Home
by Guest Fri Jun 08, 2018 10:37 pmdođem ti veliko vopi
EU - what's next?
- Guest
Anduril wrote:Gargantua wrote:Pa u (skoro) svim varijacijama igre "bankar i frends" dobijaju.
Dobijaju (relativno) kad država štedi, dobijaju kad država troši, dobijaju kad ECB upumpava lovu jer skaču aktive i mala periferna tržišta roba više nego što skače BDP ili "opšte" dobro, dobijaju (relativno) kad je inflacija jer ima više prostora da izdrži gubitke od običnog čoveka...
Donji čovek uvek najebe; on izgleda mora da voli ovog gornjeg u nadi da će se nešto i njemu preliti ili da će sistem biti "pošten" prema njemu, pa ta statika izgleda smisleno ako živiš na bogatom severu, pa nema veze dal rasteš 1 ili 3%, al je zajebano kad živiš za 500-1000 evra i u suštini si se pozdravio za pristojnom životom za ceo svoj vek.
Čuvaj "budžet", čuvaj "stabilnost" (ako ti je stabilno loše, jbg, šta da se radi), čuvaj bogataša jer tako "čuvaš sebe", čuvaj se od obećanja "šarlatana" i "populista", boj se ovna boj se govna.
Msm, na kraju, bankarima i frendovima se imovina uvek može uzeti a oni zatrpati u neki jendek. Kao deo odisaja, ne kao deo "pametne" ekonomije jer u nekom trenutku ta opcija biva prevaziđena.
Postoje i win-win situacije - balansirani budzet, umereni dugovi, kamata tece ali ne katastrofalno u slucaju visih kamata pa drzava ne mora da reze sve zivo ili da stampa para i tako pravi balone ili dize inflaciju. Vec sada se stampa da bi se platili italijanski dugovi, tj. kupuju obveznice...
Postoje, naravno.
Nekome ko nema pristojnu platu, ili oseća da nema perspektivu, argument o budžetu i kamatama i obveznicama prestaje da ima ikakvog značaja.
Hoće svoj deo, budući da je građanin političke zajednice a ne samo "učesnik na tržištu", i taj pritisak politika mora da sračuna, jer politika je veća od ekonomije. Plus je politička zajednica razvodnjena kroz x drugih savremenih tema, tenzija i problema.
Msm, liberalizam koji se brani na koti "ali pogledajte kamatne stope i budžetski deficit" nema ni promil šansi za preživljavanje narednih decenija. Uopšte nije bitno da li je na toj temi u pravu ili ne.
- Posts : 713
Join date : 2015-08-30
Mr. Moonlight wrote:ako ja tebi pozajmim 50 hiljada, a posle ti meni 30 hiljada to ne znači da imamo 80 hiljada
jebo te kurac u dupe
i ne citiraj morona viša, taman sam se rešio bede
disident wrote:Zaboravio da je i on na shit listi uz uskoka. Nece se ponoviti
Mr. Moonlight wrote:dođem ti veliko vopi
Opet ova dva - prostakluk uz glupost. Cesto ide zajedno i jos se vole.
Gargantua wrote:Anduril wrote:
Postoje i win-win situacije - balansirani budzet, umereni dugovi, kamata tece ali ne katastrofalno u slucaju visih kamata pa drzava ne mora da reze sve zivo ili da stampa para i tako pravi balone ili dize inflaciju. Vec sada se stampa da bi se platili italijanski dugovi, tj. kupuju obveznice...
Postoje, naravno.
Nekome ko nema pristojnu platu, ili oseća da nema perspektivu, argument o budžetu i kamatama i obveznicama prestaje da ima ikakvog značaja.
Hoće svoj deo, budući da je građanin političke zajednice a ne samo "učesnik na tržištu", i taj pritisak politika mora da sračuna, jer politika je veća od ekonomije. Plus je politička zajednica razvodnjena kroz x drugih savremenih tema, tenzija i problema.
Msm, liberalizam koji se brani na koti "ali pogledajte kamatne stope i budžetski deficit" nema ni promil šansi za preživljavanje narednih decenija. Uopšte nije bitno da li je na toj temi u pravu ili ne.
Argument o kamatama i inflaciji itekako radi tamo gde ljudi nesto zaradjuju u moneti koja vredi i ne zele da izgube jos vise ili svoju ustedjevinu. Zato u Nemackoj, Holandiji ili Finskoj nece da cuju za ovu francusko-italijansku frank/lira stajl budzet i ekonomiju ili jos gore Grcku - posto to nikad nije funkcionisalo bolje od ovog drugog u praksi.
No, slazem se da za italijansku, spansku, francusku ili grcku javnost mora takodje da postoji mnogo prizemnija i pozitivnija ordoliberalna politicka poruka od proste stednje - a ja mislim da su to porezi i karteli, tj. seca raznih poreskih olaksica, izbegavanja poreza, kartelskih beneficija i neefikasne birokratije.
Technokrate to nazivaju strukturnim reformama ali cak i 5 zvedica to mnogo bolje komuniciraju o cemu se zapravo radi.
Para ima ali ih elite kradu i torpediraju vise nego drugde. Pravi problem sa tom strategijom je sto ce se te elite onda okrenuti nacionalizmu da zamaskiraju kradju i Grcka je tu bila odlican primer.
Paralelni federalni nivo EU vlasti bi tu mogao da pomogne ako bi uspeli postepeno da izgrade efikasan i fer nacin oporezivanja i administracije slican severu Evrope.
- Guest
U celoj EZ ljudi zarađuju u evrima tj u moneti koja nešto vredi, ne znam kako tu odskaču pare koje zarade Holanđani, Nemci i Finci u odnosu na Grke, Italijane ili Francuze, mada vidim da su oni, iz tvog ugla, isuviše "prizemni" za "prefinjene" argumente.
Svođenje razlike u ekonomskim performansama na nekakav moral i korupciju je potpuno iščašeno.
To je politika, asimetrični uticaj monetarne unije na razne ekonomske sektore, parcijalno poštovanje mastrihtskih pravila itd itd itd.
Svođenje razlike u ekonomskim performansama na nekakav moral i korupciju je potpuno iščašeno.
To je politika, asimetrični uticaj monetarne unije na razne ekonomske sektore, parcijalno poštovanje mastrihtskih pravila itd itd itd.
- Posts : 15552
Join date : 2016-03-28
Ja sam se nesto istripovao da u prvom delu doba revolucije ima par odlicnih pasusa posvecenih ovom korupcija,moral i onom kako sistem funkcionise pitanjuGargantua wrote:U celoj EZ ljudi zarađuju u evrima tj u moneti koja nešto vredi, ne znam kako tu odskaču pare koje zarade Holanđani, Nemci i Finci u odnosu na Grke, Italijane ili Francuze, mada vidim da su oni, iz tvog ugla, isuviše "prizemni" za "prefinjene" argumente.
Svođenje razlike u ekonomskim performansama na nekakav moral i korupciju je potpuno iščašeno.
To je politika, asimetrični uticaj monetarne unije na razne ekonomske sektore, parcijalno poštovanje mastrihtskih pravila itd itd itd.
Btw jos urnebesnije je ovo o "elitama" i elitama
_____
Što se ostaloga tiče, smatram da Zapad treba razoriti
Jedini proleter Burundija
Pristalica krvne osvete
- Posts : 713
Join date : 2015-08-30
Gargantua wrote:U celoj EZ ljudi zarađuju u evrima tj u moneti koja nešto vredi, ne znam kako tu odskaču pare koje zarade Holanđani, Nemci i Finci u odnosu na Grke, Italijane ili Francuze, mada vidim da su oni, iz tvog ugla, isuviše "prizemni" za "prefinjene" argumente.
Svođenje razlike u ekonomskim performansama na nekakav moral i korupciju je potpuno iščašeno.
