Američkog saveta za strane odnose, našalio tvitom "Životni stil bogatih i slavnih, Siriza izdanje", dok je Erik Moris iz Asocijacije evropskih novinara napisao "Varufakis ima dobar životni stil, ali veoma loš marketing". 

AFP podseća da je pre samo nekoliko dana premijer Aleksis Cipras zamolio ministre da ne daju česte intervjue i da se usredsrede na rešavanje problema. 

Trenutak objavljivanja fotografija nije mogao biti gori budući da bi Grčka mogla da se nađe na ivici bankrota, pošto ovog meseca treba da pronađe oko šest milijardi evra za otplatu dospelih potraživanja na ime obveznica, kao i zajma MMF-a.

Honoring the Resistance

Alexis Tsipras on the Greek Resistance to Nazi occupation and the need for German reparations.

Greece: Phase Two

Greek MP Costas Lapavitsas on the economic barriers ahead for Syriza and the challenges of eurozone exit.

Spoiler:

Ko do sada nije verovao da se, kada je reč o Grčkoj, nemački mediji prepuštaju najnižim strastima, može u to da se uveri ovih dana. Nemački javni servis ARD je u samo dva dana ponudio dve debate koje su se takmičile u tome čija će rasprava o Grčkoj biti beskrupuloznija. Pitanje da li je Janis Varufakis u svom govoru pre dve godine pokazao srednji prst, svim „vodećim medijima” je važnije od onoga kako smo stigli do toga da srednji prst Nemačkoj sada pokazuju stotine hiljada građana Grčke.
U Grčkoj se ponovo govori o reparacijama iz Drugog svetskog rata, što pokazuje nemoć grčke politike koja na svaki način pokušava da se izvuče iz beznadne situacije. Brine me neosetljivost nemačke javnosti na to. Imamo jednu malu zemlju sateranu uza zid, koja se sa nadmoćnim protivnikom bori za svoje dostojanstvo. Gde su nemački političari da svojim građanima kažu: „Prestanite, time ništa ne dobijamo“. Ne, sa nekontrolisanom agresivnošću oni nastavljaju da nasrću na slabije od sebe.
Na kraju ćemo nesporno uništiti Evropu. Kada su svi pobeđeni, pobednik je izgubio. Biće to pobeda laži, licemerja i poricanja sopstvenih grešaka, kojih će se druge nacije dugo sećati. Pamtiće kako je nemačka vlada iskoristila moć poverilaca da ponizi dužnika i kako su se nemački mediji spustili na nivo kafanskog trača.