Can't Get You of My Head

AC There’s a brilliant parody of my voice online. Have you heard it?

DM No, but does it say: “But in fact the very opposite happened.”?

AC Exactly.

Erős Pista wrote:Nije to poenta za Limonova, već da moć (u vidu Putina) lako preuzima tu vrstu ikonografije i ideološke krinke.

Istu priču imaš sa Bregzitom, Trampom i onim kineskim gradonačelnikom što kao vraća Maovu revoluciju, pa ga na kraju skembaju za ubistvo i korupciju.

1. јер Путин никада није преузео конкретно Лимоновљеву симболику нити ће то икада урадити, јер то не функционише. Путинову иконографију је створио Сурков. 
   
2. јер то јелте наратор експлицитно каже да је поента.
   

Daï Djakman Faré wrote:meni je nejasno kako ga nisu kenslovali dosad za onaj segment sa edickinim pucanjem na sarajevo.

to je mozda najblagonaklonije citanje edicke limonova koje sam cuo u zivotu. edicka je pucao u ljude u sarajevu da bi poverovao u nesto. pucnji su bukvalno bili nekakav zalog za verovanje u nesto sto nije nihilzam stabilitokratije i globalnog finansijskog kapitala (mozda slaboumno i antihumanisticki ali opet sa necim vrlo humanim kao idejom vodiljom).

jedno je kada smontiras pucanje na sarajevo u kontekstu cetnickog divljanja, a potpuno drugo znacenje dobijas kad ga smonitras posle snimaka jelcinove vojske kako puca na ruski parlament (koje se hronoloski desava godinu dana posle). meni je to bilo jako kontraverzno to put it mildly.

Erős Pista wrote:Poenta je ovo - kao i Tupak Šakur, i Limonov zapravo prenosi kolektivizam i političku borbu u kulturu, u neki set simbola. A to se lako preuzima od strane moći.

Mór Thököly wrote:Posebno sto ono u Bosni nije imalo blage veze sa opozicijom individualizam-kolektivizam. Dokle ce ljudi lupetati nije mi jasno.

Mór Thököly wrote:Posebno sto ono u Bosni nije imalo blage veze sa opozicijom individualizam-kolektivizam. Dokle ce ljudi lupetati nije mi jasno.

Erős Pista wrote:Ne znam šta mi sad objašnjavaš. Rekao si da se Limonovljeve ideje nisu primile jer su potrošene, i to si nazvao parafrazom. Ja sam razumeo da je to parafraza Kertisovih teza iz dokumentarca, i da kao takva ne odgovara istini - u izvesnom smislu, upravo suprotno je slučaj, ideje i simboli su prošli bolje od svakog očekivanja, samo ne u Limonovljevu korist, niti pak u smeru bilo kakve transformacije društva, već kao nova krinka Putinovog režima. To je Kertisova teza.

My thesis is a simple one.  We are caught between an old world which is decreasingly able to sustain us intellectually and spiritually, maybe even materially, and a new world that has not yet been born.  Given the character of the forces of change, we may be stuck for decades in this ungainly posture.  You who are young today may not live to see its resolution.Famous landmarks of the old regime, like the daily newspaper and the political party, have begun to disintegrate under the pressure of this slow-motion collision.  Many features we prized about the old world are also threatened:  for example, liberal democracy and economic stability.  Some of them will emerge permanently distorted by the stress.  Others will just disappear.   Many attributes of the new dispensation, like a vastly larger sphere for public discussion, may also warp or break from the immoveable resistance of the established order.
Each side in the struggle has a standard-bearer:  authority for the old industrial scheme that has dominated globally for a century and a half, the public for the uncertain dispensation striving to become manifest.  The two protagonists share little in common, other than humanity – and each probably doubts the humanity of the other.  They have arrayed themselves in contrary modes of organization which require mutually hostile ideals of right behavior.  The conflict is so asymmetrical that it seems impossible for the two sides actually to engage.  But they do engage, and the battlefield is everywhere. Irreconcilable differences between old and new can be found in something as seemingly trivial as naming conventions.  The industrial age insisted on portentous-sounding names of great seriousness and formality, to validate the organizations which spoke with the voice of authority:  “Bank of America,” “National Broadcasting Corporation,” “New York Times.”  Each of these three names stood for a professional hierarchy which claimed a monopoly of specialized knowledge.  They symbolized a starched-collar kind of mastery, and they meant to impress.  Even the lowest-ranking person in these organizations, the names implied, had risen far above the masses.
The digital age loves self-mocking names, which are a way to puncture the formal stiffness of the established order:  “Yahoo,” “Google,” “Twitter,” “reddit,” “Flickr,” “Photobucket,” “Bitcoin.”  Without having asked the people in question, I feel reasonably sure that the founders of Google never contemplated naming their company “National Search Engine Corporation” and Mark Zuckerman of Facebook never felt tempted by “Social Connections Center of America.”  It wasn’t the style.