Ћина-Средње Краљевство

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/26/china-gets-a-british-bedfellow-belt-and-road-hammond-xi/

China Gets a British Bedfellow

Left vulnerable by Brexit, the U.K. looks eager to sign onto Beijing’s giant Belt and Road program.

BY KEITH JOHNSON | APRIL 26, 2019, 12:19 PM


The United Kingdom is starting to get on board China’s signature, trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative, a departure from the more confrontational line toward Beijing that’s taken hold in Washington and Brussels.

One reason for London’s outreach may be Britain’s sense of vulnerability in the wake of the stalled plans for Brexit, which have left the British reassessing their trade relations globally.

Philip Hammond, the British chancellor of the exchequer, said on Friday at the Belt and Road forum in Beijing that the U.K. is committed to helping China realize its ambitious but controversial infrastructure investment project.

Hammond’s visit to the high-profile forum underscores what he calls the continued “golden era of relations between China and the U.K.,” a bid for closer economic ties between the two countries that kicked off during the previous government of Prime Minister David Cameron.

Though Britain, unlike Italy, hasn’t yet signed a formal memorandum of understanding to take part in the Belt and Road program, Hammond said he will lobby for British firms to take part in Belt and Road projects, especially in finance and engineering. Some firms are moving ahead on their own: Standard Chartered, a London-based bank, just signed an agreement with the Export-Import Bank of China to promote Belt and Road projects.

[...]

Treasury and trade officials, in particular, are eager to deepen economic ties with China, especially as soon-to-be post-Brexit Britain seeks new trade partners. Rona Fairhead, the U.K. minister for trade and export promotion, as well as Douglas Flint, Britain’s Belt and Road envoy, also attended the forum in Beijing.

On Thursday, Hammond announced that the U.K. and China will hold an economic and financial dialogue in June to cement closer ties. “By deepening our cooperation on financial services, trade, and investment with international partners, we can ensure Britain’s global future,” he said in a statement.

But many in Britain are leery of the return to the Cameron-era red carpet for China.

“The UK’s approach risks prioritising economic considerations over other interests, values and national security,” concluded a report issued this month by Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee. “If the Government had not already committed in rhetorical terms to a ‘Golden Era’ in UK-Chinese relations, we question whether it would be appropriate to do so now.”

Most expect Britain’s participation in the Belt and Road to be limited—but that may be all China is looking for. Beijing, stung by criticism about its predatory lending and low standards of governance in deals worth hundreds of billions of dollars, is hoping the British help can burnish the Belt and Road’s standards.

[...]

Beijing could be looking for a much the same payoff as when London broke ranks with Washington and joined the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, helping nudge the nascent development bank toward better and more transparent lending standards.

China’s ambassador to the U.K. openly pleaded this week for Britain to help ensure higher-quality investments across the Belt and Road.

“From a Chinese perspective, [British participation] would lend a lot of credibility—there’s a lot of symbolic value,” said Jonathan Hillman, the director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

But China’s apparent desire to reboot the much-maligned Belt and Road might be tricky to pull off entirely. Using fewer Chinese companies or workers on projects in other countries, for example, would have costs at home. And more rigorous lending standards for new projects would require Beijing to scale back its ambitions.

“The big question: Is this just a superficial rebranding, or will the Chinese government take steps to recalibrate?” Hillman said.

Another big question is how Britain balances its desire for closer economic ties with China with the tougher stance being taken by the United States and other allies. Britain’s decision to allow Huawei on its networks has revived fears the move could hamper intelligence-sharing between Britain, the United States, and other close allies.

And even as the U.K. hopes to forge a trade deal with the United States once it leaves the European Union, Washington is putting poison pills into its new trade pacts to prevent countries from signing similar deals with China—which could complicate London’s outreach to Beijing.

“There’s a feeling post-Brexit that maybe it’s time to engage more with China on the economy and trade,” said Cainey. But the British government is also well aware of the concerns about Huawei and Chinese cyberespionage and worries about the future of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing relationship, he said.

