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by Tovar Sat Nov 04, 2023 1:40 pmInače, milina je vidjeti čudnovato bratstvo wannabe usraša i cionističke bojne koja radi prekovremeno po rvackim forumima.
Блиски исток
- Posts : 41623
Join date : 2012-02-12
Location : wife privilege
„Лоше је кад то ураде нама, добро кад ми урадимо њима“.
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cousin for roasting the rakija
И кажем себи у сну, еј бре коњу па ти ни немаш озвучење, имаш оне две кутијице око монитора, видећеш кад се пробудиш...
- Posts : 7665
Join date : 2020-03-05
U more.Filipenko wrote:Pa dobro, i Izraelci ce imati gde da odu jednog dana.
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"Burundi je svakako sharmantno mesto cinika i knjiskih ljudi koji gledaju stvar sa svog olimpa od kartona."
“Here he was then, cruising the deserts of Mexico in my Ford Torino with my wife and my credit cards and his black-tongued dog. He had a chow dog that went everywhere with him, to the post office and ball games, and now that red beast was making free with his lion feet on my Torino seats.”
- Posts : 7665
Join date : 2020-03-05
Da, pa onda ambasada u jednoj zemlji osudjuje izjavu ambasade u drugoj zemlji.Tovar wrote:Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:
Govnar je izjavio da je Hrvatska imala sreću jer su Srbi iz Hrvatske imali gde da odu, za razliku od Palestinaca iz Gaze. Kačio je to neko ovde tu izjavu.
Jebi ga, zaletio se, zaboravio da su Srbi u susjedstvu i prate hrvatske medije. Možeš se okladiti da za svakog imaju sličnu priču. Ambasador u Beogradu vjerojatno Palestince uspoređuje s Bošnjacima i kosovskim Albancima, ako imaju kakvo predstavništvo u Prištini onda ih uspoređuju sa kosovskim Srbima. I tako dalje i tako bliže...
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"Burundi je svakako sharmantno mesto cinika i knjiskih ljudi koji gledaju stvar sa svog olimpa od kartona."
“Here he was then, cruising the deserts of Mexico in my Ford Torino with my wife and my credit cards and his black-tongued dog. He had a chow dog that went everywhere with him, to the post office and ball games, and now that red beast was making free with his lion feet on my Torino seats.”
- Posts : 7665
Join date : 2020-03-05
Ovo sad što gledaš je savremena varijanta: kad mi napravimo pizdariju nekome, to ima opravdanja jer okolnosti. Kad neko drugi napravi nekom trećem, onda je to genocid i etničko čišćenje.паће wrote:„Лоше је кад то ураде нама, добро кад ми урадимо њима“.
_____
"Burundi je svakako sharmantno mesto cinika i knjiskih ljudi koji gledaju stvar sa svog olimpa od kartona."
“Here he was then, cruising the deserts of Mexico in my Ford Torino with my wife and my credit cards and his black-tongued dog. He had a chow dog that went everywhere with him, to the post office and ball games, and now that red beast was making free with his lion feet on my Torino seats.”
- Posts : 41623
Join date : 2012-02-12
Location : wife privilege
Vilmos Tehenészfiú wrote:Ovo sad što gledaš je savremena varijanta: kad mi napravimo pizdariju nekome, to ima opravdanja jer okolnosti. Kad neko drugi napravi nekom trećem, onda je to genocid i etničko čišćenje.паће wrote:„Лоше је кад то ураде нама, добро кад ми урадимо њима“.
Као и Слоби и свима после њега, желим им да се њихова правила примене на њих.
_____
cousin for roasting the rakija
И кажем себи у сну, еј бре коњу па ти ни немаш озвучење, имаш оне две кутијице око монитора, видећеш кад се пробудиш...
- Posts : 7665
Join date : 2020-03-05
Ja sam mislio na Filipenka, ali ajde može i Sloba.
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"Burundi je svakako sharmantno mesto cinika i knjiskih ljudi koji gledaju stvar sa svog olimpa od kartona."
