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by Guest Thu Apr 07, 2022 8:20 pmGrci pre par dana inače vratili poslednju tranšu tog duga. Ordnung muss sein.
Mnogo nas je sve zajedno zaklala Nemačka te godine.
Mnogo nas je sve zajedno zaklala Nemačka te godine.
EU - what's next?
- Guest
a valjda je to definicija "jedinog odraslog u sobi". tako rade odrasli ljudi. odlažu probleme za budućnost, besno tlače slabije, povijaju se pred jačima.
Erős Pista
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A onda deci ostave dugove kod komsije gangstera.
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"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
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Potresno je što je Putin odložio napad na Ukr za posle Merkelinog odlaska u mirovinu. Govori mnogo.
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#FreeFacu
Дакле, волео бих да се ЈСД Партизан угаси, али не и да сви (или било који) гробар умре.
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Join date : 2012-02-12
Location : wife privilege
kondo wrote:Potresno je što je Putin odložio napad na Ukr za posle Merkelinog odlaska u mirovinu. Govori mnogo.
Јел то оно као што је Реган средио са Хомеинијевима да пуштање талаца из амбасаде одложе до после избора?
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the more you drink, the W.C.
И кажем себи у сну, еј бре коњу па ти ни немаш озвучење, имаш оне две кутијице око монитора, видећеш кад се пробудиш...
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Game, set, and match to France - the new master of Europe
Read this exclusive extract from our Economic Intelligence newsletter and sign up at the bottom of the article to get it every Tuesday
12 April 2022 • 2:00pm
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
The war in Ukraine and the interlinked energy shock have revealed the deep strategic strengths of France. Geopolitics has lifted the weight of Paris in European affairs, and diminished Berlin in equal measure.
The French have a credible energy system, however imperfect. They have an agro-industrial core that acquires strategic value in the impending global food crisis. They have armed forces worth the name, and a nuclear deterrent capable of striking at every level.
The Germans lack all of this. It is becoming ever clearer that 16 years of depressed public investment and clammy mercantilist reliance on Russia and China under Angela Merkel have degraded the country, leaving it floundering as the world reverts to its eternal Hobbesian character.
This reshuffling of fortunes has little to do with Emmanuel Macron. The same structural strengths would come through under a President Le Pen, who would not leave Nato, whatever nonsense she uttered before Putinism went out of fashion.
It is happening as Germany’s demographic crunch starts in earnest. Berlin expects the workforce to peak next year and then to decline by 5m over the course of the 2020s, pushing the old-age dependency ratio above 50pc. France (like the UK) is on a very different trajectory.
As Putin’s war pushes the UN’s food price index to a record high, the Élysée is seizing on the moment to derail the EU’s "farm to fork strategy", a set of measures that spell the end of the old Common Agricultural Policy and its mega-subsidies for French agro conglomerates.
The reforms pushed by German and Nordic greens aim to halve the use of pesticides and raise the organic share of produce to 25pc by 2030. It pushes an ethos of sustainable farming with less use of animal feed.
President Macron has other plans. “It was based on a world before the war in Ukraine, and would cut production by 13pc. These objectives must be reviewed. In no circumstances can Europe contemplate producing less,” he said.
That loss of 13pc is disputed. It skips over the science showing that status quo industrial farming erodes the soil and is untenable. But ecological objections are being swept away by the new refrain of European agricultural sovereignty.
“Since Russia is using food security as a weapon, we must counter it with a food shield. A paradigm shift is needed in the way Brussels thinks about agriculture,” said the powerful French farmers lobby FNSEA.
Brussels is bending to pressure from the agrichemical multinationals. It has delayed the revised directive on sustainable use of pesticides, and another on ecosystems.
It is a parallel story on the energy front. The worst gas crisis in living memory has finally ended the era when Germany could export its anti-nuclear ideology through EU regulations. Berlin has been unable to stop France labelling nuclear power a form of clean energy under Europe’s €1 trillion Green Deal. This unlocks large investment flows.
Putin has rehabilitated France’s nuclear industry, which still provides 70pc of its electricity. The network was in trouble earlier this winter when a fifth of its 56 reactors were shut for safety reasons, and France had to fire up two old coal plants to avoid blackouts.