“Britain’s now trying to find a way through that,” Cainey said.

concerns about Huawei and Chinese cyberespionage

https://www.ft.com/content/0b207552-6977-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681d

China renegotiated $50bn in loans to developing countries

Study challenges ‘debt-trap’ narrative surrounding Beijing’s lending


Developing countries have renegotiated about $50bn of Chinese loans in the past
decade, with term extensions, refinancing and debt forgiveness the most frequent
outcomes, according to research challenging “debt-trap” accusations surrounding
Chinese lending.

An examination of 38 Chinese debt renegotiations with 24 countries in the past
decade by the Rhodium Group, a consultancy, concluded that China’s leverage
remains limited, with many of the renegotiations resolved in favour of the
borrower.

Debt write-offs were found in 14 cases, deferments in 11 cases, and refinancing
and debt term changes accounting for most other cases.

US officials have warned that China is strategically using overseas financing to
gain assets from developing countries. But the study found that outright asset
seizure had occurred only in the case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port in 2017.

...

The Rhodium report found that countries had more leverage over China when they
had access to alternative financing sources such as the IMF or international
capital markets, while new incoming governments also seemed to generate
increased leverage.

Debt forgiveness is often motivated by a desire to improve bilateral relations,
and also in cases of acute financial distress, the report found. China wrote off
Rmb2.6bn ($386m) of Cuban debt in 2010, and $40m of Zimbabwean loans in 2015,
according to Rhodium, which also reported that Angola had refinanced and
renegotiated the terms of $21.3bn in Chinese loans in 2015. The Maldives, whose
new government said it would ask China to reduce the sums owed, is listed as
being under negotiation.

...

The problems encountered with Chinese lending point to a lack of competency
among lending institutions, combined with their eagerness to support broader
political goals despite low potential returns, and weak project planning
capacity, according to Ms Kratz.

...

China has a decade-old policy of forgiving interest-free loans to developing
countries, and the Rhodium Group said it had excluded from its study more than
two dozen cases of debt forgiveness whose terms had not been disclosed.

China’s Belt and Road Partners Aren’t Fools
Chinese finance is attractive for good, practical reasons.
BY JACOB MARDELL | MAY 1, 2019, 3:40 PM


Bojan is three months unemployed, and his wife earns just 120 euros a month—not nearly enough to feed a family of four. He blames Serbia’s increasingly authoritarian president, Aleksandar Vucic, for his troubles. He also blames the European Union, which he says is Vucic’s ultimate master. He describes Brussels as a vaguely imperialist entity that demands too much of Serbia while delivering little. “And China?” I ask. “China is good. China is here to help,” he says.

That story is surprisingly common among Serbians, who largely view China as a reliable business partner and the country’s billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a wonderful economic opportunity. English-language coverage of Belt and Road largely targets the flaws of the initiative—principally that it lacks transparency, promotes poor standards, and deals in “debt trap diplomacy.” The critical tone contrasts dramatically with the mood on the ground in many countries touched by the BRI. Critics of Belt and Road tend to see the initiative as a conscious exercise in power projection. They are not necessarily wrong, but this focus on Beijing overlooks the agency of local decision-makers and fails to comprehend their attitude toward Chinese funding.

As disingenuous as Beijing’s “win-win” rhetoric may sound to skeptical ears, Belt and Road projects do often service the real needs of host countries at the same time as they satisfy the commercial interests of Chinese companies. It is easy to emphasize Beijing’s strategic intent while forgetting the fact that partner countries say yes to, and in most cases propose, the projects that constitute the BRI. The initiative is of course an entirely China-centric initiative, but the countries involved are not passive and unwitting recipients of Chinese designs. Beijing is often the convenient lender of last resort for projects that governments are determined to finance.