“Here he was then, cruising the deserts of Mexico in my Ford Torino with my wife and my credit cards and his black-tongued dog. He had a chow dog that went everywhere with him, to the post office and ball games, and now that red beast was making free with his lion feet on my Torino seats.”
- Posts : 13817
Join date : 2016-02-01
Erdogan rekao da je Netanjahu kod njega precrtan i najavio da će Turska podneti prijavu Međunarodnom krivičnom sudu protiv Izraela zbog ratnih zločina.
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkiye-erased-netanyahu-will-bring-israels-war-crimes-to-icc
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkiye-erased-netanyahu-will-bring-israels-war-crimes-to-icc
- Posts : 7229
Join date : 2019-11-04
Introducing Al-Azhar University in Gaza, where I had my first degree in English Literature. pic.twitter.com/kItSHzt09r
— Ahmed Alnaouq (@AlnaouqA) November 4, 2023
Al-Azhat University is run by Fatah, the main opponent of Hamas.
— Ahmed Alnaouq (@AlnaouqA) November 4, 2023
Hamas had never had any control over this university.
This is a war against every Palestinian entity.
- Posts : 10404
Join date : 2020-06-19
Izraelci kažu da je cilj legitiman jer su na tom univerzitetu školovani indžiliri koji si radili na razvoju raketa za hamas.
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Međuopštinski pustolov.
Zli stolar.
- Posts : 16550
Join date : 2014-11-06
BREAKING: Jewish woman stabbed in her home in :flag_fr: Lyon, France, with a swastika carved out on the door of her home.
— The Spectator Index (@spectatorindex) November 4, 2023
- Posts : 13817
Join date : 2016-02-01
Užas. Dva uboda, kažu, srećom izgleda nije u životnoj opasnosti, javlja Liberasion.
Papa Franja izjavio da je potrebno rešenje sa dve države za Izrael i Palestinu kako bi se okončali ratovi poput trenutnog i pozvao da se Jerusalimu dodeli poseban status.
Protest ispred Netanjahuove rezidencije u Jerusalimu, demonstranti traže ostavku, a neki i viču "Bibi je ubica".
- Posts : 13817
Join date : 2016-02-01
Sveža anketa Kanala 13:
Takođe su pitani da li treba stanovnicima Pojasa Gaze dozvoliti da se vrate kućama ako se Hamasova vlast ne raspadne i 55% je reklo da ne treba, a 24% da treba uz 21% onih koji ne znaju.
https://13tv.co.il/item/news/politics/politics/new-poll-903784948/
Takođe su pitani da li treba stanovnicima Pojasa Gaze dozvoliti da se vrate kućama ako se Hamasova vlast ne raspadne i 55% je reklo da ne treba, a 24% da treba uz 21% onih koji ne znaju.
https://13tv.co.il/item/news/politics/politics/new-poll-903784948/
- Posts : 7229
Join date : 2019-11-04
Imperial Designs
OLIVER EAGLETON
03 NOVEMBER 2023
https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/imperial-designs
Since the Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October and the ensuing assault on Gaza, the Biden administration has performed what is euphemistically described as a ‘balancing act’. On the one hand it praises the collective punishment of Palestinians; on the other it warns Israel against overreach. Its support for aerial bombardment and targeted raids is steadfast, but it has posed ‘tough questions’ about the ground invasion that started earlier this week: Is there an achievable military objective? A roadmap to release the hostages? A way to avoid untenable Israeli governance if Hamas is extirpated? Washington is pressing the Israelis on such issues – and sending its own advisers to help solve them – while also giving the green light for the ongoing massacre. Its response to the crisis has been driven by a confluence of factors, including the desire to outflank Republicans and the reactive instinct to ‘stand with Israel’. Yet it can also be placed in the context of its broader vision for the Middle East, which crystallized under Trump and was consolidated by Biden.
