WW2 revizionizam

Osim što je mit o masovnom bošnjačkom učešću u ustaškoj vojsci gnusna laž, on ima i jedan tehnički problem. Naime, ustaše nisu ni bili masovna,  nego specijalna stranačka vojska zadužena za najteže vojne operacije i genocid, koja je prije reforme 1944. brojala samo oko 30k ljudi

— Danijal Hadžović (@DaniHadzovic) June 12, 2019

...

Finally, on 2 October, Tito informed Dimitrov that he did not recognise the authority of the government-in-exile or the King, that he did not intend to allow their return to the country, and that the AVNOJ should be considered the only legal authority in the country. Significantly he reported that he had communicated his intentions to Fitzroy Maclean, Churchill’s personal envoy to the Partisans, and that Maclean had let the Partisans know that the British government would not strongly uphold the king and the government-in-exile.48 Although the telegram was widely circulated among the Soviet leadership, which had strongly discouraged Tito to take the same step a year earlier, this time Moscow did not react. Excluding the argument that the implications of this news had not been fully understood, it can be argued that Moscow preferred to remain on the fringe of the action, keeping a free hand to stop Tito if his gamble backfired or to support him in case of success. Which, in the end, is exactly what happened.

The Soviets’ silence, in any case, was enough for Tito to start preparing a new conference of the AVNOJ without feeling the need to keep them updated on the details. At the same time, Moscow started conducting discreet surveys with the British. At the end of October, meeting with Eden in Moscow, Molotov inquired cautiously about the possibility of sending a Soviet mission to the Partisans ‘to obtain information’.49 But when Eden endorsed the idea and suggested sending a Soviet mission to the Chetniks as well, Molotov simply dropped the proposal.50 At the same meeting, in response to Eden’s direct question, he did not deny that Moscow had wireless communication with the country. He added, however, that it ‘gave only a very limited and uncertain means of contact.’51 A request from Manuil’skii to send substantial military help to Tito now that the military situation made it technically possible was also kept on hold.52 Moscow was clearly waiting to see how the situation developed. The Soviets did not have to wait long. At the beginning of November 1943, Maclean suggested abandoning the Chetniks, who were considered irremediably compromised by the Germans, and giving full support to Tito. Churchill embraced the idea that instead of trying to reconcile Tito and Mihailovic´ , it was better to embrace the former, in the hope of gaining his confidence and leading him into an agreement with the king. At Tehran, the British informed Moscow that they intended to provide military support to Tito and dropped their request for assistance in brokering a deal between him and Mihailovic´ . Soviet intelligence confirmed the British shift towards Tito, providing Moscow with London’s confidential documents on the matter.53 The question of the Soviet mission was discussed again. Since the meeting in Moscow in October, however, positions had been reversed. This time it was Molotov who asked Eden ‘if he thinks that we should send a mission also to Mihailovic´ ’, and it was the British foreign minister who raised objections based both on technical reasons and on the fact that they were about to abandon the chief of the Chetniks.54 Already on his way back from the conference, Stalin instructed the chief of Soviet aviation to support the Partisans ‘whatever it takes’.55 Tito, in the meantime, made his move. On 29 November, the AVNOJ established itself as the provisional government of the country and declared that the king could not enter the country until it had been liberated and a referendum held on the monarchy.56 Apparently, Stalin reacted angrily to the news, commenting that it was ‘a stab in the back for the Soviet Union and the Teheran decisions’.57 Even if this was the case, Stalin quickly changed his tune once it was clear that the Western allies did not view this development in a negative light. On 12 December, the proposal for military supplies to Tito put forward in October by Manuil’skii was finally approved. On 13 December, the British wrote to Moscow informing the Soviets that they did not consider the results of the AVNOJ conference would affect their Yugoslav policy or relations with the partisans, and asked for Soviet assistance in brokering an agreement between Tito and the king.58 The following day the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a note praising the AVNOJ’s decisions. The wording of the note made it clear that the new policy had originated in the Western field, and that Moscow was merely following up a British initiative. The crucial passage, which was rewritten several times, stated that the events in Yugoslavia had ‘already met sympathetic responses in the United Kingdom and in the US’ and in announcing the arrival of a Soviet Mission it was stressed that the British had already established their mission in the field.59 The Soviet reply to the British note of 13 December was also carefully worded to keep the Soviets’ hands free. Assurances that the Soviet mission would facilitate cooperation between Tito and the king contained in the first draft of the response were dropped in the final version. In the end, Molotov simply stated that, although there appeared to be many obstacles, the Soviet government was ‘ready to do everything possible for the achievement of a compromise’.60 The last piece of the new Soviet policy was put in place on 22 December, when the government in Moscow communicated to the Yugoslav government-in-exile that it was not ready to sign the new friendship and mutual assistance pact that had been under discussion since 1942.61 In the following days, Moscow proved to be more than happy to leave the British out in the cold: when Eden asked Molotov if the Soviet government had any suggestions as to how to achieve the political compromise, he replied that unfortunately Moscow had not received enough information about the situation on the ground to make specific recommendations.62 Meanwhile, Dimitrov instructed Tito as to how he should reply to the question posed by the Western Allies to the Yugoslav delegation that was sent to Cairo at the beginning of December. Dimitrov agreed with Tito that he should not push for recognition of the committee by the Western Allies and that he should remain firm in his demand to postpone the issue of the position of the king until after the war. On the issue of propaganda against the king, he suggested that Tito show ‘the necessary flexibility’ in order to ‘better [disorganize] his supporters abroad and in Serbia’ and overcome ‘certain difficulties on the part of the Anglo-Americans in their aid to the People’s Liberation Army’. Tito, for example, could declare that ‘if the king will not oppose the national committee, the latter will for its part refrain from all propaganda against the king’. Above all, it was necessary to avoid giving the impression that he was favouring the Croats over the Serbs.63

