Ekologija

Talason wrote:dim padne dole zato što loš ugalj ima u sebi tegove, pa onda op

NovaS wrote:

Mučnina, vrtoglavica, kašalj, srčane smetnje, temperatura, neki su od simptoma koje su imali učenici Osnovne škole „Dule Karaklajić“, ali i dve srednje škole iz Lazarevca, kada su ih 28. oktobra, na dan kad je ovaj grad bio najzagađeniji na svetu, nastavnici izveli napolje da trče kros. Nekoliko učenika završilo je tog dana u Hitnoj službi doma zdravlja, a ostale su roditelji odveli kući, sa blažim zdravstvenim komplikacijama.

EU Commission revised upwards significantly investment needed yearly to reach 2030 climate goals. EC said around E360bn needed. @vonderleyen just said around E470bn required, almost 30% more compared with estimate only few weeks ago.COP26's gloomy horizon already having an impact

— Jorge Valero (@europressos) November 8, 2021

Mór Thököly wrote:

NovaS wrote:

Mučnina, vrtoglavica, kašalj, srčane smetnje, temperatura, neki su od simptoma koje su imali učenici Osnovne škole „Dule Karaklajić“, ali i dve srednje škole iz Lazarevca, kada su ih 28. oktobra, na dan kad je ovaj grad bio najzagađeniji na svetu, nastavnici izveli napolje da trče kros. Nekoliko učenika završilo je tog dana u Hitnoj službi doma zdravlja, a ostale su roditelji odveli kući, sa blažim zdravstvenim komplikacijama.

Kao što Andreas Malm pokazuje, dominacija kapitala nad podređenim klasama u svojim počecima u Engleskoj također je dobila konkretan oblik prijelazom s obnovljivih izvora energije (hidroenergija) na fosilna goriva (para ili ugljen). Klasna borba kapitala spriječila je otpor nove radničke klase, a istodobno je omogućila razvoj proizvodnje jer ju je oslobodila zemljopisnih ograničenja tekuće vode. Novi izvor energije kapitalistima je olakšao reguliranje radnog vremena i razine proizvodnje. Kapital se oslobodio prisile riječnih dolina jer mu više nisu bili potrebni opsežni infrastrukturni zahvati da ukroti snagu vode – to je često prisiljavalo kapitaliste na suradnju, što im nije odgovaralo, privlačnija im je bila konkurencija. Ugljen je doveo kapital u grad. To mu je omogućilo da se geografski proširi i, prije svega, da olakša discipliniranje najamnih radnika u brutalnim tvorničkim režimima.
Povijesna epizoda klasne borbe dovela je do ovisnosti o fosilnim gorivima. Na temelju novog izvora energije razvijene su ne samo pojedinačne tehnologije, već i složeni tehnološki sustavi. Druga prekretnica je tehnološka inovacija – motor s unutarnjim izgaranjem. Automobil je simbol fordističke faze razvoja kapitalizma koja je omogućila širenje kapitalističke proizvodnje na svjetsku razinu i koja je stvorila uvjete za povećanje emisije stakleničkih plinova nakon Drugog svjetskog rata. Značajan dio infrastrukture, cesta, gradova i urbanog razvoja općenito, te industrije i logistike, postao je podređen automobilu. Proces suburbanizacije nakon Drugog svjetskog rata učinio je automobil simbolom slobode, postao je neophodan za svakodnevno putovanje na posao ili u šoping. Sve je to donijelo veliku snagu automobilskoj industriji i srodnim kooperantskim industrijama. Zaštita interesa automobilske industrije prioritet je za mnoge razvijene zemlje, što se očituje, na primjer, u pregovorima o trgovinskim sporazumima ili trgovinskim ratovima.
Kulturna moć automobilske industrije također se očituje u slučaju novog tipa automobila: SUV-a. Tijekom posljednjeg desetljeća broj energetski intenzivnih i prometno opasnih SUV-ova porastao je šest puta, na više od 200 milijuna vozila. Ova vrsta automobila već ima 40% tržišnog udjela među svim prodanim lakim vozilima. Najnoviji hit automobilske industrije, električni automobil, slična je priča. Njihova proizvodnja opterećuje okoliš, a danas se dvije trećine električne energije proizvodi iz fosilnih goriva. Trenutačno su e-automobili luksuzni prestiž za bogate, no u slučaju velikog povećanja njihovog broja značili bi ogroman teret za električne sustave. Električni automobili nisu rješenje za alternativni oblik održive mobilnosti – to je bez sumnje javni prijevoz – već strategija opstanka proizvođača automobila.

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A successful carbon transition implies the harmonious unfolding of two processes complexly related at the material, economic and financial levels. First, a process of disbandment must take place. Sources of carbon must be drastically reduced: above all hydrocarbon extraction, electricity production by coal and gas, fuel-based transport systems, the construction sector (due to the high level of emissions involved in cement and steel production) and the meat industry. What is at stake here is degrowth in the most straightforward sense: equipment must be scrapped, fossil fuel reserves must stay in the soil, intensive cattle-breeding must be abandoned and an array of related professional skills must be made redundant.

