Religija i društvo

Share
avatar

Posts : 4860
Join date : 2014-11-04

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Indy on Sun Jan 17, 2016 9:03 pm

100% of Under 25s in one Country Don’t Believe God Created Universe

A poll claims that no Icelanders under 25 think God created the Universe and over 90 per cent of the respondants believe that the big bang theory created the universe.

The Icelandic Ethical Humanist Association, who commissioned the poll, said 93.9 per cent in the under 25 category were favourable to the big bang theory. None of the respondents believed that the universe had been created by God or any religious entity. 6 per cent responded with ‘don’t know’ or ‘other’.


_____
Take a day and walk around... Watch the Nazis run your town... Then go home and check yourself... You think we're singing 'bout someone else
avatar

Posts : 1959
Join date : 2014-10-28

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Mr.Pink on Sun Jan 17, 2016 9:50 pm

ficfiric wrote:


avatar

Posts : 11941
Join date : 2012-02-12
Location : сви јунаци ником поникоше

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by паће on Sun Jan 17, 2016 10:00 pm

Могао би неко и цркви да прегледа књиге. Ко зна да ли је то неопорезивање баш чисто.


_____
памтим савршено - не сећам се кад сам последњи пут нешто заборавио
They say you can't have a cake and eat it too. Then they say "have a cake".
avatar

Posts : 9745
Join date : 2012-02-10
Age : 98

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by ficfiric on Wed Feb 24, 2016 3:19 pm

Seča hektara šume na Fruškoj gori na zahtev SPC

Preko 10 hektara bagremove šume isečeno je na Fruškoj gori, što je u potpunosti ogolilo ceo potez od Zmajevca prema Vrdniku. Zahtev za sečenje stigao je iz obližnjeg manastira Vrdnik, koji je ovu šumu dobio u postupku restitucije, saznaje N1. Može li crkva da odlučuje kako će izgledati Nacionalni park?

U borbi sa prirodom, prvi će pasti čovek, slogan je Nacionalnog parka Fruška gora. Ipak, ukoliko je to božji čovek, pašće cela šuma. Transformaciju brda pod bagremovim hladom u brisani prostor obližnji vikendaši samo nemo posmatraju i kažu – ovoliku seču ne pamte.

"Ja nisam šumar, laik sam, ali mislim da se to moglo i postepeno seći i tako podmlađivati šuma. Ovako, bojim se da će u narednih 20 godina ovde ostati golo brdo", kaže vlasnik vikendice Ivan Peter.

Kada brdo postane golo, svo drvo pripašće Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi, iz koje nismo uspeli da dobijemo komentar povodom seče u njihovom ataru. U nacionalnom parku, koji radove izvodi tvrde - sve je po zakonu, jer je šuma bila stara i svakako namenjena za seču.

"Kada crkva želi da nešto poseče na svom imanju, ona nama pošalje određeni zahtev, određenu količinu koja je njima potrebna, mi vidimo u skladu sa planskim dokumentima šta je predviđeno i u skladu s tim, izađemo u susret. Znači, ne možemo da idemo preko tih planskih dokumenata, bez obzira na to radilo se o crkvi ili fizičkom licu koje je vlasnik šume u nacionalnom parku. Ne možemo da radimo ono što nije predviđeno i planirano", rekao je Milan Radojčić, rukovodilac službe nadzora u Nacionalnom parku Fruška gora.

Po toj logici, na kamionima bi moglo da završi i ostalo drveće iz okoline, jer se svuda naokolo nalazi bagremova šuma približno slične starosti. Ljubitelji prirode kažu - masovnom sečom strada ekosistem i strahuju da nova stabla neće biti posađena.

"Bez obzira na to da li je legalno ili ne, ipak treba pričati koji je dalji plan, da li će to da se pošumi. Imamo informacije da su i ostali predeli koji su isečeni na Fruškoj gori nisu naknadno pošumljeni, to su sve ostala ogoljena brda", rekla je Tina Solar iz organizacije Green adventure Fruška gora.

Prema planu, ovde bi trebalo da nikne hrastova šuma, za čiji razvoj će biti potrebne decenije. Ko god naložio jednu od najvećih seča u istoriji Fruške gore, ovaj potez će ovako izgledati još prilično dugo. Kako nam je rekao šumar koji se ovde nalazi, i ako bude ispunjen plan da se ovaj prostor ponovo zasadi hrastom, šumu nećemo dočekati da vidimo.