It is still in trouble, of course. The first Hinkley-style reactor at Flamanville has been delayed again until 2023, 12 years late and four times over budget.
State-owned EDF expects a €26bn hit this year, partly because it is being forced to provide energy below market prices to help Mr Macron’s re-election. It will need a state bailout, so this consumer subsidy is disguised taxation.
Nevertheless, France’s nuclear power has proved to be a strategic buffer at a time of crisis, valued as Europe tries to slash dependence on Russian hydrocarbons.
It is Germany that is struggling to explain why it closed three well-functioning reactors in January, and why it plans to close the last three later this year, yet still insists that a gas embargo against Russia is too traumatic to contemplate.
France has the landmass and latitude to roll out a huge expansion of solar power at viable cost. Macron is pushing for a tenfold increase to 100 gigawatts and has ordered a fast-track planning process to end “intolerable delays and barriers”.
French solar is likely to prove the cheapest form of mass energy in core Europe and could turn France into the backbone of the EU’s electrification strategy, along with British offshore wind.
The state agency Cerema says it is technically possible to install over 1,000 gigawatts in France on parking lots, on brownfield sites, and along rail and road margins, as well as on rooftops, without encroaching on farmland.
As for the balance of military credibility, the war in Ukraine has exposed the full damage left by 15 years of German penny-pinching and disarmament.
Defence minister Christine Lambrecht admitted this week that the Bundeswehr has exhausted its stocks and cannot ship more weapons to Ukraine without endangering Germany’s ability to defend itself. “I have to be honest, we have now reached a limit,” she said.
Macron has hardly covered himself with glory since the onset of the Ukraine crisis. He scoffed at US and UK warnings that Russia was poised to attack. He became Putin’s useful idiot in early February, falling for assurances of “de-escalation” and becoming a conduit for tactical disinformation.
He has continued to legitimise Putin by talking to him promiscuously. He has sent Milan anti-tank weapons to Ukraine but so far only in modest numbers. One almost has the impression that Macron’s policy, like that of Chancellor Olaf Scholz, is to nudge the Ukrainians into early capitulation to be done with the problem.
But France is indisputably the EU’s paramount military power, and the shock of full-blown Russian aggression has turned this into gold dust at Europe’s top table.
The spoiler for France’s rising fortunes is that the country is on a trajectory of slow fiscal ruin with arguably the highest structural deficit in the OECD. Its public debt has reached Club Med levels of 116pc of GDP, up 18 points since the start of the pandemic. The debt-gap with Germany has widened to 50 percentage points.
But this loses relevance once Paris gets its hands on Berlin’s credit card through a permanent EU “fiscal entity”, a euphemism for a Hamiltonian EU treasury able to raise debt collectively.
French hopes of turning Europe’s €800bn one-off Covid Recovery Fund (actually nothing to do with Covid) into an irreversible debt union was going nowhere a few months ago. Putin has come to the rescue.
There is a rising chance that it will be beefed up and repurposed for the cause of energy solidarity. Brussels is exploring options for some sort of Ukraine Fund (which will have nothing to do with Ukraine) to keep the game going for joint EU debt issuance, until it becomes irreversible practice by the Monnet Method of creepage.
If so, chapeau, mes amis. Or as we say: game, set, and match to France.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/04/12/game-set-match-france-new-master-europe/
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https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/23/digital-services-act-council-and-european-parliament-reach-deal-on-a-safer-online-space/
Digital Services Act: Council and European Parliament provisional agreement for making the internet a safer space for European citizens
...
In the context of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and the particular impact on the manipulation of online information, a new article has been added to the text introducing a crisis response mechanism.
This mechanism will be activated by the Commission on the recommendation of the board of national Digital Services Coordinators. It will make it possible to analyse the impact of the activities of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the crisis in question and decide on proportionate and effective measures to be put in place for the respect of fundamental rights.
Digital Services Act: Council and European Parliament provisional agreement for making the internet a safer space for European citizens
...
In the context of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and the particular impact on the manipulation of online information, a new article has been added to the text introducing a crisis response mechanism.
