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Rat u Ukrajini
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Jurnjava čamcima je 2d game. Avioni i dronovi su 3d protiv kojih 2d nema nikakve šanse.
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Sweet and Tender Hooligan
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Join date : 2019-11-04
Russia taking 'operational pause' in Ukraine, analysts say
Associated Press - 1h ago
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Foreign analysts say Russia may be temporarily easing its offensive in Ukraine as the Russian military attempts to reassemble its forces for a renewed assault.
On Wednesday, Russian forces made no claimed or assessed territorial gains in Ukraine “for the first time in 133 days of war,” according to the Institute for the Study of War. The think tank based in Washington suggested that Moscow may be taking an “operational pause” that does not entail "the complete cessation of active hostilities."
“Russian forces will likely confine themselves to relatively small-scale offensive actions as they attempt to set conditions for more significant offensive operations and rebuild the combat power needed to attempt those more ambitious undertakings,” the institute said.
A Thursday statement from Russia’s Defense Ministry seemed to confirm that assessment. It said Russian military units involved in combat in Ukraine were given time to rest.
“The units that performed combat missions during the special military operation are taking measures to recover their combat capabilities. The servicemen are given the opportunity to rest, receive letters and parcels from home,” read the statement, quoted by Russian state news agency Tass.
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While I read, some Western intelligece services see a "pause in the Russian offensive", I see nothing like that happening, at least not in the east of Ukraine.
Invasion forces keep pushing towards all key towns in Donetsk oblast with slow but steady success.
There is no "pause", but heavy fighting in Donetk oblast and Russian invasion forces want to capture Siversk as quick as possible.
This is spread on several of their propagada channels: https://t.co/Dijxpjp4RG
Invasion forces keep pushing towards all key towns in Donetsk oblast with slow but steady success.
There is no "pause", but heavy fighting in Donetk oblast and Russian invasion forces want to capture Siversk as quick as possible.
This is spread on several of their propagada channels: https://t.co/Dijxpjp4RG
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Join date : 2019-11-04
ko će da preuzme rizik, igranka
EU Bureaucracy Seen Blocking 1.5 Billion-Euro Loan to Ukraine
Caution prevailing over Ukraine’s urgent needs, officials say
Financial reliability the issue as Ukraine faces rising costs
ByJorge Valero and Alberto Nardelli
July 7, 2022 at 7:02 PM GMT+2
The executive arm of the European Union is blocking a 1.5 billion-euro ($1.5 billion) loan for Ukraine as caution prevails over the country’s urgent needs, according to officials.
The impasse amounts to a Catch-22 for Ukraine. The country is pushing for help to keep its economy afloat as it counters the Russian invasion, but has seen the proposed loan blocked by the European Commission’s budget unit because of concerns over its financial reliability, said the officials who declined to be named on a confidential issue.
The European Investment Bank, the EU’s lending arm, offered the loan to Kyiv to support the war-torn nation as its faces mounting war costs and revenues collapse. The commission guarantees EIB loans for operations outside the EU, with provisions usually amounting to 9% of total funding.
But in this case, the commission wants provisions at 70% of the total, as it did with a previous proposal of 1 billion euros for Ukraine, the officials said. The commission is making the demand in case the country cannot repay the funds to the markets, they said.
A commission official said the EU needs to make sure that it can absorb losses in the event of a Ukrainian default. The commission is seeking alternative solutions, which rely on EU member states or on the EIB to share part of the additional risks associated with these loans, the official added.
The EU itself has been struggling to agree on short-term financing to Ukraine to pay salaries and other current expenditure. The EU has already had to temporarily downgrade the amount of emergency funding it’s sending Kyiv, with last week’s proposal of 1 billion euros stalled as Germany blocks a larger package of nearly 9 billion euros.
A number of the bloc’s allies privately criticized the EU at a donors conference in Lugano earlier this week for not delivering on its larger commitments of nearly 9 billion euros and called on it to do so urgently, the people said.