To je politika, asimetrični uticaj monetarne unije na razne ekonomske sektore, parcijalno poštovanje mastrihtskih pravila itd itd itd.
O potrebi za "prizemnim" ordoliberalnim argumentima si pitao ti - vecina Italijana ili Grka i dalje ne bi da menja Evro za liru ili drahmu, tako da taj ordoliberalni argument tvrde valute itekako funkcionise.
Drugo, uzroci za razlike u ekonomskim performansama nisu moralni nego merljive cinjenice: recimo koliko vremena treba u Italiji za sudsku naplatu ili koja je efikasnost naplate poreza.
Za takvim sudstvom i administracijom nema sanse da podignes ekonomiju na visi nivo, niti mozes da finansiras dobar socijalni servis.
Plus, to nije nikakav specijalni italijanski ili grcki fenomen - ima toga i u Nemackoj, uzmi Berlin ili Bremen na primer koji su zaduzeni kao italija po glavi stanovnika dok Bavarska ili Baden W skoro da nemaju dugova.
No, za takve stvari oni imaju na federalnom nivou mehanizme koji pomazu slabijim clanicama federacije ali uz konstantan politicki pritisak da se uzroci neravnomernog zaduzivanja iskontrolisu.
To tako ide u funkcionalnim federacijama - Svajcarska je drugi primer bez obzira na razlicite uticaje monete na razlicite sektore privrede u kantonima. Isto i u Americi - bankrot u Kaliforniji ili Detroitu u Teksasu sigurno nece da plate.
U UK (osim pomalo Skotske) ili u Francuskoj takve federalne sisteme nemaju zbog mnogo veceg nivoa centralizacije.
- Posts : 5594
Join date : 2016-01-26
Ali eto Vučić jaše na toj priči pa prolazi nekakoGargantua wrote:
Postoje, naravno.
Nekome ko nema pristojnu platu, ili oseća da nema perspektivu, argument o budžetu i kamatama i obveznicama prestaje da ima ikakvog značaja.
Hoće svoj deo, budući da je građanin političke zajednice a ne samo "učesnik na tržištu", i taj pritisak politika mora da sračuna, jer politika je veća od ekonomije. Plus je politička zajednica razvodnjena kroz x drugih savremenih tema, tenzija i problema.
Msm, liberalizam koji se brani na koti "ali pogledajte kamatne stope i budžetski deficit" nema ni promil šansi za preživljavanje narednih decenija. Uopšte nije bitno da li je na toj temi u pravu ili ne.
Ljudi žive isto ili gore, bez perspektive, bez čak ni ventila u vidu doznaka iz EU.
Tamo gde ordoliberalni poredak obezbeđuje prosperitet i ideološku podlogu, tamo ga i štite. Tamo gde je propast, traže nešto drugo (Španija i Grčka).
Pitanje je samo šta kada Španija, Grčka i Italija potpuno počnu da trokiraju, hoće li Nemačka moći da nametne njima svoju stabilokratiju i mere štednje ili će doći do nekakve pobune?
To neki film ili knjiga?disident wrote:
Ja sam se nesto istripovao da u prvom delu doba revolucije ima par odlicnih pasusa posvecenih ovom korupcija,moral i onom kako sistem funkcionise pitanju
Btw jos urnebesnije je ovo o "elitama" i elitama
- Posts : 52531
Join date : 2017-11-16
Utvara wrote:
Ali eto Vučić jaše na toj priči pa prolazi nekako
Uz medije, represivni aparat, totalnu kontrolu tokova novca, sudstva i samih izbora. Inace bi bio na max 35 (sto doduse ne znaci da estremni nacionalisti ne bi bili na jedno 25)
- Posts : 713
Join date : 2015-08-30
Naravno - prica o stednji je sasvim promasena ako ide bez reforme neefikasnog sistema. Ali, isto tako je promaseno ocekivati da ce neko drugi da placa neciji neefikasan sistem.
- Guest
Anduril wrote:...
Drugo, uzroci za razlike u ekonomskim performansama nisu moralni nego merljive cinjenice: recimo koliko vremena treba u Italiji za sudsku naplatu ili koja je efikasnost naplate poreza.
Za takvim sudstvom i administracijom nema sanse da podignes ekonomiju na visi nivo, niti mozes da finansiras dobar socijalni servis.
Plus, to nije nikakav specijalni italijanski ili grcki fenomen - ima toga i u Nemackoj, uzmi Berlin ili Bremen na primer koji su zaduzeni kao italija po glavi stanovnika dok Bavarska ili Baden W skoro da nemaju dugova.
Ti fenomeni ne dobacuju ni do delića odgovora za ekonomsku divergenciju zadnjih 10+ godina. Ne znam zašto insistiraš na tim temama koje nemaju takav uticaj i onda ih uzdižeš na pijedestal. Praktično nema nikakvih mejnstrim (i manje mejnstrim) respektabilnih političko-ekonomskih analiza koje su od tih tema napravile glavno ili važno sredstvo za objašnjavanje različitost ekonomskih uspeha u evrozoni.
Okvir EMU/EZ je različito pao na različite ekonomije, složena sektorska međuzavisnost i različita stanja su različito reagovali. Države su u to ušle sa različitih pozicija.
- Spoiler:
- Npr:
...
Historically, the German export sector was quite small, smaller even than in Italy and France in certain periods (Figure 3). The increase was slow from 1970 to the end of the 1980s but, after a decline caused by German unification, the increase has been significantly steeper from about 1993 onward. The reasons for this sudden (and exceptional) steepening of the export trajectory after the fall of the Berlin Wall are interesting (Scharpf 2017), but need not be explored here. What matters is that, throughout the period from 1970 to 1999, German imports either exceeded exports or rose roughly in step with them. Trade surpluses, if they occurred at all, were short-lived and quite small. The dramatic change came after 1999, when imports fell significantly behind the unchanging rise of exports and when subsequently the gap even widened instead of closing again.
Trade deficits after the early 1970s had been a consequence of rising DM exchange rates in an inflationary international environment (Scharpf 1991).They had dampened the price competitiveness of German exports and increased the price attractiveness of imports (including tourist travel). After the decline of international inflation in the mid-1980s, however, Germany saw a roughly parallel increase of both imports and exports until 1999. With regard to the present problem, Figure 6 thus suggests that the rise of the German trade surplus after 1999 and its persistence should be seen as an effect of the elimination of exchange rate adjustments in the Monetary Union.
Moreover, the figure also seems to suggest that the German trade surplus did not come about by the impact of EMU on German exports.31 In any case, the share of exports in German GDP continued after 1999 to rise on roughly the same trajectory that had steepened in the mid-1990s. But EMU seems to have had a manifest impact on German imports.
The explanation appears to be quite straightforward: Germany had entered the EMU as the “sick man of Europe” in an extended recession with unemployment rising to 11.5 percent in 2005 – and thus with stagnating wages. Moreover, the government reduced unemployment benefits and social spending in order to correct its violation of the Stability Pact’s deficit rule.32 As in all recessions, therefore, domestic demand and hence imports took a plunge, while exports continued to rise as before. Before the EMU, an export–import gap of this magnitude would then have been closed by a significant rise of the nominal exchange rate, which would once again have dampened exports and lowered import prices. But as this correction was no longer available, the gap continued and even widened subsequently. In that sense, the rise and persistence of the German trade surplus since 1999 was and still is a consequence of the Monetary Union.
...
If the structural divergence of Northern and Southern economies had not been ignored in the original design of the Monetary Union, a euro regime with a starting date of 1999 might have been more symmetrical. Instead of budget deficits, it could have taken inflation differentials as its target variable. And as national fiscal and wage policies were the only remaining instruments for the macroeconomic management on the national level, low-inflation member states in a recession like Germany might have been allowed, or even required, to reflate fiscally, whereas high-growth Ireland and Spain would have had to practice fiscal austerity and wage restraint even though their budgets were in surplus. Whether such a differentiating and flexible regime would have been economically and politically sustainable after 1999 is, of course, uncertain. It seems obvious, however, that it could not have been introduced as an immediate response to the crisis of 2010.
