Liberalizam

Francis Fukuyama Postpones the End of History

The political scientist argues that the desire of identity groups for recognition is a key threat to liberalism.

By Louis Menand



The desire for recognition, Fukuyama argues, is an essential threat to liberalism.
Illustration by Aude Van Ryn
In February, 1989, Francis Fukuyama gave a talk on international relations at the University of Chicago. Fukuyama was thirty-six years old, and on his way from a job at the RAND Corporation, in Santa Monica, where he had worked as an expert on Soviet foreign policy, to a post as the deputy director of policy planning at the State Department, in Washington.
It was a good moment for talking about international relations, and a good moment for Soviet experts especially, because, two months earlier, on December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev had announced, in a speech at the United Nations, that the Soviet Union would no longer intervene in the affairs of its Eastern European satellite states. Those nations could now become democratic. It was the beginning of the end of the Cold War.
At RAND, Fukuyama had produced focussed analyses of Soviet policy. In Chicago, he permitted himself to think big. His talk came to the attention of Owen Harries, an editor at a Washington journal called The National Interest, and Harries offered to publish it. The article was titled “The End of History?” It came out in the summer of 1989, and it turned the foreign-policy world on its ear.
Fukuyama’s argument was that, with the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, the last ideological alternative to liberalism had been eliminated. Fascism had been killed off in the Second World War, and now Communism was imploding. In states, like China, that called themselves Communist, political and economic reforms were heading in the direction of a liberal order.
So, if you imagined history as the process by which liberal institutions—representative government, free markets, and consumerist culture—become universal, it might be possible to say that history had reached its goal. Stuff would still happen, obviously, and smaller states could be expected to experience ethnic and religious tensions and become home to illiberal ideas. But “it matters very little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso,” Fukuyama explained, “for we are interested in what one could in some sense call the common ideological heritage of mankind.”
Hegel, Fukuyama said, had written of a moment when a perfectly rational form of society and the state would become victorious. Now, with Communism vanquished and the major powers converging on a single political and economic model, Hegel’s prediction had finally been fulfilled. There would be a “Common Marketization” of international relations and the world would achieve homeostasis.
Even among little magazines, The National Interest was little. Launched in 1985 by Irving Kristol, the leading figure in neoconservatism, it had by 1989 a circulation of six thousand. Fukuyama himself was virtually unknown outside the world of professional Sovietologists, people not given to eschatological reflection. But the “end of history” claim was picked up in the mainstream press, Fukuyama was profiled by James Atlas in the New York Times Magazine, and his article was debated in Britain and in France and translated into many languages, from Japanese to Icelandic. Some of the responses to “The End of History?” were dismissive; almost all of them were skeptical. But somehow the phrase found its way into post-Cold War thought, and it stuck.
One of the reasons for the stickiness was that Fukuyama was lucky. He got out about six months ahead of the curve—his article appearing before the Velvet Revolution, in Czechoslovakia, and before the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, in November, 1989. Fukuyama was betting on present trends continuing, always a high-risk gamble in the international-relations business.