The Finance Ministry in Kyiv is running out of financing options as the war drags on, leaving the country increasingly reliant on outside help. Ukrainian officials are exploring the possibility of debt restructuring as a way to lighten its burden while remaining on good terms with international investors.
The commission has been pushing for weeks to get backing for the larger package to Ukraine, whose government is struggling to keep afloat financially as the Russian invasion destroys infrastructure and chokes the nation’s economy.
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Meni je super kad se neko posle pita "sta amerika radi u evropi", zasto ne moze Evropa to sama" itd.
Erős Pista
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As caution prevails.
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"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
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Ukraine’s Vice PM Iryna Vereschuk uses pretty strong language to call for Ukrainians to evacuate from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces ahead of long-promised counter offensive. “There will be huge battles. I don’t want to scare anyone, everyone understands it anyway.”
— Oliver Carroll (@olliecarroll) July 8, 2022
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Location : Waystone Inn
Good riddance, da citiram jednu hrvatsku diplomatkinju pri brexituNAKON što je u intervjuu koji je dao njemačkom youtuberu Tilu Jungu opet hvalio Stepana Banderu, ukrajinskog nacionalista i kolaboracionista nacista u Drugom svjetskom ratu, ukrajinski veleposlanik u Njemačkoj Andrij Melnik povučen je s pozicije ambasadora.
Melnika treba gledati u kontekstu ukrajinsko-njemačkog odnosa od početka rata u Ukrajini ove godine. Melnik je u više navrata otvoreno kritizirao i prozivao Njemačku za nedovoljno pomaganje Ukrajini te ju je prozivao za suradnju s Rusijom. Tada je rekao: "Činjenica da Scholz do sada odbija zaustaviti uvoz energenata iz Rusije je nož u leđa Ukrajini." Kancelara Olafa Scholza nazvao je "uvrijeđenom mladom" (njem. liverwurst), a intelektualce koji pozivaju Kijev na pregovore – "gubitnicima".
U Washington Postu izašla je izjava jednog njemačkog političara koji je htio ostati anoniman, koji je komentirao Melnikovu retoriku: "Njegovo uobičajeno ponašanje je izvan svojstva i zahtjeva veleposlanika. Ne možete kao veleposlanik svakodnevno napadati šefa vlade države." Melnik više nije uspijevao dobiti sastanak sa Scholzom, kao ni s njegovim savjetnikom za vanjsku politiku i sigurnost Jensom Plötnerom, unatoč svojim brojnim zahtjevima.
, ne znam kako sad idu diplomatski kanali prema Njemačkoj..._____
my goosebumps have goosebumps
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Join date : 2012-02-12
Location : имам пуну полицу књига, која ми је главна?
Bleeding Blitva wrote:Good riddance, da citiram jednu hrvatsku diplomatkinju pri brexitu... Olafa Scholza nazvao je "uvrijeđenom mladom" (njem. liverwurst),...
Колико ми потврђују јандекс и гугао, liverwurst је јетрена паштета.
Можда је млада мислила на lederwurst.
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I drove a škodilak before it was cool.
Морони на власти чешће мењају правила него гаће.
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Join date : 2014-12-01
Neko je pitao sta ce Rusi nakon sto zavrse sa Donjeckom (ako zavrse, naravno). Upravo su formirali harkovsku oblast, ustanovili joj grb i zastavu, ustanovili vojno-civilnu administraciju, proglasili ruski jezik zvanicnim itd. Naravno, oni drze samo mali deo te oblasti, ali je indikator sta dalje zele jer sto bi se bavili ovim ako ne nameravaju da idu dalje.
- Posts : 6160
Join date : 2019-11-04
#Ukraine: An older M270B rifle too as well as a couple more underfolders, seems to be a mixed batch.