This mechanism will be activated by the Commission on the recommendation of the board of national Digital Services Coordinators. It will make it possible to analyse the impact of the activities of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the crisis in question and decide on proportionate and effective measures to be put in place for the respect of fundamental rights.
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Sweet and Tender Hooligan
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Vol. 44 No. 10 · 26 May 2022
Germany Inc.
Jan-Werner Müller on Europe after the invasion
In 1990 the heavy metal band Scorpions released ‘Wind of Change’, a song celebrating the end of the Cold War: ‘The future’s in the air/Can feel it everywhere.’ It also contained the hopeful lines: ‘Let your balalaika sing/What my guitar wants to say.’ It turns out, though, that they had it the wrong way round: it is Putin who calls the tune to which European leaders dance. Fittingly, the Scorpions come from Hanover, home base of Gerhard Schröder, the pre-eminent example of a particular kind of post-Cold War politician: devoted to making serious petro-money while serving as living proof for Putin’s claim, unfailingly delivered with a smirk, that the West is hypocritical – and, by implication, no less corrupt than his own regime. The war on Ukraine has made it clear to everyone that something has gone wrong in the decades since the fall of the Wall. But it’s the German model of politics in particular – hard-nosed pursuit of economic advantage combined with high-minded moralising – that faces a fundamental reckoning.
- Spoiler:
Since leaving office Schröder has presented an almost cartoonish image of a sell-out, not untypical for 1990s promoters of the Third Way. But he is also a tragic example of an old-style social democratic success story gone awry. Brought up by his mother (his father was killed in Romania by the advancing Red Army), he worked his way out of hardship and became a self-described ‘consistent Marxist’ in his early political career. He was elected to the Bundestag in 1980 and is said to have stood outside the Chancellery in Bonn one night after a lengthy visit to a local pub, shaking the fence and shouting: ‘I want to get in here!’ He eventually did, having made social democracy safe for neoliberalism by reinventing himself as the ‘Genosse der Bosse’ – comrade of the capitalists.
Schröder adopted a nouveau riche style that broke with the self-conscious modesty of the old West Germany, posing in Brioni suits, cigar in hand. After his narrow defeat by Merkel in 2005, he announced in characteristically macho manner on live TV – with Merkel looking on stoically – that he would remain as chancellor (many observers assumed he must have had a drink or two before the broadcast). Instead, with unseemly haste, he took up Putin’s invitation to chair the Nord Stream 2 committee, established to create a gas pipeline that would connect Russia and Germany directly across the Baltic Sea. Even after the resignation of his personal staff earlier this year over his refusal to step down from lucrative Russian positions, Schröder ostentatiously continued his bromance with Putin – apparently delighting in defying a political class which, to his mind, has never recognised the achievements of the last working-class chancellor.
Schröder’s obstinacy is so outrageous that it has not only conveniently distracted attention from fellow Third Way profiteers such as Clinton and Blair (who helped secure Western approval for Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Kazakh Potemkin democracy), but has also taken the spotlight off the other Social Democrats who made up the ‘Hanover connection’: Sigmar Gabriel, former minister of the economy, and Frank-Walter Steinmeier, once Schröder’s chief of staff and now Germany’s president. Steinmeier has been fiercely criticised by Ukraine’s media-savvy ambassador to Berlin, Andriy Melnyk, who accuses him of cosying up to Putin just like his former boss. On 12 April, the day before he was due to arrive in Kyiv, Steinmeier was disinvited by President Zelensky: an unprecedented affront which Chancellor Olaf Scholz – another Social Democrat – called an insult not just to the head of state but to the German nation.
It’s true that many on the centre left, especially those from the former East Germany, combine a sentimental view of Russia with guilt over the Second World War (where the Soviet Union is always reduced to Russia) as well as an instinctive anti-Americanism: Manuela Schwesig, a rising centre-left star and leader of the north-eastern state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, has been relentless in her promotion of Nord Stream 2, which makes landfall in her state, and spoke out against ‘American fracking gas, which serves the interests of the US’. (Whose interests did she think Putin’s gas was serving?) In 2021 she set up the Climate and Environment Protection Foundation, which, it turned out, was largely financed by Gazprom, evidently as a means of escaping American sanctions on the ill-fated pipeline.