Aware of the chaos wrought by its regime change efforts, and eager to complete the ‘pivot to Asia’ initiated in the early 2010s, the US has sought to partially disentangle itself from the region. Its goal is to establish a model that would replace direct intervention with oversight from a distance. To contemplate any real reduction in its presence, though, it first needs a security settlement that would strengthen friendly regimes and constrain the influence of nonconforming ones. The 2020 Abraham Accords advanced this agenda, as Bahrain and the UAE, by agreeing to normalize relations with Israel, joined a wider ‘reactionary axis’ spanning the Saudi Kingdom and Egyptian autocracy. Trump expanded arms sales to these states and cultivated connections between them – military, commercial, diplomatic – with the aim of creating a reliable phalanx of allies who would tilt towards the US in the New Cold War while acting as a bulwark against Iran. Obama’s nuclear deal had failed to stop the Islamic Republic from projecting its influence. Only ‘maximum pressure’ could do so.
Once in office, Biden adopted the same general coordinates: using the Negev Summit to deepen ties between the Abraham countries and suing for formal relations between the Saudis and Israelis. The JCPOA remained a dead letter and efforts to contain Tehran continued, through a combination of sanctions, diplomacy and military exercises. As Brett McGurk, the White House Coordinator for the Middle East, put it in a speech to the Atlantic Council, the premises of this policy are ‘integration’ and ‘deterrence’: building ‘political, economic, security connections between US partners’ which will repel ‘threats from Iran and its proxies’. Having developed this programme and presided over a trade boom between Israel and its Arab partners, Biden began to make good on the ‘drawdown’ promised by his predecessor – executing the pullout from Afghanistan while reducing troops and military assets in Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
The incumbent also refined the US approach to Palestine. Whereas Trump had choked off aid to the occupied territories and tried to gain assent for his delusional ‘peace deal’, Biden simply accepted the imperfect reality – in which Israel, despite having no workable plan for the Palestinians, seemed to enjoy relative security thanks to the collaborationist authorities in the West Bank and the military stranglehold on Gaza. In the abstract, he may have wanted to revive the ‘two-state solution’, of a nuclear juggernaut flanking a defenceless and bantustanized Palestinian nation. But since that was a political impossibility, he learned to live with the situation that Tareq Baconi describes as ‘violent equilibrium’: an indefinite occupation, punctuated by periodic confrontations with Hamas which were small-scale enough to be ignored by the Israeli population.
This regional blueprint always suffered from serious problems. First, if its raison d’être was Great Power politics – stepping back from the Middle East to sharpen the focus on China – it proved partly counterproductive. For in signalling its diminished appetite for interference in the region, the US conveyed to its allies that they would not have to make a zero-sum choice between American and Chinese partnership; hence the PRC’s increasingly warm welcome in the Arab world: its construction of a military base in the UAE, its brokering of the Iran–Saudi rapprochement and its network of technology and infrastructure investments. Second, in pinning its imperial strategy on the Israeli normalization process, the US became especially reliant on this settler-colonial project just before it was captured by its most extreme and volatile elements: Smotrich, Ben-Gvir, Galant. If American support for Israel has historically exceeded any reasonable political calculus, under Trump and Biden it acquired a coherent rationale: to place its ally at the centre of a stable Middle Eastern security framework. Yet the Israeli cabinet that came to power in 2022 – addled by eliminationist fantasies, and determined to draw the US into war with Iran – proved least able to play that role.
Now, in the wake of October 7, this equilibrium has been shattered and those fantasies activated. Hamas’s attack aimed to unravel a political conjuncture in which the apartheid regime had become convinced that it could repress any serious resistance to its rule, and in which Palestine was rapidly becoming a non-issue in Israel and beyond. That intolerable state of affairs was its primary target. The leadership in Gaza anticipated a ferocious response, including a ground incursion. It also expected that this would cause problems for the Abraham settlement by sparking regional opposition, at popular and elite levels, to Israeli atrocities. All this has so far been borne out: the Saudi–Israel deal is delayed, the next Negev Summit remains on hold, the Arab nations are roiled by protests and their rulers have been forced to denounce Netanyahu. What does this mean for Washington’s overarching policy ambitions? The final answer will depend on the trajectory of the conflict.
