Ћина-Средње Краљевство

Inače, izgleda da je to bio samit malih liliputanskih zemalja koji je Kina organizovala da ne bi ponaosob vodila razgovore sa Maltama i Džibutijima, ladno niko ne kaže da je o tome reč 

Ointagru Unartan wrote:

Evo nešto za sliku

The US Will Lose Its Trade War with China
Sep 21, 2018
Anatole Kaletsky

In handicapping the US-China conflict, Keynesian demand management is a better guide than comparative advantage. In principle, China can avoid any damage at all from US tariffs simply by responding with a full-scale Keynesian stimulus.
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LONDON – The United States cannot win its tariff war with China, regardless of what President Donald Trump says or does in the coming months. Trump believes that he has the upper hand in this conflict because the US economy is so strong, and also because politicians of both parties support the strategic objective of thwarting China’s rise and preserving US global dominance.

But, ironically, this apparent strength is Trump’s fatal weakness. By applying the martial arts principle of turning an opponent’s strength against him, China should easily win the tariff contest, or at least fight Trump to a draw.

Economists since David Ricardo have argued that restricting imports reduces consumer welfare and impedes productivity growth. But that is not the main reason why Trump will be forced to back down in the trade war. In handicapping the US-China conflict, another economic principle – rarely used to explain the futility of Trump’s tariff threats – is much more important than Ricardo’s concept of comparative advantage: Keynesian demand management.

Comparative advantage certainly influences long-term economic welfare, but demand conditions will determine whether China or America feels more pressure to sue for trade peace in the next few months. And a focus on demand management clearly reveals that the US will suffer from Trump’s tariffs, while China can avoid any adverse effects.

From a Keynesian perspective, the outcome of a trade war depends mainly on whether the combatants are experiencing recession or excess demand. In a recession, tariffs can boost economic activity and employment, albeit at the cost of long-term efficiency. But when an economy is operating at or near its maximum capacity, tariffs will merely raise prices and add to the upward pressure on US interest rates. This clearly applies to the US economy today.

US businesses could not, in aggregate, find extra low-wage workers to replace Chinese imports, and even the few US businesses motivated by tariffs to undercut Chinese imports would need to raise wages and build new factories, adding to the upward pressure on inflation and interest rates. With little spare capacity available, the new investment and hiring required to replace Chinese goods would be at the cost of other business decisions that were more profitable before the tariff war with China. So, unless US businesses are sure the tariffs will continue for many years, they will neither invest nor hire new workers to compete with China.

Assuming that well-informed Chinese businesses know this, they will not cut their export prices to absorb the cost of US tariffs. That will leave US importers to pay the tariffs and pass on the cost to US consumers (further fueling inflation) or to US shareholders through lower profits. Thus, the tariffs will not be “punitive” for China, as Trump seems to believe. Instead, the main effect will be to hurt US consumers and businesses, just like an increase in sales tax.

But let us concede that the tariffs may price some Chinese goods out of the US market. Where will the competitively priced imports that undercut China come from?

In most cases, the answer will be other emerging economies. Some low-end goods such as shoes and toys will be sourced from Vietnam or India. Final assembly of some electronic and industrial machinery may relocate to South Korea or Mexico. A few Japanese and European suppliers may displace high-end Chinese suppliers. Thus, to the very limited extent that tariffs do prove “punitive” for China, the effect on other emerging markets and the global economy will not be damaging “contagion” but a modest boost to demand that results from displacing Chinese exports to the US.

True, Chinese exporters may experience modest losses as other producers take advantage of the US tariffs to undercut them. But this should have no effect on Chinese growth, employment, or corporate profits if demand management is used to offset the loss of exports. The Chinese government has already started to boost domestic consumption and investment by easing monetary policy and cutting taxes.

But China’s stimulus measures have so far been cautious, as they should be considering the negligible impact that US tariffs have had on Chinese exports. If, however, evidence starts to emerge of export weakness, China can and should compensate with additional steps to boost domestic demand. In principle, China can avoid any damage at all from US tariffs simply by responding with a full-scale Keynesian stimulus. But would the Chinese government be willing do this?

