Rat u Ukrajini

Del Cap wrote:Dobar je Maduro

6 million people fled Venezuela in one of the greatest humanitarian crises in modern history. Now, a reversal is starting to take shape, and tens of thousands are coming home https://t.co/QIuOwQo5Lf

— Bloomberg (@business) March 8, 2022

Notxor wrote:da li je ovo realno?

The White House unsuccessfully tried to arrange calls between Biden and the de facto leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE on countering Russia and containing a surge in oil prices. Both leaders spoke to Putin last week, after declining to speak with Biden. https://t.co/mKJwokoM7u

— Rebecca Ballhaus (@rebeccaballhaus) March 8, 2022

(idem da spavam u nadi da biden neće poslušati twiteraše "eksperte" i neće zatvoriti nebo iznad ukrajine. ni on ni stoltenberg)

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock on Tuesday justified Berlin’s decision not to ban Russian oil imports in retaliation for the invasion of Ukraine, saying it would plunge Germany into chaos in a win rather than a loss for the Kremlin.

If Germany felt banning those imports would end the war, it would do so, Baerbock said. But it did not.

Meanwhile, Germany was dependent on Russia for a third of its oil imports - a much higher dependency than the United States, which earlier in the day announced a ban on Russian oil imports.

“If we stopped these straight away, then tomorrow we would not be able to move in Germany anymore,” Baerbock told the online television channel of newspaper Bild, adding that essential workers like teachers and nurses would not be able to get to work and there might be electricity outages.

kondo wrote:bez obzira da li je protiv putina i rata, što verujem da je većina rusa kada se isključi tv.

58 percent of Russians support the invasion of Ukraine, 23 percent oppose it, new poll showshttps://t.co/OroMT3vPfi

— The Washington Post (@washingtonpost) March 8, 2022

Erős Pista wrote:Pa iskreno, i ta istrazivanja su kurac. Nema tu vise slobodnog izjasnjavanja nikakvog. Za protivljenje ratu se ide i zatvor, pa ti sad odgovaraj na ankete.

The study was initiated by a group of independent sociologists and IT specialists. The project brought together independent researchers and research companies from different regions of Russia. A questionnaire was developed, a sample design was formed and a survey of the RF citizens over 18 years old was conducted. 
Sampling was formed. The data were collected by telephone poll among the residents of all regions of the Russian Federation on February 28-March 1, according to the random sample. The initial sampling was stratified by time zones, so that the contact with the respondent occurred in his/her comfortable time. 1640 respondents were interviewed. Each potential respondent was contacted at least 3 times. The final sample was weighted by gender, age, and education.
On February 24, the invasion of Ukraine by Russian Federation troops, officially called a "special military operation," began. Our measurement took place on the fifth and sixth days of the invasion.
On these days, 45.5% of Russians strongly supported the start of hostilities, and another 12.7% expressed this support less strongly. In total, 58.2% of Russians approved of the invasion of Ukraine. 15.8% strongly disapproved and another 6.7% did so less strongly. Thus, there are approximately two and a half supporters per one opponent of the invasion (22.5% vs. 58.2%). As we can see, in spite of the high support of the military clash one cannot speak about its nationwide approval. 


Figure 1: Support for Russia's military invasion of Ukraine 
(RF, 28.21-1.03.2022, N=1640)

We have an opportunity to compare the newly obtained data with the perception of the armed conflict in Chechnya more than 20 years ago. According to the data of the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center in November 1999 (the initial stage of the "second Chechen war"), 61% of Russians were inclined to "continue military operations" and 27% were inclined toward peace negotiations. Six months later, in May 2000, the ratio of those in favor of continuing war and peace changed to 56% and 35%, but in February 2001, only 38% were in favor of continuing hostilities, while 50% favored negotiations. In the same survey, almost four out of every five Russians (79%) believed that a "guerrilla war" was taking place in Chechnya at that moment, and only 12% agreed that a peaceful settlement was under way there. As can be seen, Russian support for an armed conflict on a much smaller scale in its initial phase was significantly higher than today and weakened as it developed. We can assume a similar dynamics in the new conflict. 
On February 25 and 27, VCIOM polled 1,600 Russians each as part of its Sputnik daily project. According to the results, 65 percent (February 25) and 68 percent (February 27) supported the start of the invasion, an average of 67 percent. The military operation was opposed by 25% and 22%, respectively, with an average of 24%. As we can see, the data of a survey conducted by the same method (telephone poll) on a similar sample (random, stratified by the territory of the country) and largely similar humanitarian resources (call center operators) gave a significantly different result. This is likely due to two main reasons. First, we used a longer scale for coding the results - 7 scale values, including the "refuse to answer" option, obvious for such an acute and ambiguous situation instead of 3 at VCIOM. Our colleagues offered the "I have difficulty answering" option only for those who demonstrated such difficulty through their silence. We gave the respondent an opportunity to give a mixed answer - "I support some issues and some issues do not," as well as to refuse to answer. As a result, the percentage of pro-choice respondents declined from 67% to 58%, while the percentage of those who do not support the statement remained the same - 23% and 24% respectively. 
Secondly, traditionally, during omnibus, monitoring projects, questions about trust in the first persons of the state, as well as in other social institutions, come at the beginning of the interview, and by the time the topic of aggression has been broached, the respondent has been repeatedly asked about the degree of trust in the President of the Russian Federation, the government, and the ruling party. As a result he/she assimilates the logic of the interview understood by him/her and tries to follow the more "correct" point of view as he/she understands it. 
This is even more noticeable in the case of the residential poll, which is conducted, in particular, by the Public Opinion Foundation. During the February 25-27 measurement, a somewhat rephrased question was used: "On February 24, Vladimir Putin announced the beginning of a military operation in Ukraine. In your opinion, was the decision to conduct a military operation right or wrong?" but the same three-dimensional scale. In the end - 65% thought it was right, 17% thought it was wrong, and 18% had difficulty answering. As we can see, the use of longer and more flexible scales makes it possible to detect significant shifts in the measurements of public opinion.


Figure 2: Support for Russia's military invasion of Ukraine in different measurements

As mentioned above, the situation of military confrontation itself, associated with both an existential threat and the prospect of possible punishment for voicing an opinion (and the blackout and blocking of Russian media provides a reliable basis for this), can significantly affect the respondents' willingness to state their point of view sincerely. The interviewers who conducted the survey estimated that 9 percent of respondents "were very withdrawn and spoke apprehensively. In contrast, 25% were "very outspoken and willing to answer all questions. Despite the apparent dominance of outspoken and sincere respondents, among those who were reserved and wary of speaking frankly, the ratio of supporters to opponents of the invasion was nearly 1 to 1 (31% vs. 27%). Among those who were "outspoken," supporters of the military operation dominated (72% vs. 16%). Presumably, the topic of approval/disapproval of the military aspect of state foreign policy is extremely sensitive for Russian citizens today, and this sensitivity must be taken into account when conducting measurements on this topic and presenting the results.


Figure 3: Influence of respondent's willingness to communicate on the expression of an opinion regarding the approval of state policy (RF, 28.21-1.03.2022)