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by Del Cap Wed Jan 26, 2022 10:08 amCenter for Defense Strategies: How likely is large-scale war in Ukraine? (analysis) (kyivindependent.com)
In short, our conclusions are the following:
- A full-scale invasion capturing most or all of Ukraine in the near future seems unlikely.
- There are other threatening scenarios that may materialize.
- Ukraine must remain calm and actively prepare for the defense of the country in any case.
At the moment, there are not enough Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders and no fully formed military groups needed to conduct a strategic offensive against Ukraine.
According to our estimates, supported by many of the indicators below, a large-scale general military operation can’t take place for at least the next two or three weeks.
As of Jan. 23, we do not observe the required formation of several hundred thousand troops, not only on the border with Ukraine, but also on Russian territory behind the front line.
Besides, we do not see the creation of strategic reserve units, nor the mobilization of the necessary connections and units on the basis of the centers for mobilization deployment.
Russian troops move mainly as battalion tactical groups (mechanized, tank and airborne troops) and tactical groups (artillery, multiple launch missile systems).
Russia hasn’t completed the formation of groups of troops in operational areas. It also hasn’t established and tested its wartime administration system.
If Russia was conducting preparations for a large-scale invasion, it would have been much more noticeable.
Therefore, what we currently have is the military threat posed by about 127,000 Russian servicemen along Ukraine’s borders, in the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine, and in Crimea. This number has not increased since April, and is not enough for a full-scale offensive.
In general, according to experts, all the critical indicators and intelligence indicators that characterize the completion of the Russian army’s preparations for a large-scale offensive strategic operation have not yet emerged.
To sum up, Russia is currently short of forces and resources to carry out a large-scale operation, and does not demonstrate the necessary concentration of all available combat-ready forces, which requires time and a significant amount of measures and resources.
In general, a large-scale Russian offensive operation against Ukraine in 2022 seems unlikely according to many indicators, even judging by purely military requirements.
Firstly, this is evidenced by a lack of the required number of troops for such an operation, which should be in the hundreds of thousands of trained military contractors capable of participating in active hostilities against Ukraine.
Secondly, there would be a need train and coordinate the newly formed military groups, and ensure a reliable system for managing them.
Thirdly, there is the need to provide troops with weapons and military equipment, including ammunition, fuel and lubricants. This requires strategic reserves and reliable logistics, including in the occupied territories.
Fourthly, there is Russia’s questionable ability to hold occupied territories amid national resistance, where the combat experience of many Ukrainians greatly surpasses that of Russian troops who fought in Syria, or in other armed conflicts in recent decades.
Overall, a large-scale offensive operation with an attempt to hold large occupied territories is a gamble that has no chance of a positive outcome for Russia. It is impossible to calculate the course of such an operation, and when implemented, it will quickly move to an uncontrollable point.
Given the dynamics, we see the possibility for the following scenarios, which can be implemented separately or concurrently:
- A Hybrid invasion is the baseline scenario. It is already being implemented, and will be the primary option for any further options.
This would consist of cyberattacks, which are already taking place, and the forecast is that they will intensify further. These would also be psychological operations, such as active disinformation, mass bomb threats at schools, subway systems, administrative offices, and other facilities, along with the spread of disinformation and other methods.
Unfortunately, there is a very high probability of such an escalation.
- In case of an increase of activity, critical infrastructure may be damaged or meddled with – power plants, mobile communications, internet, government communications, transport.
The key goal of such operations is internal destabilization and demoralization of the population.
The goal may also be to psychologically exhaust members of law enforcement, military, and the population as a whole due to the constant high threat level and periodic exacerbations. The level of escalation can be quickly increased. This can be both a basic form of hybrid warfare and a preparation for even more active hostilities.
- A large-scale armed escalation in eastern Ukraine with the official entrance of the Russian armed forces into territories currently under occupation is very real. Attempts to break the Ukrainian lines and a general intensification of hostilities are possible.
The reason for such an escalation may be a fabricated justification, such as a false-flag operation, which will result in the death of Russian citizens in the Kremlin-occupied territories or a terrorist attack “on behalf” of Ukraine.
All these are provocations, and Ukraine does not plan any aggressive actions, but it can be blamed for anything convenient. This scenario is actively being discussed as a possibility by the governments of Ukraine’s partners.
- A significant aggravation of the security situation in the Azov and Black Sea region, involving the blocking of the Kerch Strait and Ukraine’s sea routes, is also likely. This will hinder the country’s economic activity.
These scenarios, which have been mentioned for the past two years, may include the occupation of Zmiyniy Island in the Black Sea, close to the Romanian border, or, for example, a group landing (or a demonstration of readiness to land) on the Black Sea coast to distract from or assist with other scenarios.
- Carrying out terrorist attacks in Ukraine, primarily on critical infrastructure objects.
Such a scenario could be carried out on several sites at the same time to spread panic among the population and distract the authorities.
- Using Belarusian territory for the deployment of Russian troops, possibly on a permanent basis.
Given the current movement of troops under the pretext of joint exercises, such a scenario is very likely. Troops stationed in Belarus can carry out various provocations and actions against Ukraine. The use of Russian troops stationed in Moldova’s occupied Transnistria region is also probable.
Potentially possible missile or air strikes on military or critical infrastructure as part of preparations for a limited ground invasion and provoking a response from the Ukrainian Armed Forces, or as stand-alone measures to create panic among the population.
disident
