Rusija i sve vezano za nju

Mór Thököly wrote:Danas Aljaska, sutra ceo svet Popasnaja.

В Южной Осетии пройдет референдум об объединении с РФ, соответствующий указ подписал "президент" "республики" Анатолий Бибилов. Он состоится 17 июля.

Bjeloruski predsjednik Aleksandar Lukašenko pozvao je članove vojnog saveza kojim dominira Rusija da budu ujedinjeni i optužio Zapad da pokušava produžiti sukob u Ukrajini kako bi oslabio Rusiju što je više moguće, prenosi Reuters.
Lukašenko je, govoreći na summitu čelnika Organizacije sporazuma o kolektivnoj sigurnosti (CSTO) u Moskvi, rekao da su se 'paklene sankcije' njegovoj zemlji i Rusiji mogle izbjeći da je skupina govorila jednim glasom.
Obraćajući se ruskom predsjedniku Vladimiru Putinu i čelnicima Armenije, Kazahstana, Kirgistana i Tadžikistana, Lukašenko je rekao: 'Bez jedinstvene fronte, kolektivni Zapad će pojačati pritisak na postsovjetski prostor.'

Russia has no problems with Finland and Sweden because of their entry into NATO, their entry into NATO itself does not create an immediate threat to Russia. Russia's response will depend on expanding the alliance's infrastructure.

Filipenko wrote:Da tenkovi ne funkcionisu navod
ostro demantuje Uralvagonzavod

fikret selimbašić wrote:neki današnji Gogolj

Russia is, in effect, making a lot of money selling oil and gas, but finding it hard to use that money to buy the things it needs, reportedly including crucial components used in the production of tanks and other military equipment.
Why is Russia apparently having so much trouble buying stuff? Part of the answer is that many of the world’s democracies have banned sales to Russia of a variety of goods — weapons, of course, but also industrial components that can, directly or indirectly, be used to produce weapons.
However, that can’t be the whole story, because Russia seems to have lost access to imports even from countries that aren’t imposing sanctions. Matt Klein of the blog The Overshoot estimates that in March, exports from allied democracies to Russia were down 53 percent from normal levels (and early indications are that they fell further in April). But exports from neutral or pro-Russian countries, including China, were down almost as much — 45 percent.
Some of this may, as Klein has suggested, reflect fear, even in non-allied countries, of “being on the wrong side of sanctions.” Imagine yourself as the chief executive of a Chinese company that relies on components produced in South Korea, Japan or the United States. If you make sales to Russia that might be seen as helping Putin’s war effort, wouldn’t you worry about facing sanctions yourself?
Sanctions on Russia’s financial system, such as the freezing of the central bank’s reserves and the exclusion of some major private banks from international payment systems, may also be crimping imports. Hard currency may be flowing into Russia, but using that currency to buy things abroad has become difficult. You can’t conduct modern business with suitcases full of $100 bills.
Now, it’s possible, even likely, that over time Russia will find workarounds that bypass Western sanctions. But time is one thing Putin doesn’t seem to have.
As I said, the war in Ukraine appears to have devolved into a battle of attrition, and that’s not a battle Putin seems likely to win: Russia has suffered huge equipment losses that it won’t be able to replace any time soon, while Ukraine is receiving large equipment inflows from the West. This war may well be over, and not to Putin’s advantage, before Russia finds ways around Western sanctions.
One final point: The effect of sanctions on Russia offers a graphic, if grisly, demonstration of a point economists often try to make, but rarely manage to get across: Imports, not exports, are the point of international trade.
That is, the benefits of trade shouldn’t be measured by the jobs and incomes created in export industries; those workers could, after all, be doing something else. The gains from trade come, instead, from the useful goods and services other countries provide to your citizens. And running a trade surplus isn’t a “win”; if anything, it means that you’re giving the world more than you get, receiving nothing but i.o.u.s in return.
Yes, I know that in practice there are caveats and complications to these statements. Trade surpluses can sometimes help boost a weak economy, and while imports make a nation richer, they may displace and impoverish some workers. But what’s happening to Russia illustrates their essential truth. Russia’s trade surplus is a sign of weakness, not strength; its exports are (alas) holding up well despite its pariah status, but its economy is being crippled by a cutoff of imports.

Питер. Концерт. Весь зал скандирует «Х** войне!»

К слову о том, что все россияне поддерживают Путина. Это не так! pic.twitter.com/2VT2LNx4hX

— Соболь Любовь (@SobolLubov) May 21, 2022

Robin Brooks
Chief Economist @IIF, former Chief FX Strategist @GoldmanSachs & Senior Economist @IMFnews.

Russia's economy is imploding. We forecast a GDP collapse of -30% by end-2022. Russia has stopped publishing data, but our tracking of exports from 20 countries to Russia give a clue. Those exports are down over -50% in April 2022 from a year ago (blue). With @JonathanPingle pic.twitter.com/4intbaNc0O

— Robin Brooks (@RobinBrooksIIF) May 22, 2022

Goldman's financial conditions index for Russia is now tighter than immediately after sanctions were imposed. Financial conditions are super tight and will lead to deep recession, which drives our -30% y/y GDP fall by end-2022. Ruble recovery is an illusion. With @elinaribakova pic.twitter.com/rL2RYxMqBj

— Robin Brooks (@RobinBrooksIIF) May 21, 2022

"Never have I been so ashamed"#Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, Mission to the UN in Geneva, resigns

"I regret to admit that over all these 20yrs the level of lies & unprofessionalism in the work of the Foreign Ministry has been increasing all the time"https://t.co/R0kiUJekHT pic.twitter.com/AuQ4BcOFKK

— Lotte Leicht (@LotteLeicht1) May 23, 2022