Social Democrats of this type share a long-standing tendency, going back at least to Egon Bahr, architect of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the late 1960s, and Helmut Schmidt. They treat voices from the lands between Germany and Russia as at best annoying distractions from the world-historical imperatives of detente and international friendship among great powers. They dismissed Poland’s Solidarity in the early 1980s, and in more recent years have waved away Eastern European critics of Nord Stream as pathological Russophobes. The pushback against this tendency has sometimes been too fixated on one side of the German political spectrum. A prominent Polish leftist, Sławomir Sierakowski, recently let it be known that a tradition extended from Hitler’s quest for Lebensraum to Ostpolitik, despite the fact that Ostpolitik was aimed at improving the lives of ordinary citizens by making it easier, at least for some, to communicate across the Iron Curtain, and even to travel. It also helped build the mutual trust without which neither Germany nor Europe could ever have been unified. Little of the sort can be said for the strategy of Wandel durch Handel – transformations through trade – over the past twenty years. If anything, making Europe dependent on Russian oil and gas has led to only one transformation: that of Russia into an authoritarian kleptocracy wrapped in neo-imperialist ideology.
It’s not only the left that is to blame. Christoph Heusgen, Merkel’s most trusted political adviser, is said to have begged her to back away from Nord Stream 2. But she obeyed the representatives of German industry who couldn’t get enough of cheap Russian gas. During the Trump years Merkel was often celebrated as the new ‘leader of the free world’. But her record is much murkier: she started out as a politician stressing her first-hand experience of living under totalitarianism, ready to confront Russia and China on human rights; she ended as a servant of Germany Inc., fuelled by cheap energy from one autocracy and profiting from high-end exports to another.
Nowhere was her ambivalent role more visible than in the political protection Merkel extended to Viktor Orbán for a decade or so. After winning an overwhelming parliamentary majority in 2010, Orbán set about creating a ‘system of national co-operation’. This meant packing the judiciary and the state apparatus with loyalists; restructuring the electoral system to benefit his party, Fidesz; writing a new constitution approved by Fidesz alone; and, not least, ensuring that media companies were acquired by oligarchs allied with his regime. None of this went unnoticed: the European Commission tried to resist the transformation of an EU member state into a soft autocracy by taking Hungary to court for infringing European law. After all, the commission is meant to be the ‘guardian of the treaties’ – and the treaties say that only democracies respecting the rule of law can be part of the European club.
Yet Orbán managed to get his way. He gained time by confusing international observers through selective exercises in comparative constitutionalism, arguing that the new institutional arrangements were benign since they already existed in other democracies. He built what the sociologist Kim Lane Scheppele has called a ‘Frankenstate’: Orbán’s new body politic was assembled from recognisable liberal-democratic elements, and yet, when combined in a particular way, these parts have amounted to a system in which the transfer of power has become all but impossible.
While this was happening, European leaders were busy spending political capital on the Eurocrisis. Brussels already appeared to be dictating to national capitals what kinds of budget they could pass; it seemed inconceivable that it would also start giving failing grades to political systems. Apart from the cover provided by monetary-cum-fiscal crisis, Orbán had a form of political insurance through Fidesz’s membership of the European People’s Party, the largest supranational party family, which brings together Christian Democrats and conservatives. One consequence of the European Parliament’s growing powers over the years is that incentives to discipline individual parties for infractions of democracy have diminished: once, the EPP would have found it easy to expel Fidesz, but in recent years it has mattered a great deal whose party group is the largest in Brussels and Strasbourg – so Fidesz, with its large number of MEPs, has had serious leverage.
Orbán saw he could use that leverage to get away with almost anything. He expelled the Central European University from Hungary and launched hate campaigns against George Soros and refugees and eventually Brussels itself. Hungarian highways, built with EU money, were dotted with billboards that read ‘Let’s Stop Brussels’. Merkel’s Christian Democrats gestured at ‘red lines’ – and Orbán crossed them with impunity. He could do it because while talking the talk of anti-neoliberal populism – describing himself as a ‘plebeian’ in contrast to the supposed Budapest bourgeois elite and the ‘liberal nihilists’ running Brussels – he assiduously courted German companies, with car manufacturers in effect receiving subsidies from the Hungarian taxpayer. In what the political scientist Dan Kelemen has called an ‘Audicracy’, the heads of these multinationals are said to be welcome to call the foreign minister on his mobile.