...
The EMU had no budget of its own and thus no capacity for countercyclical fiscal intervention. Whereas the ECB’s centralized monetary policy was able to stabilize average inflation rates in the eurozone, its “one-size-fits-all” policy instruments could not respond to structural divergence and the non-synchronized ups and downs and “asymmetric shocks” of the former hard- and soft-currency member economies. Hence, its uniform interest rates were too low for economies with higher rates of growth and inflation and too high for economies in a recession with low rates of inflation – and real interest rates diverged even more. Instead of stabilizing eurozone economies, it deepened the recession of 2002 in low-inflation Germany and fueled credit-financed booms of consumer spending and real-estate bubbles in Greece, Ireland, and Spain.
...
It is also understood that blaming the crisis on the fiscal irresponsibility of debtor governments was, at best, a half-truth
for Greece and totally wrong for Ireland and Spain, where fiscal performance from 1999 to 2008 had been exemplary – and far better than in Germany.
...
http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp16-15.pdf
Anduril wrote:
No, za takve stvari oni imaju na federalnom nivou mehanizme koji pomazu slabijim clanicama federacije ali uz konstantan politicki pritisak da se uzroci neravnomernog zaduzivanja iskontrolisu.
To tako ide u funkcionalnim federacijama - Svajcarska je drugi primer bez obzira na razlicite uticaje monete na razlicite sektore privrede u kantonima. Isto i u Americi - bankrot u Kaliforniji ili Detroitu u Teksasu sigurno nece da plate.
U UK (osim pomalo Skotske) ili u Francuskoj takve federalne sisteme nemaju zbog mnogo veceg nivoa centralizacije.
Pobrojane države su pre svega nacionalne države, a federalizam tj oblik ustrojstva su tek sloj ispod, kardinalno manje važan. EU niti je federacija a niti je, nota bene, nacionalna država.
Nacionalne države, sve i da su federalne, mogu da urade x stvari više nego EU struktura, politički mogu da podnesu ekonomske troškove, kao što su recimo Nemci trpeli trošak prisajedinjavanja DDR, što je bio verovatno i ključni motiv ulaska u reforme pod Šrederom. Problem u nekakvim ekonomskim performansama se (između ostalog) nadoknađuje i emocijama, simbolikom, pozivom na nacionalnu solidarnost, horizontalnu i vertikalnu; to su sve važne teme koje EU nema i praktično neće nikad imati na raspolaganju.
- Posts : 52531
Join date : 2017-11-16
Gargantua wrote:
- Spoiler:
...
Historically, the German export sector was quite small, smaller even than in Italy and France in certain periods (Figure 3). The increase was slow from 1970 to the end of the 1980s but, after a decline caused by German unification, the increase has been significantly steeper from about 1993 onward. The reasons for this sudden (and exceptional) steepening of the export trajectory after the fall of the Berlin Wall are interesting (Scharpf 2017), but need not be explored here. What matters is that, throughout the period from 1970 to 1999, German imports either exceeded exports or rose roughly in step with them. Trade surpluses, if they occurred at all, were short-lived and quite small. The dramatic change came after 1999, when imports fell significantly behind the unchanging rise of exports and when subsequently the gap even widened instead of closing again.
Trade deficits after the early 1970s had been a consequence of rising DM exchange rates in an inflationary international environment (Scharpf 1991).They had dampened the price competitiveness of German exports and increased the price attractiveness of imports (including tourist travel). After the decline of international inflation in the mid-1980s, however, Germany saw a roughly parallel increase of both imports and exports until 1999. With regard to the present problem, Figure 6 thus suggests that the rise of the German trade surplus after 1999 and its persistence should be seen as an effect of the elimination of exchange rate adjustments in the Monetary Union.
Moreover, the figure also seems to suggest that the German trade surplus did not come about by the impact of EMU on German exports.31 In any case, the share of exports in German GDP continued after 1999 to rise on roughly the same trajectory that had steepened in the mid-1990s. But EMU seems to have had a manifest impact on German imports.
The explanation appears to be quite straightforward: Germany had entered the EMU as the “sick man of Europe” in an extended recession with unemployment rising to 11.5 percent in 2005 – and thus with stagnating wages. Moreover, the government reduced unemployment benefits and social spending in order to correct its violation of the Stability Pact’s deficit rule.32 As in all recessions, therefore, domestic demand and hence imports took a plunge, while exports continued to rise as before. Before the EMU, an export–import gap of this magnitude would then have been closed by a significant rise of the nominal exchange rate, which would once again have dampened exports and lowered import prices. But as this correction was no longer available, the gap continued and even widened subsequently. In that sense, the rise and persistence of the German trade surplus since 1999 was and still is a consequence of the Monetary Union.
...
If the structural divergence of Northern and Southern economies had not been ignored in the original design of the Monetary Union, a euro regime with a starting date of 1999 might have been more symmetrical. Instead of budget deficits, it could have taken inflation differentials as its target variable. And as national fiscal and wage policies were the only remaining instruments for the macroeconomic management on the national level, low-inflation member states in a recession like Germany might have been allowed, or even required, to reflate fiscally, whereas high-growth Ireland and Spain would have had to practice fiscal austerity and wage restraint even though their budgets were in surplus. Whether such a differentiating and flexible regime would have been economically and politically sustainable after 1999 is, of course, uncertain. It seems obvious, however, that it could not have been introduced as an immediate response to the crisis of 2010.
...
The EMU had no budget of its own and thus no capacity for countercyclical fiscal intervention. Whereas the ECB’s centralized monetary policy was able to stabilize average inflation rates in the eurozone, its “one-size-fits-all” policy instruments could not respond to structural divergence and the non-synchronized ups and downs and “asymmetric shocks” of the former hard- and soft-currency member economies. Hence, its uniform interest rates were too low for economies with higher rates of growth and inflation and too high for economies in a recession with low rates of inflation – and real interest rates diverged even more. Instead of stabilizing eurozone economies, it deepened the recession of 2002 in low-inflation Germany and fueled credit-financed booms of consumer spending and real-estate bubbles in Greece, Ireland, and Spain.
...
It is also understood that blaming the crisis on the fiscal irresponsibility of debtor governments was, at best, a half-truth
for Greece and totally wrong for Ireland and Spain, where fiscal performance from 1999 to 2008 had been exemplary – and far better than in Germany.
...
http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp16-15.pdf
zakivanje
- Posts : 11623
Join date : 2018-03-03
Age : 36
Location : Hotline Rakovica
https://pescanik.net/prestrojavanje-levice/
Nije još tu, ali naziru se obrisi razuma.
Nije još tu, ali naziru se obrisi razuma.
_____
Sve čega ima na filmu, rekao sam, ima i na Zlatiboru.
~~~~~
Ne dajte da vas prevare! Sačuvajte svoje pojene!
- Posts : 15552
Join date : 2016-03-28
KnjigaUtvara wrote:Ali eto Vučić jaše na toj priči pa prolazi nekakoGargantua wrote:
Postoje, naravno.
Nekome ko nema pristojnu platu, ili oseća da nema perspektivu, argument o budžetu i kamatama i obveznicama prestaje da ima ikakvog značaja.
Hoće svoj deo, budući da je građanin političke zajednice a ne samo "učesnik na tržištu", i taj pritisak politika mora da sračuna, jer politika je veća od ekonomije. Plus je politička zajednica razvodnjena kroz x drugih savremenih tema, tenzija i problema.
Msm, liberalizam koji se brani na koti "ali pogledajte kamatne stope i budžetski deficit" nema ni promil šansi za preživljavanje narednih decenija. Uopšte nije bitno da li je na toj temi u pravu ili ne.