This is where bipartisan US support for a “containment policy” toward China paradoxically works against Trump. China’s rulers have so far been reluctant to use overt demand stimulus as a weapon in the trade war because of strong commitments made by President Xi Jinping to limit the growth of China’s debt and to reform the banking sector.

But such financial policy arguments against Keynesian policy are surely irrelevant now that the US has presented the battle over Trump’s tariffs as the opening skirmish in a geopolitical Cold War. It is simply inconceivable that Xi would attach higher priority to credit management than to winning the tariff war and thereby demonstrating the futility of a US containment strategy against China.

This raises the question of how Trump will react when his tariffs start to hurt US businesses and voters, while China and the rest of the world shrug them off. The probable answer is that Trump will follow the precedent of his conflicts with North Korea, the European Union, and Mexico. He will “make a deal” that fails to achieve his stated objectives but allows him to boast of a “win” and justify the verbal belligerence that inspires his supporters.

Trump’s surprisingly successful rhetorical technique of “shout loudly and carry a white flag” helps to explain the consistent inconsistency of his foreign policy. The US-China trade war is likely to provide the next example.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-would-lose-trade-war-with-china-by-anatole-kaletsky-2018-09

US businesses could not, in aggregate, find extra low-wage workers to replace Chinese imports, and even the few US businesses motivated by tariffs to undercut Chinese imports would need to raise wages and build new factories, adding to the upward pressure on inflation and interest rates.

Ne razumem u čemu je problem.

Lepo pise.
Rast kamatnih stopa sto smanjuje kreditnu ekspanziju koja je potrebna za nove fabrike...

Uglavnom to sto je napisano nece se desiti jer Kinezi su posveceni smanjivanju kreditnog impulsa kako bi "procistili" ekonomiju.
Oni ce oboriti juan dok ce evropljanima, japancima i korejancima skinuti odredjene tarife na uvoz u Kinu.
Tako ce kazniti samo SAD.

Inace su danas Kinezi pozvali na ribanje americkog ambasadora u Pekingu zbog najave sankcija.

Kina je vec sada suvise velika.
SAD su napravile jednu veliku gresku sedamdesetih i nakon toga kada su otvarali Kinu da bi srusili SSSR.
To se cesto dogadja u istoriji. Jednom nesto das da bi pobedio nekog drugog koji ti trenutno smeta ali dugorocno dozivis katastrofu.
Nama najblizi primer je odnos Vizantije i Venecije.

Koja je veza između povećavanja plata i pritiska na kamatne stope? Što bi stope morale da idu na gore ako plate rastu?

to je osnovni razlog zašto ne jebem ni 2% društvene nauke

neka su žive i zdrav, Big im sreću dao, ali što se mene tiče, mogu da ga duvaju

shout loudly and carry a white flag

ontheotherhand wrote:Koja je veza između povećavanja plata i pritiska na kamatne stope? Što bi stope morale da idu na gore ako plate rastu?

Ima tu različitih fora i fazona, ali najlepša od njih je svakako što su banke, kada vide da više ne plaćaš 500 Bangladežana vrećom kikirikija, već plaćaš neke veće sume američkom napaćenom pučanstvu i samim tim ti ostaje manje para što stvara pritisak i da povećaš cene proizvoda koji pučanstvo kreira, prosto moraju da reaguju povećavanjem kamatnih stopa radi ostvarivanja dobrog volstritovskog balansa  Šta misliš, zašto se naša vlast ubija da održi plate na do 300 evra, idući dotle da po manjim mestima posećuju lokalne vlasnike firmi i traže im da smanje plate? Ne može da dobijaš jeftin novac i da zapošljavaš ljude po normalnim platama, postaće zarazno 


Mislim, koreni toga se vuku iz nakazne neoliberalne pretpostavke da što imaš više fizičkog prisustva i što si veća firma u konvencionalnom smislu, to su veći troškovi i rizici, idealno je da posluješ u cloudu, zapošljavaš oko 1000 ljudi i obrćeš 740 milijardi dolara godišnje, tada te banke i investitori vole.