Video From The New Yorker

Lies and Truth in the Era of Trump

Any number of things might have happened for Gorbachev’s promise not to cash out: political resistance within the Soviet Union, the refusal of the Eastern European puppet regimes to cede power, the United States misplaying its hand. But events in Europe unfolded more or less according to Fukuyama’s prediction, and, on December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union voted itself out of existence. The Cold War really was over.
Events in Asia were not so obliging. Fukuyama missed completely the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in China. There is no mention of the massacre in Tiananmen Square in “The End of History?,” presumably because the piece was in production when it happened, in June, 1989. This does not seem to have made a difference to the article’s reception, however. Almost none of the initial responses to the piece mentioned Tiananmen, either—even though many people already believed that China, not Russia, was the power that liberal democracies would have to reckon with in the future. “The End of History?” was a little Eurocentric.
There was also a seductive twist to Fukuyama’s argument. At the end of the article, he suggested that life after history might be sad. When all political efforts were committed to “the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands” (sounds good to me), we might feel nostalgia for the “courage, imagination, and idealism” that animated the old struggles for liberalism and democracy. This speculative flourish recalled the famous question that John Stuart Mill said he asked himself as a young man: If all the political and social reforms you believe in came to pass, would it make you a happier human being? That is always an interesting question.
Another reason that Fukuyama’s article got noticed may have had to do with his new job title. The office of policy planning at State had been created in 1947 by George Kennan, who was its first chief. In July of that year, Kennan published the so-called X article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in Foreign Affairs. It appeared anonymously—signed with an “X”—but once the press learned his identity the article was received as an official statement of American Cold War policy.
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct” defined the containment doctrine, according to which the aim of American policy was to keep the Soviet Union inside its box. The United States did not need to intervene in Soviet affairs, Kennan believed, because Communism was bound to collapse from its own inefficiency. Four decades later, when “The End of History?” appeared, that is exactly what seemed to be happening. That April, Kennan, then eighty-five, appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to declare that the Cold War was over. He received a standing ovation. Fukuyama’s article could thus be seen as a bookend to Kennan’s.
It was not the bookend Kennan would have written. Containment is a realist doctrine. Realists think that a nation’s foreign policy should be guided by dispassionate consideration of its own interests, not by moral principles, or by a belief that nations share a “harmony of interests.” To Kennan, it was of no concern to the United States what the Soviets did inside their own box. The only thing that mattered was that Communism not be allowed to expand.
The National Interest, as the name proclaims, is a realist foreign-policy journal. But Fukuyama’s premise was that nations do share a harmony of interests, and that their convergence on liberal political and economic models was mutually beneficial. Realism imagines nations to be in perpetual competition with one another; Fukuyama was saying that this was no longer going to be the case. He offered Cold War realists a kind of valediction: their mission, though philosophically misconceived, had been accomplished. Now they were out of a job. “Frank thought that what was happening spelled the end of the Realpolitik world,” Harries later said. It must have tickled him to have published Fukuyama’s article.
Twenty-nine years later, it seems that the realists haven’t gone anywhere, and that history has a few more tricks up its sleeve. It turns out that liberal democracy and free trade may actually be rather fragile achievements. (Consumerism appears safe for now.) There is something out there that doesn’t like liberalism, and is making trouble for the survival of its institutions.
Fukuyama thinks he knows what that something is, and his answer is summed up in the title of his new book, “Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment” (Farrar, Straus & Giroux). The demand for recognition, Fukuyama says, is the “master concept” that explains all the contemporary dissatisfactions with the global liberal order: Vladimir Putin, Osama bin Laden, Xi Jinping, Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, gay marriage, ISIS, Brexit, resurgent European nationalisms, anti-immigration political movements, campus identity politics, and the election of Donald Trump. It also explains the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, Chinese Communism, the civil-rights movement, the women’s movement, multiculturalism, and the thought of Luther, Rousseau, Kant, Nietzsche, Freud, and Simone de Beauvoir. Oh, and the whole business begins with Plato’s Republic. Fukuyama covers all of this in less than two hundred pages. How does he do it?
Not well. Some of the problem comes from misunderstanding figures like Beauvoir and Freud; some comes from reducing the work of complex writers like Rousseau and Nietzsche to a single philosophical bullet point. A lot comes from the astonishingly blasé assumption—which was also the astonishingly blasé assumption of “The End of History?”—that Western thought is universal thought. But the whole project, trying to fit Vladimir Putin into the same analytic paradigm as Black Lives Matter and tracing them both back to Martin Luther, is far-fetched. It’s a case of Great Booksism: history as a chain of paper dolls cut out of books that only a tiny fraction of human beings have even heard of. Fukuyama is a smart man, but no one could have made this argument work.
Why is the desire for recognition—or identity politics, as Fukuyama also calls it—a threat to liberalism? Because it cannot be satisfied by economic or procedural reforms. Having the same amount of wealth as everyone else or the same opportunity to acquire it is not a substitute for respect. Fukuyama thinks that political movements that appear to be about legal and economic equality—gay marriage, for example, or #MeToo—are really about recognition and respect. Women who are sexually harassed in the workplace feel that their dignity has been violated, that they are being treated as less than fully human.
Fukuyama gives this desire for recognition a Greek name, taken from Plato’s Republic: thymos. He says that thymos is “a universal aspect of human nature that has always existed.” In the Republic, thymos is distinct from the two other parts of the soul that Socrates names: reason and appetite. Appetites we share with animals; reason is what makes us human. Thymos is in between.
The term has been defined in various ways. “Passion” is one translation; “spirit,” as in “spiritedness,” is another. Fukuyama defines thymos as “the seat of judgments of worth.” This seems a semantic overreach. In the Republic, Socrates associates thymos with children and dogs, beings whose reactions need to be controlled by reason. The term is generally taken to refer to our instinctive response when we feel we’re being disrespected. We bristle. We swell with amour propre. We honk the horn. We overreact.
Plato had Socrates divide the psyche into three parts in order to assign roles to the citizens of his imaginary republic. Appetite is the principal attribute of the plebes, passion of the warriors, and reason of the philosopher kings. The Republic is philosophy; it is not cognitive science. Yet Fukuyama adopts Plato’s heuristic and biologizes it. “Today we know that feelings of pride and self-esteem are related to levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the brain,” he says, and points to studies done with chimps (which Socrates would have counted as animals, but never mind).
But so what? Lots of feelings are related to changes in serotonin levels. In fact, every feeling we experience—lust, anger, depression, exasperation—has a corollary in brain chemistry. That’s how consciousness works. To say, as Fukuyama does, that “the desire for status—megalothymia—is rooted in human biology” is the academic equivalent of palmistry. You’re just making it up.
Fukuyama resorts to this tactic because he wants to do with the desire for recognition what he did with liberalism in “The End of History?” He wants to universalize it. This allows him to argue, for example, that the feelings that led to the rise of Vladimir Putin are exactly the same (albeit “on a larger scale”) as the feelings of a woman who complains that her potential is limited by gender discrimination. The woman can’t help it. She needs the serotonin, just like the Russians.
Hegel thought that the end of history would arrive when humans achieved perfect self-knowledge and self-mastery, when life was rational and transparent. Rationality and transparency are the values of classical liberalism. Rationality and transparency are supposed to be what make free markets and democratic elections work. People understand how the system functions, and that allows them to make rational choices.
The trouble with thymos is that it is not rational. People not only sacrifice worldly goods for recognition; they die for recognition. The choice to die is not rational. “Human psychology is much more complex than the rather simpleminded economic model suggests,” Fukuyama concludes.