— Cᴀʟɪʙʀᴇ Oʙsᴄᴜʀᴀ (@CalibreObscura) July 9, 2022
Yugos keep on trucking https://t.co/Gtf0BcK2oz pic.twitter.com/vgVMM39bhR
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Location : Waystone Inn
Vidi ovdje: The German language is full of sausage idioms, and this is one of the best. To act like an insulted liverwurst (sausage made from liver) means “to sulk or to pout”. So if someone tells you that “you have a bird”, do your best not to sulk, because you may face accusations of acting like a disgruntled sausage before you can even begin to defend yourself.паће wrote:Bleeding Blitva wrote:
Good riddance, da citiram jednu hrvatsku diplomatkinju pri brexitu
Колико ми потврђују јандекс и гугао, liverwurst је јетрена паштета.
Можда је млада мислила на lederwurst.
Durica
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my goosebumps have goosebumps
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Join date : 2012-06-10
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"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
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Ukrajinci danas porucili svima koji ostanu na "okupiranim teritorijama" da za njih nece biti humanitarnih koridora kada ukrajinske snage budu kretale u ofanzivu i preporucili su svima da beze.
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Join date : 2016-02-01
Ukrajinci koji su se povukli iz Lisičanska pokazali francuskoj TV oružje koje im je dala komanda da se bore protiv Rusa - mitraljez Maksim proizveden 1944, u čiju cev je potrebno usipati vodu radi hlađenja posle svakog pucanja i puškomitraljez DP-28 iz tridesetih.
commandement.
— UNCOVER infos
Parmi elles, une mitrailleuse Maxim produite en 1944 et un fusil-mitrailleur DP-28 datant les années 1930.
«Ce n’est pas comparable avec ce que [les Russes] ont. C’est rien pour se défendre», déplorent les militaires.
@chroniques_conflit_ukraine
️ (@william_jengu) July 7, 2022
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Ceo prilog (na francuskom, nisam našao da ga je engleska verzija France24 emitovala):
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fwiw
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/07/8/7357075/
Reznikov has revealed how many soldiers defend Ukraine
KATERYNA TYSHCHENKO – FRIDAY, 8 JULY 2022, 18:02
At the moment due to mobilisation up to 700 thousand soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 90 thousand servicemen of the National Guard of Ukraine, nearly 60 thousand border guards and 100 thousand servicemen of the National Police are deployed.
Details: Reznikov has reported that over a million people in uniform work for the sake of security and defence of Ukraine and called upon businesses to support this sector and invest into it more actively.
He has also stated that due to military action, Ukraine has become a certain kind of a polygon where new kinds of armament and innovations are being used.
"Today Ukraine is a huge polygon where tests will be conducted. This means there will be demand for new technologies, innovations and suggestions. There is already a real demand for joint enterprises, even if at first they will be located in the Eastern Europe countries or in the protected places in the West of Ukraine", – claimed Reznikov.
He has stated that the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine is making sure Ukraine is supplied with modern armament and equipment of the NATO model such as artillery, armoured vehicles and weapons which will be in need of repairs and renovation.
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Да имају 700к у војсци не би слали на критична места на фронту шаљу трећепозивце са пар недеља обуке.
Или купили људе по локалима. Тако да нешто сумњам у ту цифру.
Или купили људе по локалима. Тако да нешто сумњам у ту цифру.
- Posts : 13709
Join date : 2016-02-01
Vagner navodno vrbuje po zatvorima nudeći isključivo usmeno 3200 evra i amnestiju za 6-mesečno ratovanje u Ukrajini i 80.000 evra porodici u slučaju smrti.
Russian PMC Wagner group started recruiting in prisons for Ukraine front - 200,000 roubles (€3200) and amnesty for 6 months service, if comes back alive. https://t.co/hTokzsntup
— Karin Kaup Lapõnin (@KarinKaup) July 5, 2022
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Location : имам пуну полицу књига, која ми је главна?
Sotir wrote:Да имају 700к у војсци не би слали на критична места на фронту шаљу трећепозивце са пар недеља обуке.