Belt and Road’s big picture is tied to Chinese ambitions, both domestic and global. But it also consists of thousands of projects in scores of different countries, and there is inevitably a great degree of variance among them. Looking at the common characteristics of successful projects provides guidance, and identifying the conditions for failure means the ability to make better, more targeted criticisms of the initiative as a whole.

The Sino-Serbian “friendship bridge” in Belgrade captures what can be good about the BRI. Built by the China Road and Bridge Corp. and financed with a Chinese loan, it was delivered on time, at a reasonable price, and serves a clear economic purpose, slashing commuters’ travel time across the Danube from more than an hour to just 10 minutes.

A failed cartonboard factory in Dobrush, Belarus, shows Chinese development finance and management in a poorer light. According to Olga Kulai, a Minsk-based analyst with experience working for Chinese companies, the Dobrush project failed due to a lack of local oversight. The Chinese contractor lacked experience, and because the project was tied to a Chinese loan and privileged by Presidential Decree, a number of the usual legal obligations were waived. As a result, development fell short of Belarusian construction standards, and the contract had to be terminated. Many Central and Eastern European projects have suffered from similar problems, but others have been at least partial successes, and locals are often willing to bear the costs.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Export-Import Bank of China has promised the state electricity provider a $687 million loan to finance a lignite coal-fired power plant that the EU is none too happy about. In Montenegro, China is building and financing a very expensive highway that has also ruffled feathers and welcomed accusations of irresponsible financial management. But Bosnians are adamant that the coal plant, Tuzla 7, is absolutely necessary.

When I questioned Anto Domazet, an economics professor at the University of Sarajevo, about the environmental implications of Tuzla, he told me defensively that Germany had modernized all its plants a decade ago. According to Domazet, canceling the project “was not an acceptable option” for a developing country so rich in dirty lignite coal. With many financial institutions restricting or having banned coal finance, China was the only viable option. Similarly, the Montenegrins went cap in hand to the EU for finance to build their Bar-Belgrade highway. They got some money but not enough for the mountainous, technically challenging route, which is seen as a vital connection to Serbia.

The recent Belt and Road summit in Beijing saw the Chinese authorities putting a strong emphasis on managing the socio-economic impact of BRI projects—but it’s the pragmatic, profit-driven side of Chinese investment that often made the schemes attractive in the first place. In Western Europe and America, this self-interested development model is often seen as a negative characteristic of the BRI, but in many poorer countries, pragmatism is preferred to Western paternalism.

This is true on the African continent, but it is also a prevalent attitude within Europe—especially in Balkan countries that actually see Chinese crony capitalism as a palatable alternative to EU strings-attached finance. Sarajevo’s finance minister and former ambassador to China, Amel Kovacevic, said China is “trying to trade, not to convert or sell their ideology.” Kovacevic acknowledges that “China won’t question whether you actually need a road built,” but he admires that business minded mentality, asking, “How can you blame someone for working in their own interest?”

In Serbia and in Bosnia, almost everyone I’ve spoken to—both officials and members of the general public—view the BRI in a positive light. While some officials can seem naive in their wholesale adoption of Chinese propaganda, many are savvy operators who simply see China as an easy touch for no-questions-asked credit. As one official put it, the relationship with China is “not a marriage, it’s a one night stand.”

Naturally, this no-questions-asked development model leaves ample space for corruption—this is both part of the BRI’s intrinsic appeal and a serious problem. But this is not the whole story. Chinese finance is also attractive because it provides a hassle-free option for governments that wish to implement national projects of their own choosing. There is an emotional dimension to this offering, especially when contrasted with Western finance, which is perceived to dictate terms and prescribe rigid, pre-approved models of development. As a local (and pro-EU journalist) in Sarajevo told me, “Brussels has spent 20 years telling us what to do, and we have nothing to show for it.”

China, on the other hand, is a relatively unknown quantity. It arrives baggage-free and promises engagement on terms of mutual respect. When Brussels or Washington frets over Balkan countries becoming victims of Chinese influence and chides them for irresponsible practices, it only serves to reinforce this deep-rooted perception of paternalism.