“Sorry I’m late. I got caught up at home being happy.”
But how was that model of the rational economic actor ever plausible? It’s not just that human beings are neurotic; it’s that, on the list of things human beings are neurotic about, money is close to the top. People hoard money; they squander it; they marry for it; they kill for it. Don’t economists ever read novels? Practically every realist novel, from Austen and Balzac to James and Wharton, is about people behaving badly around money. Free markets didn’t change that. They arguably made people even crazier.
And as with money so with most of life. The notion that we have some mental faculty called “reason” that functions independently of our needs, desires, anxieties, and superstitions is, well, Platonic. Right now, you are trying to decide whether to finish this piece or turn to the cartoon-caption contest. Which mental faculty are you using to make this decision? Which is responsible for your opinion of Donald Trump? How can you tell?
“Identity” can be read as a corrective to the position that Fukuyama staked out in “The End of History?” Universal liberalism isn’t impeded by ideology, like fascism or communism, but by passion. Liberalism remains the ideal political and economic system, but it needs to find ways to accommodate and neutralize this pesky desire for recognition. What is odd about Fukuyama’s dilemma is that, in the philosophical source for his original theory about the end of history, recognition was not a problem. Recognition was, in fact, the means to get there.
That source was not Hegel. As Fukuyama stated explicitly in “The End of History?,” he was adopting an interpretation of Hegel made in the nineteen-thirties by a semi-obscure intellectual adventurer named Alexandre Kojève. How, fifty years later, Kojève’s ideas got into the pages of a Washington policy journal is an unusual story of intellectual musical chairs.
Kojève was born in 1902 into a well-off Moscow family, and he was raised in a cultivated atmosphere. The painter Wassily Kandinsky was an uncle. Kojève was a prodigious intellect; by the time he was eighteen, he was fluent in Russian, German, French, and English, and read Latin. Later, he learned Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan in order to study Buddhism. In 1918, he went to prison for some sort of black-market transaction. After he got out, he and a friend managed to cross the closed Soviet border into Poland, where they were briefly jailed on suspicion of espionage. With the pointed encouragement of Polish authorities, Kojève left for Germany. He studied philosophy with Karl Jaspers at Heidelberg and lived as a bon vivant in Weimar Berlin. In 1926, he moved to Paris, where he continued to live the high life while writing a dissertation that dealt with quantum physics.
Kojève had invested his inheritance in the French company that made La Vache Qui Rit cheese, but he lost everything in the stock-market crash. In 1933, in need of income, he accepted a friend’s offer to take over a seminar on Hegel at the École Pratique des Hautes Études. He ended up running the course for six years.
People who were around Kojève seem to have regarded him as a kind of magician. In the Hegel seminar, he taught just one text, “The Phenomenology of Spirit,” first published in 1807. He would read a passage aloud in German (the book had not been translated into French) and then, extemporaneously and in perfect French (with an enchanting Slavic accent), provide his own commentary. People found him eloquent, brilliant, mesmerizing. Enrollment was small, around twenty, but a number of future intellectual luminaries, like Hannah Arendt and Jacques Lacan, either took the class or sat in on it.
For Kojève, the key concept in Hegel’s “Phenomenology” was recognition. Human beings want the recognition of other human beings in order to become self-conscious—to know themselves as autonomous individuals. As Kojève put it, humans desire, and what they desire is either something that other humans desire or the desire of other humans. “Human history,” he said, “is the history of desired desires.” What makes this complicated is that in the struggle for recognition there are winners and losers. The terms Hegel used for these can be translated as lords and servants, but also as masters and slaves, which are the terms Kojève used. The master wins the recognition of the slave, but his satisfaction is empty, since he does not recognize the slave as human in turn. The slave, lacking recognition from the master, must seek it in some other way.
Kojève thought that the other way was through labor. The slave achieves his sense of self by work that transforms the natural world into a human world. But the slave is driven to labor in the first place because of the master’s refusal to recognize him. This “master-slave dialectic” is the motor of human history, and human history comes to an end when there are no more masters or slaves, and all are recognized equally.
This is the idea that Marx had adopted to describe history as the history of class struggle. That struggle also has winners and losers, and its penultimate phase was the struggle between property owners (the bourgeoisie) and workers (the proletariat). The struggle would come to an end with the overthrow of capitalism and the arrival of a classless society—communism. Kojève called himself, mischievously or not, a Communist, and people listening to him in the nineteen-thirties would have understood this to be the subtext of his commentary. Equality of recognition was history’s goal, whether that meant Communist equality or liberal equality. People would stop killing one another in the name of dignity and self-respect, and life would probably be boring.
After the war, Kojève’s lectures were published as “Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,” a book that went through many printings in France. By then, he had stopped teaching and had become an official in the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, where he played an influential behind-the-scenes role in establishing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union—in other words, Common Marketization. He liked to say that he was presiding over the end of history.
In 1953, Allan Bloom, then a graduate student at the University of Chicago, met Kojève in Paris, at his office in the ministry. (The connection was presumably made through the émigré political theorist Leo Strauss, who was teaching at Chicago and who carried on a long correspondence with Kojève.) “I was seduced,” Bloom later said. He began studying with Kojève, and their meetings continued until Kojève’s death, in 1968. In 1969, Bloom arranged for the publication of the first English translation of the Hegel lectures and contributed an introduction. He was then a professor at Cornell.