Ljudi žive isto ili gore, bez perspektive, bez čak ni ventila u vidu doznaka iz EU.
Tamo gde ordoliberalni poredak obezbeđuje prosperitet i ideološku podlogu, tamo ga i štite. Tamo gde je propast, traže nešto drugo (Španija i Grčka).
Pitanje je samo šta kada Španija, Grčka i Italija potpuno počnu da trokiraju, hoće li Nemačka moći da nametne njima svoju stabilokratiju i mere štednje ili će doći do nekakve pobune?To neki film ili knjiga?disident wrote:
Ja sam se nesto istripovao da u prvom delu doba revolucije ima par odlicnih pasusa posvecenih ovom korupcija,moral i onom kako sistem funkcionise pitanju
Btw jos urnebesnije je ovo o "elitama" i elitama
_____
Što se ostaloga tiče, smatram da Zapad treba razoriti
Jedini proleter Burundija
Pristalica krvne osvete
- Posts : 22555
Join date : 2014-12-01
Poenta svega sto se desava u svetu je u tome sto ljudi vise nisu blesavi, besvesni, sto imaju sredstva komuniciranja i sto ne mogu vise da im se prodaju muda za bubrege i okrivljuju ovi ili oni. Vide da se negde zivi mnogo lepo, da neki imaju mnogo stosta, da u svakoj generaciji ima 1% onih koji ubiraju 90% benefita i tako iz generacije u generaciju. Pa sad, kod jednih je odgovor na to da se masovno presele (Arapi), kod drugih da glasaju za populiste, kod trecih da se okrecu Sangajskoj organizaciji. Plus sto imamo objektivnu situaciju da su jedine zemlje u kojima standard za najveci broj stanovnika visestruko raste upravo te mrske Kina i Rusija. Naravno, pocetni stadijum je mnogo nizi, ali u principu, toeto. I sada kada pokusavas da svom stanovnistvu prodas ciglu o kamatama i obveznicama, budi srecan ako sve sto iz toga ispadne bude da izglasaju Bernija i Dzeremija.
- Posts : 713
Join date : 2015-08-30
Gargantua wrote:Anduril wrote:...
Drugo, uzroci za razlike u ekonomskim performansama nisu moralni nego merljive cinjenice: recimo koliko vremena treba u Italiji za sudsku naplatu ili koja je efikasnost naplate poreza.
Za takvim sudstvom i administracijom nema sanse da podignes ekonomiju na visi nivo, niti mozes da finansiras dobar socijalni servis.
Plus, to nije nikakav specijalni italijanski ili grcki fenomen - ima toga i u Nemackoj, uzmi Berlin ili Bremen na primer koji su zaduzeni kao italija po glavi stanovnika dok Bavarska ili Baden W skoro da nemaju dugova.
Ti fenomeni ne dobacuju ni do delića odgovora za ekonomsku divergenciju zadnjih 10+ godina. Ne znam zašto insistiraš na tim temama koje nemaju takav uticaj i onda ih uzdižeš na pijedestal. Praktično nema nikakvih mejnstrim (i manje mejnstrim) respektabilnih političko-ekonomskih analiza koje su od tih tema napravile glavno ili važno sredstvo za objašnjavanje različitost ekonomskih uspeha u evrozoni.
Okvir EMU/EZ je različito pao na različite ekonomije, složena sektorska međuzavisnost i različita stanja su različito reagovali. Države su u to ušle sa različitih pozicija.
- Spoiler:
...
Historically, the German export sector was quite small, smaller even than in Italy and France in certain periods (Figure 3). The increase was slow from 1970 to the end of the 1980s but, after a decline caused by German unification, the increase has been significantly steeper from about 1993 onward. The reasons for this sudden (and exceptional) steepening of the export trajectory after the fall of the Berlin Wall are interesting (Scharpf 2017), but need not be explored here. What matters is that, throughout the period from 1970 to 1999, German imports either exceeded exports or rose roughly in step with them. Trade surpluses, if they occurred at all, were short-lived and quite small. The dramatic change came after 1999, when imports fell significantly behind the unchanging rise of exports and when subsequently the gap even widened instead of closing again.
Trade deficits after the early 1970s had been a consequence of rising DM exchange rates in an inflationary international environment (Scharpf 1991).They had dampened the price competitiveness of German exports and increased the price attractiveness of imports (including tourist travel). After the decline of international inflation in the mid-1980s, however, Germany saw a roughly parallel increase of both imports and exports until 1999. With regard to the present problem, Figure 6 thus suggests that the rise of the German trade surplus after 1999 and its persistence should be seen as an effect of the elimination of exchange rate adjustments in the Monetary Union.
Moreover, the figure also seems to suggest that the German trade surplus did not come about by the impact of EMU on German exports.31 In any case, the share of exports in German GDP continued after 1999 to rise on roughly the same trajectory that had steepened in the mid-1990s. But EMU seems to have had a manifest impact on German imports.
The explanation appears to be quite straightforward: Germany had entered the EMU as the “sick man of Europe” in an extended recession with unemployment rising to 11.5 percent in 2005 – and thus with stagnating wages. Moreover, the government reduced unemployment benefits and social spending in order to correct its violation of the Stability Pact’s deficit rule.32 As in all recessions, therefore, domestic demand and hence imports took a plunge, while exports continued to rise as before. Before the EMU, an export–import gap of this magnitude would then have been closed by a significant rise of the nominal exchange rate, which would once again have dampened exports and lowered import prices. But as this correction was no longer available, the gap continued and even widened subsequently. In that sense, the rise and persistence of the German trade surplus since 1999 was and still is a consequence of the Monetary Union.
...
If the structural divergence of Northern and Southern economies had not been ignored in the original design of the Monetary Union, a euro regime with a starting date of 1999 might have been more symmetrical. Instead of budget deficits, it could have taken inflation differentials as its target variable. And as national fiscal and wage policies were the only remaining instruments for the macroeconomic management on the national level, low-inflation member states in a recession like Germany might have been allowed, or even required, to reflate fiscally, whereas high-growth Ireland and Spain would have had to practice fiscal austerity and wage restraint even though their budgets were in surplus. Whether such a differentiating and flexible regime would have been economically and politically sustainable after 1999 is, of course, uncertain. It seems obvious, however, that it could not have been introduced as an immediate response to the crisis of 2010.
...
The EMU had no budget of its own and thus no capacity for countercyclical fiscal intervention. Whereas the ECB’s centralized monetary policy was able to stabilize average inflation rates in the eurozone, its “one-size-fits-all” policy instruments could not respond to structural divergence and the non-synchronized ups and downs and “asymmetric shocks” of the former hard- and soft-currency member economies. Hence, its uniform interest rates were too low for economies with higher rates of growth and inflation and too high for economies in a recession with low rates of inflation – and real interest rates diverged even more. Instead of stabilizing eurozone economies, it deepened the recession of 2002 in low-inflation Germany and fueled credit-financed booms of consumer spending and real-estate bubbles in Greece, Ireland, and Spain.
...
It is also understood that blaming the crisis on the fiscal irresponsibility of debtor governments was, at best, a half-truth
for Greece and totally wrong for Ireland and Spain, where fiscal performance from 1999 to 2008 had been exemplary – and far better than in Germany.
...
http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp16-15.pdfAnduril wrote:
No, za takve stvari oni imaju na federalnom nivou mehanizme koji pomazu slabijim clanicama federacije ali uz konstantan politicki pritisak da se uzroci neravnomernog zaduzivanja iskontrolisu.
To tako ide u funkcionalnim federacijama - Svajcarska je drugi primer bez obzira na razlicite uticaje monete na razlicite sektore privrede u kantonima. Isto i u Americi - bankrot u Kaliforniji ili Detroitu u Teksasu sigurno nece da plate.