At the beginning of 1944, the Soviets continued to claim that they did not have enough information about the situation in Yugoslavia to take any action, and under this pretext they refused to issue a declaration advocating an agreement between Tito and the king.64 Behind the scenes, they were overturning one of the key features of the popular front strategy established in 1941, suggesting to Tito that he reject any agreement with the Yugoslav government-in-exile. It was Churchill who took the initiative, asking Tito, on 5 February, if the dismissal of Mihailovic´ could open up the possibility of an agreement between the Partisans and the king. Tito forwarded the letter to Dimitrov, pointing out that although he had plenty of reasons to refuse the deal, the matter was serious enough to ask the opinion of Stalin himself.65 Tito, who was used to being reprimanded by Moscow over his direct confrontations with the Government-in-exile, this time received a different response. Though Dimitrov, Stalin and Molotov let him know that he should reply to ‘the Englishman’ that he too favoured the unity of the Yugoslavs and that, for this reason, the government-in-exile, including Mihailovic´ , should be eliminated, the AVNOJ recognized as the sole government of Yugoslavia and the king submitted to its law. If the king was willing to accept these conditions, they stated, the AVNOJ would not object to cooperating with him, but of course the ultimate fate of the monarchy would only be decided after the end of the war Tito was also instructed to refer to Stalin in the subsequent telegrams as to ‘the friend’.66 Tito wrote his reply to Churchill on 9 February, using the wording of the text he had received from the Kremlin.67 Apparently, when the British Ambassador in Moscow showed the messages exchanged between Tito and Churchill to Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister commented along the lines that they ‘had not advanced things much’.68 British policy had reached an impasse. Lacking a political solution, it was clear to everybody that the crucial factor for the future of Yugoslavia was the balance of forces in the field and especially in Serbia where Mihailovic´ was still strong and the Partisans did not have a significant presence.
...

The Yugoslav case suggests that, in the context of the shifting balance of forces among the Western Allies, Moscow was ready to put aside the popular front strategy and to encourage local communists to challenge the political order supported by the British and the Americans while the Second World War was still raging. The modification of Soviet policy in 1944 also has the potential to shed light on the earlier period, highlighting that the disagreement with the Yugoslavs over the nature of the war in 1941–3 never really brought into question the Soviets’ recognition of the preeminent role played by Tito among the neighbour parties. The example of Yugoslavia, however, also shows that this apparently clear strategy covered deep uncertainties on the Soviet side as to the real intentions of the British, the real space of manoeuvre enjoyed by Moscow and the way in which relations with a new communist state in the making should be established. It also shows that, trapped in the Marxist world-view which postulated the incompatibility of the socialist and capitalist worlds, Moscow was often unable to understand its  opponents, looking for conspiracies where they did not exist.
In the short term, Soviet policy appeared successful. By directing Tito to abandon his radical stance and adopt the slogan of national liberation, Moscow helped him to gain the confidence of the British, establishing the impression that a collaboration between the Partisans and the King was indeed possible. Then the Soviets were able to support the communist take-over of the country without it affecting their relations with the Western Allies. Tito’s flight to Moscow was a brutal awakening for Churchill, who only then realized that in Tito the British had ‘nursed a viper’.100 The Soviets were also able convincingly to deny until the end the extent of their involvement with the Yugoslav communist movement, thus avoiding the risk that, if anything went wrong, the situation could be ascribed to them. In all this, they provided at the crucial moment the military, financial and diplomatic support that the Partisans needed to defeat their internal enemies and to gain credibility in the international area. Tito played his cards well, paying lip service to the Soviets when needed and continuing to advance his cause step by step while maintaining their support. 
...