While Brussels was prepared to allow a single autocracy to exist as an exception within the realm, it turned out that Orbán’s approach had set a precedent. Poland’s ruling populists promised to create ‘Budapest in Warsaw’; in Slovenia, Janez Janša followed Orbán’s far-right playbook. Measures that might have been taken against one rogue member state were off the table as soon as a second, copycat populist government was willing to veto them. At the same time, the EU kept pumping subsidies into states whose leaders equated Brussels with the Soviet Union. By giving them free money – money that keeps cronies happy and buys political support – the EU was now effectively consolidating the rule of enemies to its liberal order. What oil and gas are for Arab dictatorships (and of course for Putin), EU funds are for aspiring authoritarians inside the union.
Orbán was copying Putin in more than one way. He harassed NGOs, took control of state television and local news (while tolerating a few opposition outlets for the sake of plausible deniability) and launched a campaign of anti-liberal culture warfare designed to appeal to gullible conservatives around the globe as well as to clear-eyed conservatives prepared to sacrifice democracy for the sake of winning the war against ‘gender ideology’. He was also consolidating an actual alliance with Putin: Budapest commissioned the Russian state company Rosatom to enlarge Hungary’s only nuclear power plant, conveniently financed with a €10 billion loan from the Russian treasury.
The price of such dependencies became clear this spring. Orbán refused to allow weapons to Ukraine to be shipped through Hungary. State TV channels churned out pro-Russian propaganda. Budapest kept vetoing the proposed cessation of Russian oil imports to the EU – in Dmitry Medvedev’s words, a ‘courageous step for silent Europe’. In the run-up to April’s parliamentary elections Fidesz falsely framed the main opposition candidate, Péter Márki-Zay, as itching to send Hungarians to get killed in Ukraine. Orbán, self-declared defender of ‘peace and security’, is also in a position to veto Finland or Sweden joining Nato, or any similar measure that might cause displeasure in Moscow.
Last month Orbán won his fourth consecutive two-thirds majority in parliament. The election was considered free – i.e. no evidence of ballot-stuffing on the day – but deeply unfair: state resources were ruthlessly deployed on behalf of the governing party and Márki-Zay was granted only five minutes on state TV during the entire campaign. Gerrymandering and massive votes for Fidesz by newly enfranchised ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Serbia (while voting was made as difficult as possible for Hungarians in Western Europe and North America) also helped. Even so, not all has gone smoothly: the EPP has finally parted ways with Fidesz after the majority of its members moved to oust the party; and Orbán’s grander vision of an anti-liberal Visegrád bloc inside the EU has failed for the moment. Right-wing populists have lost power in Slovakia (2020) and the Czech Republic (2021), and while Jarosław Kaczyński remains busy creating Budapest in Warsaw, he is noticeably cooler towards Budapest in Budapest. After years of delay – but now with Merkel out of the way – the EU has finally started a process to cut subsidies to its self-declared enemy on the Danube. The commission accuses Hungary of ‘breaching the rule of law’; what Brussels really means is fraud and corruption in the use of EU money. Meanwhile, the €10.7 million loan from a Hungarian bank to Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National turned out to be a bad investment (for good measure, Orbán also rolled out the red carpet for Éric Zemmour when he visited Budapest in September).
But the fact that Le Pen received more than 40 per cent of the vote in the second round of the French presidential election shows that proximity to Putin doesn’t have to mean political death in today’s Europe. One might have thought otherwise after Matteo Salvini’s recent humiliation on a visit to Poland: a town mayor presented him with a Putin T-shirt of the kind he had once been photographed wearing in Moscow, causing Italian journalists in the audience to taunt him with shouts of ‘Buffone!’ Macron tried to capitalise on a previous Russian loan to Le Pen by hurling a line at her during a TV debate: ‘When you speak to Russia ... you are talking to your banker.’ Le Pen, while still opposing sanctions against Russia, quickly pivoted to the cost of living as the major issue of her campaign.