All things being equal, the elimination of production capacities implies a contraction of supply which would lead to generalized inflationary pressure. This is even more likely because the sectors most affected are located at the commanding heights of modern economies. Cascading through the other sectors, pressure on costs will dent firms’ mark-up, global profits and/or consumer purchasing power, unleashing wild recessionary forces. In addition, degrowth of the carbon economy is a net loss from the point of view of the valorization of financial capital: huge amounts of stranded assets must be wiped out since underlying expected profits are foregone, paving the way for fire sales and ricocheting onto the mass of fictitious capital. These interrelated dynamics will fuel each other, as recessionary forces increase debt defaults while financial crisis freezes the access to credit.

The other side of the transition is a major investment push to accommodate the supply shock caused by the degrowth of the carbon sector. While changing consumption habits could play a role, especially in affluent countries, the creation of new carbon-free production capacities, improvements in efficiency, electrification of transport, industrial and heating systems (along with the deployment of carbon capture in some instances) are also necessary to compensate for the phasing out of greenhouse gas emissions. From a capitalist perspective, these could represent new profit opportunities, so long as the costs of production are not prohibitive relative to available demand. Attracted by this valorization, green finance could step in and accelerate the transition, propelling a new wave of accumulation capable of sustaining employment and living standards.

Yet it is important to bear in mind that timing is everything: making such adjustments in fifty years is completely different from having to disengage drastically in a decade. And from where we are now, the prospects for a smooth and adequate switch to green energy are slim, to say the least. The scaling back of the carbon sector remains uncertain due to the inherent contingency of political processes and the persistent lack of engagement from state authorities.
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When one considers the economic challenges of restructuring economies to keep carbon emissions in line with the stabilization of the climate, this discussion acquires a new framing. Effectiveness must take precedence over efficiency in reducing emissions. That means abandoning the fetish of the price mechanism in order to plan how the remaining dirty resources will be used in the service of clean infrastructure. Such planning must have international reach, since the greatest opportunities for energy-supply decarbonation are located in the Global South. Moreover, as transformation on the supply side will not be enough, demand-side transformations will also be essential to stay within planetary boundaries. Energy requirements for providing decent living standards to the global population can be drastically reduced, but in addition to the use of the most efficient available technologies, this implies a radical transformation of consumption patterns, including political procedures to prioritize between competing consumption claims.

With its longstanding concern for planning and socialized consumption, international socialism is an obvious candidate to take on such a historic task. Though the poor state of socialist politics doesn’t conjure much optimism, the catastrophic conjuncture we are entering – along with price volatility and the ongoing spasms of capitalist crises – could increase the fluidity of the situation. In such circumstances, the left must be flexible enough to seize any political opportunity that will advance the cause of a democratic ecological transition.

Objavili smo rezultate istraživanja o bacanju hrane u domaćinstvima
 
Koliko jestive hrane vi bacate?

Talason wrote:siguran sam da će loženjem lignita da bude više zagađenja nego ako se loži kameni ugalj

On je ponovio da je kolubarski lignit jedan od glavnih uzroka ovolikog zagađenja u našoj zemlji.

„Prodaje se kolubarski lignit, sirov i sušen, kao jedan od najnekvalitetnijih ugljeva – kojeg u Evropi ne možete nabaviti za domaćinstva. I mislim da tu postoji čitav lanac odgovornosti, od REIK-a, koji je u posedu tog zemljišta, gde se nalaze rezerve ugja, do svih inspekcija i službi i naučnih instituta gde postoje stručnjaci koji bi trebalo da upozore na to šta ložimo i koliko je to kvalitetno“, ističe Majić.

But there is now an even more powerful weapon in the inactivist armoury. It comes in the form of an appeal to social justice: one that casts environmentalists as an aloof, out-of-touch establishment, and the inactivists as insurgents, defending the values and livelihoods of ordinary people. “The biggest single threat to the net zero transition is a culture war-style backlash that heavily politicises this agenda and spooks governments into moving more slowly,” says Murray. “At present, it’s on the periphery. But as the past few years have taught us, ideas that were on the periphery can become very influential, very quickly.”

Attempts to mobilise anti-elite sentiments against climate activists are nothing new. Wealthy celebrities who lecture others on environmental sustainability have always been charged with inauthenticity. In the 00s, Republican attacks on Al Gore, the former US vice-president whose personal fortune tops $300m, were one of the main drivers of polarisation among the American public on green issues. What has altered in the decade and a half since the release of Gore’s seminal 2006 film, An Inconvenient Truth, is our political landscape. In many parts of the world, the financial crash and years of subsequent turmoil have shredded electoral support for parties and politicians associated with the old order and propelled new forces into power, from Trump in the US to Brexiters in the UK.