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022009417737602

When, at the beginning of December 1941, the British incorrectly notified
them that the Chetniks had reached an agreement with the Partisans, the
Soviets could not dispute this information, as to do so would imply that
Moscow had a direct link with the Partisans or at least a link to independent
sources inside the country. Moscow simply replied that it did not consider it
advisable for the Soviet Government to intervene in Yugoslav internal affairs,18
leaving the British to deal with the mess by themselves.

At the beginning of 1942, it was difficult to see how the Soviets could square the
circle of three apparently incompatible goals: supporting Tito, avoiding the repercussions
of this policy for relations with the British when their help was more
needed than ever, and sustaining the pretence that they had no control over the
Yugoslav communist party. Tito, however, found a champion of his cause in
Moscow in Dimitrov.

Dimitrov’s first goal was to bring Tito in line with the Comintern’s official
position. On 5 March 1942 he accused Tito of giving grounds ‘for the supporters
of England and the Yugoslav government’ to suspect that the partisan movement
was ‘acquiring a communist character and [was] aiming at the Sovietisation of
Yugoslavia’. The secretary of the Comintern instructed him to ‘seriously review
[his] tactics and activities’, and reminded him that ‘the main task [was] to unite all
the anti-Hitler elements in order to defeat the occupiers’.19

Tito had good reasons to comply. The distance between him and the Soviet
leadership was, at its roots, strategic, arising out of the eternal debate inside the
international communist movement about the correct route to establish socialism.
But negotiating the turbulent politics of the 1930s in the Moscow of the Great
Purge had taught Tito the limits of his ability to manoeuvre, and especially that, to
operate freely in internal politics, he had to pay lip service to the Soviet line in the
international arena.20 He also realized that his ultra-radical line could alienate a
vast part of the population. In April, the leadership of the party increased its
campaign against ‘sectarianism’ and, under Soviet guidance, began a slow process
of ideological reorganization under the guidance of Dimitrov.21

At the same time, Dimitrov started lobbying Molotov and Stalin in favour of the
Yugoslav comrades, claiming that the British and the government-in-exile were
obstructing the anti-German effort of the resistance movement and urging the
Soviet leadership to send weapons to the Partisans.22 The Soviet government, however,
was uncertain as to how to proceed. As Andrey Vyshinskii, then Molotov’s
deputy, commented on 19 June 1942, it was difficult to keep the question of the
Partisans separated from its context, and especially from the problem of relations
with the government-in-exile. If Moscow were to address this issue, he wrote, ‘it will
be necessary to carry the matter through to the end’. ‘Truthfully’, he concluded, ‘I do
not see such a possibility’.23 Molotov, moreover, was still not fully convinced by
Tito’s accusations against Mihailovic´ , which seemed to him ‘simplified and onesided’.
24

It took Dimitrov making an extra effort with Tito for Moscow to start considering
a new position. At the beginning of June, while Soviet representatives in
London were claiming that Moscow had no connections with Yugoslavia and
bore no responsibility for the actions of the Comintern,25 Dimitrov delivered a
lesson in popular-front tactics to Tito. The Partisans, he explained, were right to
expose the activities of the Chetniks, but this should not be presented as an attack
on the Yugoslav government, but rather as an appeal to it, ‘emphasizing that the
fighting Yugoslav patriots are entitled to expect that government’s support’. Part of
the Chetniks, he argued, should be won over, others neutralized and only ‘the most
malicious part of them’ destroyed ‘without mercy’. He believed that the campaign
against the class enemy should be conducted in the name of unity, without giving
the impression that it was party oriented. He therefore considered it expedient to
organize some form of appeal ‘by well-known Yugoslav public figures and politicians
against collaborators and in favour of the Part[isan] people’s liberation
army’, and possibly also to set up a ‘national committee for aid for the
Yugoslav people’s war of liberation’ with the participation of ‘well-known patriotic
Serb, Croat, Montenegrin, and Slovene public figures’.26 Tito took notice. On 16
June, he summoned a ‘Congress of Patriots from Montenegro, the Bay of Kotor
and Sandzˇak’ which issued a declaration that did not refer to the communist
organization, but praised the three big powers and made an appeal to the
Yugoslav government-in-exile instead of attacking it.27 A few days later, on 19
June, he made a speech that all but abandoned the leftist tone of his previous
statements and condemned the ‘sectarianism’ of the party.28