_____

Uprava napolje!
avatar

Posts : 10566
Join date : 2014-12-01

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Filipenko on Wed Feb 24, 2016 4:02 pm

Nadam se da je Đinđiću makar malo laknulo u kazanu sada kada zna da je šuma vraćena SPC na slobodnotržšno raspolaganje.
avatar

Posts : 9745
Join date : 2012-02-10
Age : 98

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by ficfiric on Wed Feb 24, 2016 4:22 pm

Jbg, bozja volja. Stabla su otisla na bolje mesto, u raj


_____

Uprava napolje!
avatar

Posts : 9745
Join date : 2012-02-10
Age : 98

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by ficfiric on Wed May 04, 2016 9:32 am



Amfilohije: Poplave su opomena zbog Končite Vurst, to je "dokaz da nas Bog još voli"




PATRIJARH IRINEJ O IZGORELOJ CRKVI "Najmanje je moguće da su sveće uzrok požara"


_____

Uprava napolje!
avatar

Posts : 10566
Join date : 2014-12-01

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Filipenko on Thu May 12, 2016 2:50 pm

Zbog utaje poreza Srpska crkva svedena na nivo sekte u Švajcarskoj


Srpska pravoslava crkva u Švajcarskoj izgubila je posle 40 godina pravni status Crkve i stavljena je u rang sa sektama zbog neplaćenog poreza.

Ovo je posledica neprijavljivanja prihoda i samovolje episkopa austrijsko-švajcarskog Andreja koji je suprotno zakonima Švajcarske finasije i imovinu stavio pod svoju, a ne kontorlu crkvenog odbora i države.

Blic navodi da episkop od avgusta prošle godine nije platio poreze Švajcarskoj, na šta je po tamošnjim zakonima stiktno obavezan. Zbog takvog ponašanja poreznicima duguje 100.000 franaka na osnovu obaveze od prikupljenih prihoda od vernika, bogosluženja, prodaje sveća i drugog. Procenjuje se da je od vernika prikupljeno najmanje nekoliko stotina hiljada franaka na koje nije plaćen porez.

- Da bi stavio pod isključivo svoju kontrolu finasije i imovinu Crkve, on je civilnu i crkvenu upravu proglasio za protestantsku organizaciju i smenio crkveni odbor na čelu sa Milutinom Šćepanovićem i višedecenijskim starešinom Draškom Todorovićem. To je uradio ne shvatajući da su upravo oni pred civilnim švajcarskim zakonima jedini pravni predstavnici Srpske crkve - navodi sagovornik Blica i dodaje da je episkop Andrej formirao svoju grupu poslušnika koja zloupotrebljava pečat i faksimile crkvenih zvaničnika kako bi se dokopala bankovnih računa na kojem ima više miliona evra.

Protojerej Draško Todorović kaže za ovaj list da je SPC posle 40 godina u Cirihu svedena na sektu i to zato što je vladika Andrej umesto pravosnažnog statuta koji verifikuje ministarstvo Švajcarske predstavio novi statut kojim on lišava vernike prava glasa u upravljanju imovinom parohije. On tvrdi da je cilj episkopa Andreja bio da nametne paralelno finansijsko poslovanje da bi se izbegla do sada uobičajena transparentnost.

- O smeni sam obavestio patrijarha Irineja, jer je reč o finansijskoj malverzaciji koja može da ima nesagladive posledice po SPC - naveo je Todorović.



Poslednja rečenica je najjača. Obavestio Zemunce da se po Begišu diluje gudra, taj neki fazon.
avatar

Posts : 6215
Join date : 2012-02-11

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Ointagru Unartan on Sat Jun 04, 2016 7:25 pm

Zanimljivo, sekularisticki turski zurnal intervjuise americkog "istrazivaca" koji tvrdi da je politicki islam neizbezan, tacnije da je islam neizbezno politicki.

INTERVIEW: Shadi Hamid on the past and future of political Islam

Shadi Hamid’s new book “Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle over Islam is Reshaping the World” (reviewed in HDN here) argues that current troubles in the Middle East are tied to unresolved questions of how Islam relates to the state.

“Islam is, in fact, distinctive in how it relates to politics,” writes Hamid, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Instability is inevitable so long as that difference is not accommodated in governance and legal structures. Hamid spoke to Hürriyet Daily News about his work, its implications for today’s Turkey, and what the future holds for the wider region. This is an edited transcript of the conversation.


