USA - США - SAD

“We don’t know how many other buildings are out there with this level of seemingly calculated error,” said Rachel Levy, the executive director of the Friends of the Upper East Side. “It warrants a larger investigation.”

This is amazing: Forbes, The Hill, the Daily Caller and The Federalist all published articles by an Iranian opposition activist who does not exist and is actually just a fake Twitter account run by a bunch of dudes in Albania https://t.co/UTlfwtssXB

— Tom Gara (@tomgara) June 9, 2019

Hello, I have a story about that shows the extent to which the debate over Iran policy has been turned into a snake pit of disinformation that leads from social media to news outlets all the way up to the White House: https://t.co/wobaKrZEXg

— Murtaza Mohammad Hussain (@MazMHussain) June 9, 2019

...

In sum, the Pentagon’s approach is based on the idea that the U.S. has to nail down how to defeat just one great-power rival before it takes on anything more ambitious than that. This is a sensible approach, but one that also entails real risks in war and peace alike.

The major risk in wartime is that the world may throw more at the U.S. than the Pentagon can handle. America faces not one but two great-power rivals, not to mention the lesser threats posed by North Korea, Iran and various terrorist groups. There is a non-trivial chance that the U.S. could find itself dealing with serious military challenges in two or more theaters at the same time.

Indeed, if the U.S. has to throw most of its military at defeating a Chinese bid for dominance in the Western Pacific, another hostile power — perhaps Russia — could decide to roll the iron dice while America is committed elsewhere. And even if that second country doesn’t launch a major war against the U.S. or its allies, it could seek to gain diplomatic concessions by threatening — explicitly or implicitly — aggression at a time when Washington is ill-equipped to deal with it.

To be fair, the Pentagon and key former officials have argued that under a one-war doctrine the U.S. can still “deter” in a second theater, and that the success the military has in handling the first challenger will be critical in determining whether it faces others. Yet as the congressionally mandated National Defense Strategy Commission (which I worked for) has noted, it is not clear how, exactly, the Pentagon plans to deter a second aggressor if it lacks the ability to prevent that aggressor from seizing key territory in the first place.
If U.S. allies significantly increase their own capabilities, or if Washington eventually defuses tensions with Moscow so that it can concentrate more exclusively on Beijing, then perhaps this two-war dilemma might be eased. But today, these are relatively distant and uncertain prospects.

The risks of being caught shorthanded during a war could also have significant peacetime ramifications. The military balance has a profound effect on geopolitical competition, even before the shooting starts. A country’s willingness to run risks and defend its interests forcefully depends on how well it thinks it will fare should things get ugly. If an American president knows that conflict with China or Russia would tie up nearly the entire U.S. military, he or she may be less willing to run the risk of conflict in a crisis for fear that it would leave Washington dangerously exposed. And if America’s competitors perceive this weakness, they may become more inclined to push the U.S. and its allies harder.

The architects of the Pentagon’s new strategy are undoubtedly right about one essential  thing: America needs to craft the right mix of capabilities and concepts to beat either China or Russia before it significantly expands the military. But once that mix is determined, the U.S. will need to build — at significant expense — a larger force than can credibly prevent an aggressor from achieving its objectives in a second theater even as America is fighting in the first. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. is going to be engaged in intense, dangerous rivalries against China and Russia simultaneously. It cannot indefinitely risk getting caught with a one-war military in a two-war world.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-11/two-war-strategy-overhaul-creates-many-risks

Sotir wrote:
Америка је пре 15-20 година могла да води два таква рата у исто време, сад и за један би морала да скупља резерве са коца и конопца, плус не би могли да буду ангажовани на дужи период.

Sotir wrote:Не ради се о рату САД - Кина и/или Русија, него о локалним сукобима попут агресије на СРЈ, Ирака, Авганистана...

Америка је пре 15-20 година могла да води два таква рата у исто време, сад и за један би морала да скупља резерве са коца и конопца, плус не би могли да буду ангажовани на дужи период.

Santino wrote:

a zasto? sta se promenilo?

паће wrote:

Sotir wrote:
Америка је пре 15-20 година могла да води два таква рата у исто време, сад и за један би морала да скупља резерве са коца и конопца, плус не би могли да буду ангажовани на дужи период.

А није да су смањивали буџеt