Fukuyama entered Cornell as a freshman in 1970. He lived in Telluride House, a selective academic society for students and faculty, where Bloom was a resident. Fukuyama enrolled in Bloom’s freshman course on Greek philosophy, and, according to Atlas, he and Bloom “shared meals and talked philosophy until all hours.”
As it happened, that was Bloom’s last year at Cornell. He resigned in disgust at the way the administration had handled the occupation of a university building by armed students from the Afro-American Society. Fukuyama graduated in 1974 with a degree in classics. Following an excursus into the world of poststructuralist theory at Yale and in Paris, he switched his field to political science and received his Ph.D. from Harvard’s government department. He graduated in 1979, and went to RAND.
By then, Bloom was back at the University of Chicago, as a professor in the Committee on Social Thought. In 1982, he published an article on the condition of higher education in William F. Buckley’s National Review. He did not think the condition was good. Encouraged by his friend Saul Bellow, he decided to turn the article into a book. “The Closing of the American Mind,” which Simon & Schuster brought out in February, 1987, launched a campaign of criticism of American higher education that has taken little time off since.
“The Closing of the American Mind” is a Great Booksist attempt to account for the rise of cultural relativism, which Bloom thought was the bane of American higher education. Almost no one at Simon & Schuster had great hopes for sales. There is a story, possibly apocryphal, that when the editor who signed the book, Erwin Glikes, left the firm to run the Free Press he was invited to take Bloom’s book, not yet published, with him, and he declined.
If so, he missed out on one of the publishing phenomena of the decade. After a slow start, “The Closing of the American Mind” went to No. 1 on the Times best-seller list and stayed there for two and a half months. By March, 1988, it had sold a million hardcover copies in the United States alone. It made Bloom a rich man.
It was Bloom, along with another professor at Chicago, Nathan Tarcov, who invited Fukuyama to give his February, 1989, talk on international relations. If Fukuyama had not already been thinking about it, it is easy to imagine him deciding that, under the circumstances, it might be interesting to say something Kojèvean.
When “The End of History?” ran in The National Interest that summer, Bloom had become a star in the neoconservative firmament, and his was the first of six responses that the magazine printed to accompany the article. Bloom called it “bold and brilliant.” Possibly seeing the way the wind was blowing, Glikes offered Fukuyama six hundred thousand dollars to turn his article into a book. “The End of History and the Last Man” was published by the Free Press in 1992.
The book was a best-seller, but not a huge one, maybe because the excitement about the end of the Cold War had cooled. Fukuyama had taken his time writing it. “The End of History and the Last Man” is not a journal article on steroids. It is a thoughtful examination of the questions raised by the piece in The National Interest, and one of those questions is the problem of thymos, which occupies much of the book. A lot of “Identity” is a recap of what Fukuyama had already said there.
The importance of recognition has been emphasized by writers other than Kojève. The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, for example, whose book “The Sources of the Self,” published in 1989, the same year as “The End of History?,” argued that the modern idea of the self involved a cultural shift from the concept of honor, which is something for the few, to dignity, which is aspired to by all. In 1992, in the essay “The Politics of Recognition,” Taylor analyzed the advent of multiculturalism in terms similar to the ones Fukuyama uses in “Identity.” (Taylor, too, is a Hegel expert.)
Fukuyama acknowledges that identity politics has done some good, and he says that people on the right exaggerate the prevalence of political correctness and the effects of affirmative action. He also thinks that people on the left have become obsessed with cultural and identitarian politics, and have abandoned social policy. But he has surprisingly few policy suggestions himself.
He has no interest in the solution that liberals typically adopt to accommodate diversity: pluralism and multiculturalism. Taylor, for example, has championed the right of the Québécois to pass laws preserving a French-language culture in their province. Fukuyama concedes that people need a sense of national identity, whether ethnic or creedal, but otherwise he remains an assimilationist and a universalist. He wants to iron out differences, not protect them. He suggests measures like a mandatory national-service requirement and a more meaningful path to citizenship for immigrants.
It’s unfortunate that Fukuyama has hung his authorial hat on meta-historical claims. In other books—notably “The Great Disruption” (1999) and a two-volume world history, “The Origins of Political Order” (2011) and “Political Order and Political Decay” (2014)—he distinguishes civilizational differences and uses empirical data to explain social trends. But thymos is too clumsy an instrument to be much help in understanding contemporary politics.
Wouldn’t it be important to distinguish people who ultimately don’t want differences to matter, like the people involved in #MeToo and Black Lives Matter, from people who ultimately do want them to matter, like ISIS militants, Brexit voters, or separatist nationalists? And what about people who are neither Mexican nor immigrants and who feel indignation at the treatment of Mexican immigrants? Black Americans risked their lives for civil rights, but so did white Americans. How would Socrates classify that behavior? Borrowed thymos?
It might also be good to replace the linear “if present trends continue” conception of history as a steady progression toward some stable state with the dialectical conception of history that Hegel and Kojève in fact used. Present trends don’t continue. They produce backlashes and reshufflings of the social deck. The identities that people embrace today are the identities their children will want to escape from tomorrow. History is somersaults all the way to the end. That’s why it’s so hard to write, and so hard to predict. Unless you’re lucky. 

