WW2 revizionizam

Kinder Lad wrote:Nego jednostavno taj rat je, posebno posle 1942, prosto morao da se zavrsi porazom Nemacke (Italije). Nije moglo drugacije da bude (da izbacimo sad iz price nuklearke). E u takvoj postavci cela stvar je mogla da se odigra i drugacije nego se odigrala i sovjeti su mogli da ne zabasaju na Balkan ili su zapadni saveznici mogli da prvi udju u Jugoslaviju (ne iskrcavanjem na Jadran, to su gluposti). Zasto se sve odigralo kako se odigralo je stvar konkretnih odluka i interesa, a ne bogomdano.

шумидер-модер wrote:

Kinder Lad wrote:Nego jednostavno taj rat je, posebno posle 1942, prosto morao da se zavrsi porazom Nemacke (Italije). Nije moglo drugacije da bude (da izbacimo sad iz price nuklearke). E u takvoj postavci cela stvar je mogla da se odigra i drugacije nego se odigrala i sovjeti su mogli da ne zabasaju na Balkan ili su zapadni saveznici mogli da prvi udju u Jugoslaviju (ne iskrcavanjem na Jadran, to su gluposti). Zasto se sve odigralo kako se odigralo je stvar konkretnih odluka i interesa, a ne bogomdano.

Ne ide to bas tako cak ni u razmatranju postavki: rat, svaki, pa i WW2, ima svoje zakonitosti uslovljene izmedju ostalog I geografijom.

Pa tako, Sovjeti/Rusija ne mogu tek tako da zabasaju na Balkan.

Mogu, ako je recimo u pitanju akcija protiv Turske, pa i tada nekim drugim pravcima.

U WW2 pravac je onaj cuveni Koridor ratova, pravac Moskva - Varsava - Berlin - Pariz.

Sa sve sporednim Balkanom: sto se Sovjeta tice prve dve godine sporednim zarad sopstvene muke i problema sa Nemcima kod kuce, kasnije sa Balkanom kao iznenada iskrslim poligonom za uzajamno nedgornjavanje sa Zapadnim saveznicima.

Dakle, pravac Poljska, pa dalje ka Nemackoj, sa sve senkama sve veceg neslaganja sa Zapadom.

Balkan je sporedan I sa tacke gledista Zapada: da nije Cercilovih ekstremnih strategijskih koncepata I njegovom insistiranju na njihovom sprovodjenju, onoliko koliko je, uporedo, opadala moc Britanije i njena sredstva da se izbori sa narastajucom americkom snagom, Balkan bi i ostao sporedan da nije kasnijeg jugoslovenskog i eksjugoslovenskog megalomanskog pridavanja sebi znacaja koji inace nemaju.

I - da nije tvrdog americkog insistiranja na doslednom sprovodjenju jedne od najvecih i najznacajnijih strateskih odluka WW2, onog nacela ekonomije snaga, u WW2 izrazenom kroz strategiju Prvo Nemacka.

Zapadno prepoznavanje znacaja NOV I POJ za razliku od zakasnelog sovjetskog ima krajnje pragmaticne razloge: teritorija Jugoslavije je mesto na kome Nemacka dobija - kao zajednicki neprijatelj - kakve tekve batine I angazuje kakve takve snage, ali pre svega cinjenice da dogadjanja na Balkanu najvise doticu upravo Zapadne saveznike: od komunikacija ka Grckoj i dalje ka Africi, do, kasnije, veza i uticaja na njihovo angazovanje u Italiji, sa sve mogucnoscu da nemacke snage iz Grcke dospeju u Italiju u kojoj im ni malo ne ide dobro i koje neko, a zna se ko, moze jedino efikasno da ometa.

Sovjeti su kroz Balkan, tacnije jedan njegov cosak protrcali samo koliko im je trebalo da podrze svoje operacije u Madjarskoj kao takodje sporednoj i sa Becom kao glavnim ciljem.

Pritom im je vise nego dobrodoslo sto mogu svoje krilo da povere jednoj pravoj - svidjalo se to nekome ili ne - uredjenoj i efikasnoj vojsci.

