a future to believe in

Летећи Полип wrote:Deluje mi da će stvarno da puknu na ovim izborima. Sanders klonuo, Bajdenara isto, Tulsi ne može da se probije, jorkširska ekipa svukla raspravu na svoj teren. To je manje više to. Trump 2020.

bruno sulak wrote:
mislim za godinu dana i berni i trampara mogu da dobiju srcku.

bruno sulak wrote:ima dosta vremena do izbora. svasta je moguce. svi smo se smejali trampari na pokretnim stepenicama.

bruno sulak wrote:ima dosta vremena do izbora. svasta je moguce. svi smo se smejali trampari na pokretnim stepenicama.

1. Jeb Bush 22%
   
2. Scott Walker 17%
   
3. Marco Rubio 14%
   
4. Ben Carson 11%
   
5. Mike Huckabee 9%
   
6. Rand Paul 7%
   
7. Rick Perry 5%
   
8. Ted Cruz 4%
   
9. Chris Christie 4%
   
10. Carly Fiorina 2%
    
11. Donald Trump 1%
    
12. Lindsey Graham 1%
    
13. John Kasich 1%
    
14. Bobby Jindal 0%
    
15. Rick Santorum 0%
    

Летећи Полип wrote:

bruno sulak wrote:ima dosta vremena do izbora. svasta je moguce. svi smo se smejali trampari na pokretnim stepenicama.

Samo, Trampara se spustio niz te stepenice "with guns blazing", i uz ogromnu pokrivenost od strane Dems naklonjenih medija. Naspram sebe je imao gomilu sivih tipova, sa prežvakanom pričom. Na stranu harizma koju Tramp nesumnjivo ima. Da se ne lažemo, sa Sandersom je bilo jako slično. Deda je energično počeo, ali nešto mu je ipak zafalilo da pobedi Hilari. Da je možda bio malo agresivniji, da su njegovi fanovi malo više zalegli za njega, i da nije bilo Trampa da usisa gomilu belih middle class glasova - možda...

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With President Trump and his team delighted by the Democrats’ leftward turn, a central question emerges: Will running on a more explicitly progressive platform energize the Democratic base, or will it cost the Party the 2020 election? To consider this question and others, I spoke by phone with Dave Wasserman, the U.S. House editor for the Cook Political Report and a contributor to NBC News. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we also discussed whether voters are less ideological than people think they are, the ways in which the Electoral College presents a challenge to Democrats winning Presidential elections, and the true lesson of the 2018 midterms.

Do you think Democrats whose primary desire is to see Trump defeated should be concerned or excited that their party seems to be moving leftward?

I don’t think Democrats would be wise to run against Trump on a platform of completely open borders and abolishing private health insurance. There are limits. But, generally, the tiny sliver of voters in this country who are still persuadable are not highly ideological people. They are fundamentally anti-élite in nature, and they are looking for three characteristics in a candidate for President that don’t have much to do with left-versus-right. And those characteristics are authenticity, being a credible agent for change, and empathy. In other words, does this person understand my daily struggles? And a common thread between Obama and Trump was a common touch.

It’s all relative, but, whether it was having been a community organizer on the South Side of Chicago or a billionaire who ate K.F.C. and went to professional wrestling matches, it struck a chord with those voters.

Trump still got a lower percentage of the vote than Mitt Romney or John Kerry. Do you think there is a chance that we over-learn the lessons of a guy who got forty-six per cent?

Yes, but Democrats shouldn’t under-learn the lessons of Hillary Clinton’s failure. She was viewed not as an Arkansas Democrat but as a Chappaqua Democrat, by 2016. She ran a campaign that didn’t just fail in terms of targeting the right states but failed to drive an economic message. And “stronger together” and “Trump is unfit for office” were not substitutes for “here’s my plan to get the American heartland back to work.”

When you contrast Arkansas and Chappaqua, are you contrasting economics or culture? If you are arguing the latter, it seems like you could be arguing that “Massachusetts Democrat” could also be poisonous?

It’s more cultural in my opinion, but there is no question that Clinton could have talked about the economy more. The pitfalls in a potential Harris or Warren nomination are several. But the first one that comes to mind is the reinforcement of an image that the Democratic Party is dominated by coastal élitists, and, despite Warren’s Oklahoma roots and populist message, her career as an Ivy League academic is a liability, or would be a serious liability in a general-election campaign. In Harris’s case, Republicans would love to run against San Francisco, but, more than that, she hasn’t woven voters’ personal stories into her case for why she should be elected as often as some other candidates have. And that is one area where she probably has room to grow as a candidate.

It seems like you are saying freshness and authenticity are good, and we shouldn’t just be thinking about ideology, but there are various cultural markers which can be a problem, whether someone is centrist or left.

That’s correct, in my view. At this point in 2015, there was a widespread notion that the Republican candidate who wanted to build a wall and make Mexico pay for it was unelectable in a general election. That proved to be false. And we should be careful about making broad pronouncements about platform positions such as Medicare for All or an overhaul of ICE.