This new book follows your previous book, published in 2014, “Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East.” Back then, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, you described how Islamist participation in democracy was inevitable and should be facilitated. Obviously the landscape has changed a lot since then. What big shifts did you want to address in the new book?

I really wanted to address the question of how much religion matters. How much of this has to do with "Islam" and how much of it has to do with political or economic factors. That's the question that I've gotten so much from American observers. This book is an attempt to situate the role of religion, at a time when we're trying to understand the rise of ISIS and the region's descent into violence and civil war.

I make an argument that I'm slightly uncomfortable with. I realize that some people will misinterpret it and some will abuse it for purposes that I’m against. I argue that Islam is in fact exceptional. Islam is fundamentally different than other major religions in important ways, primarily in how it relates to law, politics and governance. What that means in practice is that Islam - historically but also today - plays an outsize role in public life, and also that it appears to be uniquely resistant to secularization. There have been many attempts to neutralize or privatize Islam, or make it less relevant in everyday life. But those attempts have failed. This forces us to reckon with the possibility that we aren't all the same. We don't all necessarily want the same things.

I'm trying to challenge the liberal determinism that is implicit in so many of our conversations about Islam: That all peoples cultures and societies follow a linear trajectory toward a reformation, then an enlightenment, then secularization, then the “end of history” of liberal democracy. As an American, it is so much part of our culture to just assume that these things are inevitable. But what if they're not? It's hard for people to take on the prospect that in Muslim-majority populations there is a general unwillingness to push religion aside. That has major implications for how we understand not just the Middle East but also the future of Muslims in the West.

There’s a danger that this idea of “exceptionalism” plays into the hands of both the most fundamentalist Islamists and the worst Islamophobes.

Exactly. But I have to be faithful to my findings. What I'm saying is that the “difference” of Islam isn't necessarily a bad thing. Whenever we hear that Islam is different and it can't be extracted from politics, we assume it means that Islam is backwards, bad or problematic. But we have to move beyond this presumption that religion always plays a negative role in politics and that the solution is always to move to secularism. That's why I self-consciously chose the word "exceptionalism." For me that is a word that should be value-neutral. Exceptionalism can be good and it can be bad. We also talk about American exceptionalism - which can be seen in a negative or positive light. So I hope people will resist the temptation to just say "Islam is different and that is definitely a bad thing." I argue that difference isn't necessarily a bad thing.


You write that “when observers discuss the root causes of Middle Eastern conflict, they often speak of a crisis of governance or legitimacy.” This legitimacy deficit, you say, is tied to an inability to reckon with Islam’s relationship to the state. Could you explain?

When we talk about ISIS, or the demise of the Arab Spring, we might pick certain dates. We might look back to 2011 or the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But that's a narrow way of looking at it; these problems didn’t come out of nowhere. So I emphasize a date that doesn't get as much attention: 1924, the date of the formal abolition of the last caliphate, the Ottoman caliphate. Really ever since then there has been a struggle to establish legitimate order in the Middle East.

One key issue has remained unresolved: The question of religion's role in public life. We've had an ongoing fundamental divide between what we might call Islamists and non-Islamists, who could be secularists, liberals, or nationalists. These are not just policy differences. These are issues that go to the very foundation of the state and the very meaning of the nation state. What is the purpose of the nation state? Should it be ideologically or religiously neutral? Should the state be entrusted with the mission of promoting a particular conception of virtue? With the Arab Spring, these issues bubbling under the surface finally had an opportunity to come out. People were debating them openly and publicly for the first time.

There's a real urgency to addressing these issues head on. I'm uncomfortable when people feel a need to dismiss religion as a prime mover, saying religious grievances are just a product of more material things like power or economics. People often have trouble seeing or understanding the everyday role of religion for people who are true believers.


What about the danger that seeing Islam as exceptional risks taking an essentialist position, assuming that Islam is inherently different, cannot change, and that by extension political Islam is the only authentic version of Islam. Doesn’t this risk presenting Islamism as the only “legitimate” political force, delegitimizing all opposition?

If we're saying Islam is inherently different, what does that word "inherently" mean? I'd say that Islam is a product of its own history. From an academic perspective you might say, "Of course the Quran has something to say about law and governance because the Prophet Muhammad was a state-builder. He was capturing new territory and had to contend with questions of how to govern that territory.” If the Prophet hadn't been the head of an incipient state in Medina then perhaps the Quran wouldn't have had to address questions of governance in the way it did. That is not “inherent,” it's a product of what actually happened.