У грубој теорији, повећање масе плата захтева и повећање крајње цене производа, што тера цене горе.

Опет, гледали смо како је пар хиљада милијарди долара задњих десетак година упуцано у "систем" тј у берзу и није било никаквог повећања цена/инфлације, плус долар је у позицији да не мора нужно остати у САД и вршити инфлаторни притисак, свакако не у мери у којој би то радио динар овде.

Pa da, gledali smo za dolare, ajde ti upumpaj na taj način rublje, dinare ili juane, pa da vidiš šta će da se desi. Lako je za dolare gde upumpavanje par desetina milijardi mesečno nije toliko problematično jer je u pitanju rezervna svetska valuta pa je udeo štampanog novca u ukupnoj masi svetskih valuta mali. Čak ni evro nije uspeo da se održi, već mu je realna vrednost dosta smanjena nakon upumpavanja para.

Mozes da upumpavas i dinare ako imas razvijen finansijski sistem.
Nije samo FED gurao u finansijski sektor stotine milijardi to radi i Evrozona, Svajcarska, Svedska, UK i Japan. Posredno, na njima specifican nacin, radi Kina.

Ali se to ne preliva na inflaciju jer to ne ulazi u "realnu" ekonomiju, vec pumpa berzu preko rekupovine akcija, kao jedan primer.
Zato su berze napumane dok ostatek ekonomije ni priblizno nije to pratio, zato imas toliko raslojavanje...Pomaze realnoj ekonomiji tako sto smanjuje kamate na npr. obveznice ali i tu ima negativnih efekata...

ontheotherhand wrote:Koja je veza između povećavanja plata i pritiska na kamatne stope? Što bi stope morale da idu na gore ako plate rastu?

Veza je inflacija.
Mogu da ti objasnjavam, sto sam bio i uradio, ali malo razmisli.

Je l taj drugosrbijanac neki verski komunista?
Pa nisu popovi glupi, znaju i oni pricati populisticki.

povećanje poreza na nasleđe, dividende i profite korporacija; povećanje minimalnih plata; povećanje javnih investicija; uvođenje radnika u upravljanje kompanijama i energičnije prenošenje vlasti na regije (samoupravljanje?)

Ovo je plan fasisticke partije iz 1919 plus prava zena na glas, ogranicavanje prava crkvi na imovinu, obezbedjivanje minimalne plate za radnike i smanjivanje zivotne dobi za odlazak u penziju...



Nego ko danas finansira tzv. pescanik?

Pa što ga ne sprovedoše u delo kada su došli na vlast... Nego nekako sve suprotno.

povećanje poreza na nasleđe, dividende i profite korporacija; povećanje minimalnih plata; povećanje javnih investicija; uvođenje radnika u upravljanje kompanijama i energičnije prenošenje vlasti na regije (samoupravljanje?)

Pa ajde. Samo još da objasni kako.

Pa neku vrstu samoupravljanja su pokusali da uvedu u nekim svojim fazama vlasti...
Inace na pocetku svoje vlasti fasisti u italiji, u ekonomskom smislu, su bili prilicno liberalni.

Inace, fasisti su bili cuveni po javnim radovima.
Veliki projekti su radjeni za vreme njih, naravno neke druge oblasti su patile...
Primera radi, prvi javni autoput je izgradjen u italiji za vreme fasista a ne nemackoj kako se misli.
Zbog javnih radova i relativno dobrog prolaska kroz Veliku depresiju je Musolini bio hvaljen u SAD npr. u Njujork Tajmsu su imali pohvalne tekstove za njega zbog toga a i Cercil je bio boleciv na njega.

