Rat u Ukrajini

ukrajinski je inače mnogo bliži našem jeziku, iz nekog razloga

fikret selimbašić wrote:

ficfiric wrote:

sta je sporno u javljajetsja - ja b voleo da tako govori Porfirije, bio bi dobar materijal za skeceve

Jaževljajetsja i ognjica efimera.

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:Ma ne govorni, pisani.

Duplo n, čemu to služi.

является - od ovog zaboli glava.


Slova koja se ne izgovaraju.


itd itsl

Двоструко (енгр. дупло) н се изговара, као код нас у „ваннаставни“.

Јавља се... јебига, исто као што и наше представља. Ово представља оно, а никад не кажу коме га представља и којом пригодом, како то да се досад нису познавали итд итд.

А за слова која се не изговарају, ено ти енглески, француски, италијански и још неки светски шампиони у томе.

паће wrote:

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:Ma ne govorni, pisani.

Duplo n, čemu to služi.

является - od ovog zaboli glava.


Slova koja se ne izgovaraju.


itd itsl

Двоструко (енгр. дупло) н се изговара, као код нас у „ваннаставни“.



А за слова која се не изговарају, ено ти енглески, француски, италијански и још неки светски шампиони у томе.

B1: Zajebi to, vannastavni je van + nastavni. Oni pišu Anna ko Englezi, ničim izazvani. Ne očekujem da vidim to na ćirilici, prosto bode oči.
B2: Znam to, ali ne očekujem od slovenskog jezika da ima tu devijaciju. Vidi pod B1.

MNE wrote:ukrajinski je inače mnogo bliži našem jeziku, iz nekog razloga

Ruski i srpski u stvari imaju malo identicnih reci ali dosta reci koje su dovoljno slicne da mozes da pogodis sta je.
Ukrajinski nema onoliko dovoljno slicnih reci kao sto ima ruski, ali ima vise identicnih reci od ruskog.

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:

паће wrote:

Двоструко (енгр. дупло) н се изговара, као код нас у „ваннаставни“.



А за слова која се не изговарају, ено ти енглески, француски, италијански и још неки светски шампиони у томе.

B1: Zajebi to, vannastavni je van + nastavni. Oni pišu Anna ko Englezi, ničim izazvani. Ne očekujem da vidim to na ćirilici, prosto bode oči.
B2: Znam to, ali ne očekujem od slovenskog jezika da ima tu devijaciju. Vidi pod B1.

Ма механизам изговора је исти, нисам спомињао порекло двојца. Имаш парова речи где значи ово са једним а оно са два н, дакле носи значење. А и Ана Карењина је Анна и оба н се изговарају, то је дуго.

Бе два: а не смета ти кад то исто раде на латиници? Словенски језици? Језици који се иначе пишу фонетски?

fikret selimbašić wrote:Napisao si jezik, ne pismo  :paće:

Bolja je srpska ćirilica, istina. Ukrajinska mi je i lošija i teža od ruske.

Negde sam procitao (sa sve primerima), kako bi za poljski bilo daleko lakse da se pise cirilicom. I stvarno, mnogo lakse za citanje kad je na cirlici.

паће wrote:

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:
B1: Zajebi to, vannastavni je van + nastavni. Oni pišu Anna ko Englezi, ničim izazvani. Ne očekujem da vidim to na ćirilici, prosto bode oči.
B2: Znam to, ali ne očekujem od slovenskog jezika da ima tu devijaciju. Vidi pod B1.

Ма механизам изговора је исти, нисам спомињао порекло двојца. Имаш парова речи где значи ово са једним а оно са два н, дакле носи значење.

Бе два: а не смета ти кад то исто раде на латиници? Словенски језици? Језици који се иначе пишу фонетски?

Od kad je zaratilo je pocelo da mi smeta jer sam poceo vise da se bavim ruskim jezikom jer telegram. Kad se zarati u Ceskoj mozda se udubim u to dal i oni imaju slovo koje se ne izgovara.

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:

MNE wrote:ukrajinski je inače mnogo bliži našem jeziku, iz nekog razloga

Ruski i srpski u stvari imaju malo identicnih reci ali dosta reci koje su dovoljno slicne da mozes da pogodis sta je.
Ukrajinski nema onoliko dovoljno slicnih reci kao sto ima ruski, ali ima vise identicnih reci od ruskog.