As many onlookers have noted, Israel’s stated aim of ‘destroying Hamas’ poses a risk of continual and protracted escalation. In planning an urban war against an embedded guerrilla army, the national unity government has contemplated various endgames, including the depopulation of the northern Strip and mass expulsions to the Sinai. Any such strategy is liable to cross the ambiguous thresholds that could trigger major reprisals from Hezbollah and – potentially – the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. (Yemen’s Houthis have already launched missiles and drones at Israel, and are primed to send more over the coming weeks.) Biden’s deployment of warships to the Mediterranean and Red Sea, plus Blinken’s shuttle diplomacy, are intended to avert this outcome. It is too early to assess the impact of their efforts, but failure would see the hegemon drawn deeper into this bloody quagmire. The effect would be to widen fissures in the Arab–Israeli axis and distract America from its priorities in the Far East.
In the event that the invading army manages to demolish Hamas politically and militarily, the US would also have to grapple with the problem of succession. At present it hopes to corral Arab states into providing a force to govern the territory so as to relieve Israel of the burden. US officials are reporting that American, French, British and German soldiers could be dispatched to defend this hypothetical dictatorship. But if regional powers refuse to cooperate, as seems likely, alternative proposals include a ‘peacekeeping’ coalition modelled on the Sinai’s Multinational Force and Observers – to which the Pentagon currently contributes almost 500 troops – or an administration under the auspices of the UN. Such schemes would effectively restore the US to the status of neo-colonial authority in the Middle East, despite its years-long attempts to fill the role with local subordinates. They would turn American forces into a visible target for the rage and resentment created by the Zionist war – an unenviable legacy for Biden to leave behind.
But it may not come to that. There are other foreseeable scenarios that would be more favourable to the White House. Given Egypt’s refusal to facilitate the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, the banishment of Gaza’s 2.2 million residents seems unlikely in the short term. This, combined with American diplomatic pressure, has evidently caused Israel to modify the plan for its invasion, choosing an incremental approach over a rapid sweep. Whether this will reduce the chances of intervention by Hezbollah or Iran remains unclear. But the first is mindful of its precarious standing in Lebanon, which could be further harmed by a military conflagration, while the second is anxious to avoid the perils of direct involvement. The Saudis, though outwardly critical of the US position, are no less keen to prevent a conflict that would consume the entire Middle East and derail their ‘Vision 2030’. In each case, a number of domestic political imperatives are at odds with the regionalization of the war. A ray of hope for the declining empire?
Whether or not the violence is contained, however, Israeli success is hardly assured. Hamas’s 40,000 hardened fighters, adept at hybrid warfare and capable of ambushing the enemy via underground tunnels, are a stark contrast with the Israeli reservists who just received their refresher training. As the streetfighting begins, the numerical and technological asymmetries between the two may seem less decisive. One can therefore imagine a timeline in which the militants fight Netanyahu to a stalemate, the taboo on a ceasefire is lifted, and both sides eventually declare victory: Hamas because it repelled an existential threat from Israel; Israel because it can claim (however disingenuously) to have inflicted irreparable damage on Hamas and precluded any recurrence of its attack.
Thereafter, Gaza would slowly emerge from the rubble and return to something resembling the status quo ante – yet with worse humanitarian conditions, as well as a wounded neighbour that is even more obsessed with its destruction. Although the US claims it wants Hamas to perish, it would stand to benefit from this situation in several important respects. It would save it from coordinating the post-war governance of the Strip; it would allow Israeli normalization to resume after a necessary hiatus; and, in the best-case scenario for Biden, it would place limits on further escalation while also undermining Russian and Chinese attempts to straddle both sides of the Israel–Palestine conflict. The Abraham paradigm could thus be reinstated, at least until the next major flare-up. Rather than transforming the Middle East, then, the war may leave intact the ‘security architecture’ built by Trump and Biden. Yet the instability of this edifice has been proven. It would only be a matter of time before it buckles once again.