U UK (osim pomalo Skotske) ili u Francuskoj takve federalne sisteme nemaju zbog mnogo veceg nivoa centralizacije.
Pobrojane države su pre svega nacionalne države, a federalizam tj oblik ustrojstva su tek sloj ispod, kardinalno manje važan. EU niti je federacija a niti je, nota bene, nacionalna država.
Nacionalne države, sve i da su federalne, mogu da urade x stvari više nego EU struktura, politički mogu da podnesu ekonomske troškove, kao što su recimo Nemci trpeli trošak prisajedinjavanja DDR, što je bio verovatno i ključni motiv ulaska u reforme pod Šrederom. Problem u nekakvim ekonomskim performansama se (između ostalog) nadoknađuje i emocijama, simbolikom, pozivom na nacionalnu solidarnost, horizontalnu i vertikalnu; to su sve važne teme koje EU nema i praktično neće nikad imati na raspolaganju.
1. Ovaj, skoro svaka ozbiljnija analiza italijanske ekonomije poslednjih godina i zasto zaostaje za ne samo nemackom nego i drugima kao glavne argumente ima strukturne probleme uz poor governance. Evro, kao glavni razlog se retko spominje medju ekonomistima - to je vise nesto sto je gurao Berluskoni.
- https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/09/13/why-italys-troubled-economy-is-returning-to-form
- http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/06/03/italys-economic-problems-are-not-caused-by-the-euro-but-by-the-countrys-chaotic-political-system/It repeatedly grew more slowly than other European economies in the good times and shrank faster in the bad ones. The financial and euro crises of 2008-11 made things a lot worse. But the underlying problems, which include low productivity, too few big corporations, sky-high public debt, a fragmented banking system, limited competition, slow civil justice and underfunded, underperforming universities, were all handicaps before.
Ovo je od autora koji je u drugim postovima itekako kritican prema Evru, ali strukturni problemi i italijanska politika su mnogo veci faktor za njega.Clearly, the euro has more than one problem, but these issues have been presented incorrectly in the Italian debate. In reality the solution is not ‘less Europe’, but more Europe. Monetary policy has become integrated, but local governments still compete over fiscal policy. The result is that countries across the Eurozone possess different kinds of policies, from social security to commercial laws. The fact that the European market is not complete is what disadvantages Italian firms.
High levels of corruption, criminality, and inefficiencies in the country’s bureaucratic and banking systems are additional problems in Italy. None of these problems will be solved by exiting the euro and in many ways leaving the single currency could achieve the opposite result. If Italian politicians again have the capacity to determine both fiscal and monetary policy why should we expect a different situation from that which occurred in the 1980s, where policies were regularly set with the aim of securing votes rather than solving existing problems?
Contrary to public opinion, Italy is not respecting important European legislation in the areas of competition and anti-corruption, among others. The reasons for this are clear: the Italian system is not competitive internally, with banks and firms closely connected to each other, and politics having to take into account the opinion of the strongest voting blocks. The sale of the ‘old’ Alitalia airline in 2008 is a prominent example, where the Italian government split the company into two parts and sold the profitable section to a group of Italian investors, at great cost to taxpayers, under the guise of preventing it becoming French property.
Onda dalje imas Daniela Grosa, koji je prilicno upucen u temu:
- https://www.ceps.eu/publications/who-lost-italy
Populist politicians charge that the rules of the Growth and Stability Pact do not allow them to stimulate demand and employment. And many economists would agree that the ‘austerity’ imposed on crisis countries in the past aggravated the recession. But this does not add up to a convincing argument that euro area membership was somehow responsible for Italy’s economic underperformance.Spain, Portugal and Ireland, which also had to reduce their deficits in trying times, are recovering much more strongly than Italy. Moreover, over the last few years, Italy has been granted a number of exceptions from the fiscal rules, allowing it to actually slightly increase the deficit, if one calculates the impact of the economic cycle. In almost every one of the last 20 years, Italy has grown less than the rest of the euro area while being allowed to run a fiscal deficit which almost every year was higher than in other member states (see Figures 1 and 2 below.) Thus, one cannot argue that Italy is still growing much less than the rest of Europe because the country is not allowed to run even larger deficits.
Ovo sledece je mozda i najdetaljnija od analiza - opet dobar poznavalac lokalnih prilika a ne neki Nemac.
- http://bruegel.org/2017/07/italian-economic-growth-and-the-euro/
The conclusion that Italian stagnation is not caused by the Euro is reached on the basis of the following nine points:
- Italy has hardly grown over the last two decades,
- The responsibility of the Euro in this poor performance is hard to reconcile with the dearth of economic models in which monetary factors determine long-term stagnation,
- The time pattern of the Italian growth slowdown does not fit well with a responsibility for the Euro,
- The improvement of unemployment, in Italy but also in other euro-area countries, in the first years of the single currency also does not fit well with a responsibility of the Euro,
- The experience of Italy is worse than that of the other euro-area countries, in particular Spain, which belongs, like Italy, to the euro-periphery, thus shedding further doubts on the Euro as cause of the stagnation,
- The introduction of the Euro has led to lower real interest rates, which likely had, in Italy and Spain, a negative effect on productivity growth in the first years of the single currency,
- But it is not clear that this negative effect on productivity can be extended to real growth,
- The record of Italy in managing its exchange rate has been historically pretty poor and the loss of the ability to devalue the currency is more a benefit than a cost,
- There is a host of structural reasons that can explain the long-term poor growth performance of Italy, without the need to look for responsibility in the Euro.
Za ovaj drugi deo, ne znam zasto tekst o Nemackoj kada to nije glavna tema niti nemacki uspeh objasnjava problem u Italiji.
Pored Nemacke tu je citav niz razlicitih ekonomija unutar Evra koje su rasle i brze ili na slicnom nivou.
Meni to vise lici na opsednutost monetarista i makroekonomista koja moze sve nekako objasni i resi centralnim merama iako su u proslosti zakazali onoliko puta.
Kad vidim kakvu probblematicnu metodologiju koriste i kako i dalje izvode samouverene zakljucke u zavisnosti kojoj ideologiji pripadaju - to mi i dalje lici na pseudo-science.
Od kada je uveden Evro, nije se promenila samo situacija u Nemackoj nego drasticno na citavoj planeti.
Ne konkurise Italija samo sa Nemackom nego sa globalizacijom i konkurencijom kakvu ranije nisu imali i to ne samo na polju ekonomije nego upravo i na polju efikasnosti administracije koja je kljuc i za rast ekonomije. Ovde recimo imas odlican tekst o Kini i kako su reforme administracije zapravo bile kljucan faktor da se dostigne ovaj nivo rasta - to je velika pouka ne samo za Italiju nego citavu EU i da mora da se reformise:
- Spoiler:
- Monday, April 16, 2018 - 12:00am
Autocracy With Chinese Characteristics
Beijing's Behind-the-Scenes Reforms
Yuen Yuen Ang
YUEN YUEN ANG is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and the author of How China Escaped the Poverty Trap.
Sooner or later this economy will slow,” the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declared of China [1] in 1998. He continued: “That’s when China will need a government that is legitimate. . . . When China’s 900 million villagers get phones, and start calling each other, this will inevitably become a more open country.” At the time, just a few years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Friedman’s certainty was broadly shared. China’s economic ascent under authoritarian rule could not last; eventually, and inescapably, further economic development would bring about democratization.
Twenty years after Friedman’s prophecy, China has morphed into the world’s second-largest economy. Growth has slowed, but only because it leveled off when China reached middle-income status (not, as Friedman worried, because of a lack of “real regulatory systems”). Communications technology rapidly spread—today, 600 million Chinese citizens own smartphones and 750 million use the Internet—but the much-anticipated tsunami of political liberalization has not arrived [2]. If anything, under the current regime of President Xi Jinping, the Chinese government appears more authoritarian, not less.