Или купили људе по локалима. Тако да нешто сумњам у ту цифру.
Ја не сумњам толико у првих пет цифара, само у шесту.
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I drove a škodilak before it was cool.
Морони на власти чешће мењају правила него гаће.
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Join date : 2020-09-07
Forreign Affairs
Ukraine’s Implausible Theories of Victory
The fantasy of Russian defeat and the case for diplomacy.
As Russian forces gain ground in Ukraine, that country’s president and allies all seem to agree: Ukraine must fight on to victory and restore the prewar status quo. Russia would disgorge the territorial gains it has made since February. Ukraine would recognize neither the annexation of Crimea nor the secessionist statelets in the Donbas and would continue down the path toward membership in the EU and NATO.
Ukraine’s Implausible Theories of Victory
The fantasy of Russian defeat and the case for diplomacy.
As Russian forces gain ground in Ukraine, that country’s president and allies all seem to agree: Ukraine must fight on to victory and restore the prewar status quo. Russia would disgorge the territorial gains it has made since February. Ukraine would recognize neither the annexation of Crimea nor the secessionist statelets in the Donbas and would continue down the path toward membership in the EU and NATO.
- Spoiler:
For Russia, such an outcome would represent a clear defeat. Given the vast costs it has already paid, along with the likelihood that Western economic sanctions against it would not be lifted anytime soon, Moscow would gain less than nothing from this war. Indeed, it would be headed toward permanent enfeeblement—or in the words of U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”
Ukraine’s backers have proposed two pathways to victory. The first leads through Ukraine. With help from the West, the argument runs, Ukraine can defeat Russia on the battlefield, either depleting its forces through attrition or shrewdly outmaneuvering it. The second path runs through Moscow. With some combination of battlefield gains and economic pressure, the West can convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war—or convince someone in his circle to forcibly replace him.
But both theories of victory rest on shaky foundations. In Ukraine, the Russian army is likely strong enough to defend most of its gains. In Russia, the economy is autonomous enough and Putin’s grip tight enough that the president cannot be coerced into giving up those gains, either. The most likely outcome of the current strategy, then, is not a Ukrainian triumph but a long, bloody, and ultimately indecisive war. A drawn-out conflict would be costly not only in terms of the loss of human life and economic damage but also in terms of escalation—including the potential use of nuclear weapons.
Ukraine’s leaders and its backers speak as if victory is just around the corner. But that view increasingly appears to be a fantasy. Ukraine and the West should therefore reconsider their ambitions and shift from a strategy of winning the war toward a more realistic approach: finding a diplomatic compromise that ends the fighting.
VICTORY ON THE BATTLEFIELD?
Many in the West contend that the war can be won on the ground. In this scenario, Ukraine would destroy the Russian army’s combat power, causing Russian forces to retreat or collapse. Early on during the war, boosters of Ukraine argued that Russia could be defeated through attrition. Simple math seemed to tell the story of a Russian army on the verge of collapse. In April, the British defense ministry estimated that 15,000 Russian soldiers had died in Ukraine. Assuming that the number of wounded was three times as high, which was the average experience during World War II, that would imply that roughly 60,000 Russians had been knocked out of commission. Initial Western estimates put the size of the frontline Russian force in Ukraine at 120 battalion tactical groups, which would total at most 120,000 people. If these casualty estimates were correct, the strength of most Russian combat units would have fallen below 50 percent, a figure that experts suggest renders a combat unit at least temporarily ineffective.
These early estimates now look overly optimistic. If they were accurate, the Russian army ought to have collapsed by now. Instead, it has managed slow but steady gains in the Donbas. Although it is possible that the attrition theory could one day prove correct, that seems unlikely. The Russians appear to have suffered fewer losses than many thought or have nonetheless found a way to keep many of their units up to fighting strength. One way or another, they are finding reserves, despite their stated unwillingness to send recent conscripts or mobilized reservists to the front. And if push came to shove, they could abandon that reluctance.