China and Russia: new BFFs thanks to an insecure US
Recent war games highlight Moscow and Beijing’s increasingly closer ties, which are based on a convergence of national interests, a similar view of the world order – and the need for an ally against a belligerent America
By Alexander Lukin
23 Sep 2018


https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2165255/china-and-russia-new-bffs-thanks-insecure-us



The involvement of Chinese troops and military hardware in Russia’s recent military exercises in the Russian Far East and Siberia – its largest drills since 1981 – has sparked new interest in the rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. The West reacted in predictable fashion, with some observers claiming that Russia and China had long been allies and were now preparing for war with the United States, and others dismissing their growing closeness as “a shallow partnership of convenience”.
Both positions justify the policy of the US and its allies. The first serves the interests of those who advocate a military build-up and increased defence spending to counter an imaginary military threat, while the second justifies levelling sanctions and trade pressure against both countries simultaneously – arguing, meanwhile, that such an approach does not impel them to form an anti-US alliance.

In fact, relations between Moscow and Beijing have been improving steadily for more than a quarter of a century. Although they quarrelled in the 1960s and 1970s, the two countries have been growing closer since the final years of the Soviet Union and have now reached the point of “strategic partnership and interaction”.
The very fact that China changed leaders several times during that period and Russia transformed its entire political system indicates that the Moscow-Beijing rapprochement is based not on transient ideology or political goals, but on a convergence of national interests.
Globally, both countries favour preserving the post-second world war system of international law based on the United Nations and its Security Council. This is understandable given Russia and China, even together, are weaker than the US and its allies, but their Security Council veto puts them on a par with the US and gives them control over UN decisions. In this sense, the US – kept in check by international law – is a revolutionary force in international relations, while Russia and China are conservatives.
Moscow and Beijing advocate multipolarity – a world based not on the dominance of a central power, but on the interaction of several major centres. In such a world, they could play an important and independent role.
The two countries share common views on most regional conflicts: Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the Iranian and Korean nuclear problems. China has been Russia’s largest trading partner for the past seven years. Although Russia has a smaller share of China’s foreign trade, China purchases vital goods from Russia, such as weapons systems – which it cannot buy elsewhere – and raw materials, which it needs to diversify its supply chain. Finally, cooperation between their border regions plays a significant role in both countries’ development. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s decision to attend the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in early September underscored the importance of such cooperation.
Russia and China have developed an extensive infrastructure for cooperation, from annual summits between senior leaders to numerous intergovernmental commissions and lower-level contacts. Almost every Russian region, city, university, and research centre now has permanent “sister” relations with a counterpart in China. Neither Russia nor China maintains a similar degree of cooperation with any other country.

Many foreign observers spread myths about Russian-Chinese relations in an attempt to bring the two into conflict or else deny the reality of their rapprochement.

The most common of these myths suggest China is expanding demographically into Eastern Russia, the two countries are at odds in Central Asia, and Beijing is trying to intimidate Moscow with its disproportionate economic might. None of these is true. In fact, fewer Chinese citizens live in Russia’s eastern regions than in Moscow, and most of them are in the country legally. What’s more, most people in northern China try to relocate not to Russia, but to southern China, for the better climate and living conditions.
Although China’s influence in Central Asia will inevitably grow, it poses much less of a threat to Russia’s interests than the destructive influence of the US. US policy for the region has the potential to breed the same sort of chaos as it did in Libya and Iraq. Moscow and Beijing work closely in Central Asia, particularly within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the expanding mechanism for linking China’s Silk Road Economic Belt with the development of the Eurasian Economic Union – which consists of five former Soviet states, including Russia.

This trend will continue, thanks in large part to the extremely hostile approach the US has taken towards both countries. This is not about US President Donald Trump or any other leader; Trump is only a symbol of the larger situation. The US has long been accustomed to profiting from its global economic dominance, but its influence is declining, even as the relative influence of other centres of power, including Russia and China, is growing. Washington finds it especially irritating that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not mark the “end of history” and the ultimate triumph of the US, but only the start of new and far less advantageous global developments.

In an effort to maintain its position in the world, the US continues to behave like a hegemon and becomes increasingly embittered by the resistance it encounters. The current period – in which the US must learn painful lessons in the school of multipolarity – will be particularly dangerous. Russia and China are the main instructors in this school, a role that strengthens the bonds between them.
These ties, however, are unlikely to lead to a formal alliance that includes mutual defence obligations. There are three historical precedents for such alliances, and all three failed. Obviously, Russia and China are just too large and too powerful to become shackled by such far-reaching mutual commitments.