O.K., but it seems to me that there is a fundamental difference, which is that no Democrat is capable of winning with forty-six per cent of the vote, because of the Electoral College map. That may be because the system is unfair, but it seems like you can make an argument that Republicans have more leeway in how they can run.

That’s correct. The problem for Democrats is that they could still win five million more votes than Donald Trump and lose the Electoral College. The problem is that trends are benefitting Democrats in states that are not decisive in the Electoral College. Democrats are continuing to gain millions more votes in California. They could cut into Trump’s margin in Texas by eight hundred thousand and not be rewarded by a single electoral vote. Those trends are not as present in Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania. 

The question is: Can a more progressive candidate from a coastal state perform well in the middle of the country? And part of why Obama appealed in those [Midwestern] states was that he was a Midwestern candidate. He was someone who had experience going to fish fries in rural counties of Illinois, which, culturally and economically, are a lot like the parts of Wisconsin and Michigan and Iowa where Democrats’ fortunes have fallen recently.

So we shouldn’t assume we know how this will work—I certainly don’t—but the Democratic bar is simply higher.

That’s correct. I believe too much of the media in Washington, D.C., is viewing candidates’ chances against Trump through a left-versus-right spectrum, or a sliding scale, in which if they nominate Biden they can win middle America, but if they nominate someone too far left they will risk alienating those voters. I don’t view it that way. The reason that, in my opinion, Biden is vulnerable—perhaps more vulnerable than other Democrats in the race [against] Trump—is that I have watched congressional races for the last twelve years, and, over and over again, I have seen candidates with long paper trails and voting records get picked apart for every comment they made twenty or thirty years ago. And that’s what is happening at the moment.

The Biden people would probably say they are being picked apart for things that aren’t going to hurt him if he makes it to a general election, though, right?

But here’s how they will: Democrats tend to underestimate the Trump campaign’s ability to weaponize social media to divide the Democratic base by attacking the eventual nominee from the left. Trump’s campaign, it’s no secret, is going to take to Facebook ads and other media to convince casual voters—in other words, voters who only turn out occasionally—that, for example, Joe Biden mistreated women, including Anita Hill; is a creep; opposed busing; and is, generally, a corporate Democrat.

What lessons about Democratic electability do you draw from 2018? Is the best case for someone like Biden that turnout was huge in 2018, the highest in a century in a midterm, and so any Democrat, no matter how moderate, is likely to get a strong turnout?

You can easily flip the coin and make the case that many Trump voters, particularly white men without college degrees, did not turn out in 2018 because Trump was not on the ballot. And there is real risk for Democrats that those voters are the largest drop-off universe from 2016 to 2018, and will return in 2020. So I am not convinced that 2018 signals a trend toward Democrats in 2020, especially because Trump has proven he is better than anyone else at incinerating his opponents’ images.

So you don’t think Democrats should feel good about 2018 turnout?

They should feel good about it, but 2018 was as much about subtraction as it was about addition. The number of young and nonwhite voters that cast ballots in 2018 was light-years ahead of 2014. But a lot of Democrats’ success had to do with Trump voters’ failure to turn out, which was almost a mirror image of Obama voters’ failure to turn out in 2010, and look how 2012 turned out.

Can you explain that a little bit, given that over-all turnout was so high for a midterm?

Look at it this way: Almost every Democrat who cast a ballot in 2018 also cast ballots in 2016. I am not sold on the proposition that 2018 indicates a surge in enthusiasm that’s meaningful for 2020. Part of why Democrats did well in 2018 was that they didn’t need one clear leader or one clear message. Their unifying figure was Donald Trump. In 2020, Democrats will have to settle on one choice. And right now I have a hard time seeing one candidate in this field who is capable of truly unifying the Democratic Party into battle. And, in fact, the Democratic field to me, so far, is more about quantity than quality.

When you mentioned Democrats and the dangers of moving left, you brought up health care and immigration, which are two things some Democrats have moved left on. Are you saying that Democrats are going into territory they should be worried about ideologically?

I have a hard time seeing Democrats running on totally open borders with Mexico or abolishing private health insurance and winning the general election. But it’s much more about the posture the nominee is willing to adopt. If, instead of responding defensively to Trump attack ads, the nominee immediately reclaims the offense and makes his or her case forcefully for why his or her plan should be adopted, then they will already be several steps ahead of where Hillary Clinton was in 2016.

The people Democrats need to be very concerned about turning out are the young and nonwhite demographics that did not show up for Hillary Clinton in 2016. A candidate like Stacey Abrams, who is younger and nonwhite and not from a bastion regarded as élite and liberal, would have a better chance of turning those voters out than a seventy-eight-year-old white guy who has been in office for most of his life.

Would the case against what you were saying about Biden and Abrams be that swing voters in the Midwest, specifically, would find Biden more appealing?