Lucien Sève

Udžbeničke definicije liberalizam predstavljaju kao ideologiju individualne slobode i univerzalizacije ljudskih prava. Protupovijest liberalizma, važna knjiga preminuloga talijanskog povjesničara ideja Domenica Losurda, uvjerljivo otkriva selektivnost i jednostranost tih hagiografskih prikaza. U srce liberalnog projekta od početka je bila upisana antidemokratska i rasistička dimenzija


Onaj tko o liberalizmu gaji sliku kakvu nude liberali neugodno će se iznenaditi čitajući Protupovijest liberalizma, ključnu knjigu Domenica Losurda koja već na samom početku otkriva nevjerojatan paradoks. Biti liberalom u principu znači boriti se, po uzoru na velike mislioce poput Huga Grotiusa ili Johna Lockea, Adama Smitha ili Alexisa de Tocquevillea, za slobode pojedinca i protiv političkog apsolutizma, dirigirane ekonomije i filozofske netolerancije. Posrijedi je idejno i u praksi moćan pokret koji je u razdoblju od 16. do 18. stoljeća, s tri slavne revolucije u Nizozemskoj, Engleskoj i Americi, oblikovao čitavu suvremenu povijest. No upravo je s njim došlo do najvećeg razvoja ropstva. U Americi 1700. godine ima tristo tisuća robova, 1800. gotovo tri milijuna, a sredinom 19. stoljeća još dvostruko više. Holandija ukida ropstvo u svojim kolonijama tek 1863. godine. Sredinom 18. stoljeća, broj robova najveći je u Velikoj Britaniji – gotovo devetsto tisuća. Pritom je riječ o najgoroj vrsti ropstva, tzv. chattel racial slavery, gdje je rob druge rase jednostavno “imovina”. Teško je zamisliti radikalnije poricanje slobode pojedinca. Gdje je greška?

Ovo je djelo od početka do kraja posvećeno objašnjavanju te greške, potkrijepljeno dojmljivim obiljem krvavih činjenica i citata od kojih zastaje dah. Ne, ne radi se o grešci. Liberalna je doktrina rođena s dva lica i takvom je ostala: s jedne strane gorljiva poruka o slobodi pojedinca samo za građane, bijele posjednike koji čine Herrenvolk, “rasu gospodara” – germanizam koji je ta uvelike anglofona ideologija bez kompleksa usvojila; s druge cinično poricanje ljudskosti ne samo drugih rasa u kolonijama, nego jednako tako i naroda koje se smatralo “barbarima”, kao što su Irci ili američki Indijanci, te mnoštva sluga i radnika u metropolama, slobodno se može reći – velike većine ljudi. Protupovijest liberalizma, nimalo ne niječući njegove dobre strane, otkriva pune razmjere njegova mračnog naličja, koje je prisutno od početka, a liberalna ga hagiografija neprestano skriva. Na primjer (uzmimo jedan detalj od tisuću), kad saznamo da je veliki liberalni filozof John Locke bio dioničar tvrtke Royal African Company, glavne organizatorice trgovine crnim robljem, odjednom su nam jasnije mnoge stvari u našoj modernoj povijesti.

No također nam je jasno da je ovoj ikonoklastičkoj knjizi trebalo vremena da se pojavi. I da ono što o njoj škrto prozbore glavni mediji često odaje posramljenu zlovolju. Djelo je ujedno i previše eruditsko i jasno da bi ga se moglo lako odbaciti. Zbog toga se protiv njega služe izlizanim polemičkim trikovima. Dovode se u pitanje autorovi stavovi prema sasvim drugim temama, s kojima se uopće ne moramo slagati. Optužuje ga se za jednostranost, dok on ne propušta priliku da prikaže raznolikost aspekata liberalizma, složenost njegovih pravaca, često i dvosmislenost njegovih mislioca. Za kraj mu se dobacuje “Ali to je općepoznato!” iako dominantna ideologija bez prestanka radi na oživljavanju bezobrazno pristranog pozlaćenog mita o liberalizmu.

Treba reći da Losurdova knjiga obiluje navodima koji veoma štete tom mitu. Poput ovog Tocquevilleova teksta koji opravdava istrebljenje crvenokožaca: “Providnost im je, čini se, smještajući ih posred bogatstava Novog svijeta, dala samo kratkotrajno pravo uživanja. Oni su tamo, na neki način, samo čekali. Obale tako dobro pripremljene za trgovinu i industriju, tako duboke rijeke, neiscrpna dolina Mississippija, cijeli taj kontinent, djelovali su tada kao još uvijek prazna kolijevka jednog velikog naroda.” “Prazna kolijevka”: tako jedan slavni liberal lakim zamahom pera opravdava jedan od najvećih genocida u povijesti, unaprijed dajući dragocjeno opravdanje doktrinarcima “zemlje bez naroda” koju Bog nudi narodu bez zemlje. Tekstovi takvoga tona nisu rijetki u ovoj protupovijesti i često ih potpisuju imena kojima bismo se najmanje nadali.