If the collapse-through-attrition theory seems to have failed the test of battle already, there is another option: the Ukrainians could outmaneuver the Russians. Ukraine’s forces could beat the enemy in mechanized warfare, with tanks and accompanying infantry and artillery, just as Israel beat its Arab enemies in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has sufficient mechanized combat units to densely defend their vast fronts, which means in principle that either side should be vulnerable to rapid, hard-hitting mechanized attacks. So far, however, neither side appears to have resorted to such tactics. Russia may be finding that it cannot concentrate forces for such attacks without being observed by Western intelligence, and Ukraine may suffer from similar scrutiny by Russian intelligence. That said, a cagey defender such as Ukraine could lure its enemy into overextending itself. Russian forces could find their flanks and supply lines vulnerable to counterattacks—as appears to have occurred on a small scale around Kyiv in the early battles of the war.
The Ukrainian and Western theories of victory have been built on weak reasoning.
But just as the Russian army is unlikely to collapse through attrition, it is also unlikely to lose by being outmaneuvered. The Russians now seem wise to the gambits Ukraine tried early on. And although details are scarce, Ukraine’s recent counterattacks in the Kherson region do not appear to involve much surprise or maneuver. Rather, they seem to look like the kind of slow, grinding offensives that the Russians have themselves mounted in the Donbas. It is unlikely that this pattern will change much. Although the Ukrainians, because they are defending their homeland, are more motivated than the Russians, there is no reason to believe that they are inherently superior at mechanized warfare. Excellence at that requires a great deal of planning and training. Yes, the Ukrainians have profited from Western advising, but the West itself may be out of practice with such operations, having not waged mechanized warfare since 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq. And since 2014, the Ukrainians have focused their efforts on preparing forces for the defense of fortified lines in the Donbas, not for mobile warfare.
More important, a country’s ability to conduct mechanized warfare correlates with its socioeconomic development. Both technical and managerial skills are needed to keep thousands of machines and electronic devices in working order and to coordinate far-flung, fast-moving combat units in real time. Ukraine and Russia have similarly skilled populations from which to draw their soldiers, so it is unlikely that the former enjoys an advantage in mechanized warfare.
A possible counterargument is that the West could supply Ukraine with such superior technology that it could best the Russians, helping Kyiv defeat its enemy through either attrition or mobile warfare. But this theory is also fanciful. Russia enjoys a three-to-one advantage in population and economic output, a gap that even the highest-tech tools would be hard-pressed to close. Advanced Western weapons, such as the Javelin and NLAW antitank guided missiles, have probably helped Ukraine exact a high price from the Russians. But so far, this technology has largely been used to leverage the tactical advantages that defenders already enjoy—cover, concealment, and the ability to channel enemy forces through natural and manmade obstacles. It is much harder to exploit advanced technology to go on the offense against an adversary that possesses a significant quantitative advantage, because doing so requires overcoming both superior numbers and the tactical advantages of defense. In the case of Ukraine, it is not obvious what special technology the West possesses that would so advantage the Ukrainian military that it could crack Russian defenses.
To comprehend the difficulty Ukraine faces, consider Nazi Germany’s failure in its last major offensive of World War II, the Battle of the Bulge. In December 1944, the Germans surprised the Allies in the Ardennes Forest with a concentration of mechanized and infantry divisions against a thinly defended 50-mile stretch of front. They hoped to shatter the Allied defenses in Belgium, split the U.S. and British Armies, take the critical port of Antwerp, and stall the Allied war effort. The Wehrmacht bet that its skill at armored warfare, its laboriously assembled local numerical superiority, and its advanced armored vehicle technology would overcome the combined advantages that the U.S. and British militaries enjoyed in terms of manpower, artillery, and airpower. Although the Germans were able to achieve surprise and enjoyed a few days of success, the operation soon foundered. Western commanders quickly figured out what was going on and efficiently used their materiel superiority to beat back the advance. Today, some seem to be suggesting that the Ukrainians try a strategy similar to the Germans to overcome similar constraints. But there is no compelling reason to believe that the Ukrainians would fare any better.