Most Western observers have long believed that democracy and capitalism go hand in hand, that economic liberalization both requires and propels political liberalization. China’s apparent defiance of this logic has led to two opposite conclusions. One camp insists that China represents a temporary aberration and that liberaliza [3]tion will come [3] soon. But this is mostly speculation; these analysts have been incorrectly predicting the imminent collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for decades. The other camp sees China’s success as proof that autocracies are just as good as democracies at promoting growth—if not better. As Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad put it in 1992, “authoritarian stability” has enabled prosperity, whereas democracy has brought “chaos and increased misery.” But not all autocracies deliver economic success. In fact, some are utterly disastrous, including China under Mao.
Both of these explanations overlook a crucial reality: since opening its markets in 1978, China has in fact pursued significant political reforms [4]—just not in the manner that Western observers expected. Instead of instituting multiparty elections, establishing formal protections for individual rights, or allowing free expression, the CCP has made changes below the surface, reforming its vast bureaucracy to realize many of the benefits of democratization—in particular, accountability, competition, and partial limits on power—without giving up single-party control. Although these changes may appear dry and apolitical, in fact, they have created a unique hybrid: autocracy with democratic characteristics. In practice, tweaks to rules and incentives within China’s public administration have quietly transformed an ossified communist bureaucracy into a highly adaptive capitalist machine. But bureaucratic reforms cannot substitute for political reforms forever. As prosperity continues to increase and demands on the bureaucracy grow, the limits of this approach are beginning to loom large.
CHINESE BUREAUCRACY 101
In the United States, politics are exciting and bureaucracy is boring. In China, the opposite is true. As a senior official once explained to me, “The bureaucracy is political, and politics are bureaucratized.” In the Chinese communist regime [5], there is no separation between political power and public administration. Understanding Chinese politics, therefore, requires first and foremost an appreciation of China’s bureaucracy. That bureaucracy is composed of two vertical hierarchies—the party and the state—replicated across the five levels of government: central, provincial, county, city, and township. These crisscrossing lines of authority produce what the China scholar Kenneth Lieberthal [6] has termed a “matrix” structure. In formal organizational charts, the party and the state are separate entities, with Xi leading the party and Premier Li Keqiang heading up the administration and its ministries. In practice, however, the two are intertwined. The premier is also a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s top body, which currently has seven members. And at the local level, officials often simultaneously hold positions in both hierarchies. For example, a mayor, who heads the administration of a municipality, is usually also the municipality’s deputy chief of party. Moreover, officials frequently move between the party and the state. For instance, mayors may become party secretaries and vice versa.
The Chinese public administration is massive. The state and party organs alone (excluding the military and state-owned enterprises) consist of over 50 million people, roughly the size of South Korea’s entire population. Among these, 20 percent are civil servants who perform management roles. The rest are street-level public employees who interact with citizens directly, such as inspectors, police officers, and health-care workers.
The top one percent of the bureaucracy—roughly 500,000 people—make up China’s political elite. These individuals are directly appointed by the party, and they rotate through offices across the country. Notably, CCP membership is not a prerequisite for public employment, although elites tend to be CCP members.
Within each level of government, the bureaucracy is similarly disaggregated into the leading one percent and the remaining 99 percent. In the first category is the leadership, which comprises the party secretary (first in command), the chief of state (second in command), and members of an elite party committee, who simultaneously head key party or state offices that perform strategic functions such as appointing personnel and maintaining public security. In the second category are civil servants and frontline workers who are permanently stationed in one location.
Managing a public administration the size of a midsize country is a gargantuan task. It is also a critical one, since the Chinese leadership relies on the bureaucracy to govern the country and run the economy. Not only do bureaucrats implement policies and laws; they also formulate them by tailoring central mandates for local implementation and by experimenting with local initiatives.
REFORM AT THE TOP
When Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, unleashed reforms, he maintained the CCP’s monopoly on power. Instead of introducing Western-style democracy, he focused on transforming the Chinese bureaucracy into a driver of economic growth. To achieve this, he injected democratic characteristics into the bureaucracy, namely, accountability, competition, and partial limits on power.
Perhaps the most significant of Deng’s reforms was a shift in the bureaucracy away from one-man rule toward collective leadership and the introduction of term limits and a mandatory retirement age for elite officials. These changes constrained the accumulation of personal power and rejuvenated the party-state with younger officials. Lower down, the reformist leadership changed the incentives of local leaders by updating the cadre evaluation system, which assesses local leaders according to performance targets. Since Chinese officials are appointed rather than popularly elected, these report cards serve an accountability function similar to elections in democracies. Changing the targets for evaluating cadres redefined the bureaucracy’s goals, making clear to millions of officials what they were expected to deliver, as well as the accompanying rewards and penalties.
Breaking from Mao’s fixation on class background and ideological fervor, Deng, ever the pragmatist, used this system to turn local leaders into more productive economic agents. From the 1980s onward, officials were assigned a narrow list of quantifiable deliverables, focused primarily on the economy and revenue generation. Tasks unrelated to the economy, such as environmental protection and poverty relief, were either relegated to a lower priority or not mentioned at all. Meanwhile, the goal of economic growth was always paired with an indispensable requisite: maintaining political stability. Failing this requirement (for instance, allowing a mass protest to break out) could cause leaders to flunk their entire test in a given year.
In short, during the early decades of reform, the new performance criteria instructed local leaders to achieve rapid economic growth without causing political instability. Reformers reinforced this stark redefinition of bureaucratic success with incentives. High scores improved the prospects of promotion, or at least the chances of being laterally transferred to a favorable office. Local leaders were also entitled to performance-based bonuses, with the highest performers sometimes receiving many times more than the lower performers. The government also began publicly ranking localities. Officials from the winning ones earned prestige and honorary titles; officials from those at the bottom lost face in their community. In this culture of hypercompetition, nobody wanted to be left behind.
Newly incentivized, local leaders dove headlong into promoting industrialization and growth. Along the way, they devised strategies and solutions that even party bosses in Beijing had not conceived. A famous example from the 1980s and 1990s are township and village enterprises, companies that circumvented restrictions on private ownership by operating as collectively owned enterprises. Another, more recent example is the creation of “land quota markets” in Chengdu and Chongqing, which allow developers to buy quotas of land from villages for urban use.
Through these reforms, the CCP achieved some measure of accountability and competition within single-party rule. Although no ballots were cast, lower-level officials were held responsible for the economic development of their jurisdictions. To be sure, Deng’s reforms emphasized brute capital accumulation rather than holistic development, which led to environmental degradation, inequality, and other social problems. Still, they undoubtedly kicked China’s growth machine into gear by making the bureaucracy results-oriented, fiercely competitive, and responsive to business needs, qualities that are normally associated with democracies.
STREET-LEVEL REFORMS
Bureaucratic reforms among local leaders were critical but not sufficient. Below them are the street-level bureaucrats who run the daily machinery of governance. And in the Chinese bureaucracy, these inspectors, officers, and even teachers are not merely providers of public services but also potential agents of economic change. For example, they might use personal connections to recruit investors to their locales or use their departments to provide commercial services as state-affiliated agencies.
Career incentives do not apply to rank-and-file public employees, as there is little chance of being promoted to the elite level; most civil servants do not dream of becoming mayors. Instead, the government has relied on financial incentives, through an uncodified system of internal profit sharing that links the bureaucracy’s financial performance to individual remuneration. Although profit sharing is usually associated with capitalist corporations, it is not new to China’s bureaucracy or, indeed, to any premodern state administration. As the sociologist Max Weber noted, before the onset of modernization, instead of receiving sufficient, stable salaries from state budgets, most public agents financed themselves through the prerogatives of office—for example, skimming off a share of fees and taxes for themselves. Modern observers may frown on such practices, considering them corrupt, but they do have some benefits.