Jacob Mardell is a freelance writer currently traveling through Belt and Road countries.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/01/china-belt-road-partners-serbia-belarus-debt/

Ali, da se vratimo na pitanje: kakav je efekat silnog kineskog novca i „čeličnog prijateljstva“, što je već postala metafora koju kao papagaji ponavljaju svi ovdašnji političari kada govore o odnosima Srbije i Kine. Koliko sve to doprinosi razvoju naše zemlje? Odnosno – može se na to gledati i iz drugog ugla – kako se i da li se uopšte razvijaju zemlje koje sa Kinom nemaju tako neverovatno prijateljske odnose?

Pa evo, onako, na prvu loptu, kad pogledamo robnu razmenu između dve zemlje, i to u poslednjih nekoliko godina, od kada počinje njen uspon, vidimo da je ona porasla sa oko milijardu i 550 miliona dolara 2015. na 2,3 milijarde dolara prošle godine. Pri tome, kineski izvoz u Srbiju porastao je za oko 700 miliona dolara, tj. sa nešto preko 1,5 na 2,2 milijarde dolara, dok je izvoz Srbije porastao sa 20 miliona 2015. na stotinak miliona dolara 2018. Dakle na tom čisto spoljno-trgovinskom planu Kina je imala mnogo više koristi nego Srbija.
Uzmimo drugo merilo. Ekonomski razvoj. U našem regionu, na zapadnom Balkanu, Srbija sa prosekom od 1,9 odsto u poslednjih pet godina (Albanija je imala 3,1 odsto; Bosna i Hercegovina 2,7; Kosovo 3,5; Makedonija 2,6; Crna Gora 3,4 odsto) beleži ubedljivo najnižu stopu privrednog rasta. Ni kada malo proširimo vizuru pa se uporedimo sa zemljama centralno-istočne Evrope, situacija nije ništa bolja, jer je Srbija od svih njih imala niži rast. Posle Srbije najgora Hrvatska imala je rast od 2,3 odsto. Dakle, svih tih petnaestak zemalja napredovalo je mnogo brže od Srbije, iako praktično uopšte nisu imale kineske „investicije“.

yoyogi wrote:Kina ulazi u budžake, gde nema pravila (ne meša im se u unutrašnje stvari) pa će posle da se kaže da je tamo bila i imala foothold.
Banana države kao Srbija. Nije vam ovo mnogo dobro ali izgleda bolje nego što dobijate od Evrope.

Kao narkomanu, daj još jednu dozu.

KinderLad wrote:No, ipak...

https://pescanik.net/srbija-i-kina-koliko-nas-kosta-celicno-prijateljstvo/

yoyogi wrote:Kinu to ne zanima. Kao što prave aerodrome na sprudima i školjima gde nasipaju zemlju samo da piste postoje, samo da zapišaju svoju teritoriju koju niko ne sme da uzme, tako je i ovo što Vučić naziva podvizima. Kina širi pipke, u korumpirane ne-EU državama kao Srbija, jednog dana kada se dođe do nečega - oni su već  bili tu, legalno. Mali trošak za Kinu a posle možda veliki dobitak.

Zuper wrote:

yoyogi wrote:Kinu to ne zanima. Kao što prave aerodrome na sprudima i školjima gde nasipaju zemlju samo da piste postoje, samo da zapišaju svoju teritoriju koju niko ne sme da uzme, tako je i ovo što Vučić naziva podvizima. Kina širi pipke, u korumpirane ne-EU državama kao Srbija, jednog dana kada se dođe do nečega - oni su već  bili tu, legalno. Mali trošak za Kinu a posle možda veliki dobitak.