This is a main point of divergence with Christianity. Jesus was not in a position to govern, he was a dissident against the reigning state. So it's no mistake that the New Testament has very little to say about law and governance. And in those crucial early centuries of Christianity, Christians were a minority living under other people's rule. It wasn't until several centuries into the Christian experience that Christians had to contend with these issues. So my argument is not essentialist; it’s an argument that history matters and the founding moments of religions matter.

On the question of whether Islamism is the only legitimate approach, you don't need to be an Islamist to believe that Islam should play a central role in public life. You can have Islamism without Islamists. That may sound counter-intuitive but we actually see this in many parts of the Muslim world. In Malaysia and Indonesia ostensibly "secular" parties have experimented with sharia ordinances at the local level. Why? Because if they want to win in conservative regions, they have to appeal to conservative sentiment, where voters want more Islam in their politics not less. The most anti-Islamist leader today is probably Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. But Sisi is not secularist. He has said very openly and explicitly that it's the role of the president to promote the correct understanding of Islam. He has a vision of an Egyptian state Islam. His regime has also launched campaigns against gays, Shias, Baha'is, secular dissidents, blasphemers. That doesn't mean he's an Islamist, it means he's reflecting a conservative consensus in Egyptian society.

I don't want to give the impression that if Islam is somehow exceptional that means it is a narrow tradition. Islam is a rich tradition with many different expressions and approaches - Sufis, Islamists, Salafis, Wahhabis, liberals, progressives. But if you’re a secular Muslim and are arguing for a separation of religion from politics, you're probably going to have a lot of trouble selling your case. Because you essentially have to argue against the prophetic model.


I also wonder about the dichotomy between the “secular state” and the “religious society.” On closer inspection things look a bit more ambiguous. In Turkey, republican history is in many ways a story of religious sentiments seeping into the system basically from its founding in 1923. Certainly since the 1980 coup there has been a strong emphasis on the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” as the pillar of state identity. So clearly the rigid dichotomy between a secular state and religious society isn’t quite so clear cut.

Everyone uses religion. It's just a question of how they use it and to what ends. Even the most secular leader has had to talk about religion and incorporate it into state discourse and policy, because we're dealing with relatively conservative societies. Even an autocratic leader has to be at least somewhat responsive to that popular sentiment. Islam is such a natural currency of discourse and politics that it's almost effortless. That's not just today - that's the way it has been for the better part of 14 centuries. In the pre-modern era, Islam as an overarching religious and legal culture informed everything; it went without saying, so it wasn't said.

What I think is different about the modern era is that Islam was challenged for the first time with the rise of secularism and colonialism, so people felt they had to affirm or assert their religious identity. Everyone competes with everyone else about who is the guardian of true Islamic identity. That's another reason why Islamism could not have existed in any era but our own. Islamism would have made no sense if we're talking about four centuries ago: Why would you have to call yourself an Islamist if Islam already imbued every facet of public life and politics?

Turkey is a fascinating laboratory because there is so much to mine historically. It also supports one of the bigger points I'm trying to make: Even when you have vigorous efforts to control the role of Islam or minimize its power in politics, those efforts are doomed to fail in the long run. Atatürk promoted a kind of state Islam, where the state controlled Islam for its own purposes as part of a secularizing project, in which Islam would matter less and where there would be an overarching Turkish nationalism superseding everything. But despite generations of Turks growing up with this ethos, ideology and indoctrination, Turkey has seen a resurgence of religion in public life and politics. Examples of that are the AK Party and its predecessors, which gained ground in the 1980s, 90s and 2000s. The lesson there is that if people have the choice to vote in free and fair elections eventually they're going to say they want more Islam in their politics, not less.

You recently traveled to Turkey again for meetings with senior government officials and others. What had changed, if anything from your previous visits?

The atmosphere was definitely tenser. There was a sense that things weren't right. But part of what's fascinating about talking to people in the AK Party is that the polarization is so much more in your face. Not all AK Party officials, but definitely some of them made no pretense of national dialog or trying to reach out to secularists. Some of them were essentially saying, "This is our moment. We kind of hate secularists and we're not going to apologize for it. We want to destroy them and relegate them to the dustbins of history." As someone who has worked on Islamist movements in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, I've always been used to Islamists at least offering the pretense of caring about the feelings of secularists. They may not be sincere and they may hate secularists deep down, but they at least feel a need to pretend. What was interesting - and in some ways even refreshing - about Turkey is that people don't play around: If they hate their political opponent they will tell you. That's also scary. It shows that the center has weakened. If you try to come up with the names of centrist journalists, who are somewhere in the middle, you don't find them anymore. Everyone is forced to take sides. That is the most dangerous aspect today of Turkish politics. It has always had a combative tone, but it seems to have gotten worse. You'd hope that with decades of democratic experience the center would have grown stronger but that hasn't been the case.