Dobro, i Bugarima.

U svemu tome, kako god, pojavljuje se cinilac, poprilicno opipljiv, u obliku obnovljene i na sopstvene noge postavljene Jugoslavije koja nije puki subject neke i necije politike, vec strana koja ima svoje, zasebne interese.

I sto je najvaznije - sredstva da ih brani.

Vojno, diplomatski i kako god se hoce i sa koje se god strane posmatra i koja nije strana kojoj svako kome padne na pamet moze da diktira.

Te, 1945. godine.

Zuper wrote:Ono bese Bugari ucestovali kao ispomoc JNA u Raskoj(podaleko od Bugarske) kada su se "nacionalne snage" i E grupacija probla i izvukla na zapad i sever?
Jbg. nije bilo Crvene armije.

шумидер-модер wrote:

KinderLad wrote:
Ja bih dodao konjukturu. Plus sto  mi "nezavisnost" i "samostalnost" nije vrednost po sebi, nego samo u funkciji.

Наравно и коњунктуру, околности, контекст.
Такозвани историјски тренутак и умешно коришћење исте те коњунктуре што је, отприлике, дефиниција успешне дипломатије и зналачки вођене сопствене стратегије и заступања и одбране сопствених интереса.
Али, зашто онда негирати и по сваку цену подводити под стране утицаје аутохтоне успехе постигнуте сопственим напорима, сопственом способном дипломатијом.
Плаћене, у крајњој линији сопственом крвљу.

...
The last piece of the new Soviet policy was put in
place on 22 December [1943], when the government in Moscow communicated to the
Yugoslav government-in-exile that it was not ready to sign the new friendship
and mutual assistance pact that had been under discussion since 1942.61
In the following days, Moscow proved to be more than happy to leave the
British out in the cold: when Eden asked Molotov if the Soviet government had
any suggestions as to how to achieve the political compromise, he replied that
unfortunately Moscow had not received enough information about the situation
on the ground to make specific recommendations.62 

Meanwhile, Dimitrov
instructed Tito as to how he should reply to the question posed by the Western Allies
to the Yugoslav delegation that was sent to Cairo at the beginning of
December. Dimitrov agreed with Tito that he should not push for recognition of
the committee by the Western Allies and that he should remain firm in his demand
to postpone the issue of the position of the king until after the war. On the issue of
propaganda against the king, he suggested that Tito show ‘the necessary flexibility’
in order to ‘better [disorganize] his supporters abroad and in Serbia’ and overcome
‘certain difficulties on the part of the Anglo-Americans in their aid to the People’s
Liberation Army’. Tito, for example, could declare that ‘if the king will not oppose
the national committee, the latter will for its part refrain from all propaganda
against the king’. Above all, it was necessary to avoid giving the impression that
he was favouring the Croats over the Serbs.63

At the beginning of 1944, the Soviets continued to claim that they did not have
enough information about the situation in Yugoslavia to take any action, and
under this pretext they refused to issue a declaration advocating an agreement
between Tito and the king.64 Behind the scenes, they were overturning one of the
key features of the popular front strategy established in 1941, suggesting to Tito
that he reject any agreement with the Yugoslav government-in-exile.
It was
Churchill who took the initiative, asking Tito, on 5 February, if the dismissal of
Mihailovic´ could open up the possibility of an agreement between the Partisans
and the king. Tito forwarded the letter to Dimitrov, pointing out that although he
had plenty of reasons to refuse the deal, the matter was serious enough to ask the
opinion of Stalin himself.65 Tito, who was used to being reprimanded by Moscow
over his direct confrontations with the Government-in-exile, this time received a
different response. Through Dimitrov, Stalin and Molotov let him know that he
should reply to ‘the Englishman’ that he too favoured the unity of the Yugoslavs
and that, for this reason, the government-in-exile, including Mihailovic´, should be
eliminated, the AVNOJ recognized as the sole government of Yugoslavia and the
king submitted to its law. If the king was willing to accept these conditions, they
stated, the AVNOJ would not object to cooperating with him, but of course the
ultimate fate of the monarchy would only be decided after the end of the war. Tito
was also instructed to refer to Stalin in the subsequent telegrams as to ‘the friend’.66