OLIVER EAGLETON
03 NOVEMBER 2023
https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/imperial-designs
Since the Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October and the ensuing assault on Gaza, the Biden administration has performed what is euphemistically described as a ‘balancing act’. On the one hand it praises the collective punishment of Palestinians; on the other it warns Israel against overreach. Its support for aerial bombardment and targeted raids is steadfast, but it has posed ‘tough questions’ about the ground invasion that started earlier this week: Is there an achievable military objective? A roadmap to release the hostages? A way to avoid untenable Israeli governance if Hamas is extirpated? Washington is pressing the Israelis on such issues – and sending its own advisers to help solve them – while also giving the green light for the ongoing massacre. Its response to the crisis has been driven by a confluence of factors, including the desire to outflank Republicans and the reactive instinct to ‘stand with Israel’. Yet it can also be placed in the context of its broader vision for the Middle East, which crystallized under Trump and was consolidated by Biden.
Aware of the chaos wrought by its regime change efforts, and eager to complete the ‘pivot to Asia’ initiated in the early 2010s, the US has sought to partially disentangle itself from the region. Its goal is to establish a model that would replace direct intervention with oversight from a distance. To contemplate any real reduction in its presence, though, it first needs a security settlement that would strengthen friendly regimes and constrain the influence of nonconforming ones. The 2020 Abraham Accords advanced this agenda, as Bahrain and the UAE, by agreeing to normalize relations with Israel, joined a wider ‘reactionary axis’ spanning the Saudi Kingdom and Egyptian autocracy. Trump expanded arms sales to these states and cultivated connections between them – military, commercial, diplomatic – with the aim of creating a reliable phalanx of allies who would tilt towards the US in the New Cold War while acting as a bulwark against Iran. Obama’s nuclear deal had failed to stop the Islamic Republic from projecting its influence. Only ‘maximum pressure’ could do so.
Once in office, Biden adopted the same general coordinates: using the Negev Summit to deepen ties between the Abraham countries and suing for formal relations between the Saudis and Israelis. The JCPOA remained a dead letter and efforts to contain Tehran continued, through a combination of sanctions, diplomacy and military exercises. As Brett McGurk, the White House Coordinator for the Middle East, put it in a speech to the Atlantic Council, the premises of this policy are ‘integration’ and ‘deterrence’: building ‘political, economic, security connections between US partners’ which will repel ‘threats from Iran and its proxies’. Having developed this programme and presided over a trade boom between Israel and its Arab partners, Biden began to make good on the ‘drawdown’ promised by his predecessor – executing the pullout from Afghanistan while reducing troops and military assets in Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
The incumbent also refined the US approach to Palestine. Whereas Trump had choked off aid to the occupied territories and tried to gain assent for his delusional ‘peace deal’, Biden simply accepted the imperfect reality – in which Israel, despite having no workable plan for the Palestinians, seemed to enjoy relative security thanks to the collaborationist authorities in the West Bank and the military stranglehold on Gaza. In the abstract, he may have wanted to revive the ‘two-state solution’, of a nuclear juggernaut flanking a defenceless and bantustanized Palestinian nation. But since that was a political impossibility, he learned to live with the situation that Tareq Baconi describes as ‘violent equilibrium’: an indefinite occupation, punctuated by periodic confrontations with Hamas which were small-scale enough to be ignored by the Israeli population.
This regional blueprint always suffered from serious problems. First, if its raison d’être was Great Power politics – stepping back from the Middle East to sharpen the focus on China – it proved partly counterproductive. For in signalling its diminished appetite for interference in the region, the US conveyed to its allies that they would not have to make a zero-sum choice between American and Chinese partnership; hence the PRC’s increasingly warm welcome in the Arab world: its construction of a military base in the UAE, its brokering of the Iran–Saudi rapprochement and its network of technology and infrastructure investments. Second, in pinning its imperial strategy on the Israeli normalization process, the US became especially reliant on this settler-colonial project just before it was captured by its most extreme and volatile elements: Smotrich, Ben-Gvir, Galant. If American support for Israel has historically exceeded any reasonable political calculus, under Trump and Biden it acquired a coherent rationale: to place its ally at the centre of a stable Middle Eastern security framework. Yet the Israeli cabinet that came to power in 2022 – addled by eliminationist fantasies, and determined to draw the US into war with Iran – proved least able to play that role.