In response to Western anti-Russian sanctions, Russia granted Chinese investors access to its energy sector, concluded deals for the sale of its most modern weapons, and established closer military cooperation with China.
Trump’s trade tariffs and Chinese countermeasures led to Beijing’s search for alternative suppliers of agricultural products such as soy. As a result, China might begin importing more soy from Russia and investing in soybean production in the Russian Far East. Many more examples exist.
Thus, Russia and China would have continued improving cooperation even in the absence of outside pressure, but the US sanctions and tariffs are actually serving to accelerate and deepen their rapprochement.

Milanović

Hayekian communism


You think it is a contradiction in terms, a paradox. But you are wrong: we are used to think in pure categories while life is much more complex; and paradoxes do exist in real life. China is indeed a country of Hayekian communism.

Nowhere is, I think, wealth and material success more openly celebrated than in China. Perhaps it was stimulated by the 40^th anniversary of the opening up which is this year, but more fundamentally, I think, it is stimulated by the most successful economic development in history.  Rich entrepreneurs are celebrated in newspapers, television, conferences. Their wealth and rags-to-riches stories are held as examples for all. Ayn Rand would feel at home in this environment. So would Hayek: an incredible amount of energy and discovery was unleashed by the changes that transformed lives of 1.4 billion people, twice as many as the combined populations of the “old” EU-15 and the United States. People discovered economic information that was inaccessible or unknown before, organized in a Schumpeterian fashion new combinations of capital and labor, and created wealth on an almost unimaginable scale (certainly, unimaginable for anyone who looked at China in 1978). 

At a large banquet in Beijing, we were presented first-hand stories of five Chinese capitalists who started from zero (zilch! nada! ) in the 1980s, and became dollar billionaires today. One spent years in countryside during the Cultural Revolution, another was put in prison for seven years for “speculation”, the third made his “apprentissage” of capitalism, as he candidly said, by cheating people in East Asia (“afterwards I learned that if I really wanted to become rich, I should not cheat; cheating is for losers”). Hayek would have listened to these stories, probably transfixed.  And what news would he have loved better than to read in today’s Financial Times that the Marxist society at the Peking University was disbanded because of its support of striking workers in the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen.

But there is one thing where Hayek went wrong. These incredible personal (and societal) successes were achieved under the rule of a single party, Communist Party of China. Celebration of wealth comes naturally to Marxists. Development, widespread education, gender equality, urbanization, and indeed faster growth than under capitalism, were the rationale, and sources of legitimacy, of communist revolutions as they took place in the less developed world. Lenin said so; Trotsky confirmed it when he canvassed for large-scale industrialization; Stalin implemented it: “We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this difference in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed”.

I remember, as a precocious high-school student in Yugoslavia, how I scanned the newspapers for the indicators of industrial growth. Since Yugoslavia was then among the fastest growing economies in the world, I was deeply disappointed when the monthly growth rate (annualized) would fall below ten percent. I thought ten percent was the normal growth rate of communist economies: why would you care to become communist if you would not grow faster than under capitalism?

So the celebration of growth—new roads, new super fast trains, new housing complexes, new well-lit avenues and orderly schools—comes naturally to communists. Not any less than to Hayekian entrepreneurs. (As an exercise in this, read Neruda’s beautiful memoirs Confeso Que He Vivido where he exudes enormous pleasure at seeing Soviet-built dams.) The difference though is that the Hayekinans celebrate private success which also helps society move forward; in communism, success too was supposed to be socialized.

But this did not happen. Collectivist efforts worked for a decade or two but eventually growth fizzled out and the efforts flagged. Cynicism reigned supreme. It was left to China and to Deng Xiaoping to stumble (in the immortal phrase of Adam Ferguson) on a combination where the rule of the communist party would be maintained but full freedom of action, and social encomium, would be given to individual capitalists. They would work, become rich, enrich many others in the process, but the reins of political power would firmly remain in the hands of the communist party. Capitalists will provide the engine and the fuel, but the party will hold the steering wheel.