In Turkey there is this popular idea that political Islam is basically the natural state of things and inevitably going to be there, but it's easy to forget that Islamist parties only first started emerging in the 1970s and 80s. Before then there were fairly traditional center-right politicians. Perhaps this shows that the flux of history changes the parameters of debate and political Islam is not this timeless force that has always been there and always will be there.

The argument of my book isn't that political Islam is timeless. It's that Islam as a religion or faith tradition is timeless. It is going to matter in people's lives in ways that Westerners may not be comfortable with. Of course I don't want to give the impression that Islam can be clearly defined – but rather than Islam in all its richness and diversity is a very powerful thing in people's lives. That's something that I myself have come to appreciate over time. You see all the different ways that Islam motivates people; it drives them, animates them, gives them hope and makes them do things they otherwise wouldn't do.


A lot of Islamist groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere, have been ruthlessly crushed by repressive regimes. But you emphasize that these are mass movements with very deep roots and it’s almost impossible to stamp them out. How do you see their future?

It's really important for us as analysts to separate our personal preferences and what's really possible in the Middle East. I myself as an American liberal may think that a more secular order is preferable, but that doesn't necessarily mean I should try to impose that idea on other societies. It should be up to them. Maybe in theory it would be better if the Middle East becomes more liberal and secular. But there's very little evidence to suggest that this process is going to come to pass. We just have to be realistic and come to terms with Islam's outsize role in public life.

We also have to be careful what we wish for. Some might think it's good that mainstream Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood have been defeated and pushed out of power. But this has strengthened the narrative of jihadist groups like ISIS, which say violence is effective. They say the mainstream gradual approach has been tried and failed. So we as outside observers have to think seriously about the incentive structures that are currently in place in the Middle East. People have more and more incentive to turn to violence. That doesn't necessarily mean they're going to join ISIS, but it does mean that turning to violence has become more tempting.

It's hard for me to be very optimistic. But my hope is that people in the region will find ways to address those contradictions through peaceful political processes. I'm not an optimist who says "if you get people together to talk to each other they will understand each other better and change their views." I don't really buy that. People will continue to have fundamentally different visions for the future of their countries. But they can have those different visions as long as they express them peacefully. That's the most we can hope for.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/interview-shadi-hamid-on-the-past-and-future-of-political-islam.aspx?pageID=238&nID=100049&NewsCatID=386


_____
"Ne morate krenuti odavde da biste dosli tamo. Moguce je krenuti odavde i vratiti se ponovo tu, ali preko onoga tamo."
Aca Seltik, Sabrana razmisljanja o topologiji, tom cetvrti.

My Moon Che Gavara.
avatar

Posts : 6215
Join date : 2012-02-11

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Ointagru Unartan on Fri Jun 10, 2016 11:58 pm

Jel bi mogao neko da objasni desavanja oko otkazivanja "svepravoslavnog sabora" na Kritu? Sta je trebalo da bude svrha sabora i zasto su neki otkazali?


_____
"Ne morate krenuti odavde da biste dosli tamo. Moguce je krenuti odavde i vratiti se ponovo tu, ali preko onoga tamo."
Aca Seltik, Sabrana razmisljanja o topologiji, tom cetvrti.

My Moon Che Gavara.
avatar

Posts : 8417
Join date : 2015-09-26

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Blind Lime Pie on Sat Jun 11, 2016 1:03 am

Sabor je pre svega propao zbog odnosa nekih crkava prema ekumenizmu. Konkretno, Bugari su odavno rekli da su za njih sve crkve osim pravoslavne jeretičke i oko toga neće da diskutuju, a neki tekstovi Sabora su odveć pomirljivi prema paparima i luteranima. 

Svrha Sabora bio je pokušaj pomirenja ruske i carigradske struje.


_____
The four of you are three of my closest friends, and one treasured acquaintance.
Dr Sheldon Cooper
avatar

Posts : 6215
Join date : 2012-02-11

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Ointagru Unartan on Sat Jun 11, 2016 1:16 am

Hvala.


