One of my comrades, who had returned from the front for reorganization, asked me briefly and clearly (without getting into the jungle of military science) to summarize and state my thoughts that were expressed in a conversation with him and concerning the reasons for my "pessimism" regarding the success of the "second ("concrete") stage of the NWO". - He thinks it might be useful to someone. I think that no one (of those who make decisions) will pay attention, but I promised and, therefore, I keep my promise.
So, let's briefly assess the operational situation:
1. On our part: after the "successful completion of the first stage of the operation" (which ended in a large-scale RETREAT from the territory of the Kiev, Chernihiv and Sumy regions) - there is a redeployment and concentration of forces in the Donetsk sector of the front. Apparently (and according to the statements of the political leadership of the Russian Federation), it is here that it is planned to carry out the "second stage" and solve the problem of completely clearing the territory of the LDNR from enemy groups.
Obviously, the calculation is being made on the creation of two or three strike groups sufficient in number, which - with the concentrated support of all aviation forces and most of the artillery - will "grind" the opposing Ukrainian forces (which are still estimated for some reason not highly) and defeat them in one big battle.
2. On the part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: the plans of the command of the RF Armed Forces are well known to the enemy, and he - the enemy - does not at all consider the defeat of his grouping inevitable. On the contrary, the Armed Forces of Ukraine intend to defend themselves on their heavily fortified positions, relying on previously and newly created (the command of the RF Armed Forces provided them with enough time) fortified nodes in the alleged directions of the strike of the Russian troops (and they are obvious - it’s enough to look at the map).
We ask ourselves the question: does the superiority of the RF Armed Forces in aviation and heavy weapons guarantee victory over an enemy (for whom offensive plans are obvious) prepared for defense, with high morale? My answer is NO, not guaranteed.
Why? - I answer:
The "superiority" of the RF Armed Forces in aviation and artillery is very relative. Since the enemy has a well-equipped and numerous military air defense, which seriously limits the actions of tactical aviation, which is capable of supporting its troops on the battlefield. The enemy has an ADVANTAGE in the means of field and artillery reconnaissance (unmanned aerial vehicles of various classes are already almost at the platoon level). And its artillery has good weapons and well-trained personnel. And against the numerous Russian armored vehicles - the Armed Forces of Ukraine (in defense conditions) are quite capable due to the really huge amount of anti-tank weapons in the hands of the infantry (ATGM).
In conditions when Russian troops will have to storm one urban agglomeration after another, the amount of manpower comes to the fore. But in it, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the LDNR, alas, do not have a serious advantage.
Suppose, having overcome the first line of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine south of Izyum and in the Gulyai-Pole area, our troops begin to advance in converging directions.
Can they quickly unite in the deep rear of the Ukrainian grouping, creating ("according to the classics") two encirclement rings (external and internal)? With a guarantee that the enemy will not immediately break through them and create their own "cauldrons" for the attackers? (The Germans did this repeatedly in 1942 with our troops).
I express doubt. Why? - I answer: because this requires a LOT of units and formations, designed not only to break through, but also to firmly secure the territory. As well as a large number of supply units. If the enemy had few forces, the protection of communications could be partially ignored. But the Armed Forces of Ukraine (thanks to mobilizations) already have enough forces - comparable to the number of our troops in the theater. In addition, the enemy has the ability to shorten the front line and transfer the released forces to threatened areas - the Russian Federation does not have complete air supremacy simply because of the insufficient number of strike aircraft and the negligible number of strike drones. At the same time, the main The enemy can hold the front line near Donetsk with relatively small forces due to the excellent engineering equipment that has been produced for many years, while our brilliant politicians "chewed Minsk snot."
In this regard, I assume that the general lack of forces will not allow the Russian command to carry out "deep coverage in the area of the Dnieper (Ekaterinoslav). - There simply will not be enough forces for this. Therefore, the offensive will be carried out "along the shortest directions" - from the north - to Slavyansk-Kramatorsk (maximum - on Barvenkovo), from the south - on the Ugledar-Kurakhovo line. Both of these lines of operation inevitably lead our troops to "sticking" into heavily fortified and occupied by large, pre-prepared for defense garrisons continuous urban agglomerations. the enemy is completely left with roads along which he will be able to supply his troops.