WINNING IN MOSCOW?
If Kyiv can’t win on the battlefield in Ukraine, perhaps it can achieve a victory in Moscow. This, the other main theory of victory, imagines that a combination of battlefield attrition and economic pressure could elicit a decision on Russia’s part to end the war and relinquish its gains.
In this theory, battlefield attrition mobilizes the family members of slain, injured, and suffering Russian soldiers against Putin, while economic pressure makes the lives of average Russians ever more dismal. Putin watches his popularity wane and begins to fear that his political career could soon end if he doesn’t stop the war. Alternatively, Putin doesn’t see how fast battlefield attrition and economic privation are undercutting his support, but others in his circle do, and in their own naked self-interest, they depose and perhaps even execute him. Once in power, they sue for peace. Either way, Russia concedes defeat.
Even the most patriotic soldiers can run out of patience if the fighting seems futile.
But this path to Ukrainian victory is also strewn with obstacles. For one thing, Putin is a veteran intelligence professional who presumably knows a lot about conspiracies, including how to defend against them. This alone makes a strategy of regime change suspect, even if there were some in Moscow who were willing to risk their lives to try it. For another thing, squeezing the Russian economy is unlikely to produce sufficient privation to create meaningful political pressure against Putin. The West can make the lives of Russians a bit drabber, and it can deprive Russian weapons manufacturers of sophisticated imported electronic subcomponents. But these achievements seem unlikely to shake Putin or his rule. Russia is a vast and populous country, with ample arable land, plentiful energy supplies, lots of other natural resources, and a big, if dated, industrial base. U.S. President Donald Trump tried and failed to strangle Iran, a much smaller and less developed but equally energy independent country. It is hard to see how the same strategy will work against Russia.
The effect of casualties on Putin’s calculations of his own interests is harder to assess. Again, however, there is reason to be skeptical that this factor will convince him to retreat. Great powers often incur major war losses for years, even for flimsy reasons. The United States did so in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq; the Soviet Union did so in Afghanistan. Before Russia’s invasion in February, many in the West insisted that the Ukrainians organize for a guerrilla insurgency against Russia. The hope was that this prospect would deter a Russian attack in the first place or, failing that, exact such a high price from Russian forces that they would soon depart. One problem with this strategy is that insurgents themselves must suffer a lot for the privilege of imposing a high price on their occupiers. Ukrainians may be willing to incur painful losses in a conventional war of attrition against Russia, but it is not clear that they can inflict enough pain to achieve the victory they want.
Nor is it clear that they can sustain such losses for a long time. Even the most patriotic soldiers can run out of patience if the fighting seems futile. If mounting casualties require Ukraine to throw ever less prepared troops into a hopeless battle, support for an open-ended war of attrition would erode even further. At the same time, the Russians are likely to have a high tolerance for pain. Putin has so controlled the domestic narrative about his war that many Russian citizens see the fight the same way he does—as a crucial battle for national security. And Russia has more people than Ukraine.
TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE
Nobody can say with certainty that the Russian army cannot be hit hard enough or cleverly enough to induce its collapse or that Russia cannot be hurt enough to induce Putin to surrender. But these outcomes are highly improbable. At present, the most plausible result after months or years of fighting is a stalemate close to the current battle lines. Ukraine should be able to stop Russian advances, thanks to its highly motivated force, infusions of Western support, and the tactical advantages of the defense. Yet Russia enjoys superior troop numbers, and that, plus the tactical advantages of defense, should allow it to thwart Ukrainian counterattacks designed to reverse its gains. In Russia, Western sanctions will annoy the population and set back economic development, but the country’s self-sufficient supply of energy and raw materials should prevent the measures from achieving anything more than that. In the West, meanwhile, populations inconvenienced by the collateral damage of sanctions could themselves lose patience with the war. Western support of Ukraine may become less generous. Taken together, these factors point to one outcome: a draw on the battlefield.