_____
"Ne morate krenuti odavde da biste dosli tamo. Moguce je krenuti odavde i vratiti se ponovo tu, ali preko onoga tamo."
Aca Seltik, Sabrana razmisljanja o topologiji, tom cetvrti.

My Moon Che Gavara.
avatar

Posts : 10566
Join date : 2014-12-01

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Filipenko on Sat Jun 11, 2016 5:02 pm

Plus se tu umešalo štošta oko ekumenizma, za koji pravi, istinoljubivi hrišćani neće ni da čuju jer je reč o podlom oružju u rukama rimskih satanista i mrskog šaptača sa Balovog trona u crkvi Sv. Petra.

U suštini, Bugari su u pravu, sa rimskom jeresi i ostalim jeresima nema razgovora. Sad, ostaje pitanje da li su Rusi isturili Bugare da budu ti koji odbijaju dogovor pa će oni da "u cilju interesa i jedinstva insistiraju na pomeranju" ili ne, to je već diskutabilno.
avatar

Posts : 6455
Join date : 2014-10-27

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Bluberi on Mon Aug 21, 2017 8:00 pm

To summarise: the typical radical is a young, second-generation immigrant or convert, very often involved in episodes of petty crime, with practically no religious education, but having a rapid and recent trajectory of conversion/reconversion, more often in the framework of a group of friends or over the internet than in the context of a mosque. The embrace of religion is rarely kept secret, but rather is exhibited, but it does not necessarily correspond to immersion in religious practice. The rhetoric of rupture is violent – the enemy is kafir, one with whom no compromise is possible – but also includes their own family, the members of which are accused of observing Islam improperly, or refusing to convert.


At the same time, it is obvious that the radicals’ decision to identify with jihad and to claim affiliation with a radical Islamic group is not merely an opportunistic choice: the reference to Islam makes all the difference between jihad and the other forms of violence that young people indulge in. Pointing out this pervasive culture of violence does not amount to “exonerating” IslamThe fact that these young people choose Islam as a framework for thought and action is fundamental, and it is precisely the Islamisation of radicalism that we must strive to understand.
Olivier Roy
avatar

Posts : 42019
Join date : 2012-06-10

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by William Murderface on Mon Aug 21, 2017 9:56 pm

Odlican.


_____
"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."

Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
avatar

Posts : 4539
Join date : 2012-02-10
Location : Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Hubert de Montmirail on Mon Aug 21, 2017 10:02 pm

jest


_____
Proud to be Scottish
avatar

Posts : 6215
Join date : 2012-02-11

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Ointagru Unartan on Mon Aug 21, 2017 11:43 pm

Bluberi wrote:
To summarise: the typical radical is a young, second-generation immigrant or convert, very often involved in episodes of petty crime, with practically no religious education, but having a rapid and recent trajectory of conversion/reconversion, more often in the framework of a group of friends or over the internet than in the context of a mosque. The embrace of religion is rarely kept secret, but rather is exhibited, but it does not necessarily correspond to immersion in religious practice. The rhetoric of rupture is violent – the enemy is kafir, one with whom no compromise is possible – but also includes their own family, the members of which are accused of observing Islam improperly, or refusing to convert.


At the same time, it is obvious that the radicals’ decision to identify with jihad and to claim affiliation with a radical Islamic group is not merely an opportunistic choice: the reference to Islam makes all the difference between jihad and the other forms of violence that young people indulge in. Pointing out this pervasive culture of violence does not amount to “exonerating” IslamThe fact that these young people choose Islam as a framework for thought and action is fundamental, and it is precisely the Islamisation of radicalism that we must strive to understand.
Olivier Roy

Ne slazem se sa tezom o islamizaciji radikalizma. Previse je zapadnocentricna. Naslov pominje nove dzihadiste, ali tekst se bavi samo radikalnim islamistima iz zapadnih zemalja. "Domaci teroristi" nas prirodno najvise interesuju, ali oni su samo marginalni fenomen u globalnom dzihadizmu, koji je sa svoje strane tek jedan od simptoma retradicionalizacije muslimanskog sveta. Ne moze se uopstavati o Daechu, kako to cini Roy, na osnovu relativno malog broja dobrovoljaca iz zapadnih zemalja (malog u odnosu na ukupan broj stranih dobrovoljava u sastavu Daech-a, a pogotovu u odnosu na ukupan broj boraca). Takodje se ne moze uopstavati o dzihadizmu na osnovu Daech-a, koji se od ostalih politickih projekata uspostavljanja idealizovane islamske drzave razlikuje jedino tome sto je trenutno jedini koji izvodi i inspirise teroristicke napade na Zapadu.


