Летећи Полип wrote:
Ali šta da mu radim, Da je uložio onih dva triliona u infrastrukturu, kao što je obećao, da je Flintmičigenu očistio vodu, da je dao makar neko zdravstveno svima...
U stvari, što je najgore, mislim da bi i dalje bio pobeđen od koalicijie ljudi koje takve stvari ne dotiču.
How Trump Lost
Peter Beinart
If he’d governed as he ran in 2016, as an economic populist, he would likely have been reelected. Instead, he reverted to the same old Republican playbook.
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/11/07/how-trump-lost/
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In his campaign four years ago, Trump didn’t tell Americans that he had embraced Ryan’s take-from-the-poor-and-give-to-the-rich agenda. To the contrary, Trump vowed not to cut Social Security, Medicare, or Medicaid. He said he’d raise the minimum wage. He pledged to end Wall Street’s beloved carried-interest deduction. In his election night victory speech, he promised to “rebuild our highways, bridges, tunnels, airports, schools, hospitals.” In part because of these claims, polls found that Americans viewed Trump as more ideologically moderate than any Republican presidential nominee since 1972.
What Trump promised was authoritarian nationalism plus economic populism. It’s a recipe that in other countries has proven strikingly popular. In 2019, Poland’s xenophobic and homophobic Law and Justice party won a dominant election victory in large measure because of its immensely popular payouts to Polish families, which, according to the World Bank, dramatically reduced child poverty. (Law and Justice’s popularity has fallen since then, as many Poles have revolted against its draconian efforts to outlaw abortion.) In Hungary, Viktor Orbán has launched a New Deal-style public works program that gives hundreds of thousands of Hungarians government jobs. In Brazil, another Trump ally, Jair Bolsonaro, has boosted his approval ratings—particularly with poor Brazilians—by buffering them during the pandemic with government checks. Obviously, these autocrats also use repression and propaganda to buttress their rule. But even commentators who acknowledge their authoritarianism admit that their economic policies enjoy substantial support.
By contrast, Trump has—in spite of his campaign promises—embraced a fiercely anti-populist economic agenda. A Gallup poll taken the month he was inaugurated found that Americans considered infrastructure his most important campaign promise. But a former Trump official told The Washington Post that the White House never seriously considered making infrastructure its top agenda item because “Paul Ryan and these guys had waited 30 years for this once-in-a-lifetime chance to cut taxes. They were not going to let that go.” In 2017, after Ryan and Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell shepherded a tax cut through Congress, Trump signed it into law even though, according to the recent book Let Them Eat Tweets by political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, it constituted the second-least popular piece of major legislation of the last twenty-five years. When the Trump White House did finally propose an infrastructure bill, congressional Republicans reportedly balked at both its price tag and the prospect that it would increase the deficit. So the idea was shelved.
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For years now, commentators have wondered when the Republican Party would return to normal. By “normal,” they generally mean well-mannered, not openly racist, and not openly hostile to the rule of law. They mean the Republican Party as defined by people like Paul Ryan. But that Republican Party, for all its supposed decorum, has for decades pushed policies that threatened the wellbeing and economic survival of many Americans.
Four years ago, Trump won the presidency in part because he pledged to end that assault. Instead, he escalated it, even during the worst economic downturn since the Depression. Donald Trump didn’t lose reelection because he changed the Republican Party too much. He lost because he changed it too little.
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by MNE Sun Nov 08, 2020 1:21 pm
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