As the months and years go on, Russia and Ukraine will both have suffered a lot to achieve not very much more than what each has already achieved—limited and pyrrhic territorial gains for Russia, and a strong, independent, and sovereign government with control over most of its prewar territory for Ukraine. At some point, then, the two countries will likely find it expedient to negotiate. Both sides will have to recognize that these must be true negotiations, in which each must give up something of value.
If that is the most likely eventual outcome, then it makes little sense for Western countries to funnel even more weapons and money into a war that results in more death and destruction with every passing week. Ukraine’s allies should continue to provide the resources that the country needs to defend itself from further Russian attacks, but they should not encourage it to expend resources on counteroffensives that will likely prove futile. Rather, the West should move toward the negotiating table now.
There is only one responsible thing to do: seek a diplomatic end to the war now.
To be sure, diplomacy would be an experiment with uncertain results. But so is the continued combat necessary to test Ukrainian and Western theories of victory. The difference between the two experiments is that diplomacy is cheap. Besides time, airfare, and coffee, its only costs are political. For example, participants may leak details of negotiations for the purpose of discrediting one camp or another, destroying a particular proposal and generating political opprobrium. Such political costs pale in comparison to costs of continued war, however.
And those costs could easily grow. The war in Ukraine could escalate to include even more destructive attacks by either side. Russian and NATO units operate in proximity at sea and in the air, and accidents are possible. Other states, such as Belarus and Moldova, could get drawn into the war, with knock-on risks for neighboring NATO countries. Even more frightening, Russia possesses powerful and diverse nuclear forces, and the imminent collapse of its effort in Ukraine might tempt Putin to use them.
A negotiated solution to the war would no doubt be hard to achieve, but the outlines of a settlement are already visible. Each side would have to make painful concessions. Ukraine would have to relinquish considerable territory and do so in writing. Russia would need to relinquish some of its battlefield gains and renounce future territorial claims. To prevent a future Russian attack, Ukraine would surely need strong assurances of U.S. and European military support, as well as continuing military aid (but consisting mainly of defensive, not offensive, weapons). Russia would need to acknowledge the legitimacy of such arrangements. The West would need to agree to relax many of the economic sanctions it has placed on Russia. NATO and Russia would need to launch a new set of negotiations to limit the intensity of military deployments and interactions along their respective frontiers. U.S. leadership would be essential to a diplomatic solution. Because the United States is Ukraine’s principal backer and the organizer of the West’s economic pressure campaign against Russia, it possesses the greatest leverage over the two parties.
It is easier to state these principles than it is to hammer them into the implementable provisions of an agreement. But that is precisely why negotiations should start sooner rather than later. The Ukrainian and Western theories of victory have been built on weak reasoning. At best, they are a costly avenue to a painful stalemate that leaves much Ukrainian territory in Russian hands. If this is the best that can be hoped for after additional months or years of fighting, then there is only one responsible thing to do: seek a diplomatic end to the war now.
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Sweet and Tender Hooligan
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Join date : 2014-10-27
lol ukrajina da da sve a rusija da kaze dosta nam je. teski ustupci na obe strane.
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And Will's father stood up, stuffed his pipe with tobacco, rummaged his pockets for matches, brought out a battered harmonica, a penknife, a cigarette lighter that wouldn't work, and a memo pad he had always meant to write some great thoughts down on but never got around to, and lined up these weapons for a pygmy war that could be lost before it even started
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Zahtevi Rusije u moljenju za mir se nece ticati samo UA
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Join date : 2019-06-06
Zelensky fires ambassadors to Germany, Hungary. President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 9 fired Ambassador to Germany Andriy Melnyk and Ambassador to Hungary Liubov Nepop.
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