Ukrajinski je blizi srpskom (bos.hrv...). To je prosto lingvisticka cinjenica. Razlog je to sto su oba jezika standardizovani vernakular. Dakle blizi izvornom slovenskom narodnom jeziku.

Standardizovani ven… ver… verna… what?

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:Standardizovani ven… ver… verna… what?

Кулер за каверне.

паће wrote:Двоструко (енгр. дупло)

duplus (lat.) = dvostruk

https://www.online-latin-dictionary.com/latin-english-dictionary.php?parola=duplus

Imaš još u 3. izdanju Vukovog rečnika iz 1898. reč dupli za koju je navedeno da se u Vojvodini koristi u istom značenju kao nemački doppelt i latinski duplus, tako da si se malo prešao da to ima veze s uticajem engleskog.

Mór Thököly wrote:

Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:
Ruski i srpski u stvari imaju malo identicnih reci ali dosta reci koje su dovoljno slicne da mozes da pogodis sta je.
Ukrajinski nema onoliko dovoljno slicnih reci kao sto ima ruski, ali ima vise identicnih reci od ruskog.

Ukrajinski je blizi srpskom (bos.hrv...). To je prosto lingvisticka cinjenica. Razlog je to sto su oba jezika standardizovani vernakular. Dakle blizi izvornom slovenskom narodnom jeziku.

Ближи нам је зато што је то русификовани пољски. Пољски језик нам је иначе ближи него руски, и по лексици и по граматици. Oczy, czekaj уместо глаза, жди.

nosite kuci i ukrajiski i ruski i recite im jos jednom od mene da se teraju u kurac i jedni i drugi

...
From his vantage point, sitting across from senior Kremlin officials and advisers, it was apparent that the greatest issue was that the Russians were unable to articulate what exactly they wanted and needed.

“They don't know how to define victory or defeat. In fact, some of the elites to whom we spoke had never wanted the war in the first place, even saying it had been a complete mistake,” said the official.

“But now they’re at war — suffering a humiliating defeat is not an option for these guys.”

“It was here that we made clear that the U.S. was prepared to work constructively with Russian national security concerns,” the official added, breaking from the official U.S. line of squeezing Russia financially and isolating it internationally so as to prevent it from continuing its war against Ukraine.

“An attempt to isolate and cripple Russia to the point of humiliation or collapse would make negotiating almost impossible — we are already seeing this in the reticence from Moscow officials,” he said.

“In fact, we emphasized that the U.S. needs, and will continue to need, a strong enough Russia to create stability along its periphery. The U.S. wants a Russia with strategic autonomy in order for the U.S. to advance diplomatic opportunities in Central Asia. We in the U.S. have to recognize that total victory in Europe could harm our interests in other areas of the world.

“Russian power,” the official concluded, “is not necessarily a bad thing.”
....

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/07/26/us-official-shares-details-of-secret-track-15-diplomacy-with-moscow-a81972

It's extraordinary to see how clearly defined the frontline now is in Ukraine, even when viewed from space at a macro scale.

The grey of the dried up Kakhovka Reservoir followed by a green scar of un-harvested fields where it is too dangerous for agriculture. pic.twitter.com/Z91POuIiY6

— Michael Cruickshank (@MJ_Cruickshank) July 27, 2023

Priroda se obnavlja

Ko se seća Zelenw linije u Bejrutu za vreme gradjanskog rata?

Putin is looking for a bigger war, not an off-ramp, in Ukraine

New mobilisation law is part of a wider effort to maximise Russia’s firepower and blunt western support for Kyiv

ALEXANDER GABUEV
The writer is the director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin

“These amendments are written for a big war and general mobilisation. And the smell of this big war can already be scented,” Andrei Kartapolov, the head of the Duma’s defence committee, said this week as the Russian parliament rushed to adopt a new law. The legislation enabling the Kremlin to send hundreds of thousands more men into combat reveals a sad truth: that far from seeking an off-ramp from his disastrous war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin is preparing for an even bigger war.

It is understandable that many in Ukraine and the west want to believe that Russia’s president is cornered. The Ukrainian army is gradually reconquering lands occupied by the Russians and has shown itself capable of striking deep into enemy territory — even into the Kremlin itself. The sanctions pressure on Russia is mounting.
For now, the west remains united in support of Kyiv, and streams of modern weaponry and money sustain the Ukrainian war effort. Finally, the mutiny staged by the Wagner mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin and visible conflicts among senior Russian military commanders add to hopes that the Kremlin’s war machine will break down.