_____
"Ne morate krenuti odavde da biste dosli tamo. Moguce je krenuti odavde i vratiti se ponovo tu, ali preko onoga tamo."
Aca Seltik, Sabrana razmisljanja o topologiji, tom cetvrti.

My Moon Che Gavara.
avatar

Posts : 6455
Join date : 2014-10-27

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Bluberi on Tue Aug 22, 2017 12:10 am

Mislim da je poruka da nije kriva religija, nego da je u pitanju njena upotreba, u ovom slučaju islamizacija radikalizma, dakle mislim da je na mestu. Pre svega jer oslobadja islam tereta radikalizma.
avatar

Posts : 6396
Join date : 2015-11-22

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Gargantua on Tue Aug 22, 2017 12:54 am

Pa da ali da li je i to zadatak analitičkog objašnjenja džihadizma?

Da li je pitanje ovo:
"Nađi mi objašnjenje, ali takvo da oslobodi islam tereta džihadizma"

A odgovor:
"Say no more"


Ako je objašnjenje opterećeno i tim preduslovom (u suštini time da ne tercira ikakvim tekućim evro-desničarskim narativima o islamu u celini i delovima) čemu ono služi? Je li to "zaista" objašnjenje džihadizma ili pre svega odgovor na specifičan odnos političke klime na zapadu Evrope spram percepcije džihadizma?

Mogu da izvedem još pitanja:
- zašto ne bi religija bila kriva (tj da nije jedan od slojeva koji se kasno aktivira nego dominantni sloj koji se rano aktivira), zašto bi isključivali tu mogućnost? 
- može li se pričati o džihadizmu van zapadno-evropskog koncepta koji se temelji na imigrantskoj prirodi svog sudara sa muslimanskim stanovništvom?
avatar

Posts : 6455
Join date : 2014-10-27

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Bluberi on Tue Aug 22, 2017 1:00 am

This is an edited extract from Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State by Olivier Roy, published by Hurst.
avatar

Posts : 6455
Join date : 2014-10-27

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Bluberi on Tue Aug 22, 2017 1:08 am

Mislim da se iz ovog teksta vidi šta mi je intencija,kao što ti primećuješ, a da li je valjano potkrepio tezu ne znam.
avatar

Posts : 6215
Join date : 2012-02-11

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Ointagru Unartan on Tue Aug 22, 2017 10:49 am

Roy je 2011. konstatovao da je gotovo sa globalnim dzihadizmom.


This explains why Al-Qaeda is out of the picture: the uprooted global jihadist is no longer a model and fails to germinate when he comes to enlist local militants for the global cause (Al-Qaeda has been expelled from Iraq by the local fighters), with the exception of the geographic fringes of the Arab world (Sahel, Somalia, Yemen). Al-Qaeda was part and parcel of the old anti-imperialist Middle East political culture: fighting the West first and never caring about real societies. It disappears with the dictators because they are two sides of the same coin.

https://tif.ssrc.org/2011/09/08/the-paradoxes-of-the-re-islamization-of-muslim-societies/

Tri godine kasnije, nakon osvajanja Mosula, proglasen je Kalifat. Arapsko prolece trebalo je po Roy-u da znaci kraj dzihadizma, a jedina zemlja koja je u tom procesu uspesno demokratizovana (Tunis) je upravo ona koja je dala procentualno (u odnosu na populaciju) najveci broj stranih dobrovoljaca Daech-u, dok se  ostale zemlje Arapskog proleca, sest godina nakon citiranog teksta, jos uvek krljaju sa al-Kaidom i lokalnim ograncima Daech-a (Egipat sa Daech-om na Sinajskom poluostrvu, dok su Jemen, Tunis, Libija i Sirija blagosloveni paralelnim kampanjama i al-Kaide i Daech-a). Istovremeno, lokalni pokreti militantnih vehabija ukljucuju se u ova dva globalna dzihadisticka pokreta (napr somalijski al-Shabaab prikljucio se al-Kaidi 2012., Boko Haram Daechu 2015.), a pojavljuju se i uvek novi ogranci globalnih dzihadista (najnoviji primer, Daech na Filipinima, gde su borbe za Marawi jos uvek u toku). Ukratko, Roy ne da je fejlovao sa svojim predvidjanjima, nego je fejlovao da nije mogao gore fejlovati, i u gorem trenutku.