This may set a precedent for the way the war in Ukraine translates into domestic politics in Europe. Even if parties are united in their condemnation of the invasion, this does not – and should not – end challenges to government policies by opposition parties. The temptation to go easy on Russia will remain. After all, everyone has their reasons: the far right still loves Putin’s supposed defence of traditional values; the far left can’t resist whataboutism (‘What about Iraq?’). Those who use the turn against Russian gas to further their campaign against fossil fuel dependency in general – i.e. the Greens – can be dismissed as bobos who don’t understand the concerns of a gilets jaunes-style constituency more worried about the end of the month than the end of the world.
In Germany, the Christian Democrats – forgetting Merkel’s complicity in Putin’s and Orbán’s successes – are blaming the Social Democrats for being soft on Russia. And even Scholz’s own coalition partners, the Greens and centre-right liberals, are complaining that the chancellor hesitated for too long before finally agreeing to supply heavy weapons to Ukraine (apparently seven howitzers so far). Both Scholz and Macron are being outpaced by the European Commission in its eagerness to include Ukraine in the European club. The commission had largely been sidelined during the Eurocrisis. But now, after a number of years in the shadow of Merkel and Macron, Ursula von der Leyen (also from Hanover, incidentally, though from a Christian Democratic dynasty) appears ready to assert herself.
Von der Leyen’s prominent role on the European stage distracts from the fact that Modell Deutschland is still only tentatively being questioned. It has roughly conformed to the caricature of liberalism which the German jurist and sometime Nazi Carl Schmitt painted in the interwar period: liberals, Schmitt charged, clung to the illusion that all conflicts could be made to disappear through economics or ethics. Potential antagonists could either find common ground through shared material interests, or deliberate among themselves until a moral solution acceptable to all was found. During Merkel’s long reign, this translated into the economic reality of German business relying on cheap Russian gas to produce exports for China. It also meant an ethical order in which German governments could lecture southern Europeans on the morality of thriftiness and the categorical imperative of structural adjustment.
This should be the hour of structural adjustment for Germany, and what has been called its ideology of Exportismus. It should also be the hour of some humility. Instead, a group of intellectuals – writers, comedians, professors – have published an ‘open letter’ to Scholz imploring him not to provide tanks to Ukraine. Their argument rests on what they call ‘moral norms with universal application’; they claim that the number of civilian casualties might be so high that it would be unethical for Kyiv to continue fighting. Driven in part by fear of nuclear confrontation, they are asking Ukrainians to capitulate at what a group of intellectuals – 1200 kilometres away – deems the morally appropriate point in time. Neither the right to self-defence nor the dangers of letting an autocrat get away with blackmail figure in the calculations of those seeking to hold on to what they call a seventy-year ‘European peace narrative’ that conveniently forgets about Srebrenica. They believe that a leader bent on annihilating a neighbour must be given the opportunity to save face and sell a compromise at home – which hardly squares with Moscow’s complete crackdown on opposition. In the end, they give no reason to think that Putin’s balalaika would play what their guitar wants to say.
Scholz has come up with the term Zeitenwende to describe this moment of historical rupture. Wende – ‘turn’ – was also the word used to describe regime change in East Germany in 1989. Many who brought about that change judged it a dubious expression: rather than revolution by courageous citizens (with a little help from Gorbachev), it suggested the reign of impersonal forces. The same implication – historical trends not political decisions by individuals – comes with Zeitenwende. It’s telling that one of the professors criticising the government for sleepwalking into global war uses abstractions like Gewaltprozess – a ‘process of violence’. Such language betrays a desire not to be held responsible, or better still just to be left alone, while clinging to a sense of moral superiority: in a recent TV encounter, the same professor told the Ukrainian ambassador that the Germans know best because they had been sensitised to the horrors of war through their own family histories. Everyone has their reasons.
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"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
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Jebo im je milu majku.
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"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
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Najbolji deo je - hranite Putina, zaradjujete na Kini, a nama pricate o moralu.
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Dobro, malo da pohvalimo 
Njemački kancelar Olaf Šolc rekao je da će otputovati na Zapadni Balkan prije sastanka Evropskog savjeta sljedećeg mjeseca, noseći poruku da region pripada Evropskoj uniji, prenosi Rojters.
