EU - what's next?

kondo wrote:čekaj, oni misle da LNG tankerima snabdevaju evropu?



ja sam mislio da oni imaju svoj gas u nekim kazahstanima i slično....

https://www.bruegel.org/2022/02/preparing-for-the-first-winter-without-russian-gas/

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The immediate challenge is to refill storages as much as possible before next winter. A previous Bruegel blog explored three scenarios to see whether Europe could survive this winter without Russian gas. This blog post updates this analysis to consider the coming year and outlines three scenarios in more detail.

All scenarios begin with 320 TWh of EU-wide storage on 1 March 2022. A monthly demand is set according to the average across 2018-2021 (440 TWh/month in March 2022 to 240 TWh/month in summer months). We choose this assumption to allow calculation of the necessary demand reduction to compensate for import shortfalls. We assume that imports from North Africa, Norway and Azerbaijan remain at similar levels to the last few months, at their maximum capacity (in total 120 TWh/month). For LNG, we assume record import levels, approaching the technical maximum capacity of regasification terminals (140 TWh/month). Russian imports are considered as follows:

- No Russian imports: Even record high non-Russian imports would not be enough to sufficiently refill storage ahead of next winter. Europe would need to reduce demand by at minimum 400 TWh (or 10%-15% of annual demand). This is possible. A portfolio of exceptional options could abate at least 800 TWh.

- Limited Russian imports: The Nord Stream 1 and Turkstream pipelines would operate (60 TWh/month), while Ukraine transit, Yamal and flows to the Balkans are stopped. Gazprom would earn a lot of money from high prices and maintain control over the EU’s gas supply, while Europe would still suffer from a highly volatile gas market.

- Average Russian imports: Russian exports to the EU market closely resemble 2021, which we consider roughly equal to Gazprom’s long-term contractual obligations. Without energy sanctions from either side, this is likely to be the prevailing scenario. It would allow storages to be easily replenished and lead to lower prices.

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Storing up: who pays for the gas?

Injecting around 700 TWh into EU storages ahead of next winter will be a costly exercise. At current prices this would cost at least €70 billion, compared to €12 billion in previous years.

So, Europe will not only have to find somebody to sell this gas, but also someone willing and able to buy it. Typically, this would be the business of European gas companies. But private companies are profit-maximising and risk-adverse. Buying at record prices in a market environment in which geopolitical decisions and the strategic behaviour of a pivotal supplier can drastically change the demand-supply balance is a bet with limited upside and massive downsides (see Figure 5). Just imagine what would happen if by the summer, EU gas companies managed to amass close to 1000 TWh and Gazprom suddenly decides it is time to release the volumes it withheld last year. Prices would drop dramatically, leaving all those who stored gas – helping Europe prepare for winter – with huge losses. This is a catch-22 scenario. If companies do not increase storage, Gazprom might continue keeping the market very tight, leading companies to lose lots of money by not being able to supply their customers. However, if the same companies store lots of gas, Gazprom will be tempted to flood the market.

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These efforts are necessary but not sufficient. Over the next 12 months, there is little that can be done to remove hard physical bottlenecks. Without Russian gas, there will remain a gap between supplies and a ‘normal’ year’s demand. Exceptional measures are possible to reduce demand. They would send a signal of united European defiance and stop billions of euros currently flowing from west to east.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/24/energy/qatar-gas-europe/index.html

Doha, Qatar (CNN Business) Qatar will stand "in solidarity with Europe" and will keep natural gas flowing there, even if other customers are willing to pay more, Qatari Energy Minister Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi told CNN's Becky Anderson in an exclusive interview on Thursday.

The Gulf monarchy supplies some European countries with liquefied natural gas (LNG) but has the contractual right to divert supply to other customers — primarily in Asia — if they are willing to pay more.

Most of Qatar's LNG supply to Europe is contractually divertible. But Qatar will keep sending gas in Europe, as countries there try to wean themselves off Russian energy.

"We're not going to divert [contracts] and will keep them in Europe, even if there is financial gain for us to divert away, we would not do that," said Al-Kaabi, who is also president and CEO of QatarEnergy. "That's in solidarity with what's going on in Europe."

https://tass.com/economy/1427805

CAIRO, March 26. /TASS/. Qatar is currently unable to help Europe with gas deliveries, as there is no alternative to Russia at this stage, Qatari Minister of State for Energy Affairs Saad Sherida Al Kaabi said at the Doha Forum on Saturday.

"I do not think that at the moment we can urgently help [Europe]," he said. "No one can take Russia’s place in energy supply."

On Friday, the minister said that Qatar would not be able to replace Russia, which accounts for 30-40% of gas deliveries, as the emirate could not substitute such amounts.

Del Cap wrote:битна је ствар да не оставиш највећу земљу и највећу нуклеарну силу на континенту ван интегративних токова. америка се ослонила на низ ист.евр. земаља, ради својих итнереса - сталног присуства у европи, и то је све јарцало тензије (не аболира руски политички курс). већина европе је пасивно плутала у тој тужној жабокречини.