The decision to take a public stand in Yugoslav affairs was finally agreed between
Molotov and Dimitrov at the end of July.29 It was the result of several factors: the
new line adopted by Tito, increasing reports of collaboration between Mihailovic´
and the Italians, and the British veto of the conclusion of a treaty between Moscow
and the Yugoslav government-in-exile as proposed by the Soviet government.30
...

In the following months, while Soviet relations with Tito were punctuated by
occasional disagreements and complicated by Tito’s frustration with the lack of
Soviet military support,38 Moscow seemed to be unsure as to whether it was
better openly to support the Partisans, work for an agreement with the Chetniks,
or simply remain steadfast in their policy of denial. On 5 March 1943, for example,
the British government asked Moscow for support in getting in touch with the
Partisans.39 Molotov’s first reaction was, as usual, to deny the existence of any
connections with Yugoslavia,40 but then he pondered over whether it might be expedient
to present a more articulate reply. The several different drafts of his response,
which were prepared, are indicative of the doubts that were harboured in Moscow.

A first version, dated 31 March, stated that the Soviet Union considered unification
of all the forces which were fighting against the Germans to be of utmost
importance. The draft also contained a cautious expression of support for the
partisan movement ‘which encompassed the very broadest sectors of the population
irrespective of political orientation’. However, the document continued, the
Soviet government did not wish to interfere in internal problems that needed to be
sorted out by the Yugoslav government. It denied that it was supporting the
Partisans against Mihailovic´ or producing propaganda against him. A second version
of the document, prepared on 4 April, dropped the call for unification of the
resistance forces and the claim that Soviet radio was not attacking Mihailovic´ ,
emphasizing that ‘there should be no recrimination in the British and Soviet
press and radio, either against Mihailovic´ or the Partisan’. On 16 April, it was
decided to delay the reply and indeed it was never sent.41

In the meantime, British policy was shifting. British intelligence in Cairo seemed
increasingly convinced that the Partisans were a better investment from a military
point of view, and started lobbying to establish liaisons with them. In March, they
also sent their first agent to Tito’s headquarters. Over the summer, it was decided to
support both groups, and to send them two high ranking missions to evaluate the
situation and advise on policy. Moscow remained suspicious. When, in May, one of
the British agents despatched to his headquarters asked Tito to send a delegation to
Cairo, Stalin himself agreed with Dimitrov that the request should be turned down
on the grounds that everybody was busy fighting the enemy.42

Moscow’s paralysis lifted at the end of 1943, in the context of the transition in
Soviet policy towards the entire communist movement. In May, Moscow had
announced the disbandment of the Comintern. Although this move is generally
interpreted as an attempt to improve relations with the Western Allies, privately
Stalin explained that it was also designed to enlarge the field of manoeuvre of the
communist parties which, due to their participation in the Comintern, were ‘falsely
accused of supposedly being agents of a foreign state’.43

Gargantua wrote:Vi prosto ne razumete da je prvenstvena stvar i za Britance i za Sovjete bila da održavaju svoje međusobne odnose te da lokalna tema poput Jugoslavije nije nikad trebala da postane kamen spoticanja u tom odnosu. 

Stoga su obe strane taktizirale, igrajući na kratkoročne ciljeve. Britanci na to ko više šteti Nemcima, Sovjeti ne čak ni na to (taj front je vojno irelevantan za njih) nego podržavaju - prvo preko Kominterne/Dimitrova a tek od 1944. preko državnog kanala - KPJ informativno i direktivno dok su držali javnu distancu spram dešavanja u Jugoslaviji.

Na kraju su Sovjeti pobedili.