"Šest zemalja zapadnog Balkana sa aspiracijama za članstvo u EU - Crna Gora, Srbija, Albanija, Severna Makedonija, Bosna i Hercegovina i Kosovo - uključene su u višegodišnji reformski proces", rekao je Šolc poslanicima u sredu u Berlinu.
"Poštovanje naših obaveza prema njima nije samo pitanje našeg kredibiliteta. Danas je više nego ikada njihova integracija u našem strateškom interesu“, rekao je on, ukazujući na uticaj "spoljnih sila" u regionu, uključujući Rusiju.
vijesti.me
Njemački kancelar Olaf Šolc rekao je da će otputovati na Zapadni Balkan prije sastanka Evropskog savjeta sljedećeg mjeseca, noseći poruku da region pripada Evropskoj uniji, prenosi Rojters.
"Šest zemalja zapadnog Balkana sa aspiracijama za članstvo u EU - Crna Gora, Srbija, Albanija, Severna Makedonija, Bosna i Hercegovina i Kosovo - uključene su u višegodišnji reformski proces", rekao je Šolc poslanicima u sredu u Berlinu.
"Poštovanje naših obaveza prema njima nije samo pitanje našeg kredibiliteta. Danas je više nego ikada njihova integracija u našem strateškom interesu“, rekao je on, ukazujući na uticaj "spoljnih sila" u regionu, uključujući Rusiju.
vijesti.me
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Visegodisnji reformski proces. Pas mater.
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Dosta smo se zajebavali, sad mora era skupog života
Europeans will need to pay a “national security premium” in the future as they unwind their dependence on cheap Russian gas and Chinese labor @vestager tells @handelsblatt https://t.co/Km78XK8s6y
— Noah Barkin(@noahbarkin) May 25, 2022
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Moze, ali da se podeli ravnopravno po klasama. Ima jos nesto, al otom potom.
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Oce to 
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Bugarska traži objašnjenje: Neke zemlje drugačije tretirane?
Sofija -- Potpredsednik bugarske vlade i ministar finansija Asen Vasilev zatražio je objašnjenje od Evropske komisije.
Naime, on je pozvao EK da objasni da li su neke zemlje drugačije tretirane od strane Gasproma u odnosu na druge zemlje članice EU, prenosi BNR radio Bulgaria.
To se dogodilo nakon što je saopšteno da su sve grčke kompanije, uvoznici ruskog gasa, prešle na plaćanje u rubljama.
Vasilev je izrazio rezerve i prema finansiranju koje je EK predložila zemljama članicama kako bi nadoknadile ekonomske gubitke od sankcija Rusiji.
e moj ti
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Join date : 2012-06-10
Bugarin zbunjen nakon što mu je neko zabio nož u leđa: NISMO SE TAKO DOGOVORILI!
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"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
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Join date : 2019-11-04
Opet, grecite u piratskom modu
The oil the tanker carried turned out to be Iranian. At the request of the US government, Greek authorities confiscated the oil and had it transferred to another tanker that would deliver it to the US. /2
— Artyom Lukin (@ArtyomLukin) May 25, 2022
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Join date : 2017-11-16
Malo rublje, malo smrt tankeru. Srbi za bogate.
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Join date : 2012-06-10
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/nemacka-embargo-nafta-rusija/31873931.html
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"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
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Join date : 2019-11-04
gomila real-političkih tema u briselu dobija oblik ritualnog ispoljavanja tzv jedinstva, ili kuknjave što ga nema. a sama tema se brzo pomalo zaboravi.
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Join date : 2019-11-04
EU admits impact of 2/3 Russian gas cut ‘not assessed’
By Margherita Montanari, Oliver Noyan, Sarantis Michalopoulos and Vlad Makszimov | EURACTIV.de and EURACTIV.it
The European Commission has not conducted an economic impact assessment of its push to cut Russian gas imports by two thirds by year’s end, the first step of its €300 billion plan to eliminate Russian energy imports altogether by 2027, EURACTIV has learned.
Instead of an assessment, the Commission conducted a “simulation” in its spring economic forecast that considers the impact of an abrupt stop of imports of any Russian gas.