Tito wrote his reply to Churchill on 9 February, using the wording of the text he
had received from the Kremlin.67 Apparently, when the British Ambassador in Moscow
showed the messages exchanged between Tito and Churchill to Molotov,
the Soviet foreign minister commented along the lines that they ‘had not advanced
things much’.68 British policy had reached an impasse. Lacking a political solution,
it was clear to everybody that the crucial factor for the future of Yugoslavia was the
balance of forces in the field and especially in Serbia where Mihailovic´ was still
strong and the Partisans did not have a significant presence.

At the end of February, the possibility of Soviet action in Yugoslavia substantially
increased with the arrival of the Soviet military mission. The mission, led
by the Lieutenant-General of the military intelligence, Nikolai Korneev, was
composed of 21 members, including at least two members of the KGB, whose
task was to report, among other things, on the intentions of the British and the
Americans in Yugoslavia. At Tito’s request, in April an additional group of KGB
agents was dispatched to train the partisans in the intelligence field.69

In the following months, the ranks of the mission were further increased, and by October
1944 it numbered 94 members, including 32 medical personnel.70 The importance
attached to the mission by the Soviets was also reflected in the rank of Korneev, a
Lieutenant-General, who outranked both the heads of the British and the
American missions attached to the partisans.71
Officially, the mission was there only to gather information on the country.72
It did much more than this. Firstly, the mission, which reported directly to
Molotov, created for the first time a direct channel of communication between
Tito and the Soviet leadership when Moscow wanted to be sure that the situation
was developing in line with its foreign policy.

Completing the process of side-lining Dimitrov, which had started with the
disbandment of the Comintern, Tito was informed that from April he could
communicate directly with Molotov, and that Dimitrov would have nothing more to do
with Yugoslavia. Soviet correspondence with Tito shows that starting from 1944,
the Soviet leadership was not only concerned to reassure the Western Allies, but
also to reassure Tito, who was clearly emerging as the master of postwar
Yugoslavia. In the same letter, which confirmed the marginalization of Dimitrov,
Stalin and Molotov personally assured Tito that they considered Yugoslavia an
ally of the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria an enemy, and that even if the situation
changed in Bulgaria they wanted Yugoslavia to be their ‘principal support in
South-eastern Europe’. The two leaders added that they had no plans for the
‘sovietisation’ of either Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, which they characterised as
democratic countries allied with the Soviet Union, and that whatever Dimitrov was
thinking, any decision on the question of Macedonia would be taken with Tito’s
agreement73. From April 1944 onwards, the tone of Soviet correspondence with
Tito changed significantly. While Dimitrov had addressed Tito as a subordinate,
Molotov generally expressed himself in terms of giving advice rather than directives.
In June, Korneev was also reminded that he should make suggestions to Tito
only when he was asked to do so, and that he should not overwhelm him with
questions ‘especially when he shows no desire to express an opinion’.74
...

While doing their best to help the Partisans, Molotov and Stalin remained determined
that Tito’s increasing hold over the country did not appear to be orchestrated by Moscow.
KGB officers attached to the mission were instructed to keep a
low profile demonstrate ‘extreme caution and tact so as not to provoke complains
that we are interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia or that we are not loyal
to the allies’.81 The same caution encouraged Moscow to reject the option to sever
relations with the Yugoslav government-in-exile, which had been contemplated
in the first months of the year.82 In April, meeting Djilas in Moscow, Molotov
guaranteed that the Soviet government intended to recognize the AVNOJ as
the legitimate government of Yugoslavia, but he also made it clear that this step
was premature and that it should be done with consideration for relations with
the Western Allies and the situation in other countries. Although Djilas
was pushing for a quick solution, both he and Molotov agreed that international
recognition depended on the capacity of Tito to strengthen his position in Serbia.

...