Before Deng’s reforms, the Chinese bureaucracy was far from modern or technocratic; it was a mishmash of traditional practices and personal relationships, inserted into a Leninist structure of top-down commands. So when Chinese markets opened up, bureaucratic agents naturally revived many traditional practices, but with a twentieth-century capitalist twist. Within the vast Chinese bureaucracy, formal salaries for officials and public employees were standardized at abysmally low rates. For instance, President Hu Jintao’s official salary in 2012 was the equivalent of only about $1,000 a month. An entry-level civil servant received far less, about $150 a month. But in practice, these low salaries were supplemented by an array of additional perks, such as allowances, bonuses, gifts, and free vacations and meals.
And unlike in other developing countries, supplemental compensation in China’s bureaucracy was pegged to financial performance: the central government granted local authorities partial autonomy to spend the funds they earned. The more tax revenue a local government generated and the more nontax revenue (such as fees and profits) that party and state offices earned, the more compensation they could provide to their staff members.
What emerged was essentially a variant of profit sharing: public employees took a cut of the revenue produced by their organizations. These changes fueled a results-oriented culture in the bureaucracy, although results in the Chinese context were measured purely in economic terms. These strong incentives propelled the bureaucracy to help transition the economy toward capitalism.
A profit-oriented public bureaucracy has drawbacks, of course, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese complained endlessly about arbitrary payments and profiteering. In response, from the late 1990s on, reformers rolled out a suite of measures aimed at combating petty corruption and the theft of public funds. Central authorities abolished cash payments of fees and fines and allowed citizens to make payments directly through banks. These technical reforms were not flashy, yet their impact was significant. Police officers, for example, are now far less likely to extort citizens and privately pocket fines. Over time, these reforms have made the Chinese people less vulnerable to petty abuses of power. In 2011, Transparency International found that only nine percent of Chinese citizens reported having paid a bribe in the past year, compared with 54 percent in India, 64 percent in Nigeria, and 84 percent in Cambodia. To be sure, China has a serious corruption problem, but the most significant issue is collusion among political and business elites, not petty predation.
Although none of these bureaucratic reforms fits the bill of traditional political reforms, their effects are political. They have changed the priorities of government, introduced competition, and altered how citizens encounter the state. Above all, they have incentivized economic performance, allowing the CCP to enjoy the benefits of continued growth while evading the pressures of political liberalization.
THE LIMITS OF BUREAUCRATIC REFORM
Substituting bureaucratic reform for political reform has bought the CCP time. For the first few decades of China’s market transition, the party’s reliance on the bureaucracy to act as the agent of change paid off. But can this approach forestall pressure for individual rights and democratic freedoms forever? Today, there are increasing signs that the bureaucracy has come close to exhausting its entrepreneurial and adaptive functions. Since Xi [7] took office in 2012, the limits of bureaucratic reform have become increasingly clear.
The Xi era marks a new stage in the country’s development. China is now a middle-income economy with an increasingly educated, connected, and demanding citizenry. And the political pressures that have come with prosperity are, in fact, beginning to undermine the reforms that propelled China’s rapid growth.
The cadre evaluation system has come under particular stress. Over time, the targets assigned to local leaders have steadily crept upward. In the 1980s and 1990s, officials were evaluated like CEOs, on their economic performance alone. But today, in addition to economic growth, leaders must also maintain social harmony, protect the environment, supply public services, enforce party discipline, and even promote happiness. These changes have paralyzed local leaders. Whereas officials used to be empowered to do whatever it took to achieve rapid growth, they are now constrained by multiple constituents and competing demands, not unlike democratically elected politicians.
Xi’s sweeping anticorruption campaign, which has led to the arrest of an unprecedented number of officials, has only made this worse. In past decades, assertive leadership and corruption were often two sides of the same coin. Consider the disgraced party secretary Bo Xilai, who was as ruthless and corrupt as he was bold in transforming the western backwater of Chongqing into a thriving industrial hub. Corrupt dealings aside, all innovative policies and unpopular decisions entail political risk. If Xi intends to impose strict discipline—in his eyes, necessary to contain the political threats to CCP rule—then he cannot expect the bureaucracy to innovate or accomplish as much as it has in the past.
Moreover, sustaining growth in a high-income economy requires more than merely constructing industrial parks and building roads. It demands fresh ideas, technology, services, and cutting-edge innovations. Government officials everywhere tend to have no idea how to drive such developments. To achieve this kind of growth, the government must release and channel the immense creative potential of civil society, which would necessitate greater freedom of expression, more public participation, and less state intervention.
Yet just as political freedoms have become imperative for continued economic growth, the Xi administration is backpedaling. Most worrying is the party leadership’s decision to remove term [8]limits [8] among the top brass, a change that will allow Xi to stay in office for the rest of his life. So long as the CCP remains the only party in power, China will always be susceptible to what the political scientist Francis Fukuyama has called “the bad emperor problem”—that is, extreme sensitivity to leadership idiosyncrasies. This means that under a leader like Deng, pragmatic and committed to reform, China will prosper and rise. But a more absolutist and narcissistic leader could create a nationwide catastrophe.
Xi has been variously described as an aspiring reformer and an absolute dictator. But regardless of his predilections, Xi cannot force the genie of economic and social transformation back into the bottle. China today is no longer the impoverished, cloistered society of the 1970s. Further liberalization is both inevitable and necessary for China’s continued prosperity and its desire to partake in global leadership. But contrary to Friedman’s prediction, this need not take the form of multiparty elections. China still has tremendous untapped room for political liberalization on the margins. If the party loosens its grip on society and directs, rather than commands, bottom-up improvisation, this could be enough to drive innovation and growth for at least another generation.
CHINA AND DEMOCRACY
What broader lessons on democracy can be drawn from China? One is the need to move beyond the narrow conception of democratization as the introduction of multiparty elections. As China has shown, some of the benefits of democratization can be achieved under single-party rule. Allowing bureaucratic reforms to unfold can work better than trying to impose political change from the outside, since over time, the economic improvements that the bureaucratic reforms generate should create internal pressure for meaningful political reform. This is not to say that states must delay democracy in order to experience economic growth. Rather, China’s experience shows that democracy is best introduced by grafting reforms onto existing traditions and institutions—in China’s case, a Leninist bureaucracy. Put simply, it is better to promote political change by building on what is already there than by trying to import something wholly foreign.
A second lesson is that the presumed dichotomy between the state and society is a false one. American observers, in particular, tend to assume that the state is a potential oppressor and so society must be empowered to combat it. This worldview arises from the United States’ distinct political philosophy, but it is not shared in many other parts of the world.
In nondemocratic societies such as China, there has always been an intermediate layer of actors between the state and society. In ancient China, the educated, landholding elite filled this role. They had direct access to those in power but were still rooted in their communities. China’s civil service occupies a similar position today. The country’s bureaucratic reforms were successful because they freed up space for these intermediate actors to try new initiatives.
Additionally, observers should drop the false dichotomy between the party and the state when reading China. The American notion of the separation of powers is premised on the assumption that officeholders possess only one identity, belonging either to one branch of government or another. But this doesn’t hold in China or in most traditional societies, where fluid, overlapping identities are the norm. In these settings, whether officials are embedded in their networks or communities can sometimes matter more than formal checks and electoral competition in holding them accountable. For example, profit-sharing practices within China’s bureaucracy gave its millions of public employees a personal stake in their country’s capitalist success.
Challenging these unspoken assumptions sheds light on why China has repeatedly defied expectations. It should also prompt the United States to rethink its desire to export democracy around the world and its state-building efforts in traditional societies. Everyone everywhere wants the benefits of democracy, but policymakers would be dearly mistaken to think that these can be achieved only by transplanting the U.S. political system wholesale.