“Compared to an abrupt stop of Russian gas imports, a gradual reduction by 2/3 would be much smoother, as firms and consumers would have the time to prepare, and governments could secure critical infrastructure for alternative imports,” a Commission spokesperson told EURACTIV.
Germany sneezes
However, businesses across the bloc are wary of the coming economic fallout from the move.
Since the onset of the war in Ukraine, Germany reduced its reliance on Russian gas imports, amounting to more than half of all gas imports, by around 35%.
By the end of the year, Berlin plans to further reduce imports to 30% of its overall gas imports, almost half of what it imported last year.
However, the diminished dependency achieved so far is partially driven by a decrease in demand from German industry.
“Due to the rapid increase in gas prices, the demand for gas is falling incessantly anyway, by up to 10% in the industry in the first months of the war alone,” Claudia Kemfert, head of the department for Energy, Transportation and Environment at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) told EURACTIV.
Meanwhile, German businesses are critical of the Commission’s plan to reduce Russian gas imports by two thirds until the end of the year.
“The strong will and the plan of the EU Commission to cut off the money supply to Russia by means of an energy embargo will not pass companies by without a hitch,” Marc S. Tenbieg, Executive Director of the German Association for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (DMB) told EURACTIV.
Even if an alternative to Russian gas imports were to be found, a gas embargo “would not only lead to considerable additional burdens on the German economy in the short term, but also to compensation demands on the part of companies,” he added.
According to Tenbieg, the European Commission’s plan to reduce Russian gas imports is wishful thinking.
“While a reduction of this magnitude is certainly possible with a very great effort, it is not possible in the short time available,” he said.
“Unfortunately, what has led to energy dependency over decades cannot be dissolved within a few months,” Tenbieg added.
However, analysts are convinced that such a reduction is tenable under certain conditions.
“It is possible to reduce Russian gas imports and that they can even be dispensed altogether,” economic expert Kemfert told EURACTIV. Germany would have to increase LNG imports, fill up gas storages, introduce measures to save gas, and invest heavily in renewable energy to reach this goal.
Cutting Russian gas could lead to losses of up to 5% of the gross national product in Germany and considerable negative repercussions in other European countries.
Economic performance is falling even without the Commission’s push for an accelerated phase-out of Russian gas “due to the very strong overall increase in prices for fossil energies and the associated inflation,” Kemfert emphasised.
“The better and more intensively we prepare for a gas embargo, the smaller the negative effects on the national economy,” the economic analyst stressed.
Cold water on Italy’s growth
Other big European economies might be even harder hit.
Italy’s GDP growth slowdown will be more evident than in the rest of Europe due to the country’s energy and economic ties with Moscow, said Economy Commissioner and former Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni at the Italian banking association (ABI) in Rome on Monday.
Following Confindustria’s economic forecasts in case of a possible Russian gas shutdown, Gentiloni said he expects “a significant impact on growth prospects this year, especially for a country like Italy that is among the largest importers of Russian gas in Europe.”
“In a worst-case scenario that simulates the impact of higher energy prices for a longer period, along with a complete halt in gas supplies from Russia, would give negative growth for this year”, he added.
Gentiloni recalled that the European Commission forecasts Italy’s economy to grow 2.4% in 2022 and less than 2% in 2023.
Gentiloni also repeated the Commission’s call on countries to adopt more “cautious” policies as Brussels has halted the bloc’s fiscal rules until the end of 2023. High-debt countries like Italy “need to have special attention to public finance in these circumstances,” he added.
Gas is off the table
After weeks of intense talks and disagreements, late last night, EU leaders finally reached a political agreement to impose a partial oil ban on Russian oil.
A move to ban Russian gas too is “realistically off the table”, an EU diplomat told EURACTIV yesterday.
“If there was such a mess with Russia’s oil, imagine what would happen with a proposal to ban gas”, another diplomat representing a southern EU member state told EURACTIV on 17 May.
“The 7th package of sanctions against Moscow will be extremely difficult […] We are very close to reaching our limits. What will the 7th package include?” the diplomat wondered.
https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/russian-gas-cut-eu-economy-enters-uncharted-territory/
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Join date : 2017-11-16
Ban na gas nije realan sada
- Posts : 52640
Join date : 2017-11-16
Ali, mislim, rat je, nije nogometna utakmica.