When, at the
beginning of June 1944, Tito established his headquarters on the island of Vis to
escape German pressure, the British found the occasion propitious for a meeting
with the new Yugoslav prime minister, Ivan Sˇubasˇic´. Molotov was informed by the
British of the meeting, but before replying rushed to ask Tito’s opinion and plans.
Then, he put all Moscow’s might into the negotiations and handed to Korneev a
letter addressed to Sˇubasˇic´, in which they promised to support a government
formed in agreement with Tito and which unified the various forces against traitors
of the people ‘such as Pavelic´, Nedic´ and Mihailovic´’88. They also promised
substantial financial help,89 and warned Tito that that the presence of the Soviet
mission in Yugoslavia might arouse British suspicions and therefore worsen their
relations with Tito. If at any point Tito began to think that this was the case,
Moscow was ready to reduce the size of the mission leaving behind only a few
minor figures.90 The agreement between Tito and Sˇubasˇic´ was signed on 16 June.

The AVNOJ was recognized as the only legitimate government in Yugoslavia and
Sˇubasˇic´ agreed to form his new administration without those elements compromised
by the German occupation. The question of the monarchy was postponed
until the end of the war.

The signing of the pact did not ease Moscow’s concern. The KGB, which intercepted
a report by Churchill on this matter, informed Stalin that neither the Prime
Minister nor the British Foreign Office was fully satisfied, and that the conservative
circles in the British Foreign Office were working against Tito, claiming that he did
not have enough support in Serbia. In his report to Stalin, Korneev sounded a
similarly alarmed note, claiming that British support to the Partisans was more
fictitious than real, that the British had not really broken off relations with
Mihailovic´ and that they were secretly mobilizing all their reactionary forces to
oppose the Partisan army in the event of a German withdrawal.91 The British, who
had cultivated the illusion of having tied Tito to an agreement for the restoration of
the monarchy, were indeed disappointed, sensing that they were just giving Tito
what he wanted without any reasonable concessions on his side.92 But as Eden had
commented at the beginning of June, the British only had themselves to blame for
this situation, as ‘the Russians have merely sat back and watched us doing their
work for them’.93 At the same time, the Foreign Office vetoed an SOE plan to
reestablish connections with Mihailovic´ out of fear of losing Tito’s confidence,
and for the same reasons the British also forced the USA to withdraw the intelligence
mission they still maintained with the Chetniks.94

...

Soviet troops entered Yugoslavia at the end of September under orders to fight
the Germans and the ‘reactionary forces of Yugoslavia of Nedic´ and Mihailovic´’.97
The Soviets did not inform the Western Allies of Tito’s request and only notified
the British and US ambassadors that they had asked permission from the AVNOJ
to temporarily cross the border to carry on operations against the Germans. In the
way, they demonstrated that that they considered the committee to be the only
legitimate power in the country and also avoided the creation of a precedent for the
entrance of Western troops.98 The arrival of the Red Army was coupled with a
peak in Soviet supplies reaching the AVNOJ, which was made possible by, among
other things, the use of airfields in the Romanian territory and in Bari.99 

...

The Yugoslav case suggests that, in the context of the shifting balance of forces
among the Western Allies, Moscow was ready to put aside the popular front strategy
and to encourage local communists to challenge the political order supported
by the British and the Americans while the Second World War was still raging.
The modification of Soviet policy in 1944 also has the potential to shed light on the
earlier period, highlighting that the disagreement with the Yugoslavs over
the nature of the war in 1941–3 never really brought into question the Soviets’
recognition of the preeminent role played by Tito among the neighbour parties.
The example of Yugoslavia, however, also shows that this apparently clear strategy
covered deep uncertainties on the Soviet side as to the real intentions of the British,
the real space of manoeuvre enjoyed by Moscow and the way in which relations
with a new communist state in the making should be established. It also shows that,
trapped in the Marxist world-view which postulated the incompatibility of
the socialist and capitalist worlds, Moscow was often unable to understand its
opponents, looking for conspiracies where they did not exist.