My rejoinder to that would be that the idea that Joe Biden could return a lot of those white working-class voters to the Democratic fold could turn out to be a mirage. These voters have become culturally loyal to Trump. They are much likelier to live in places where local news is declining—in other words, places that are more susceptible to aggressive social-media propaganda campaigns. Trump’s popularity has not waned much in those places.

Would your argument in this conversation imply that you disagree with someone like Nate Silver, who argued that Clinton probably would have won the election, perhaps by five or six points nationally, if not for the Comey letter? Because, if you believe that, even with a candidate like Clinton, who is far from perfect, her loss may have been more of a fluke, and so you might want to go with what is perceived as a safe choice.

In an election decided essentially by seventy-eight thousand votes in three states, just about anything makes a difference. But what I think 2016 proved was that doubling down on the evolution of your party and its base can pay dividends. We saw in 2012 that Mitt Romney, who represented the last vestiges of the country-club wing of the Republican Party, simply could not excite the voters that Trump could excite in 2016. I see the same potential scenario on the Democratic side, where Joe Biden might be the last vestige of a certain kind of Democratic Party that failed to excite the future of the Democratic Party.

But Romney got more votes than Trump.

That’s not true.

Sorry, he got a higher percentage, but not more votes. So it seems like this is about the Electoral College. He excited different people than Trump did, but the ones Trump excited counted more in the Electoral College. So it seems like the argument may be different for Democrats, because they don’t have that advantage.

It’s all about which states candidates are over- or underperforming in. It may not be fair, but the reality is that Democrats need to win places like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania to beat Donald Trump in 2020. They may nominate a candidate who is really popular in California or Texas. [But], yeah, there is a higher bar for Democrats here. No doubt about that.

Trump was good at motivating a certain type of person, and it seems unclear what that means for Democrats.

We tend to think of those states as dominated by white working-class voters, and they are. But that element of the electorate doesn’t fully explain what happened in 2016. But there was also a decline in African-American participation in those states versus 2012, and that is another key to 2020. The six states that I argue will decide the race are those three, plus Arizona, Florida, and North Carolina. If I had to narrow it down to the two states I think will be absolutely most decisive, I would say Arizona and Wisconsin. But what five of the six have in common are pretty robust African-American populations. And if I wanted to know the turnout rate for one demographic in 2020 for the sake of predicting the result, it would be African-American voters under forty.

My summary of everything you have said today is that I don’t think it will necessarily make Democrats feel good, and Michelle Obama is the clear answer.

If Michelle Obama were remotely interested in running, which, after reading her book, seems about as likely as me winning the Tour de France next year, she would have a better chance to win than just about anyone in the field.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/what-the-democrats-turn-leftward-means-for-the-partys-chances-in-2020

Harris, Warren tie for third place in new 2020 Dem poll, but Biden still leadshttps://t.co/5tltSmJZed

— POLITICO (@politico) July 4, 2019

His greatest concern, he says, is to protect Israel, by strengthening the United States-Israel relationship. At a conference last fall in Israel, Saban described his formula. His “three ways to be influential in American politics,” he said, were: make donations to political parties, establish think tanks, and control media outlets.
...
By far his most important relationship is with Bill and Hillary Clinton. In 2002, Saban donated five million dollars to Bill Clinton’s Presidential library, and he has given more than five million dollars to the Clinton Foundation. In February, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a major policy address at the U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Doha, co-sponsored by the Saban Center. And last November Bill Clinton was a featured speaker at the Saban Forum, an annual conference attended by many high-level Israeli and U.S. government officials, which was held in Jerusalem. Ynon Kreiz, an Israeli who was the chairman and chief executive of a Saban company and Saban’s closest associate for many years, attended the conference, and when I commented that his former boss appeared to be positively smitten with Bill Clinton, Kreiz replied, grinning broadly, “No! No! I remember once Haim was talking to me on the phone, and he said in Hebrew, without changing his tone so Clinton would have no idea he was speaking about him, ‘The President of the United States, wearing his boxers, is coming down the stairs, and I am going to have to stop talking and go have breakfast with him.’ ”

He and his wife, Cheryl (who, by the way, is not Jewish), slept in the White House several times during President Clinton's two terms. And Mr. Saban has remained close to the former president.

rumbeando wrote:Pa nikome, upravo o tome se i radi.

Filipenko wrote:Meni su najjaci clanci poput "Epstein was an agent, but whose...?" gde uopste nemamo predstavu ciji je agent Jevrejin kabalista koji seksualno i na druge nacine iskoriscava decu i robove prema uputstvima iz Tore i drugih antickih hebrejskih spisa, cija je glavna briga zastita Izraela i koji upumpava stotine miliona u projevrejske lobisticke grupe. Verovatno je kineski ili jos bolje ruski agent.

the winter vacation to someplace “tropical,” the summer vacation to someplace “cultural,”