Now, in the wake of October 7, this equilibrium has been shattered and those fantasies activated. Hamas’s attack aimed to unravel a political conjuncture in which the apartheid regime had become convinced that it could repress any serious resistance to its rule, and in which Palestine was rapidly becoming a non-issue in Israel and beyond. That intolerable state of affairs was its primary target. The leadership in Gaza anticipated a ferocious response, including a ground incursion. It also expected that this would cause problems for the Abraham settlement by sparking regional opposition, at popular and elite levels, to Israeli atrocities. All this has so far been borne out: the Saudi–Israel deal is delayed, the next Negev Summit remains on hold, the Arab nations are roiled by protests and their rulers have been forced to denounce Netanyahu. What does this mean for Washington’s overarching policy ambitions? The final answer will depend on the trajectory of the conflict.
As many onlookers have noted, Israel’s stated aim of ‘destroying Hamas’ poses a risk of continual and protracted escalation. In planning an urban war against an embedded guerrilla army, the national unity government has contemplated various endgames, including the depopulation of the northern Strip and mass expulsions to the Sinai. Any such strategy is liable to cross the ambiguous thresholds that could trigger major reprisals from Hezbollah and – potentially – the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. (Yemen’s Houthis have already launched missiles and drones at Israel, and are primed to send more over the coming weeks.) Biden’s deployment of warships to the Mediterranean and Red Sea, plus Blinken’s shuttle diplomacy, are intended to avert this outcome. It is too early to assess the impact of their efforts, but failure would see the hegemon drawn deeper into this bloody quagmire. The effect would be to widen fissures in the Arab–Israeli axis and distract America from its priorities in the Far East.
In the event that the invading army manages to demolish Hamas politically and militarily, the US would also have to grapple with the problem of succession. At present it hopes to corral Arab states into providing a force to govern the territory so as to relieve Israel of the burden. US officials are reporting that American, French, British and German soldiers could be dispatched to defend this hypothetical dictatorship. But if regional powers refuse to cooperate, as seems likely, alternative proposals include a ‘peacekeeping’ coalition modelled on the Sinai’s Multinational Force and Observers – to which the Pentagon currently contributes almost 500 troops – or an administration under the auspices of the UN. Such schemes would effectively restore the US to the status of neo-colonial authority in the Middle East, despite its years-long attempts to fill the role with local subordinates. They would turn American forces into a visible target for the rage and resentment created by the Zionist war – an unenviable legacy for Biden to leave behind.
But it may not come to that. There are other foreseeable scenarios that would be more favourable to the White House. Given Egypt’s refusal to facilitate the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, the banishment of Gaza’s 2.2 million residents seems unlikely in the short term. This, combined with American diplomatic pressure, has evidently caused Israel to modify the plan for its invasion, choosing an incremental approach over a rapid sweep. Whether this will reduce the chances of intervention by Hezbollah or Iran remains unclear. But the first is mindful of its precarious standing in Lebanon, which could be further harmed by a military conflagration, while the second is anxious to avoid the perils of direct involvement. The Saudis, though outwardly critical of the US position, are no less keen to prevent a conflict that would consume the entire Middle East and derail their ‘Vision 2030’. In each case, a number of domestic political imperatives are at odds with the regionalization of the war. A ray of hope for the declining empire?
Whether or not the violence is contained, however, Israeli success is hardly assured. Hamas’s 40,000 hardened fighters, adept at hybrid warfare and capable of ambushing the enemy via underground tunnels, are a stark contrast with the Israeli reservists who just received their refresher training. As the streetfighting begins, the numerical and technological asymmetries between the two may seem less decisive. One can therefore imagine a timeline in which the militants fight Netanyahu to a stalemate, the taboo on a ceasefire is lifted, and both sides eventually declare victory: Hamas because it repelled an existential threat from Israel; Israel because it can claim (however disingenuously) to have inflicted irreparable damage on Hamas and precluded any recurrence of its attack.