In the short term, Soviet policy appeared successful. By directing Tito
to abandon his radical stance and adopt the slogan of national liberation,
Moscow helped
him to gain the confidence of the British, establishing the impression that a
collaboration between the Partisans and the King was indeed possible. Then the Soviets
were able to support the communist take-over of the country without it affecting
their relations with the Western Allies. Tito’s flight to Moscow was a brutal
awakening for Churchill, who only then realized that in Tito the British had
‘nursed a viper’.100 The Soviets were also able convincingly to deny until the end
the extent of their involvement with the Yugoslav communist movement, thus
avoiding the risk that, if anything went wrong, the situation could be ascribed to
them. In all this, they provided at the crucial moment the military, financial and
diplomatic support that the Partisans needed to defeat their internal enemies and to
gain credibility in the international area. Tito played his cards well, paying lip
service to the Soviets when needed and continuing to advance his cause step by
step while maintaining their support.

The seeds for further conflicts, however, had been planted. Paradoxically, by
pushing Tito to widen his popular base in Yugoslavia after 1942, the Soviets had
established him as the leader of a communist state that was now challenging
Moscow’s supremacy. Created by Stalin and nursed by Churchill, ‘the viper’
Tito was now ready to bite eastward. Exacerbated by Tito’s attempt to impose
his leadership on the other ‘popular democracies’ in the Balkans after the war, the
conflict between the two leaders of the communist movements eventually became
unmanageable, and in 1948 led to the most serious split in the communist world.


https://sci-hub.tw/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022009417737602

шумидер-модер wrote:

Zuper wrote:Ono bese Bugari ucestovali kao ispomoc JNA u Raskoj(podaleko od Bugarske) kada su se "nacionalne snage" i E grupacija probla i izvukla na zapad i sever?
Jbg. nije bilo Crvene armije.

Jebem ti Srbina, pa jos Ljotićevca koji čak i Bugarima daje prednost, auuuu bre, pa može li da se niže padne…

Gargantua wrote:opet, kontekst. to boldovano je delimično tačno, ali u glavnim crtama su stvari (ne sve) rađene u koordinaciji sa sovjetima

Zuper wrote:Sto se tice napisanog, to su cinjenice.
Jbg. nije bilo Crveno armije pa je efikasnost borbe protivu E koalicije bila dosta manja cak i uz Bugare koji su dolazili na ispomoc jugoslovenskim komunistima daleko od Bugarske.

Zuper wrote:Jbt. poslednji put su bili u Raskoj u 10. veku za vreme cara Samujla.

шумидер-модер wrote:

Gargantua wrote:opet, kontekst. to boldovano je delimično tačno, ali u glavnim crtama su stvari (ne sve) rađene u koordinaciji sa sovjetima

Ma ne sporim.

Samo sto je citirano (Cripps?) samo deo opet sireg konteksta.

Koordinacija sa Sovjetima je bila krajnje uslovna, jer drugacija i nije mogla da bude zbog udaljenosti i nemogucnosti Sovjeta da pruze bilo kakvu konkretnu pomoc.

A deo nekih drugih konteksta je, izmedju ostalog, sposobnost odricanja, obostranog guranja u stranu ideoloskih elemenata, mislim naravno pre svega na Britance i Jugoslovene, a sve zarad nespornog zahednickog vojnog cilja.

Tommaso Piffer , Stalin, the Western Allies and Soviet Policy towards the Yugoslav Partisan Movement, 1941–4, Journal of Contemporary History, 2017.

Ali, koliko ja razumem danasnja batrganja ovde na forumu, mogao bih da ih svedem na sledece: Jugoslavija je, 1945, bila mnogo manje podlozna uticajima i pritiscima sopstvenih saveznika, od Srbije/Jugoslavije 1918-19. godine.

I to pre svega zahvaljuci samoj sebi i sopstvenim naporima.

A to je, ako sam u pravu, istorijska cinjenica od itekakvog značaja koja se danas uporno pokusava da skrajne samo zarad pokusaja potpunog dezavuisanja dometa druge Jugoslavije sa najprimitivnijih antikomunistickih pozicija koje bez greske vode u revizionizam najgore vrste.

