jugoslavija - od nemila do nedraga

Secretary of State William Rogers called President Richard Nixon
at 10:36 a.m. on October 29, 1971, to recount a conversation he had had
with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac during a reception the
previous evening. Relevant portions of a transcript prepared from a
tape recording of the conversation read:

Rogers: “You should know this in case you talk to Tito again.
Nixon: “Yeah.
Rogers: “Yesterday, in my meeting with the Foreign Minister, I again pressed him on whether they were encouraged or not as a result of the Brezhnev visit and he indicated yes and he indicated President Tito was satisfied, as he had done in New York.
Nixon: “Yeah.
Rogers: “And so forth. Last night when we were up in your gold room, he took me aside.
Nixon: “[Unclear] Yeah.
Rogers: “Yeah, he took me aside, spoke in English.
Nixon: “Uh huh.
Rogers: “He doesn’t speak English very well, but he didn’t want the interpreter there. And he said: ‘I want you to know, for your own ears, and your ears only, the meeting with Brezhnev did not go well.’
Nixon: “Ha.
Rogers: “And then I said to him to say it again and he said: ‘The meeting with Brezhnev did not go well.’ He said: ‘You should know that.’ And he said: ‘You’re the only one I have told it to.’ And, I said, ‘Well, of course, I want to tell President Nixon.’ He said, ‘Yes, President Tito told me to tell you so you could tell President Nixon.’
Nixon: “Isn’t it interesting that Tito, of course, he’s a little gingerly, but he did not indicate that much. He said it did not go well?
Rogers: “That’s right.
Nixon: “Very interesting.
Rogers: “Now the reason that I’m sure that he did it that way, was to, so that he could say that he, Tito, had never told you, had never told anybody that.
Nixon: “Exactly. Shows you how scared they are. Well, let me tell you an interesting side light to that. After the dinner last night, I had the, I had him, I went over and talked to him.
Rogers: “Uh huh.
Nixon: “Now the interpreter, you know, the very distinguished—
Rogers: “Yeah. Yeah.
Nixon: “—man—
Rogers: “The white-haired fellow.
Nixon: “The white-haired guy who was in Yugoslavia—was with him in Yugoslavia. So, I think he was trying to do double talk. But the message came through very, very clear. He said, he said, he said: ‘You know, I know I only have a few moments.’ And, actually I spent all the time in the coffee hour with him, except for about the last 3 or 4 minutes when I met a few of those outsiders. He said a few moments. But he said: ‘I want to tell you that we in Yugoslavia may face some very great problems.’ He said that ‘President Tito is a very old man and when he dies, when he goes, I mean when he retires, then we may be confronted with the attempts of some of our neighbors to capitalize on that.’
Rogers: “Uh huh.
Nixon: “He said, he said: ‘What I would strongly hope is that as far as U.S. policy,’ and he was referring to my toast about independence and [unclear], ‘as far as U.S. policy is that, that ah, that we, you would be aware of this and, and, and could use all your influence.’ And I said, ‘Well, let me say just one thing. First, you can be sure that we will never threaten your independence and so forth.’
Rogers: “Uh huh.
Nixon: “ ‘And, second, that we will use our influence to see that others have,’ or I put it this way: he used the word ‘hands off’ Yugoslavia. I said that ‘you can be sure that our hands will always be off Yugoslavia and we will use our influence to see that others keep their hands off.’
Rogers: “Uh huh.
Nixon: “He said: ‘You get the message.’ ”

After a brief discussion of the physical characteristics of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, the President continued:
Nixon: “I’m telling you he didn’t speak in English to me.
Rogers: “Oh, I see.
Nixon: “So the interpreter was there, so he probably wasn’t as frank with me.
Rogers: “I see, yes, yes.
Nixon: “But I could tell that what he was trying to tell me and now I see the picture. What he was trying to tell me was, probably, it fits in with what you had said, that they fear the Russians.
Rogers: “That’s right. Well, very much so. He said to me after my meeting in which I said that we would be happy to cooperate in the military way with them as we have been this year, on an accelerated basis as long as it wasn’t disruptive, as far as they were concerned, and as long as consistent with our policy. He said afterwards when I met with Tito at lunch. Tito said to me, the Foreign Minister told me about his conversation with you and we feel very much better. Now, at that time, I didn’t know what he was talking about, but, ah, this was a very interesting thing and he didn’t even have the interpreter, and he [unclear].
Nixon: “And I, when he was with me, he did not speak English at all, but he did have the interpreter. But he did, but I think now that the two conversations, that the two conversations fit together.
Rogers: “Right.
Nixon: “When he said we are, when he says I am, he used the word fearful, of what will happen after Tito goes.
Rogers: “Yeah.
Nixon: “He says that he just hopes that hands off Yugoslavia [laughs] and, so I see exactly and in view of what he said, the meetings did not go well, the point [be]cause I pressed Tito in, in the dinner, at dinner we got into the question of what sort of man Brezhnev was, and all that sort of thing. Whether or not the Brezhnev Doctrine, really, did it mean, I said it would be very significant if, if the reports were that the Brezhnev Doctrine had been modified. And, he, he, of course he has the girl interpreter there, who is probably an agent of both sides, and he’s, he said, and he left the implication, yes, that the Brezhnev Doctrine was modified or had been modified but what the Foreign Minister tells you would indicate it certainly had not.
Rogers: “I gathered that it had not and he was really, had an ominous tone in his voice. As I say, this was not, this was a very, he took me aside.”

Secretary Rogers then repeated the account of his talk with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister.
Nixon: “It’s interesting how Tito, probably because he figures that everything is going to be reported, took, took the line that he did. I suppose he doesn’t trust that, the interpreter. He didn’t trust her.
Rogers: “I think that’s right. And, he doesn’t want word to get out either publicly.
Nixon: “That’s right. Oh God. He can’t. He’s scared to death.
Rogers: “He can’t afford it. He can’t afford it.
Nixon: “Very interesting. Well, at least we’ve, but now I see the two conversations fit together like a glove.
Rogers: “Yes.
Nixon: “He was trying to tell me exactly the thing: hands off Yugoslavia. I am afraid. You know, and he, he always talks in an ominous way, I notice. I like him though. He’s tough. Tough and strong.
Rogers: “Oh, he’s tough and strong.
Nixon: “And, I was so glad and I sought him out, actually, I saw
him, or the aide did, you know our Assistant Chief of Protocol, brought him over—”
Rogers: “Good.
Nixon: “And, and, so this fits in very well.”

Nixon and Rogers then agreed not to pursue this issue during talk
with Tito, because, Nixon concluded, “Tito is afraid to say what he thinks
of the Russians.” The editors prepared the conversation printed here
specifically for this volume. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,
White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon
and Rogers, October 29, 1971, 10:36 a.m., Conversation No. 13–25)