Ne lupetaj.
Pogledaj strukturu ulaganja Kineza u Evropi.
Samo nastaje problem kada se to desava po Balkanu ali ne kada kupe Volvo.

yoyogi wrote:Kinu to ne zanima. Kao što prave aerodrome na sprudima i školjima gde nasipaju zemlju samo da piste postoje, samo da zapišaju svoju teritoriju koju niko ne sme da uzme, tako je i ovo što Vučić naziva podvizima. Kina širi pipke, u korumpirane ne-EU državama kao Srbija, jednog dana kada se dođe do nečega - oni su već  bili tu, legalno. Mali trošak za Kinu a posle možda veliki dobitak.

yoyogi wrote:

Zuper wrote:

Ne lupetaj.
Pogledaj strukturu ulaganja Kineza u Evropi.
Samo nastaje problem kada se to desava po Balkanu ali ne kada kupe Volvo.

Lupetaj ti.
Vidi Afriku i kineska ulaganja tamo, ne propituju ničija ljudska prava.

Volvo je kupila privatna , ne državna firma. Što pričam je državna, kineska država kupuje zemlju i firme. To srbiju bananiše još više.

KinderLad wrote:
Dobro, ali ok, kao neko ko ima velike rezerve prema prisnim odnosima sa Kinom svejedno kazem da, kakva god da je njihova racunica, sta god da bude posle - put ostaje, most ostaje, pruga ostaje, bilo kakva infrastruktura ostaje. Oni nikad nece odneti to sa sobom za Kinu, to je nemoguce. A drugo, oni ulazu i u mnogo uredjenije drzave, nit je njihov, nit je evropski, nit je, for that matter, ruski posao da mi postanemo uredjena drzava, medjutim za razliku od Rusa oni nikako svesno i namerno ne ometaju ceo proces prikljucivanja EU, a cak ni o NATO-u nemaju neko bitno misljenje, ne truju javnost, nego prosto - vi radite sta ocete, a ovo je nas interes. Mnogo postenija pozicija.

KinderLad wrote:No, ipak...

Ali, da se vratimo na pitanje: kakav je efekat silnog kineskog novca i „čeličnog prijateljstva“, što je već postala metafora koju kao papagaji ponavljaju svi ovdašnji političari kada govore o odnosima Srbije i Kine. Koliko sve to doprinosi razvoju naše zemlje? Odnosno – može se na to gledati i iz drugog ugla – kako se i da li se uopšte razvijaju zemlje koje sa Kinom nemaju tako neverovatno prijateljske odnose?

Pa evo, onako, na prvu loptu, kad pogledamo robnu razmenu između dve zemlje, i to u poslednjih nekoliko godina, od kada počinje njen uspon, vidimo da je ona porasla sa oko milijardu i 550 miliona dolara 2015. na 2,3 milijarde dolara prošle godine. Pri tome, kineski izvoz u Srbiju porastao je za oko 700 miliona dolara, tj. sa nešto preko 1,5 na 2,2 milijarde dolara, dok je izvoz Srbije porastao sa 20 miliona 2015. na stotinak miliona dolara 2018. Dakle na tom čisto spoljno-trgovinskom planu Kina je imala mnogo više koristi nego Srbija.
Uzmimo drugo merilo. Ekonomski razvoj. U našem regionu, na zapadnom Balkanu, Srbija sa prosekom od 1,9 odsto u poslednjih pet godina (Albanija je imala 3,1 odsto; Bosna i Hercegovina 2,7; Kosovo 3,5; Makedonija 2,6; Crna Gora 3,4 odsto) beleži ubedljivo najnižu stopu privrednog rasta. Ni kada malo proširimo vizuru pa se uporedimo sa zemljama centralno-istočne Evrope, situacija nije ništa bolja, jer je Srbija od svih njih imala niži rast. Posle Srbije najgora Hrvatska imala je rast od 2,3 odsto. Dakle, svih tih petnaestak zemalja napredovalo je mnogo brže od Srbije, iako praktično uopšte nisu imale kineske „investicije“.

https://pescanik.net/srbija-i-kina-koliko-nas-kosta-celicno-prijateljstvo/