Gargantua wrote:
pa imaš link na kraju

Tommaso Piffer , Stalin, the Western Allies and Soviet Policy towards the Yugoslav Partisan Movement, 1941–4, Journal of Contemporary History, 2017.

iz sovjetske arhivske građe



Besmisleno ti je poređenje.

45 se nije pravila nova zemlja, sem što je u njoj promenjen model vlasti (u odnosu na pre 41) i uz korekciju granica na Jadranu. U suštini sam legitimitet postojanja i obnove Jugoslavije saveznici (zapadni i istočni) nisu dovodili u pitanje od početka rata, igrala se naravno igranka oko vlasti i uticaja. To je slabo uporedivo sa slamanjem habzburškog Rajha sa više pretendenata na njegove delove 1918. što je bila promena viševekovnog poretka. U poređenju s tim 1945. na Balkanu je minorna stvar.  

Pitanje je u odnosu na koga je Jugoslavija 45. morala da bude nezavisna, tj da li ju je neko realno ugrožavao. Nije. Ne znam šta misliš da je bilo "vršenje nezavisnosti". Morala se primati pomoć u hrani spolja (iz očiglednih razloga ratnih razaranja).

Britanski i američki "pritisak" je bio u suštini slabašan, na nivou verbalne podrške građanskim/nekomunističkim političarima, koji su opet brzo počišćeni. Toliko o onih vajnih (a i lažnih, to su Čerčilova bezvezna hvalisanja) 50:50.

Ustav FNRJ je bio modeliran po uzoru na sovjetski. Sovjeti su između ostalog pomogli pravljenje aparata bezbednosti oko Tita, slanjem ekipe za obuku iz NKVDa od juna 45. Vozači, bezbednjaci, testeri hrane itd, obezbeđenje objekata, ljudi, konvoja, know-how je "donirao" SSSR. Istovremeno Moskva je odbila Titove teze o "korekciji" granica Jugoslavije prema nekim susedima i sputavala njegove spoljnopolitičke ambicije.

Dakle nezavisna u odnosu na koga, šta, na koju konkretnu opasnost, i na koje svoje ciljeve?

Гаргантуа wrote:Sovjeti su između ostalog pomogli pravljenje aparata bezbednosti oko Tita, slanjem ekipe za obuku iz NKVDa od juna 45. Vozači, bezbednjaci, testeri hrane itd, obezbeđenje objekata, ljudi, konvoja, know-how je "donirao" SSSR.

Гаргантуа wrote:Ustav FNRJ je bio modeliran po uzoru na sovjetski.

Не буди ми замерено на препоруци: лакше мало са совјетским изворима, нарочито оним напрасно откривеним последњих 20-ак година  

шумидер-модер wrote:

Може , данас нарочито, совјетским изворима да се доказује све и свашта, што се и ради навелико, али је овај део нетачан:

Гаргантуа wrote:Sovjeti su između ostalog pomogli pravljenje aparata bezbednosti oko Tita, slanjem ekipe za obuku iz NKVDa od juna 45. Vozači, bezbednjaci, testeri hrane itd, obezbeđenje objekata, ljudi, konvoja, know-how je "donirao" SSSR.

Југословени су, проверено, били довољно паметни да нипошто не дозволе превелику совјетску инфилтрацију, скрајну совјетске обавештајне експерте, и сачувају самосталност по тим питањима: уосталом, као и свака млада полиција било какве идеолошке провенијенције, била је више него способна да се брине о себи него ужирени и до коске бирократизовани совјетски саветници са којима се брзо увидело с киме се има посла, од војске до полиције.
Код Југословена је, а то се може лако проверити, благи ужас изазивала неспособност Совјета чак и на високим позицијама да сами доносе одлуке или предузимају било какву иницијативу без амина са вишег места.
Људи који су 4 године провели у шуми, без поузданих веза и навикнути да самостално одлучују тако нешто напросто нису могли да прогутају.
Уосталом, у тој игри су надиграли Совјете током ИБ догађања и без ослањања на совјетски know-how
Да нису, 1948. би много горе прошли.