Podučavajući nas mnogome, autor nam još više daje za razmišljanje. Na primjer, kad iznosi ove riječi jednog Georgea Washingtona ili Johna Adamsa, toliko indikativne za američku revoluciju koju su krajem 18. stoljeća vodili liberalni kolonisti, vlasnici robova, potpuno svjesni da su oni u odnosu na robove “bijeli britanski podanici, rođeni slobodni”, spremni na vapaj zbog Engleza iz metropole koji ih gnjave: “Ne želimo biti njihovi crnci!” Ovdje najednom upada u oči da liberalna misao nikad nije bila autentično univerzalistička misao. Slobode koje su se zahtijevale “za pojedinca” nipošto nisu za sva ljudska bića, nego samo za mali broj izabranih, u dvostrukom, biblijskom i građanskom, smislu riječi.

Ovakav agresivni partikularizam doista jest u samom temelju liberalnog učenja. Grotius, jedan od očeva liberalne doktrine u 17. stoljeću, bez oklijevanja opravdava instituciju ropstva (“Postoje ljudi rođeni za služenje”, piše on pozivajući se na Aristotela), govori o stanovnicima holandskih kolonija kao o “divljim životinjama” i, opisujući njihovu religiju kao “pobunu protiv Boga”, unaprijed opravdava njihovo kažnjavanje najokrutnijom “kaznom primjerenom krivcima”. Uopće se dakle ne radi o odstupanjima u praksi, sama ideja liberalizma odaje izravno segregirajući i dehumanizirajući antropološki aristokratizam.

Francuz Tocqueville, aristokrat-demokrat, i sâm o više tema misli na vrlo sličan način. Losurdo navodi ovu izjavu: “Europska je rasa od neba primila ili svojim trudom stekla toliko neporecivu nadmoć nad svim ostalim rasama koje čine veliku ljudsku obitelj, da je čovjek odavde, sa svim svojim porocima i neznanjem, onaj s dna društvene ljestvice, još uvijek prvi među divljacima.” Mnoge danas zapanjuje kastinska oholost koju pokazuju mnogi, i muški i ženski članovi vladajućeg miljea. Čitajući ovu Protupovijest shvaćamo da je ona, prije no što bi bila psihološko-društvena crta pojedinaca, temeljna osobina same liberalne doktrine i praktičnog držanja koje je u svim razdobljima nalagala. Liberalizam i demokracija nikad nisu bili sinonimi.

“Radi se”, zaključit će Losurdo, “o diskursu potpuno usredotočenom na ono što, za zajednicu slobodnih ljudi, predstavlja ograničen sveti prostor” – sveti prostor koji priznaje protestantska etičko-religiozna kultura odgojena na Starom zavjetu. Dovoljno je u analizu unijeti i čimbenik “profanog prostora” (robove iz kolonija i sluge iz metropola) da bi se uvidio neprikladan i varljiv karakter kategorija koje se uobičajeno koriste pri prikazu povijesti liberalnog Zapada: apsolutno prvenstvo slobode pojedinca, antietatizam, individualizam. Je li Engleska 18. i 19. stoljeća zemlja vjerske slobode? Što se Irske tiče, liberal Gustave de Beaumont, koji je pratio Tocquevillea za njegova putovanja u Ameriku, govori o “vjerskoj opresiji koja prelazi svaku maštu”.

Praćenje duge povijesti liberalizma također podrazumijeva makar drugorazredno zanimanje za ono što ga je pobijalo, što mu se protivilo. U ovoj knjizi vidimo kako su se oblikovale razne figure univerzalizma, od onog katoličkog i monarhijskog Jeana Bodina u 16. stoljeću, preko antikolonijalnog i abolicionističkog radikalizma kojemu su ponekad pomagali napredni liberali 19. stoljeća, pa sve do temeljne kritike Karla Marxa, koji briljira raskrinkavajući “konzervativni karakter engleske revolucije”. Buržujska politička emancipacija zapravo je bila znak društvenog bijesa ne samo prema narodima iz kolonija, nego i prema samim engleskim seljacima, prije no što će se okomiti na gradski proletarijat, nevjerojatno zlostavljan u tzv. workhouses, radnim kućama. Losurdo takvu analizu ipak ne slijedi u potpunosti, nego skicira osobni pregled liberalnih revolucija, kako latinskoameričkih tako i europskih.

No koliko god bili važni ti antiliberalni istupi, konkretnije su rezultate ostvarili sami narodni pokreti. Na prvo mjesto među njima Losurdo smješta pobunu na Saint-Domingueu (danas Haiti) i njezinog vođu Toussainta Louverturea, pravi topovski udar za to vrijeme (crnački narod s nevjerojatnom odvažnošću da se oslobodi!), koja, istodobno s Francuskom revolucijom, predstavlja odlučujuću prekretnicu za kreolsku neovisnost i ukidanje ropstva u Latinskoj Americi. Sto dvadeset i pet godina kasnije, moćan podstrek u istom smjeru dat će Oktobarska revolucija u Rusiji. “Kad se sve temeljito razmotri, pobuna na Saint-Domingueu i Oktobarska revolucija ugrozile su, svaka zasebno, prvo ropstvo, zatim teroristički režim bjelačke dominacije”; to su dva povijesna poglavlja koja je “većinski mrzila liberalna kultura epohe”.

Ne dotičući se nedavne povijesti neoliberalizma, Losurdo se za kraj pita o odgovornosti liberalizma za “katastrofe 20. stoljeća”, te je vrlo uvjerljivo procjenjuje velikom. Oslanjajući se na tezu Hannah Arendt koja “polazi od kolonija britanskog carstva da bi objasnila genezu totalitarizma 20. stoljeća”, podsjeća da su se svijet koncentracijskih logora i ostale antidemokratske institucije “počele ocrtavati davno prije kraja samoprozvane belle époque”, navodeći primjere “krvavih i uzastopnih deportacija Indijanaca, počevši od one koju je poduzela Jacksonova Amerika (koju je Tocqueville proglasio uzorom demokracije)”.