Thus, after some time in these areas, the situation will repeat itself, which already exists in the areas of Rubizhnoye-Severodonetsk, Popasnaya, Avdeevka and Marinka, where the Allied forces are moving forward very slowly and with very heavy losses (especially in the infantry). Or they don't advance at all (Avdeevka).
The enemy is "more than completely" satisfied with this method of warfare. Why? - Because the Armed Forces of Ukraine need another one and a half to two (maximum - three) months to prepare large reserves - not in the form of constant replenishment to the active troops (they continuously do this, maintaining the number of units directly involved in the battles at a fairly high level), but in the form of new units and formations that can be deployed in other strategic directions, while Russian forces "bleed", storming the fortified cities of Donbass.
In the worst case scenario, we may repeat a situation similar to the one that developed for the Wehrmacht during Operation Citadel (Kursk Bulge). While the Germans, slowly gnawing through the defense in depth of the Soviet troops, were losing time and wasting their accumulated reserves, the Soviet command concentrated to the north (near Belgorod and Orel) a large grouping of its own troops, not involved in the battle. And when she went on the offensive, it “suddenly became clear” that Germany did not have the strength to simultaneously continue Operation Citadel and repel the counteroffensive of Soviet troops. I had to curtail the operation and return the battered troops to their original positions. And then, in general, more or less organized (which the Germans did not succeed in everywhere) - to roll back beyond the Dnieper.
In this regard, I remind you that the so-called. "Ukraine" is finishing the THIRD STAGE OF GENERAL MOBILIZATION. It has a human resource (200-300 thousand people) and technical capability (a huge flow of various weapons from Europe and the USA) to not only maintain a sufficient number of its troops at the front, but also create new reserves. And to create them "in quantity" (even 100 thousand people - this is about 50 battalion tactical groups, including reinforcements and rear infrastructure - that is, about 10 full-blooded divisions).
And we have? We are recruiting for various PMCs, recruiting contract soldiers in the military registration and enlistment offices and ... that's all ... LDNR (in terms of mobilization) "swept clean" - and those "who else can be caught", God forbid, will be able to replenish already incurred and future losses.
Suppose it is possible (at the expense of PMCs) to create another 10 (even 20, which is unlikely) of various kinds of detachments and BTGs. What next? The losses incurred in the Donbass (during the assault on the next "fortresses" they will definitely be VERY HIGH) will also need to be compensated somehow.
In general, HOW will the Russian command be able to "fend off" the concentration of fresh formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for example, on the borders of the Kursk and Belgorod regions in a month or two? And if they go on the offensive, how will they be repelled? Consolidated police detachments, detachments of "Alco-Cossacks" (all real Cossacks are already at the front) or the regional militia? So it - the regional militia - has not even been created yet !!! Nobody stutters...
Or did our military "agree in advance" with the enemy that he (the enemy) would behave strictly within the framework of the plans of our glorified General Staff? At the "first stage of the NWO" - somehow this did not work out "from the word at all." With sensitive losses for participants. And I don’t think that at the “second stage” it will be somehow different - the military men are obviously not going to act as “whipping boys”.
Thus, summing up, I note:
Without carrying out at least partial mobilization in the Russian Federation - to carry out deep strategic offensive operations on the so-called. "Ukraine" is both impossible and extremely dangerous. We need to prepare for a long and difficult war, which will require all the human resources that are mediocrely squandered now for the sake of "a flag over the next city council" (how quickly you can "change flags" - Gostomel and Bucha will not let you lie).
And - yes - I would very much like to be mistaken in my forecasts for the operation that has begun ("second stage"). But the pomp with which the hedonists, who have already pissed themselves off many times (in all fields), through and through false talkers and mediocrity, "present" it - does not inspire additional optimism in me. NO CONCLUSIONS have been drawn from the failures of the first two months - strategically.'
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by Nektivni Ugnelj Wed Apr 20, 2022 4:39 pm