Would things be ever better if the political power too was in the hands of capitalists? This is doubtful. They might have used it to recreate the Nanjing government of the 1930s, venal, weak and incompetent. They would not work hard but would use political power to maintain their economic privileges. It is one of the key problems of US capitalism today that the rich increasingly control the political process and thus skew economic incentives away from production and competition into creation and preservation of monopolies. Much worse would likely have happened in China. It is precisely because the political sphere was largely insulated from the economic sphere that capitalists could be safely kept busy with production, and at arm’s length (as far as possible because the party is exposed to growing corruption) from the politics.

How did China stumble on this combination? There may be many reasons including millennial tradition of being run by imperial bureaucracies, the historical alliance --even if it got unraveled—between the Communist patty and Sun Yat-sen’s KMT (an alliance the like of which never existed elsewhere in the communist world)—but one cannot but ask oneself, could it have happened elsewhere too? Perhaps. Lenin’s New Economic Policy was not much different from Chinese policies of the 1980s. But Lenin saw NEP as a temporary concession to capitalists—because he believed that socialism was more progressive and thus “scientifically” generated higher growth. Perhaps it is only the failures of the Great Leap Forward and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution that chastened Chinese leadership and convinced Deng and others that private initiative was more “progressive” than social planning and state-owned enterprises. Lenin could not have seen that. It was too early.

I also wondered what Stalin would have made of China. He probably would have been glad that his name is still enshrined in the official pantheon. (In a large bookstore in downtown Beijing, the first row of books are translations of Marxist classics: Marx himself, Engels, Lenin..and Stalin. Very few people look at them. The next rows that display books on wealth management, finance economics, stock market investments etc. are much more popular.) Stalin would have been impressed by Chinese growth; by the extensive power of the state and the country (for sure, no longer a country to which he could send his advisors to help it technologically), by the party’s ability to control in a very sophisticated and unobtrusive manner the population.

Stalin would have loved economic success and the military power that comes with it, but would have probably been shocked by private wealth. It is hard seeing him coexist with Jack Ma. Hayek’s reaction would have been the opposite: he would have been delighted that his claims about the spontaneous market order have been vindicated in a most emphatic fashion, but would have failed to understand that this was possible only under the rule of a communist party.

No one would have been left indifferent by the most successful economic story ever. And no one would have fully understood it.


http://glineq.blogspot.com/2018/09/hayekian-communism.html

Kuva se...

U.S. approval of $330 million military sale to Taiwan draws China's ire

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-military/u-s-approval-of-330-million-military-sale-to-taiwan-draws-chinas-ire-idUSKCN1M42J9

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were a serious breech of international law and harmed Chinese sovereignty and security interests.
China strongly opposes the planned arms sales and has already lodged “stern representations” with the United States, he told a daily news briefing in Beijing.

China urges the United States to withdraw the planned sale and stop military contacts with Taiwan, to avoid serious harm to both Sino-U.S. cooperation in major areas, and peace and stability in the Taiwan strait, Geng added.
China’s Defense Ministry, in a separate statement, also condemned the planned sale, adding that the Chinese military had a “firm and unshakable” resolve to protect the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
China is deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions toward Taiwan, which is equipped with mostly U.S.-made weaponry and wants Washington to sell it more advanced equipment, including new fighter jets.

China has never renounced the use of force to bring what it sees as a wayward province under its control.
Chinese President Xi Jinping told U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis during a visit to Beijing in June that Beijing was committed to peace, but could not give up “even one inch” of territory that the country’s ancestors had left behind.

Uh! Kako se tek kuvalo prosle godine, kada su SAD prodale Tajvanu naoruzanje vredno 1,4 milijarde dolara... A tek za vreme dva Obamina manadata, gde su prodali oruzja za 14-15 milijardi... A tek za vreme W. Busha, 20-tak milijardi... I jos toliko dok je Klinton bio predsednik... Napeto je, da ne moze biti napetije...

"Ма само нека купују... ионако ће то једног дана све бити наше"