To ne znaci da je Islam posebno opaka religija. Meni se cini da je dzihadizam i te kako povezan sa reislamizacijom (koja se ogleda recimo u uvodjenju serijata, od UK na Zapadu (paralelno sudstvo) do Indonezije na Istoku (krenulo sa bicevanjima na Acehu ove godine)), a da su oba fenomena forme endarkmenta, tj globalnog otklona od liberalnih vrednosti, u koji bi se mogle uracunati i rehinduizacija Indije i fasizacija Rusije sa blagoslovom Crkve i identitetski pokreti na Zapadu.


_____
"Ne morate krenuti odavde da biste dosli tamo. Moguce je krenuti odavde i vratiti se ponovo tu, ali preko onoga tamo."
Aca Seltik, Sabrana razmisljanja o topologiji, tom cetvrti.

My Moon Che Gavara.
avatar

Posts : 42019
Join date : 2012-06-10

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by William Murderface on Tue Aug 22, 2017 10:55 am

Auh, ovo predviđanje jes blam.

Ointagru, slažem se oko endarkementa, donekle. Nisam siguran samo da je retradicionalizacija prava reč, što bi rekao Buden, religija sad igra političku ulogu, ona povlači granice političke zajednice, i to je bukvalno igra njenog života.


Kod Roja mi se svidela ova paralela između school shooter-a i terorista-samoubica iz ISISa. I meni se čini da su u pitanju vrlo slični fenomeni, samo što school shooter-i do sada nisu mogli da otkriju svoj ideološki script. Ali evo na putu su da ga otkriju, thanks to alt right.


_____
"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."

Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije
avatar

Posts : 6215
Join date : 2012-02-11

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Ointagru Unartan on Tue Aug 22, 2017 11:23 am

Ne mora cak ni religija da bude ideoloska podloga endarkmenta. U Kini naprimer, opsta anti-liberalna kampanja i ukidanje ono malo izvojevanih sloboda od kako je Xi Jinping postao Generalni sekretar vrse se u ime socijalistickih vrednosti, dok su "zapadne vrednosti" sada eksplicitno definisane kao pretnja kineskom nacinu zivota. U Roy-evoj domovini sekularizam (tacnije "laicizam") prisvojen je od strane ekstremne desnice kao identitetski oznacivac.

Sa cime se ne slazes oko endarkementa? Ja ne znam sta da mislim o tome (zasto sada i kome to odgovara, mogu li se stvarno toliko razlicitih pojava opisati tim konceptom), pa me zanima tvoje misljenje.


_____
"Ne morate krenuti odavde da biste dosli tamo. Moguce je krenuti odavde i vratiti se ponovo tu, ali preko onoga tamo."
Aca Seltik, Sabrana razmisljanja o topologiji, tom cetvrti.

My Moon Che Gavara.
avatar

Posts : 42019
Join date : 2012-06-10

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by William Murderface on Tue Aug 22, 2017 11:31 am

Zapravo ne oko endarkenmenta  (mada ni meni nije najjasnije šta tačno podrazumevamo pod tim pojomom), nego oko toga da je u pitanju nekakva istorijska regresija na ranije forme (retradicionalizacija), mislim da imamo posla sa novim fenomenom, ja bih ga nazvao politikom identiteta, (ne u onom smislu u kojem se upotrebljava povezano sa manjinskim pitanjima, ali ne ni potpuno nevezano za njega). Religija radi posao dok može da posluži kao označitelj našeg "autentičnog" identiteta, suprotstavljenog neuatntičnom, globalnom, zapadnom, nazovi ga kako hoćeš. Mislim da Roj dobro hvata nešto od toga, čak i ako mu overall teza možda slabije fercera. Taj "born again" fenomen ima veze pre svega sa politikom identiteta, a sa religijom u meri u kojoj može poslužiti kao osnova za takvu politiku.


_____
"Oni kroz mene gledaju u vas! Oni kroz njega gledaju u vas! Oni kroz vas gledaju u mene... i u sve nas."

Dragoslav Bokan, Novi putevi oftalmologije

Re: Religija i društvo

Post by Sponsored content


    Current date/time is Sun Jan 21, 2018 6:02 am