№60
Докладная записка наркомов внутренних дел и государственной безопасности СССР Л.П.Берии и В.Н.Меркулова И.В.Сталину и В.М.Молотову о намечаемых мероприятиях по усилению охраны И.Б.Тито
г. Москва 29 июня 1945 г.
СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
ОСОБАЯ ПАПКА
Товарищу СТАЛИНУ И.В.
Товарищу МОЛОТОВУ В.М.


В связи с телеграммой тов. САДЧИКОВА из Белграда от 23 июня т.г., в целях усиления охраны маршала ТИТО считаем 
необходимым провести следующие мероприятия:


1. Командировать в Белград заместителя начальника 6-го Управления НКГБ СССР комиссара госбезопасности тов. ШАДРИНА Д.Н. и начальника отделения подполковника госбезопасности тов. ГЛУХОВЦЕВА Д.А. с группой в 30 работников того же Управления для оказания соответствующим органам Югославии необходимой помощи.
Тов. ГЛУХОВЦЕВ в дальнейшем, после организации охраны, может быть оставлен в Югославии в должности начальника личной охраны маршала ТИТО по договоренности с последним2;

2. Командировать в Белград комиссара госбезопасности тов. ВЛОДЗИМИРСКОГО Л.Е. для проведения совместно с 
соответствующими органами Югославии агентурно-следственных мероприятий по перепроверке сообщения упомянутого в телеграмме тов. САДЧИКОВА английского агента РАКИЧА и принятия на месте необходимых оперативных мер;


3. Обязать тов. ХРУЛЕВА подобрать и направить в Белград в распоряжение тов. ШАДРИНА для маршала ТИТО одну 
бронированную автомашину из числа трофейных.

Просим Ваших указаний.
(Л.Берия)
(В.Меркулов)

ГА РФ. Ф. 9401. Оп. 2. Д. 97. Л. 69-70. Копия.



№ 66
Докладная записка Л.П.Берии И.В.Сталину о мероприятиях по охране Й.Б.Тито и массовых мероприятий в Белграде
г. Москва 13 июля 1945 г.
СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
ОСОБАЯ ПАПКА
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ КОМИТЕТ ОБОРОНЫ
товарищу СТАЛИНУ И.В.


Тов. ШАДРИН, находящийся в Белграде, сообщает о проводимых мероприятиях по охране:


1. Начальник отделения 6 Управления ГЛУХОВЦЕВ назначен заместителем начальника охраны, и с ним согласовываются все вопросы, связанные с охраной.


2. Наши товарищи распределены по участкам работы в качестве инструкторов по оказанию помощи. В выездной группе дежурят по три человека в смену. Физическая охрана главного объекта состоит из 15 человек, и 8 человек распределены по другим объектам. 


3. 7 и 10 июля обеспечивалась охрана крупных мероприятий: двух массовых митингов и антифашистского конгресса балканской молодежи. Охрану этого мероприятия организовывали они сами, а наши товарищи использовались в качестве физической охраны на уязвимых участках и частично в качестве инструкторов. После мероприятий был сделан подробный разбор всех выявленных недостатков, как в руководстве охраной, так и в работе рядового состава.


4. Намечено провести ряд практических занятий с  начальствующим составом по организации охраны трассы, мест временного
пребывания и мест проведения парадов.


5. Организуется практическое обучение рядового состава наружного наблюдения и состава, обеспечивающего физическую охрану трассы и мест временного пребывания. Произведена экипировка части состава в гражданскую одежду.

6. Проверена и перестроена охрана правительственных учреждений.

7. Проверен блок питания. Организуется усиленный контроль за качеством доставляемых продуктов и приготовлением пищи, так как существующий контроль слаб.

НАРОДНЫЙ КОМИССАР
ВНУТРЕННИХ ДЕЛ СОЮЗА ССР
(Л.Берия)

ГА РФ. Ф. 9401. Оп. 2. Д. 97. Л. 351—352. Заверенная копия.