Things likely look very different to the Kremlin, which believes that it can afford a long war. The Russian economy is forecast to record modest growth this year, mostly thanks to military factories working around the clock. Critical components such as microchips needed for the defence industry are arriving from China and other sources.

Despite sanctions, the Kremlin’s war chest is still overflowing with cash, thanks to windfall energy profits last year and also to the adaptability of Russian commodities exporters, who have found new customers and who settle payments mostly in yuan. If budgetary pressures were to become more acute, Russia’s central bank could further devalue the rouble, making it easier to pay soldiers, defence industry workers and the internal security forces who keep the Russian elite and public repressed and largely in line with Putin’s disastrous course.

When it comes to the war itself, the Kremlin still seems unperturbed by the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Even if Kyiv makes more advances, the Kremlin may brush them off as temporary. Putin is banking on the fact that the Russian manpower that can potentially be mobilised is three to four times bigger than Ukraine’s, and the only pressing task is to be able to tap into that resource at will: to mobilise many more men, arm them, train them and send them to fight. This is precisely the purpose of the new law, which should help the Kremlin to avoid another official mobilisation.

From now on, the government can quietly send draft notices to as many men as it deems necessary. The upper age limit for performing mandatory service will be increased from 27 to 30, and could be raised again in future. Once an electronic draft notice is issued, Russia’s borders will be immediately closed to its recipient in order to prevent a massive exodus of military-age men like the one Russia witnessed last autumn. The punishments for refusing to serve have also been ramped up. These moves, combined with massive state investment in expanding arms production, should help Putin to build a bigger and better equipped army.

A parallel tactic is the strangulation of Ukraine’s economy. Knowing that the Ukrainian budget is on life support provided by its western allies, the Kremlin wants to deny Kyiv all sources of revenue. Moscow has therefore not only pulled out of the grain deal that had enabled Ukrainian agricultural exports via the Black Sea, it has also launched massive air strikes against Ukrainian ports to destroy any possibility of reviving the agreement. The same logic underpins Russia’s air strikes against civilian infrastructure: they are aimed at making Ukrainian cities uninhabitable and preventing reconstruction efforts.

The Kremlin hopes that the rapid rebuilding of the Russian army and gradual decimation of the Ukrainian economy and armed forces will result in growing western frustration and a decline in material support for Kyiv. To speed up this process and break the west’s will, Moscow is using threats of escalation, including expansion of the conflict towards Nato territory via Belarus with the help of Wagner mercenaries based there.
Putin has made plenty of fatal mistakes. But as long as he is in charge, Moscow will dedicate its still vast resources to achieving his obsession with destroying and subordinating Ukraine. As western leaders think about policies to support Ukraine into the third year of this ugly war, any long-term strategy must take this reality into account.

https://archive.is/20230730094816/https://www.ft.com/content/861a8955-924e-4d3e-8c59-73a13403e191

Carnegie je ponajmanje antiruski od svih tih think-Leoparda.

​The counteroffensive has largely been a brutal lesson for Ukrainian troops, who have struggled to seize back territory across the southern region of Zaporizhzhia. In two months, Ukrainian troops have advanced less than 10 miles at any point along the region’s 100-mile front. (...)
In one battle in which his unit took part, Ukrainian soldiers attacked in 10 American-made MaxxPro armored vehicles, but only one came back, he said. He showed photographs of the damaged vehicles, ripped open and burned out, which he said had been hauled back to a repair base. (...)
The soldier lost a 22-year-old friend, Stas, in the shelling the day before, he said, adding that in just over a month, his battalion had suffered so many dead and wounded that only 10 men remained at the front line.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/30/world/europe/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia.html

A battalion is a military unit, typically consisting of 300 to 1,000 soldiers

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battalion

Dakle, između 96,7% i 99% izbačenih iz stroja za mesec dana.

Napredovali su samo tamo gde su imali ljudsku artiljerijsku podrsku. "Što je i - logično"

Hoćeš da kažeš da je na ostalim delovima fronta ofanziva bila nelogična?

Citiram Miloševića, to bi bar ti trebalo da se sećaš