Bleeding Blitva wrote:

Mór Thököly wrote:Ja sam sve vise ubedjen da ce istorijski sud o Merkelici biti veoma los.

Proglasili je Putinovim korisnim idiotom: https://www.politico.eu/article/putin-merkel-germany-scholz-foreign-policy-ukraine-war-invasion-nord-stream-2/

EU countries bet on floating LNG terminals to raise import capacity
By Nikolaus J. Kurmayer | EURACTIV.com 7:48 (updated:  13:36)


   
The war in Ukraine has focused attention on liquefied gas (LNG) to replace Russian supplies coming via pipeline. Germany, France and Italy are all planning to rent or acquire special floating terminals in order to increase import capacity.

While replacing Russian oil and coal is considered doable, gas is more complicated because deliveries rely on existing pipeline infrastructure linked to Russia.

But the war in Ukraine is forcing EU governments to speed up the search for alternatives.

“We can report that construction on the alternatives is progressing very well and quickly,” explained Germany’s vice-chancellor Robert Habeck on Friday (25 March) as he briefed journalists on progress made in ensuring the country’s supply security.

To ship gas across long distances, it needs to be cooled down to -160° Celsius and compressed into liquid form, reducing its volume by 1/600th. This process requires terminals for the liquefaction and regasification process, which usually take around five years to build.

Over the past weeks, Habeck has visited potential LNG suppliers like Canada, the US, Norway and Qatar in a bid to replace the 46 billion cubic meters of Russian gas that Germany consumed last year.

But even if those countries were able to increase production, Europe lacks the import capacity. In Germany, the first LNG terminal is due to enter operation in 2026, which has prompted Berlin to look elsewhere.

The German government has instructed utilities RWE and Uniper to rent three so-called Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs) from the Greek company Dynagas and the Norwegian subsidiary of Hoegh.

“The news that I can make public now is that we have created the framework for companies to rent so-called FSRUs, which are special ships that can land LNG and regasify it,” Habeck said.

Dynagas did not respond to a request for comment on how far the talks have progressed with RWE regarding the two floating terminals.

Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FRSUs) are often former supertankers which have been repurposed to regasify significant quantities of LNG. While onshore terminals must follow strict construction regulations, all that is required for floating terminals is a deep water port that can land very large ships.

Germany’s first floating LNG terminal is expected to be operational already before the end of the year, with the rest of them due by mid 2024.

For the coming winter, that will allow Germany to receive 7.5 billion cubic meters of LNG, going up to 27 bcm by the Summer of 2024 using these retrofitted tankers moored at German ports and fitted with pipes connecting them to the shore.

The rush for FSRUs

Alongside Germany, other European countries have started looking towards floating LNG terminals as pressure grows to move away from Russian gas.

Italy, which is similarly dependent on Russian imports, also signalled its interest for two FSRUs.

“Today we officially mandated (gas group) Snam to negotiate the acquisition of an FSRU and the leasing of a second,” said Italy’s energy transition minister Roberto Cingolani in a parliamentary hearing, Reuters reported.

Likewise, the French government has tasked Total Energies and a subsidiary of Engie with installing a floating terminal in the harbour of Le Havre, Les Echos reported.

Greece is an exception. Before the Ukraine war, the Hellas Motor Oil company launched construction of the Dioriga FSRU terminal, which is due to be completed at the end of 2023 to serve the Hellenic and Southeast Europe markets.

Altogether, this means additional demand for at least six floating LNG terminals across Europe. The problem is, there are just 33 of them around the world, fewer than the 36 that were estimated to be operational by today four years ago.

Outside Europe, floating terminals are already commonplace. An industry report published in April 2020 found that 19 countries imported LNG through FSRUs.

Costs

Floating terminals come at a lower initial cost than comparable onshore terminals, with analysts saying that the cost of a new FSRU “can typically represent only 50-60% of an onshore terminal”.

Over time, this would be somewhat counterbalanced by higher operating expenditure for every cubic meter of gas processed. Floating terminals also require a deep water port, as well as gas infrastructure on land to store and transport the gas, the International Gas Union said.

A big advantage, however, is that they are flexible and can be sold or transported elsewhere after use.

There's a structural problem Germany is waking up to: the competitiveness of its heavy, energy-intensive industry (chemicals, engineering, metals) is based in no small part on cheap Russian gas; take that away, and made-in-Germany may not that different to, ehem, made-in-Spain

— Javier Blas (@JavierBlas) April 7, 2022

From the Financial Times. @ft #EconTwitter #economy #trade pic.twitter.com/xjqerMZSxa

— Mohamed A. El-Erian (@elerianm) April 7, 2022

Mór Thököly wrote:

Bleeding Blitva wrote:
Proglasili je Putinovim korisnim idiotom: https://www.politico.eu/article/putin-merkel-germany-scholz-foreign-policy-ukraine-war-invasion-nord-stream-2/

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