S postupanjem prema crncima u Novom svijetu dostignuti su, što se dehumanizacije tiče, “vrhunci kojima je teško parirati”. Na britanskoj Jamajci “roba bi se prisililo da se olakša u usta robu koji je nešto skrivio, da bi mu se zatim ta usta na četiri-pet sati zašila”. U SAD-u školska su djeca mogla dobiti slobodan dan da bi prisustvovala linčovanju. Jedna knjiga, izašla u Bostonu 1913. godine, u svom naslovu zaziva “krajnje rješenje” (ultimate solution) crnačkog pitanja. Jedan američki istraživač, Ashley Montagu, o rasizmu i nacizmu piše da je “to što se čudovište moglo slobodno kretati svijetom u velikoj mjeri naših ruku djelo (…), i mi smo odgovorni za stravičan oblik koji je poprimilo”.

Griješi li autor kad u zaključku poziva da se prestane s lažljivom hagiografijom liberalizma, koja nam se ponovno u visokim dozama servira posljednja tri desetljeća, od početka vladavine Margaret Thatcher?

Here is the simple truth: As long as corporations are free to roam the globe in search of lower wages and taxes, and as long as the United States opens its borders to millions of unskilled immigrants, liberals will not be able to create bountiful, equitable societies, where people are free from basic anxieties about obtaining health care, education and housing. In Europe, social democrats face very similar challenges with immigration, refugees and euro-imposed austerity. To achieve their historic objectives, liberals and social democrats will have to respond constructively to, rather than dismiss, the nationalist reaction to globalization.

In Prague, Bannon also offered an economic epiphany. Trade is simply “unfair competition using underpaid labor in other countries,” he declared. The audience’s stunned silence was not due to his radical challenge to conventional wisdom but because of the approximately 80 percent of the Czech Republic’s GDP that comes from exports.


Bannon and Trump may have correctly identified the populist ideological urges in the region, but they flunked Economics 101 by failing to understand how economic realities determine political priorities for these small European nations.
Asked to identify his county’s biggest foes last weekend, Trump named the EU for “what they do to us in trade.” But trade is the tether that keeps Hungary, Poland, and other Eastern European countries inside the bloc, no matter how much political capital their governments earn from bashing the Brussels bogeyman. And Trump’s threat to extend his trade war by placing tariffs on EU cars puts the region’s biggest industry at risk.
Slovakia has the most to fear, with cars accounting for 60 percent of its exports to the United States. On top of the vehicles produced by the Volkswagen, PSA Peugeot Citroen, Kia, and Jaguar Land Rover plants on Slovakian soil, the country plays a large role in the supply chain of numerous German brands being built across the region. Boasting the world’s highest car output per capita, the country of 5 million people could suffer a hit of 0.7 percent to its GDP if the United States imposes the vehicle import tariffs that Trump has threatened. If he follows through, tariffs would put 40,000 jobs at risk in Poland, and 25,000 each in Hungary and the Czech Republic.
No matter how much regional populists may enjoy the nationalist turn in Washington, that kind of threat can’t be ignored. Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis, a billionaire businessman often compared to Trump, rarely misses an opportunity to blow the immigration dog-whistle. But he’s also keenly aware of the risks to his country’s economy.
Reform of the EU to remove the final barriers to free trade across the single market is his government’s top priority, Babis told Foreign Policy in an interview an hour before Bannon took the stage just across the river. Trump’s trade tantrums and his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal have prompted concern that U.S. leadership of the West is flagging, the prime minister warned. Unlike his Hungarian counterpart, Babis did not pop in to greet the U.S. president’s former sidekick, appearing uninterested in the performance.

Liberal democracies do not affirm the principles of liberalism, as Rawls expected, neither domestically nor internationally. It was inconceivable for Rawls, were these societies working well, that they would, as in the US now, generate a third or more of “malcontent” population that clearly does not believe in liberal principles nor is willing to affirm them in their daily lives. Far from it. This, plus the pervasive role of money in electoral politics, lower tax rates for capital than labor, neglect of public education etc. imply that domestically so called liberal societies are very far from Rawls’ idea of liberalism. The difference is so great that we cannot, I think, speak of the discrepancy any longer as the expected difference between an abstract idea and what exist in reality. These societies belong to an entirely different category.

Moreover, in foreign policy, as became clear with the Iraq war, they act like outlaw states since they break the fundamental rules on which the international community is founded, namely absence of wars of aggression.

Thus, “liberal” societies are both non-liberal (in the Rawlsian sense) domestically and act as outlaw states.

The benign consultative hierarchies that Rawls had in mind probably in order to fit Islamic societies in his scheme are practically non-existent.  The Middle East is either in total chaos or in the grip of absolutist dictatorships like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms.  Thus they are not well-ordered societies in Rawls’ terms.

There is no place in his taxonomy for the multi-county non-state organizations like ISIS. A general theory that has no place for organizations that do not accept current state borders is clearly incomplete. (This is an issue on which Rawls is especially weak because he takes borders as given, which is, as he wrote in the wake of the break-up of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, rather odd).