Thereafter, Gaza would slowly emerge from the rubble and return to something resembling the status quo ante – yet with worse humanitarian conditions, as well as a wounded neighbour that is even more obsessed with its destruction. Although the US claims it wants Hamas to perish, it would stand to benefit from this situation in several important respects. It would save it from coordinating the post-war governance of the Strip; it would allow Israeli normalization to resume after a necessary hiatus; and, in the best-case scenario for Biden, it would place limits on further escalation while also undermining Russian and Chinese attempts to straddle both sides of the Israel–Palestine conflict. The Abraham paradigm could thus be reinstated, at least until the next major flare-up. Rather than transforming the Middle East, then, the war may leave intact the ‘security architecture’ built by Trump and Biden. Yet the instability of this edifice has been proven. It would only be a matter of time before it buckles once again.
- Posts : 13817
Join date : 2016-02-01
Turska agencija Anadolija u svojoj analizi tvrdi da su se Izraelci u subotu povukli 2 km iz severnog dela Pojasa Gaze na pozicije koje su zauzeli 1. dana kopnenog napada, 27.X, dok drugde napreduju, kao i da intenzivno bombarduju delove u koje nameravaju da uđu.
Izraelci su dosad objavili da je 29 vojnika poginulo u njihovoj kopnenoj invaziji na Gazu.
Izraelci su dosad objavili da je 29 vojnika poginulo u njihovoj kopnenoj invaziji na Gazu.
It's almost four weeks since the horrific terrorist attack on #Israel. A lot has happened, the public debate has become heated and confused. Find thoughts from Vice-Chancellor Robert #Habeck in the video, putting the events in context.
— Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz (@BMWK) November 2, 2023With English, Hebrew and Arabic subtitles. pic.twitter.com/5jdXAZr7ey
- Posts : 10404
Join date : 2020-06-19
Israeli far-right Minister of Heritage proposes to nuke the Gaza Strip
— NEXTA (@nexta_tv) November 5, 2023
"Nuclear bombardment of Gaza is one of the possibilities. They can go to Ireland or deserts, the monsters in Gaza should find a solution by themselves," The Times of Israel quoted Amichai Eliyahu as saying.… pic.twitter.com/1cXFuecMN9
Bibi:
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:
— Prime Minister of Israel (@IsraeliPM) November 5, 2023
Minister Amihai Eliyahu's statements are not based in reality. Israel and the IDF are operating in accordance with the highest standards of international law to avoid harming innocents. We will continue to do so until our victory.
Last edited by fikret selimbašić on Sun Nov 05, 2023 11:42 am; edited 1 time in total
_____
Međuopštinski pustolov.
Zli stolar.
- Posts : 22555
Join date : 2014-12-01
Izrael naravno laze za gubitke. Bas bi se zbog 29 izgubljenih ljudi povukli iz citavih sektora koje su mukotrpno zauzimali. Okupator je potucen, makar privremeno.
Lepo je videti od americkog spijuna da preuzima deo odgovornosti, sada je jasno da na optuzenickoj klupi jednog dana ne smeju zavrsiti samo Izraelci, nego i Zeleni, sto je i logicno buduci da se radi o americkoj trol-ekipi u Nemackoj.
Lepo je videti od americkog spijuna da preuzima deo odgovornosti, sada je jasno da na optuzenickoj klupi jednog dana ne smeju zavrsiti samo Izraelci, nego i Zeleni, sto je i logicno buduci da se radi o americkoj trol-ekipi u Nemackoj.
- Posts : 13817
Join date : 2016-02-01
fikret selimbašić wrote:Israeli far-right Minister of Heritage proposes to nuke the Gaza Strip
— NEXTA (@nexta_tv) November 5, 2023
"Nuclear bombardment of Gaza is one of the possibilities. They can go to Ireland or deserts, the monsters in Gaza should find a solution by themselves," The Times of Israel quoted Amichai Eliyahu as saying.… pic.twitter.com/1cXFuecMN9
Bibi:Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:
— Prime Minister of Israel (@IsraeliPM) November 5, 2023
Minister Amihai Eliyahu's statements are not based in reality. Israel and the IDF are operating in accordance with the highest standards of international law to avoid harming innocents. We will continue to do so until our victory.