As for other authoritarian governments keen to emulate China, their leaders should not pick up the wrong lessons. China’s economic success is not proof that relying on top-down commands and suppressing bottom-up initiative work. In fact, it’s the exact opposite: the disastrous decades under Mao proved that this kind of leadership fails. In Deng’s era, the CCP managed a capitalist revolution only insofar as it introduced democratizing reforms to ensure bureaucratic accountability, promote competition, and limit the power of individual leaders. The current Chinese leadership should heed this lesson, too.
- Posts : 10694
Join date : 2016-06-25
Крај немачке доминације
Само пре неколико месеци канцеларка Немачке Ангела Меркел је сматрана за новог лидера слободног света. Међутим, у последње време није јој лако да гради свој пут чак ни у Берлину и Европи. Дани њене доминације се, изгледа, завршавају, наводи немачки „Шпигл“.
Канцеларка Ангела Меркел је сазвала тајни састанак како би са лидерима коалиционе Владе разговарали о стању у свету, пише „Шпигл“. На састанак су дошли министар финансија Олаф Шолц и министар иностраних послова Хејко Мас као представници левоцентристичке Социјалдемократске партије, као и министар унутрашњих послова Хорст Зехофер и министарка одбране Урсула фон дер Лајен. Састанак је трајао четири сата.
Они су разговарали о „застрашујућој слици света“: нападу председника САД Доналда Трампа на слободну трговину, жељи Кине да постане светска сила, нестабилној Украјини, Сирији. Политика САД према Ирану се није померили ни за педаљ.
На крају састанка присутни су дошли до прилично неоригиналног закључка да је једина шанса Немачке та да остане у Европи.
Социјалдемократска партија Немачке се тешко може усредсредити на управљање земљом, јер покушавају да реше проблем свог постојања. У среду су социјалдемократе у Бундестагу биле агресивније према Меркеловој него неки представници опозиције, нагласио је недељник.
Nadvilo se vreme opadanja...
- Posts : 10694
Join date : 2016-06-25
Poljski zvaničnici: Prestajemo da udovoljavamo EU
Pomoćnik poljskog premijera Mateuša Moravjeckog, Jacek Sasin, rekao je da je Poljska "gotova s ustupcima" i da čeka na naredni potez Evropske komisije.
Poljski zvaničnici kažu da vlada te zemlje neće više pokušavati da udovolji Evropskoj uniji, koja je zabrinuta zbog aktuelnih promena pravosudnog sistema Poljske.
Pomoćnik poljskog premijera Mateuša Moravjeckog, Jacek Sasin, rekao je da je Poljska "gotova s ustupcima" i da čeka na naredni potez Evropske komisije.
Komisija je saopštila da promene u Poljskoj podrivaju nezavisnost sudstva i pokrenula proceduru za uvođenje sankcija Varšavi, prenosi AP.
Komisija je, takođe, dala preporuke Poljskoj za poboljšanje situacije.
Desničarska vlada primenila je neke od predloga, ali smatra da će druge preporuke ugroziti reforme, za koje tvrdi da su ključni deo vladine politike.
Komisija smatra da ti koraci nisu dovoljni.
- Posts : 82754
Join date : 2012-06-10
The Bright Side of Populism?
Jan-Werner Müller
_____
"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
- Posts : 713
Join date : 2015-08-30
Odlican clanak - posebno ovaj deo:
To je ustvari konstruktivna uloga populizma u svakoj funkcionalnoj demokratiji dok god se te razlicite snage u sistemu nalaze u nekom balansu i medjusobno komuniciraju. I pored rizika, to je verovatno jedini put kako se politicki sistem moze reformisati.
But Podemos’s own standards for success are not the only available measures. What Podemos and the FSM, as well as the left-wing Syriza party in Greece, have achieved is that the main conflict in today’s southern Europe—essentially austerity versus anti-austerity—can be represented inside the political system. That’s not much, radical critics might say. But when compared to the impression, held especially by young southerners, that the party system consisted of two main political blocs alternating in power, with little discernible policy difference in practice, and much in the way of corruption on both sides, this development seems important. Podemos and the FSM managed to get well-educated young people who were either unemployed or stuck in jobs for which they were completely overqualified back to the voting booths
To je ustvari konstruktivna uloga populizma u svakoj funkcionalnoj demokratiji dok god se te razlicite snage u sistemu nalaze u nekom balansu i medjusobno komuniciraju. I pored rizika, to je verovatno jedini put kako se politicki sistem moze reformisati.
- Posts : 11623
Join date : 2018-03-03
Age : 36
Location : Hotline Rakovica
Here the “hypothesis” of switching from a left-right split to one of establishment versus anti-establishment actually seems to have been proven.
Ja ovu podelu vidim samo kao neko prelazno stanje, i neka dva scenarija koji posle toga mogu proizići:
1. Establismentske partije nestaju, odnosno bivaju preuzete iznutra. Podela na levicu i desnicu ostaje, samo što su populisti novi establisment. To bi bio neki dobar, ali manje verovatan scenario. Barem po meni.
2. Prelazak u istočnoevropski oblik vladavine. Desni čvrstorukaš i smrt pluralizma. Po meni, verovatniji scenario.
_____
Sve čega ima na filmu, rekao sam, ima i na Zlatiboru.
~~~~~
Ne dajte da vas prevare! Sačuvajte svoje pojene!
- Posts : 82754
Join date : 2012-06-10
Ista ploča, samo leva strana:
On the Front Lines of the Populism Wars
Jun 08
- Anton Jäger
Left populism might be working in practice — but does it work in theory? A review of Chantal Mouffe’s latest salvo in the “populism wars.”
_____
"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."
Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
- Guest
Sve nesrećne porodice nesrećne su na svoj način....
Italy threatens to drop France summit over migration criticism
Rome’s decision to turn away ship full of migrants described as ‘nauseating.’
By Jacopo Barigazzi
6/12/18, 9:11 PM CET
Italy on Tuesday threatened to cancel a summit with France after Paris strongly criticized an Italian decision to close its ports to a vessel carrying more than 600 migrants, according to Italian media.
France has not pulled its punches over Sunday’s decision by the new Italian interior minister, Matteo Salvini, who is also leader of the far-right League, to prevent a rescue ship operated by a French NGO from docking in Italy. On board are 629 migrants, including 123 unaccompanied minors and seven pregnant women.
After Malta also refused to take in the boat, Spain said the rescue ship could dock in Valencia.
French President Emmanuel Macron, who had been criticized for not offering to take in the boat at a French port, broke his silence on the topic during a Cabinet meeting Tuesday, denouncing the “cynicism and irresponsibility of the Italian government,” government spokesperson Benjamin Griveaux said at a press conference. Earlier, a spokesperson for Macron’s party, Gabriel Attal, said on a TV show that “the line of the Italian government is nauseating.”
The Italian government responded with a statement saying “Italy cannot accept hypocritical lessons from countries that in the migration field have always preferred to turn their head to the other side,” Italian media reported, adding that Rome is considering canceling a summit between Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte on Friday.
Italy did, however, get the backing of Hungary. Speaking Tuesday after a meeting with his Slovak counterpart, Peter Pellegrini, Hungarian PM Victor Orbán was quoted as saying that Italy’s decision was a “great moment which may truly bring changes in Europe’s migration policies.”
Salvini tried to defuse tensions and in a tweet said that “Spain wants to denounce us, France says that I’m ‘nauseating.’ I want to work calmly with everybody but with a principle: #firsttheitalians.”
- Posts : 10317
Join date : 2012-02-10
Europe has a fifth column in its ranks: Putin's cheerleaders who want to destroy Europe & liberal democracy from within: Le Pen, Wilders, Farage, Orbàn, Kaczynski, Salvini use Kremlin money & intel. Like Farage's friend Arron Banks, who colluded w/ Russians to deliver #Brexit
— Guy Verhofstadt (@guyverhofstadt) June 13, 2018
- Posts : 52531
Join date : 2017-11-16
Ajd sve, ali Kaczynski Putinov pijun...
- Guest
Jebemu sve ako je ovo domet liberal rage-a