There is also no place for what is now called illiberal democracy, namely a society that has most of the accoutrements of a liberal society (elections, political parties, NGOs), and yet where only one party or one leader ever wins elections and where the media and the judiciary are directly or indirectly controlled.

Migrations, driven by economic reasons and thus by global inequality, do not have a place in Rawls. But they do exist in real life where economic migrants from Africa and Asia into Europe or Mexico and Central America into the United States number millions. But the theory that says that this should not happen is of no use when these things do happen.

Finally, Rawls grossly underrated the importance that people attach to income and wealth for their happiness. Importance of pecuniary incentives has only increased with globalization since income differences have become more visible.    

The changes over the past two decades have been, I believe, so remarkable that the typology offered by Rawls has lost its relevance. But if the typology does not fit reality then the recommended relations between the different societies, based on this typology, do not have any relevance. This is why I think it is time to either ditch Rawls or revise him very thoroughly. A job for political philosophers.

I don't want a future in which politics is primarily a battle between cosmopolitan finance capitalism and ethno-nationalist backlash.

— Chris Hayes (@chrislhayes) June 24, 2016

William Murderface wrote:

Liberal democracies do not affirm the principles of liberalism, as Rawls expected, neither domestically nor internationally. It was inconceivable for Rawls, were these societies working well, that they would, as in the US now, generate a third or more of “malcontent” population that clearly does not believe in liberal principles nor is willing to affirm them in their daily lives. Far from it. This, plus the pervasive role of money in electoral politics, lower tax rates for capital than labor, neglect of public education etc. imply that domestically so called liberal societies are very far from Rawls’ idea of liberalism. The difference is so great that we cannot, I think, speak of the discrepancy any longer as the expected difference between an abstract idea and what exist in reality. These societies belong to an entirely different category.

Moreover, in foreign policy, as became clear with the Iraq war, they act like outlaw states since they break the fundamental rules on which the international community is founded, namely absence of wars of aggression.

Thus, “liberal” societies are both non-liberal (in the Rawlsian sense) domestically and act as outlaw states.

The benign consultative hierarchies that Rawls had in mind probably in order to fit Islamic societies in his scheme are practically non-existent.  The Middle East is either in total chaos or in the grip of absolutist dictatorships like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms.  Thus they are not well-ordered societies in Rawls’ terms.

There is no place in his taxonomy for the multi-county non-state organizations like ISIS. A general theory that has no place for organizations that do not accept current state borders is clearly incomplete. (This is an issue on which Rawls is especially weak because he takes borders as given, which is, as he wrote in the wake of the break-up of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, rather odd).

There is also no place for what is now called illiberal democracy, namely a society that has most of the accoutrements of a liberal society (elections, political parties, NGOs), and yet where only one party or one leader ever wins elections and where the media and the judiciary are directly or indirectly controlled.

Migrations, driven by economic reasons and thus by global inequality, do not have a place in Rawls. But they do exist in real life where economic migrants from Africa and Asia into Europe or Mexico and Central America into the United States number millions. But the theory that says that this should not happen is of no use when these things do happen.

Finally, Rawls grossly underrated the importance that people attach to income and wealth for their happiness. Importance of pecuniary incentives has only increased with globalization since income differences have become more visible.    

The changes over the past two decades have been, I believe, so remarkable that the typology offered by Rawls has lost its relevance. But if the typology does not fit reality then the recommended relations between the different societies, based on this typology, do not have any relevance. This is why I think it is time to either ditch Rawls or revise him very thoroughly. A job for political philosophers.

Sećate se 7.decembra?
Ja se sećam "manite se klinci ćorava posla, nema od toga ništa".  

Tri meseca kasnije, i dalje smo na ulicama, i ništa nismo uradili.

Jedva čekam leto da idem na more, da odmorim od svega...

— Parazit (@parazitsrpski) March 16, 2019

Sećate se 7.decembra?
Ja se sećam "manite se klinci ćorava posla, nema od toga ništa".

Tri meseca kasnije, i dalje smo na ulicama, iako se niko tome nije nadao.
Sutra vas čekamo u Aberdarevoj, sve kritike slušamo na licu mesta.

Vidimo se! https://t.co/gNrlliKCuH

— Jelena Anasonovic (@AnasonovicJ) March 15, 2019

Vise od rijeci. Molim RT... Hvala.... pic.twitter.com/8jABoRUBAh

—



forum drinske legije


We might not have expected much more from Gopnik, but A Thousand Small Sanities’ aimless joyride of free-associated clichés and its stubborn refusal to look at reality may indicate more broadly how little the American establishment has learned since the turn of the century. The climate crisis, more than anything, has highlighted the inadequacy of the liberal orthodoxy’s self-congratulatory moderation and celebration of glacial incrementalism. It poses, in stark terms, the need for dramatic action and the inescapability of confronting the powerful interests behind the deadly carbon economy. The rapid degradation of the planet has made radicalism rational and incrementalism a kind of civilizational death drive. In this context, Gopnik’s blissful ignorance reads not as comical but as deeply sinister.


The evening epitomized these disorienting times in American politics. It was the liberal who argued for maintaining or defending the status quo, and the conservative who recognized the necessity of change. With friends like Gopnik, liberals who don’t want to live in the past might have to make do with Sullivan.