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Советский фактор в Восточной Европе. 1944—1953 гг. В 2-х тт. Документы / Т. 1. 1944—1948 гг. Отв. редактор — Т.В.Волокитина. — М.: «Российская политическая энциклопедия» (РОССПЭН), 1999. — 687 с

Berija wrote:3. Обязать тов. ХРУЛЕВА подобрать и направить в Белград в распоряжение тов. ШАДРИНА для маршала ТИТО одну 
бронированную автомашину из числа трофейных.

Gargantua wrote:ја сам изнео релативно ограничену тврдњу да су совјети у лето 1945 помогли титу у успостави система личног обезбеђења и обезбеђења партијског врха, за коју си рекао да је нетачна. 

само сам показао да је она тачна.

Gargantua wrote:не знам што је битно шта је било 3 године касније, нешто о одупирању стаљинистичким процесима касније, дал је тито волео ролс ројс и шта су неки колективни југословени хтели, знали итд.

U pravu si, nije bitno, ni malo.  

шумидер-модер wrote:

Gargantua wrote:ја сам изнео релативно ограничену тврдњу да су совјети у лето 1945 помогли титу у успостави система личног обезбеђења и обезбеђења партијског врха, за коју си рекао да је нетачна. 

само сам показао да је она тачна.

Pod #1 nisi je opovrgao, još manje se ogranicio u pogledu na svoj prethodni post na tu temu.
A sustinski je netacna iz prostog razloga sto je - ako iko - sam Tito odlicno znao da poveriti se iskljucivoj brizi NKVD-a ume da bude itekako opasno po zivot.
Ako izistinski mislis da su Jugosloveni bili toliko blesavi, onda OK, dokazao si sta si hteo.

Sovjeti su između ostalog pomogli pravljenje aparata bezbednosti oko Tita, slanjem ekipe za obuku iz NKVDa od juna 45. Vozači, bezbednjaci, testeri hrane itd, obezbeđenje objekata, ljudi, konvoja, know-how je "donirao" SSSR.

Gargantua wrote:to da je "suštinski netačna" (uprkos crno na belo i čitljivo da je tačna) baziraš na ovome "isključivoj brizi nkvd" iako sam napisao "pomogli pravljenje" a ne "nkvd je bila isključivi prsten obezbeđenja oko tita" ili šta tako.

ne znam ko su ovde jugosloveni, svih njih ondašnjih 15 miliona, ck kpj, tito i ranković, ili 1. prva proleterka divizija? obično "izistinski" ne mislim ništa jednoznačno o tako nasumičnim skupovima.

Gargantua wrote:umeš li da čitaš, znaš li na šta odgovaraš?

Gargantua wrote:не знам што је битно шта је било 3 године касније, нешто о одупирању стаљинистичким процесима касније, дал је тито волео ролс ројс и шта су неки колективни југословени хтели, знали итд.

Uostalom, ne ispustaj Российску[size=14]ю политическую энциклопедию…  

шумидер-модер wrote:

Gargantua wrote:не знам што је битно шта је било 3 године касније, нешто о одупирању стаљинистичким процесима касније, дал је тито волео ролс ројс и шта су неки колективни југословени хтели, знали итд.

Bravo, ovo se zove odgovor.

U pravu si, nije bitno, ni malo.  

Osim sto je za decenije promenilo zivot generacijama Jugoslovena, ustedelo im zivot u standardnom istocnoevropskom sivilu, otvorilo vrata modernizmima svake vrste od likovnjastva, do knjizevnosti i filma, zacrtalo za decenije kretanja u evropskoj levici, uticalo na neka nimalo beznacajna kretanja i promene u svetskim razmerama...



Jebiga.

Gargantua wrote:
Pričali smo o ratu, i konkretno o kraju rata. 

Što si skočio na 48, staljinizam i generacije koloritnih života?

Gargantua wrote:...u glavnim crtama su stvari (ne sve) rađene u koordinaciji sa sovjetima.