Suspendovalo ga:
Israeli minister Amichai Eliyahu has been suspended from government’s meetings indefinitely, Israeli media reported, after saying that dropping a nuclear weapon on the Gaza Strip is “an option.”
— Middle East Eye (@MiddleEastEye) November 5, 2023
Eliyahu later said that his comments were "metaphorical"https://t.co/B8zDG8s2IV pic.twitter.com/UQfystVCZI
- Posts : 22555
Join date : 2014-12-01
Pitam se zasto, odao ih? 
- Posts : 13817
Join date : 2016-02-01
Horrifying: After bombing dozens of bakeries, water stations, and fishing boats, and preventing food assistance into the Gaza Strip, Israeli barbarism reached a new record. They just bombed a water reserve tank in Jabalia refugee camp which now deprives more than 120.000 of fresh… pic.twitter.com/EevQKdui1h
— Ramy Abdu| رامي عبده (@RamAbdu) November 4, 2023
— Globe Eye News (@GlobeEyeNews) November 5, 2023
????????????????????: World's Largest Pro- Palestinian Protest, More than 2 million people gathered in Indonesia.#Indonesia l #Palestine l #Gaza l #Hamas #GazaGenocide l #CeasefireNOW l #Israel pic.twitter.com/jad0MaQF5y
- Posts : 2513
Join date : 2015-08-13
100 doctors in Israel demand that the Israeli army bomb and blow up hospitals in Gaza as they are infrastructure for the Hamas movement
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Gdje punac drži pive?
Erős Pista
- Posts : 82754
Join date : 2012-06-10
Potpuno normalna ljudska bica.
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"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
- Posts : 41623
Join date : 2012-02-12
Location : wife privilege
Ал су сложно гракнули, као да им је неко турио муда у менгеле.
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cousin for roasting the rakija
И кажем себи у сну, еј бре коњу па ти ни немаш озвучење, имаш оне две кутијице око монитора, видећеш кад се пробудиш...
- Posts : 2513
Join date : 2015-08-13
Da budemo fer, Izrael ima 30.000 doktora medicine, dakle ovo je 0.33% njih pa nema baš govora o nekakvoj slozi.
Ova trenutna izraelska sloga je vrlo nalik na našu slogu tokom bombardovanja 1999, dakle ili bleji kao ovca na target skupovima ili ćuti - nije baš bilo povoljno vreme za iskazivanje nesloge.
Izrael je u 6. oktobar ušao kao nezdravo podeljeno društvo predvođeno duboko korumpiranom vladom sa elementima neofašizma, i sa širokim stratumom društva koji je duboko protiv investitorske teokratije koja je kastrirala IDF, satrla kredibilitet Izraela i generalno na svaki način omogućila taj napad. Sve te stvari su i dalje tu ali je trenutno nejevrejski govoriti o njima. To će proći, pa ćemo čuti i šta misli ovih drugih 29900 lekara.
Ova trenutna izraelska sloga je vrlo nalik na našu slogu tokom bombardovanja 1999, dakle ili bleji kao ovca na target skupovima ili ćuti - nije baš bilo povoljno vreme za iskazivanje nesloge.
Izrael je u 6. oktobar ušao kao nezdravo podeljeno društvo predvođeno duboko korumpiranom vladom sa elementima neofašizma, i sa širokim stratumom društva koji je duboko protiv investitorske teokratije koja je kastrirala IDF, satrla kredibilitet Izraela i generalno na svaki način omogućila taj napad. Sve te stvari su i dalje tu ali je trenutno nejevrejski govoriti o njima. To će proći, pa ćemo čuti i šta misli ovih drugih 29900 lekara.
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Gdje punac drži pive?
- Posts : 82754
Join date : 2012-06-10
+1
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"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
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